TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (9) TMI 1539
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....ta, Ms. Sunita Gupta, Mr. Sakshit Bhardwaj, Ms. Punya Rekha Angara, Ms. Vasundhara N, Mr. Aman Akhtar, Ms. Sana Singh, Mr. Vinayak Gautam, Advocates for Respondent No. 1. Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Special Counsel, Mr. Vivek Gurnani, Panel Counsel, Mr. Kartik Sabharwal, Mr. Kanishk Maurya and Mr. Satyam, Advocate. JUDGMENT HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. 1. By the present Judgment, we intend to dispose of two proceedings, one being a Letters Patent Appeal against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court and another being a Writ Petition preferred against a Provisional Attachment Order [PAO]. 2. The Letters Patent Appeal, being LPA 362/2020, has been filed by the Directorate of Enforcement [ED] under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, assailing the Judgment dated 18.11.2020 [Impugned Judgment dated 18.11.2020] passed by the learned Single Judge. By the said judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed W.P.(C) No. 3551/2020 filed by the Respondents herein and, consequently, set aside the Notice/ Summons dated 26.05.2020 issued by the learned Adjudicating Authority in Original Complaint No. 1228/2019 dated 05.12.2019. The learned Single Judge has held that, the said Noti....
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.... has also been consistently affirmed by several High Courts, including the Telangana High Court in Hygro Chemicals Pharmtek (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr 2023 SCC OnLine TS 4457. 7. He would contend that the private parties were themselves responsible for the repeated delays in the adjudication proceedings, as they initially sought adjournments before the learned Adjudicating Authority instead of filing replies to the show-cause notice, which resulted in multiple postponements, and subsequently, the proceedings could not progress due to the nationwide lockdown. Relying on the principle laid down in Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2007) 11 SCC 447, namely, that a wrongdoer cannot take advantage of his own wrong, he would further argue that the private parties, having themselves caused the delay, cannot now claim that the provisional attachment automatically lapsed after 180 days. 8. Counsel for the ED would seek to distinguish the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Kasi vs State (2021) 12 SCC 1, which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge and the private parties, by submitting that it dealt with default bail and the question of personal libert....
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....of adjudication and thereby a Quasi-Judicial body. He would submit that the requirements under Section 8(1) and 8(2) were unable to be carried out for the purpose of an adjudication under 8(3) and for that reason too, the reasoning of the learned Single Judge is erroneous. 14. With respect to the Impugned Judgment dated 18.11.2020, he would submit that it was premised only on the initial order dated 23.03.2020 passed in In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), but subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021, 23.09.2021 and 10.01.2022 categorically clarified that limitation in all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings stood excluded during the pandemic, and these later pronouncements impliedly overruled the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, while Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution make the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court binding on all authorities, so the exclusion of limitation must extend to PMLA proceedings as well. 15. Learned counsel for ED would also argue that the legislative intent of Section 5 of the PMLA is to ensure urgent and preventive attachment of proceeds of crime so that offenders cannot frustrate the process of law, and....
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....earned Adjudicating Authority becomes functus officio and is divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate or confirm a non-existent attachment, with the attached property necessarily standing released, and in support of this proposition, placed reliance on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Shri Prahlada. vs. Deputy Director of Enforcement Directorate & Ors. W.P. No. 12413/2024, which unequivocally held that the 180-day ceiling is a statutory embargo, as well as on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), where, while upholding the validity of PMLA, the Court emphasized that the short duration of a PAO constitutes one of the key procedural safeguards protecting individuals against prolonged deprivation of property without adjudication, and therefore, in the present case, since the PAO was not confirmed within 180 days, it automatically lapsed and the learned Adjudicating Authority lacked jurisdiction to proceed further. 20. Learned Senior Counsel would strongly contend that the ED's reliance on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's orders in In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), is misplaced, as the ED itself had filed an interlocutory appli....
