TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (4) TMI 1714
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....ected that he be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits from the date of the dismissal. FACTS 3. The appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the Crime Investigation Department [CID] in 1973. He proceeded on earned leave for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties on 8th August, 1988. Incidentally, on 7th August 1988, a First Information Report [FIR] was registered on the complaint of one Prem Kumar Singh [informant] against unknown persons, giving rise to Kotwali P.S. Case No. 882 of 1988 for offences under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC]. The FIR included a request for the formation of a raiding party to apprehend those who had extorted money from the informant by blackmailing him. A raiding party was formed, which proceeded to raid the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna on 8th August, 1988. The accused was expected to arrive there to collect Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from the informant. Meanwhile, the appellant was on his way to the office to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when the informant handed over the briefcase to the appellant. Subsequently....
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....ond show cause notice on 11th March, 1996 seeking to point out the illegalities committed by the Inquiry Officer in course of the inquiry thereby vitiating the same. Nevertheless, the respondent no. 5 accepted the Inquiry Report and, by order dated 14th June, 1996 contained in Memo No. 1833 dated 21st June, 1996, dismissed the appellant from service, with the additional direction that the appellant would not be entitled to any payment for the period of suspension, except for the amounts already disbursed to him. 7. Meanwhile, the appellant along with the co-accused was tried and convicted by the trial court on 26th April, 1994. The appellant was found guilty of offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. However, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392 and 419 of the IPC. 8. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence having been carried in an appeal [Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1994] by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Patna [sessions judge], on 16th February, 1996, set aside the judgment and order under challenge. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, with the ....
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....y, the appellant sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant him all consequential benefits as if he had never been dismissed from service. 12. The Single Judge observed, upon an examination of the allegations made by the informant - who had also submitted a written statement against the appellant in the department - that the narrative presented by the informant lacked credibility due to several apparent inconsistencies. Notably, the question that seemed to trouble the Single Judge was why a person would enter a hotel room solely for the purpose of having tea, and why an acquaintance would escort both the informant and Devnath Pathak [PW-2] to the hotel room while leaving a young girl in the attached toilet. The Single Judge opined that the Inquiry Officer's reliance on the testimony of PW-1, who was not allowed to be cross-examined, raised concerns of undue influence. PW-1 had a matrimonial connection with the family of Virendra Singh, who allegedly had a strained relationship with the appellant's family, suggesting a personal motive to act against the appellant. However, the Inquiry Officer failed to examine or address the appellant's c....
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....nefits from the date of dismissal. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH 16. The respondents, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single Judge, appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court. 17. The Division Bench, relying on a series of precedents and quoting therefrom extensively, observed that exercise of jurisdiction by the Single Judge evinced exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the departmental authorities, whereas judicial review of departmental orders should focus solely on the decision-making process and not on the merits or demerits of the findings. The Division Bench, relying on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [(2015) 2 SCC 610], held that the Single Judge's reappreciation of evidence, which led to the conclusion of the appellant's innocence, was unsustainable due to the lack of a justifiable basis for such an approach. It also emphasized that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to departmental proceedings, as declared in T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai [(2006) 2 SCC 255]. The Division Bench further distinguished the decision in Sawai Singh (supra) relied on by the Single Judge, based on differing factual circums....
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...., a fact brought to the attention of the respondents. However, this issue was neither examined nor considered by them, although the same did deserve thorough examination and proper consideration being fact finding authorities. E. Fifthly, regarding charge no. 2, the appellant had already faced disciplinary proceedings and been penalized; hence, proceeding against him again for the same misconduct was barred on the ground of double jeopardy. Furthermore, a review of the Inquiry Report reveals a complete lack of evidence substantiating the said charge. F. Sixthly, charges 3 and 4 are derived from charge no. 1 and are driven by extraneous motives. Following his arrest on 8th August 1988, the appellant's repeated requests to the Officer-in-Charge to inform the CID authorities were deliberately ignored. The Inquiry Report itself acknowledges the lack of evidence for charge no. 4. Moreover, the appellant could only have been suspended on 8th August 1988 if the authorities had not been informed of his arrest. G. Seventhly, the procedure followed in the inquiry was neither fair nor proper, as an interested witness (PW-1) was examined in the appellant's absenc....
