TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (12) TMI 1643
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...., Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as "learned AO"), dated 29 July 2024 for the Assessment Year ("AY") 2020-21, under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act") (hereinafter referred to as "final assessment order") in pursuance of the directions issued by Hon'ble Dispute Resolution Panel - 1, Bengaluru ("Hon'ble DRP") dated 25 June 2024 under section 144C(5) of the Act inter-alia on the following grounds which are without prejudice to each other. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble DRP, the learned AO and Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, DC/ ACIT TP 1, Hyderabad ("learned TPO") have: GENERAL 1. erred in determining the income of the Appellant at INR 31,99,82,158 as against returned income of INR 28,40,73,030 for the year under consideration. VALIDITY OF FINAL ORDER PASSED BEYOND TIMELINES PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 153 OF THE ACT 2. erred in not passing the final assessment order within the time limit prescribed under section 153 of the Act which is the outer time limit for passing the final assessment order and hence, the assessment proceedings ar....
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....asis points (equivalent to 4.01%) as the arm's length price ("ALP") for the interest on ECB by placing reliance on the judgement of Hon'ble Tribunal in the case of Dr. Reddy's Laboratories in ITA No. 1605/Hyd/2020 read with M.A. No. 217/H/13. 13. erred in rejecting the arm's length analysis undertaken by the Appellant in the TP documentation for benchmarking the subject transaction. 14. erred in rejecting the corroborative analysis undertaken by the Appellant for benchmarking the subject transaction using comparable uncontrolled price method to identify the comparative borrowings from the sources namely RBI, Thomas Reuters LPC Loan calculator and Bloomberg to conclude the same at ALP, thus warranting no TP adjustment. TP adjustment in relation to provision of software development services by the Appellant to AE [INR NIL] The below grounds are without prejudice to the fact that the TP adjustment in relation to provision of software development services was deleted by learned AO/ learned TPO while giving effect to the Hon'ble DRP directions. 15. erred in not granting appropriate adjustments to account for differences in....
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....amend, vary, omit, or substitute any of the aforesaid grounds of appeal at any time before or at the time of hearing of the appeal, to enable the Hon'ble Tribunal to decide on the appeal in accordance with the law. The Appellant prays for appropriate relief based on the said grounds of appeal and the facts and circumstances of the case. For Concentrix Catalyst Technologies Private Limited Place: Hyderabad Date: 20 September 2024 sd/- Signed (Appellant) Sanjay Gupta Director 3. On perusal of the grounds of appeal of the assessee, we find that under the ground no. 2 of the appeal, the assessee has raised a purely legal ground challenging the validity of the assessment order passed by the Ld. AO for AY 2020-21 under under section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) the Act in accordance with the directions of the Learned Dispute Resolution Panel ("Ld. DRP") under section 144C(5) of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "the final assessment order"), on the ground that it is barred by the limitation prescribed under section 153 of the Act. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to adjudicate the said legal ground first. In this regard, the Learned Authorize....
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....f the Act. He submitted that due to the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) of the Act, the limitation under section 153 of the Act stands excluded. The Ld. DR argued that section 153 of the Act predates section 144C of the Act, which was introduced in 2009, and therefore the legislature intended that section 144C of the Act should override section 153 of the Act. He further submitted that the Act provides two different mechanisms of assessment (a) for eligible assessees under section 144C(15)(b) of the Act and (b) for normal assessees governed by section 153 of the Act. Under the special regime of section 144C of the Act, the assessee may accept the draft assessment order, object before the Ld. DRP, or file appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). Once the assessee chooses to file objections before the Ld. DRP, the limitation applicable is that prescribed under section 144C(13) of the Act. The Ld. DR submitted that once the final assessment order is passed within 30 days from the receipt of directions of Ld. DRP, it is well within limitation. He also submitted that the issue is pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and therefore the issue may be kept open until decid....
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.... that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on - (i) the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months", the words "twelve months" had been substituted. (ii) the 1st day of April, 2020, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months", the words "eighteen months" had been substituted. Provided also that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2021, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months", the words "nine months" had been substituted: Provided also that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2022, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months", the words "twelve months" had been substituted: (1A) xxxxx xxxxx (1B) xxxxx ....