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....tutory framework, the ED cannot now retrospectively invoke the Hon'ble Supreme Court's Covid extension orders as a means to secure additional time. 24. By way of analogy, he would further submit that if a plaintiff were to institute a suit during the extended period and the defendant filed a written statement within the prescribed time, the plaintiff could not later invoke the Hon'ble Supreme Court's Covid orders to seek further time for filing a rejoinder, and in the same manner, once the ED elected to proceed under the statutory framework during the pandemic, it cannot selectively "pause the clock" for its convenience. This reasoning, he would contend, is fortified by this Court's decision in HT Media Limited v. Brainlink International 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5398, wherein it was held that a party choosing to act within time during the extension period cannot later claim exclusion of time, a view subsequently affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brainlink International, Inc. v. HT Media Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 980. 25. He would then assert that acceptance of the ED's argument would result in anomalous and unjust consequences, for it would permit the ED to indefinitely delay....
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.... [(2001) 3 SCC 537 : 2001 AIR SCW 848] and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111]] 146. Although decisions are galore on this point, we may refer to a recent one in State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal [(2004) 5 SCC 155: AIR 2004 SC 3894] wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 172, para 19) "It is trite that any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which it was used." 147. It is further well settled that a decision is not an authority for the proposition which did not fall for its consideration." 28. Similarly, in Goan Real Estate & Construction Ltd. v. Union of India (2010) 5 SCC 388, the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborated upon certain principles relating to the interpretation of judicial orders, which read as under: "31. It is well settled that an order of a court must be construed having regard to the text and context in which the same was passed. For the said purpose, the judgment of this Court is required to be read in its entirety. A judgment, it is well settled, cannot be read as a statute. Construction of a judgment sh....
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....tion for directions, the applicant has made the following prayer: "To issue appropriate directions qua (i) arbitration proceedings in relation to section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and (ii) initiation of proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881;" In view of this Court's earlier order dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3/2020 and taking into consideration the effect of the Corona Virus (COVID 19) and resultant difficulties being faced by the lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders to be passed by this Court in the present proceedings. In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockd....
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....r Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, time is prescribed for completing the process of compulsory pre-litigation, mediation and settlement. The said time is also liable to be extended. We, accordingly, direct that the said time shall stand extended from the time when the lockdown is lifted plus 45 days thereafter. That is to say that if the above period, i.e. the period of lockdown plus 45 days has expired, no further period shall be liable to be excluded. I.A. No. 48461/2020- Service of all notices, summons and exchange of pleadings Service of notices, summons and exchange of pleadings/documents, is a requirement of virtually every legal proceeding. Service of notices, summons and pleadings etc. have not been possible during the period of lockdown because this involves visits to post offices, courier companies or physical delivery of notices, summons and pleadings. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to direct that such services of all the above may be effected by e-mail, FAX, commonly used instant messaging services, such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal etc. However, if a party intends to effect service by means of said instant messaging services, w....
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.... period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 4. The ....
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.... We have heard Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav, President SCAORA in support of the prayer made in this application. Learned Attorney General and Learned Solicitor General have also given their valuable suggestions. We also take judicial notice of the fact that the steep rise in COVID-19 Virus cases is not limited to Delhi alone but it has engulfed the entire nation. The extraordinary situation caused by the sudden and second outburst of COVID-19 Virus, thus, requires extraordinary measures to minimize the hardship of litigant-public in all the states. We, therefore, restore the order dated 23rd March, 2020 and in continuation of the order dated 8th March, 2021 direct that the period(s) of limitation, as prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended till further orders. It is further clarified that the period from 14th March, 2021 till further orders shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of....
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.... is consensus that there is no requirement for continuance of the initial order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020 and relaxation of the period of limitation need not be continued any further. The contention of Mr. Vikas Singh is that the order dated 08.03.2021 can be restored, subject to a modification. He submitted that paragraph No.2 of the order dated 08.03.2021 provides that the limitation period of 90 days will start from 15.03.2021 notwithstanding the actual balance of period of limitation in cases where limitation has expired between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. According to him, the period of limitation prior to 15.03.2020 has to be taken into account and only the balance period of limitation should be made available for the purpose of filing cases. 6. The order dated 23.03.2020 was passed in view of the extraordinary health crisis. On 08.03.2021, the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. While doing so, it was made clear that the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021. As the said order dated 08.03.2021 was only a one-time measure, in view of the pandemic, we are ....
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....'ble Supreme Court passed its final order dated 10.01.2022, which reads as under: "1. In March, 2020, this Court took Suo Motu cognizance of the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/ all other quasi proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic. 2. On 23.03.2020, this Court directed extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before Courts/Tribunals including this Court w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till further orders. On 08.03.2021, the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. While doing so, it was made clear that the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021. 3. Thereafter, due to a second surge in COVID¬19 cases, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) intervened in the Suo Motu proceedings by filing Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 seeking restoration of the order dated 23.03.2020 relaxing limitation. The aforesaid Misc....