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.... of the departmental decision of taking disciplinary action for proved misconduct. D. Fourthly, the Division Bench was absolutely right in observing that the Single Judge had exceeded its writ jurisdiction as if it were sitting in appeal on the administrative decisions of the respondents. E. Fifthly, the appellant being the member of a disciplined force was found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a police officer and, therefore, the Division Bench was right in interfering with the injudicious exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. 23. Mr. Khan, therefore, urged that the impugned order of the Division Bench deserves affirmation and dismissal of the appeal ought to be ordered. ANALYSIS AND REASONS 24. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at length and examined the materials on record. 25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are: (i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service is justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that have unfolded before us? (ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witne....
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....0]. These were adopted through Notification No. III/63-8051-A dated 3rd July, 1963, and were subsequently repealed by the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. 31. Our abovesaid inference is bolstered by Rule 824A (e) of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978, which stipulates that for experts and other ranks officials - i.e., barring members of the Indian Police Services, Deputy Superintendents and their equivalent ranks, ministerial officers and members of the Bihar Sashastra Police-the Rules of 1935 would be applicable if the official is non-gazetted and the Rules of 1930 would be applicable if gazetted. It is noteworthy that the post of Constable in the CID is a non-gazetted post and, hence, the Rules of 1935 provided the source of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant by drawing a chargesheet. 32. Note 1 attached to Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935 underlines that the procedure stipulated in Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 must be followed prior to the issuance of a dismissal order against the charged official. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the proposed disciplinary action must be clearly arti....
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....entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit. (emphasis supplied) 36. Moving further, the appellant had raised an allegation that PW-1 was not allowed to be cross-examined. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 provides that the witnesses may be cross-examined by the charged individual. Had the departmental file been placed on record, it would have facilitated a more thorough analysis of this sub-issue. Nevertheless, based on the available material, the question remains whether it can be determined if the appellant was provided with a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine PW-1, or if the appellant chose not to exercise that opportunity. 37. The respondent....
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....ceedings, thereby preventing an ascertainment of the cause of the delay in production by the prosecution of PW-2 for cross-examination by the appellant. In any event, can the appellant be held liable for such a prolonged gap? Likely not, as it is the responsibility of the prosecution to produce the witness. Moreover, in the absence of the departmental file, we cannot conclusively attribute the delay to the appellant either. Consequently, the lapse, without anything more before us, has to be attributed to the prosecution. 41. Nonetheless, we are of the view that dismissing PW-2's cross-examination as incredible, solely due to the delay in its conduct, would not be a reasonable conclusion. PW-2 had also denied the appellant's involvement in the criminal proceedings and, during his cross-examination in the inquiry, he explained that he had previously disclosed the appellant's name based on hearsay from individuals within the department. 42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the approach he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be returned by him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the basis of legal evidence. A....
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....inadvertent slip or oversight; but, whatever be it, in our opinion, such slip or oversight resulted in a failure of justice. ISSUE NO. 2 46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect of this issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same. 47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan [(2024) 1 SCC 175] 48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed cru....
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....ul procedures and untenable findings, the Division Bench, upon reviewing the "original file of the departmental proceedings," concluded that there was no procedural irregularity or breach of natural justice; and, therefore, held that the Single Judge's interference with the inquiry officer's findings- particularly by evaluating the merits of those findings in its writ jurisdiction-was unwarranted. 55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental authorities are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the f....
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....quires the disciplinary authority to give sufficient notice to the charged employee of such intention to take the same into consideration for deciding the question of punishment. Useful reference could be made to the decisions in State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda [AIR 1964 SC 506] and Nicholas Piramal India Limited v. Harisingh [(2015) 8 SCC 272]. The argument of the appellant to the contrary is overruled. Since, however, the disciplinary proceedings have been found to be suffering from incurable defects, assessment of the appellant's conduct for deciding on the punishment does not really survive. 61. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant was arrested on 8th August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after his earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have not raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant's arrest. 62. Finally, what remains is charge no. 4. Having been arrested, the appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact of his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed that he requeste....