TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2022 (4) TMI 1666
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ellants') claim to be owners of land [Khasra Nos. 141, 232/142, 143, 144, 145, 281/267, 206/147, 158, 268/149, 282/267, and Khasra Nos. 201/138, 242/146, 209/154, 158, 211/163, 16/172, further Khasra Nos. 50, 51, 89, 278/92, 280/93, and 205/147, 281/267, 151, 152, 283/153, 285/20.] situated at Mauzal Sarol Basach, Tehsil Pachhad, District Sirmaour, Himachal Pradesh (hereafter 'subject land'). The Respondent-State utilised the subject land and adjoining lands for the construction of the 'Narag Fagla Road' in 1972-73, but allegedly no land acquisition proceedings were initiated, nor compensation given to the appellants or owners of the adjoining land. 3. Pursuant to a judgment by the Himachal Pradesh High Court [In Devender Singh & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh CWP No. 816/1992.] (hereafter 'High Court') directing the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter 'Act') was issued on 16.10.2001 (published on 30.10.2001) and the award was passed on 20.12.2001 fixing compensation at Rs.30,000 per bigha. Proceedings under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation, were initiated by ten neigh....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....the appellants' lands, without following due process of law and reliance was placed on this court's decision in State of U.P. v. Manohar [(2005) 2 SCC 126 (hereafter "Manohar")] and Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC)[ 2012 (13) SCR 29 (hereafter "Tukaram Kana Joshi")]. 7. It was further submitted that the appellants' case is on the same footing as that of adjoining land owners who were granted compensation and consequential benefits by land acquisition award dated 04.10.2005, and in subsequent writ proceedings. Counsel urged that the state's inaction is arbitrary, given that the lands adjoining the subject land were acquired under directions of the High Court, despite it being used for the same purpose. 8. Counsel highlighted that the Respondent-State had not disputed that the appellants were owners of the subject land, that it had been taken and used by the State for construction of Narag Fagla Road, and that no compensation had been paid. So, given that these facts are undisputed, it was urged that the High Court had erred in dismissing the writ petition, in light of this court's decision in Air India Ltd. v. Vishal Capoor [20....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....writ proceedings, were acquired for the road between Jalari to Sujanpur via Bara-Choru, which is a different road, falling in the Hamirpur district. Therefore, on these facts, the counsel urges that the ground of parity is untenable. 12. Lastly, it was argued that in light of the disputed questions of fact relating to limitation, construction of the road, and verbal consent for the same - the appropriate forum would be the civil court, and thus the impugned order required no intervention. Analysis and conclusion 13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right [Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.], it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A. 14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench in Entick v. Carringto....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....find this conclusion to be unacceptable and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness. 17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State's actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court's directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law. 18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclu....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....cted before the court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: "300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.-No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 22....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... Court's intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment. 23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances - rejected the contention of 'oral' consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State: "12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Con....