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.... prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 6. As prayed for by learned Senior Counsel, M.A. No. 29 of 2022 is dismissed as withdrawn." 35. By the said order dated 10.01.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the aforesaid Miscellaneous Applications. This order constitutes the last in the series of suo motu directions in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra). 36. A careful examination of this series of orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reveals certain clear and undisputed conclusions, which may be summarized as follows: (a). Covid-19 pandemic was an extraordinary and unprecedented crisis that posed severe challenges not only for the citizens and the government but also for litigants and the judicial institutions across the country. (b). Recognising the extraordinary difficu....
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....s extended to all proceedings, whether or not the statute concerned permitted condonation of delay. (m). The Hon'ble Supreme Court eventually directed that the entire period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purpose of computing limitation, and the balance period of limitation available on 15.03.2020 would commence from 01.03.2022. (n). Further, in cases where the limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, the Court granted all persons a fresh limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022, irrespective of the actual balance period otherwise available. (o). If, however, the balance period of limitation available on 01.03.2022 exceeded 90 days, then such longer period would apply. (p). The scope of these directions was not confined to any particular statute, forum, or authority, but extended widely to all general and special laws in respect of all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. (q). The relaxations were not intended for any specific category of litigants but were broad-based and comprehensive. (r). The applicability of these orders extended equally to all courts, tribunals, and authorit....
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....s been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act. Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted.; (2) The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, ....
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....shall, after- (a) considering the reply, if any, to the notice issued under sub- section (1); (b) hearing the aggrieved person and the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf; and (c) taking into account all relevant materials placed on record before him, by an order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties referred to in the notice issued under subsection (1) are involved in money-laundering: Provided that if the property is claimed by a person, other than a person to whom the notice had been issued, such person shall also be given an opportunity of being heard to prove that the property is not involved in money-laundering. (3) Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money-laundering, he shall, by an order in writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under subsection (1) of section 5 or retention of property or record seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall- (a) continue dur....
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....r upon the passing of an order by the learned Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3), whichever is earlier. 42. Section 5(4) of the PMLA clarifies that even if a property is attached, the person who has an interest in that immovable property is not barred from using or enjoying it. The term "person interested" covers anyone who has a claim or entitlement to the property. 43. Section 5(5) mandates that within 30 days of provisional attachment, the Director or authorised officer must file a complaint before the learned Adjudicating Authority, stating the facts and circumstances of the attachment. 44. The complaint under Section 5(5) is adjudicated in accordance with Section 8 of the PMLA. Upon such filing, the learned Adjudicating Authority is empowered under Section 8(1) to issue a notice of not less than 30 days to the concerned person(s), requiring them to explain the source of income, assets or means by which the attached property was acquired, produce supporting evidence, and show cause why such property should not be declared as involved in money laundering and consequently confiscated. If the property is jointly held or claimed on behalf of another, notice must be ....
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....ely as P.Ws and those by the defendant or any other persons not being applicants as D.Ws. and any witness examined at the instance of the complainants shall be numbered consequently as C.Ws, and the witness called by the Adjudicating Authority shall be numbered as A.Ws. 24. Witness expenses payable. The Adjudicating Authority may, if it considers necessary, direct the concerned party for the payment of expenses to the witness, as the case may be. 25. Marking of documents. Every document filed by the applicant shall be marked as Ex. A1 and the document filed by the complainant shall be marked as Ex. C1 and the documents filed by the defendants or other person not being applicant shall be marked as Ex. Dl and so on." 48. The statutory framework under Sections 5 and 8 of the PMLA, as appears from the above, leaves no manner of doubt that the PMLA contemplates a carefully balanced, two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, the ED may, upon recording cogent "reasons to believe" on the basis of material in its possession, provisionally attach property suspected to be proceeds of crime. In the second stage, the learned Adjudicating Authority is entrusted with an indepe....