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....e, the order giving effect to the said order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 shall be made within the time specified in sub-section (3)." 8. A co-joined reading of sub-sec.(1) with third proviso of this sub- section of sec. 153 makes it clear that in normal course, no order of assessment shall be made after the expiry of 9 months from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable. The third proviso is relevant for the case in hand because the assessment year under consideration is 2021-2022 and, therefore, the period of 21 months from the end of the assessment year is reduced to 9 months. Sub-sec.(4) contemplates the cases where a reference u/sec.92CA(1) is made during the course of assessment proceedings, then, the period available for completion of the assessment shall be extended by 12 months. It is an undisputed fact that the present case is falling in the category of an "eligible assessee" where reference u/sec.92CA(1) was made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO and, therefore, the time limit for completing the assessment was extended by 12 months whereby the Assessing Officer was ....
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....writ petitions holding that the time limit under Section 153(2A) was not adhered to and in any case, the proceedings have not been concluded within a reasonable time. 20. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsels and affirmed by the Learned Judge, the DRP proceedings is a continuation of assessment proceedings. To put it further, it is a part of assessment proceedings, once the objections are filed and under section 144C(12) a period of 9 months is prescribed, within which, directions are to be issued by the DRP, failing which any directions are to be treated as otiose. As seen from the timeline discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the original assessment proceedings are to be completed within 21 months and the additional time of 12 months is granted when proceedings before TPO is pending. The TPO has to pass orders before 60 days prior to the last date. Then 30 days time is given to the assessee to file their objection before the DRP and the DRP is given 9 months time and thereafter, within one month from the end of the month of receipt of directions from DRP, the final order is to be passed. This court is not in consonance with the contention of the learned sen....
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....he non-obstante clause in Section 144C(13) is concerned, we concur with the view of the Learned Judge. The exclusion of applicability of Section 153 or Section 153 B is for a limited purpose to ensure that dehors larger time is available, an order based on the directions of the DRP has to be passed within 30 days from the end of the month of receipt of such directions. The section and the sub- section have to be read as a whole with connected provisions to decipher the meaning and intentions. At this juncture it would be useful to refer to the following decisions: (i) Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [1997] 1 SCC 373 at page 381: "11. The statute has to be read as a whole to find out the real intention of the legislature. 12. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. [1898 AC 735 : 67 LJPC 126], Lord Davy observed: "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter." 14. This rule of construction which is also spoken of as "ex visceribus actus" helps in avoidi....
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....nancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006])." (iii) Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P.) Ltd. v. Amruta Garg [2021] 124 taxmann.com 326/164 SCL 720: "17. The concept of "absurdity" in the context of interpretation of statutes is construed to include any result which is unworkable, impracticable, illogical, futile or pointless, artificial, or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief [See Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p. 969.]. Logic referred to herein is not formal or syllogistic logic, but acceptance that enacted law would not set a standard which is palpably unjust, unfair, unreasonable or does not make any sense. [Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p. 986.] When an interpretation is beset with practical difficulties, the courts have not shied from turning sides to accept an interpretation that offers a pragmatic solution that will serve the needs of society [Id, p. 971, quoting Griffiths, L.J.]. Theref....
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.... of limitation and hence, we hold that the proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution are maintainable. 25. As regards the relief sought in other appeals viz., W.A.No. 1517/2021 etc. batch, the findings rendered above are equally applicable. In these cases, for the assessment year 2009-10, the order of remand to the Assessing officer was passed on 18-12-2015 and insofar as the assessment year 2010-11 is concerned, for one issue, it was passed on 18-12-2015 and for other two issues, it was passed on 23-9-2016 after the amendment, by which time, the time limit was brought down to 9 months. As such, fresh orders ought to have been passed before 31-3-2017 for the assessment year 2009-10 and for one issue relating to the assessment year 2010-11 reckoning the 12 months from the financial year 2015-16 and on or before 31-12-2017 reckoning 9 months from the financial year 2016-17. Therefore, the Assessing officer ought to have passed a draft assessment order immediately and asked the assessee to file their objections with the DRP. For the mistake and the lapse of the Assessing officer, the vested right of the Assessee cannot be taken away. 26. We are not oblivious ....
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....nts urged that Rule 12 is unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it does not provide for any period of limitation for the recovery of duty. He urged that in the absence of any prescribed period for recovery of the duty as contemplated by Rule 12, the officer may act arbitrarily in recovering the amount after lapse of long period of time. We find no substance in the submission. While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render the rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of each case. Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice of demand for recovery was made within reasonab....
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....y well be that for an exercise of the suo motu power of revision also, the revisional authority has to initiate the proceeding within a reasonable time. Any unreasonable delay in exercise may affect its validity. What is a reasonable time, however, will depend upon the facts of each case." 23. The question as to what would be the reasonable period did not fall for consideration therein. The binding precedent of this Court, some of which had been referred to us hereto before, had not been considered. The counsel appearing for the parties were remiss in bringing the same to the notice of this Court. Furthermore, from a perusal of the impugned notice dated 4-9-2006, it is apparent that the revisional authority did not assign any reason as to why such a notice was being issued after a period of 51/2 years.' Generally, no hard and fast rule can be laid down to indicate what is a reasonable time. It though depends upon the facts of the each case, drawing a clue from Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the residual entry, it would be reasonable to conclude that in such cases, action is to be concluded within 3 years. Needless to say, if the statute presc....