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.... 5(1)(b) alone. 54. Assuming only Section 5(1)(b) is considered, in that event, given a restrictive reading, the purpose of any provisional attachment is stated to be for ensuring that "any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter" are not frustrated. 55. As is apparent, the provisions relating to confiscation of proceeds of crime are a subject matter of Section 8 and for the purpose of which, the entire procedure prescribed therein would have to necessarily be pursued. The provisional attachment, thus, is the enabler for the exercise of the adjudication under Section 8, being the first step in what we have held is a two-step procedure in respect of proceedings for attachment (provisional and confirmatory). 56. The provisions of Section 8(1) also make it clear that, within a period of 30 days from provisional attachment under Section 5(1), the Officer specified in Section 5(5) would have to mandatorily file a complaint with the learned Adjudicating Authority. 57. Thus, the provisions of Section 8 are triggered almost immediately upon the event of a provisional attachment under Section 5(1) and upon the receipt of the procedural c....
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....t of the concerned authorities in provisionally attaching what is believed to be "proceeds of crime" is an intermediate step provided for the learned Adjudicating Authority to meaningfully exercise its adjudicatory powers and in the present case, due to the advent and prevalence of Covid-19, the learned Adjudicating Authority was clearly unable to undertake this exercise. 63. The learned Adjudicating Authority, constituted under Section 6, is not a mere extension of the ED's functioning but an independent, expert, statutory forum vested with the solemn responsibility of scrutinising the ED's action. Its duty is to assess whether the attachment has been validly made in law and fact. For this purpose, it considers replies, examines the materials placed before it, and may even call for further evidence. It is, therefore, clear that the learned Adjudicating Authority performs adjudicatory functions of a quasi- judicial nature. 64. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivji Nathubha v. Union of India 1960 SCC OnLine SC 32 laid down the test for determining whether the functions of a statutory authority are quasi-judicial in nature. Referring to earlier precedents,....
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....ct opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi- judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially." (Emphasis supplied) 65. Similarly, in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma 1964 SCC OnLine SC 62, another Constitution Bench reiterated and elaborated upon these principles. The Court emphasized that the true test is not the nomenclature of the body but the nature of the power it exercises. If an authority or tribunal, though not a court in the strict sense, is empowered to decide disputes affecting the rights of parties or is required to act judicially while exercising powers that may prejudicially affect individuals, then its function is quasi-judicial. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment state as follows: "10. This problem has been considered by this Court on several occasions and judicial decisions show that it arises in two different forms. Sometimes, the question which is posed for the decision of this Court is whether a particular decision reached by an authority or a body can be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari by the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdictio....
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....l, provided in coming to the decision well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed". (p. 633). ***** 18. Let us now refer to some of the decisions which deal with the problem with which we are concerned. The first decision where this question was elaborately considered was pronounced in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., and the Bharat Bank Employees' Union, Delhi [1950 SCC 470]. In that case, an award pronounced by an Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was brought to this Court in appeal by special leave under Article 136(1), and the respondents' preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent, raised the problem as to whether the Industrial Tribunal was a tribunal under Article 136(1) or not. The majority decision was in favour of the view that the Industrial Tribunal is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1). Mahajan, J., who delivered the principal judgment in support of the majority view on this point, held that "Industrial Tribunals though they are not full- fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions and are within the am....
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....invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than two, as Parliament prescribes. It is clear that the scheme of Sections 71 to 80 which form part of Chapter III of the said Constitution, is that the judicial power of the State can be conferred only on courts recognised by the provisions of the said Chapter. In other words, it is not competent to the legislature in Australia to confer judicial power properly so-called on any body or authority other than or apart from the courts recognised by Chapter III and so, the use of the expression "judicial power" or its conferment in regard to tribunals which are not courts properly so-called, would under the Australian Constitution be wholly inappropriate. If any tribunals other than courts are established and power is given to them to deal with and decide special disputes between the parties, the power which such tribunals would exercise cannot be described as judicial power, but would have to be called quasi-judicial power." (Emphasis supplied) 66. Further clarity on this issue was provided by another Constitution Bench in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India....
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....y the commissioners had to be approved by the Minister of Transport and by resolutions of Parliament. The Commissioners nevertheless were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, as can be seen from R. v. Postmaster-General Ex parte Carmichael [(1928) 1 KB 291] and Rex v. Boycott Ex parte Kesslay [(1939) 2 KB 651] the remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected. The position as I see it is that the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court, later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter partes. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or subsequent rights of a citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from....
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....ance for Extension of Limitation (supra), we find no merit in the contention of the private parties. 70. As already noted, the initial order dated 23.03.2020 was general in nature. Further orders supplementing the same came to be passed from time to time. 71. Between April 2020 and December 2020, nearly two dozen applications of varied nature, such as intervention, declaration, and clarification, were filed in the said suo motu writ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of some of these applications by orders dated 06.05.2020 and 10.07.2020. Thereafter, the matter was not listed again until March 2021, though numerous applications were filed in the meantime, including I.A. 91204/2020 filed by the ED seeking clarification regarding PMLA timelines. 72. Upon noticing improvement in Covid-19 situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by a comprehensive order dated 08.03.2021, disposed of Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 along with all pending applications, rather than passing separate orders on each of them. 73. In our considered view, once the main petition itself was disposed of on 08.03.2021 in light of the changed circumstances, there was no necessity for the....
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....eant to enlarge the time available for purely administrative acts of the executive, such as the filing of charge sheets under Section 167 of the CrPC. (c) Unlike Section 167 of the CrPC, where the failure of the police alone triggers the consequence of bail, proceedings before the learned Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA require the participation of both parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's pandemic-related directions were intended precisely to safeguard such adjudicatory processes from being defeated by logistical impossibilities faced by courts, tribunals, litigants and lawyers across the country. (d) Extending the limitation under Section 167 of the CrPC would have handed arbitrary power to the police to continue detaining individuals. In contrast, applying the extension to proceedings under Section 8 of the PMLA does not create arbitrariness. The process remains under judicial scrutiny, ensuring fairness for all concerned. (e) The right to property under Article 300A, though a constitutional right of significance, does not stand on par with Article 21 of the Constitution. Even during a national emergency, Article 21 cannot be suspended, and the J....
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....ing not able to physically come to file such proceedings. The order was for the benefit of the litigants who have to take remedy in law as per the applicable statute for a right. The law of limitation bars the remedy but not the right. When this Court passed the above order for extending the limitation for filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings, the order was for the benefit of those who have to take remedy, whose remedy may be barred by time because they were unable to come physically to file such proceedings. The order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] cannot be read to mean that it ever intended to extend the period of filing charge-sheet by police as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Investigating Officer could have submitted/filed the charge-sheet before the (Incharge) Magistrate. Therefore, even during the lockdown and as has been done in so many cases the charge-sheet could have been filed/submitted before the Magistrate (Incharge) and the Investigating Officer was not precluded from filing/submitting the charge-sheet even within the stipu....
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....e may also imagine circumstances where the concerned authority itself was unable to discharge its functions due to these very restrictions. Therefore, a broad-based contention that the ED was fully functional during this period may not be appropriate. In any case, there is no material on record to support the claim that the learned Adjudicating Authority was fully operational for the purpose of exercising its functions. (j) The various restrictions and curbs on the facets of Article 21 of the Consitution were necessitated, keeping in mind the pandemic and its virulent nature. Curbs were imposed on travel and also on a person's liberty in cases where one was found to be infected. Such curbs, by their very nature, show that the Courts and public were well aware of the need for the same to be imposed. 77. We are also in agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the ED that once the ED files a complaint before the learned Adjudicating Authority within the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 5(5) of the PMLA, the responsibility for further proceedings squarely shifts to the learned Adjudicating Authority, which is statutorily mandated to conclude the m....
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..... Wherever Parliament had already enacted legislative measures covering specific statutes, recourse to the Court's directions was not required. However, in areas not legislatively addressed, the Court's orders continued to apply with full force. 83. We are also unable to agree with the argument advanced by the private parties that acceptance of the ED's position in the present case would lead to anomalous and unjust consequences. It was contended that such an interpretation would allow the ED to indefinitely delay confirmation of provisional attachment orders under the PMLA by invoking Covid-related extension orders, thereby keeping attachments alive far beyond the period contemplated by the Parliament. According to them, this would dilute statutory safeguards, disturb the delicate balance between enforcement powers and individual rights, undermine the rule of law, render Section 5(3) of the PMLA nugatory, and set a dangerous precedent of enforcement agencies misusing exceptional reliefs meant for litigants as a tool to curtail substantive rights. 84. We find this concern misplaced. Covid-19 pandemic was not an ordinary occurrence; it was an unprecedented event in recent huma....