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....ere will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed." 9. Thus, the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held that provisions of sec. 144C and 153 are not mutually exclusive, but, are rather mutually inclusive. The period of limitation u/sec. 153 is applicable for completing the assessment and sec. 144C(13) is only in the nature of restricting the time period, within which, the Assessing Officer is required to pass the Final Assessment Order after the Directions of the DRP and not enlarging the limitation provided u/sec. 153 of the Act. 10. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., vs., ACIT, International Taxation (supra) in Paras-23 to 34 as under : "23. No doubt, section 144C of the Act is a self-contained code of assessment and time limits are inbuilt at each stage of the procedure contemplated. Section 144C envisions a special assessment, one which includes the determination of Arm's Length Price (ALP) of international transactions engaged in by the assessee. The DRP was constituted bearing in mind the necessity for an expert body to look int....
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....et his accounts audited or inventory valued under sub-section (2-A) of section 142 of the Act or in a case where an application made before the Income-tax Settlement Commission is rejected by it or is not allowed to be proceeded with by it, the period commencing from the date on which an application was made before the Settlement Commission and ending with the date on which the order is received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or where the period commencing from the date on which an application is made before the Authority for Advance Rulings or before the Board for Advance Rulings under sub-section 1 of section 245Q of the Act and ending with the date on which the Advance Ruling pronounced by it is received by the Commissioner or where reference for exchange for information is made by an authority competent under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A of the Act or where a reference for declaration of an arrangement to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement is received by the Principal Commissioner etc., shall be excluded. There is no mention anywhere about section 144C of the Act. 26. If we accept the submissions of Shri Suresh Kumar that ....
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....nd of the month in which such direction is received. What is contemplated under section 144C (13) is the passing of the final assessment order. Twelve months as provided under section 153(3) would start from the end of the financial year in which the Principal Commissioner received the order under section 254 from the ITAT. The assessing officer should have taken steps to pass the final order under sub-section (13) of section 144C within 12 months period. 30. The exclusion of applicability of section 153, in so far as non- obstante clause in sub-section (13) of section 144C is concerned, it is for limited purpose to ensure that dehors larger time available, an order based on the directions of the DRP has to be passed within 30 days from the end of the receipt of such directions. The section and sub- section have to be read as a whole with connected provisions to decipher the meaning and intentions. 31. We would also observe that a similar non-obstante clause is also used in section 144C(4) of the Act with the same limited purpose to imply, even though there might be a larger time limit under section 153, once the matter is remanded to AO by the ITAT under section ....
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....equently, re- assessment order, but, granted the liberty to the parties to get the petition revived as per the outcome of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the identical issue. The relevant part of the Judgment of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court of Telangana in the case of Kotha Kantaiah vs., Income Tax Officer (supra) in Paras-15 to 18 of the said judgement is as under : 15. What is worrying this Bench more is the fact that an endeavour is being made whole heartedly to ensure not to generate further litigation on issues which have been laid to rest by a large number of High Courts all of whom have taken a consistent stand that the action of the Income Tax Department being violative of the Finance Act, 2020 and Finance Act, 2021. Now, in order to protect the interest of the Revenue as also that of the assessee, it would be trite at this juncture, if we dispose of the writ petition with an observation/direction that the disposal of the instant writ petition in terms of the judgment rendered by this High Court in the case of Kankanala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra) shall however be subject to the outcome of the SLPs which were filed by the Income Tax Departmen....
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....he case of Ashish Agarwal, supra. 18. We would only further like to make observations that since we are inclined to dispose of the instant writ petition, conscious of the fact that the earlier order of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra) is subjected to challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.3574 of 2024, preferred by the Income Tax Department, we make it clear that allowing of the instant writ petition is subject to outcome of the aforesaid SLP preferred by the Revenue against the decision of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra). This, in other words, would mean that either of the parties, if they so want, may move an appropriate petition seeking revival of this writ petition in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending SLP on the very same issue. 14. Accordingly, we dispose of this appeal on this legal issue and keep open the other issues raised by the assessee on the merits if the Hon'ble Supreme Court decides this issue otherwise." 6. On perusal of above, we find that this Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court and ....