TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (9) TMI 865
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....2023, assailing impugned order dated 24.05.2025 passed by the learned ASJ, Saket Courts, in connection with cases bearing C.A. nos.75-80/2025, whereby a direction was issued to the petitioner to deposit a sum equal to 20% of the fine amount awarded in favour of the respondent by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate vide judgments of conviction and sentencing dated 16.12.2024 and 28.01.2025, respectively. Subject to the making of such deposit within 60 days, the operation of the learned Trial Court's order of conviction was stayed, and the petitioner's sentence was suspended - as contemplated within Section 389 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 ("CrPC" hereinafter). The Impugned Order 2. The respondent had invested in a real estate project and had subsequently entered into a buy-back agreement with the petitioner to the extent of 22 flats for a consideration of Rs. 3,78,76,866/- (of which a sum of Rs. 18,76,866/- was paid upfront). Per this agreement, 9 postdated cheques ("PDCs" hereinafter) of Rs. 40,00,000/- each were issued to the respondent by the petitioner, whereby it was agreed between parties that each cheque was to be returned to the petitioner along with the tit....
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....hat rival submissions of parties were duly considered, subsequent to which relevant law had also been discussed. 9. This view was also clarified as being prima facie, and that examining the correctness of the learned Trial Court's order to an ex- facie degree would require a thoughtful examination of the entire record, including a detailed scrutinization of evidence led by both parties. Rival Contentions 10. Arguments before this Court were advanced on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog and Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel, while the respondent was represented by Mr. Gautam Narayan, learned Senior Counsel. However, it is to be noted that Mr. Nandrajog appeared on behalf of the petitioner's only on a few occasions in Mr. Mathur's absence, and that final arguments were advanced by Mr. Mathur. 11. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners began their submissions by drawing this Court's attention to the Buy Back Agreement between parties. First, they highlight the purpose for which the PDCs were handed over to the respondent, as laid down in Clauses 3 and 4 of the Buyback Agreement: "3. That it has been mutually agreed that....
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....begins with the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Surender Singh Deswal, stating that it was in this case that a deposit under Section 148 was interpreted to have a mandatory connotation. He then highlights a more recent decision in Jamboo Bhandari, paragraph 6 of which, he argues, as qualifying and diluting the interpretation adopted in Surender Singh Deswal to the extent of such deposit being waivable in case it was observed as being unjust or curbing a party's right to appeal. 15. He then submits that in Jamboo Bhandari, the revision petitions before the concerned High Court stood restored as the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it was erroneous to proceed on the premise that a deposit under Section 148 was the absolute rule and that it does not accommodate any exception. 16. Mr. Mathur then brings this Court's attention to paragraph 27 of the decision in Muskan Enterprises. He submits that this decision contemplates a scenario that lies in addition to the exceptions carved out in Jamboo Bhandari with respect to the ordering of a deposit under Section 148, where the appellate court may waive such deposit if it is of the opinion that the order of conviction is so wholl....
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....enewable Energy Development Agency Ltd. (2016) 10 SCC 458 to the present facts was wholly erroneous as Sampelly was a situation where a loan had been advanced by the complainant and liability under Section 138 of the Act was clear and unambiguous. He states that the learned Trial Court ought to have instead relied upon M/s Indus Airways Pvt Ltd v M/s Magnum Aviation Pvt Ltd (2014) 12 SCC 539, where the implications of advance payments on liability under Section 138 was discussed and distinguished from a civil liability that arises from breach of contract. 22. Lastly, Mr. Mathur submits that the conduct of the respondents in not pursuing civil proceedings and instead choosing to encash the cheques in contravention to the clauses of the Buyback agreement speaks volumes as to their intention of precipitating criminal proceedings from a purely civil dispute. 23. Mr. Gautam Narayan begins his rebuttal by challenging the very maintainability of a criminal revision petition against an order directing a deposit under Section 148, citing the Madras High Court's decision in Bapuji Murugesan v Mythli Rajagopalan (2022 SCC OnLine Mad 3258), where such revision petition was dismissed as b....
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....ab and Haryana in Kesar Singh v M/s Mohit Commission Agent Judgment dated 14.01.2025 in CRR-55-2025 (O&M) and the decision of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Chander Shekhar Jain v Manjeet Singh (Judgment dated 14.07.2025 in Cr MMO 575/2025), the latter of which also held that directions calling for a deposit under Section 148 of the Act do not amount to an act of "prejudging" an appeal by the appellate court. 29. In rebuttal, Mr. Mathur submits that a challenge to the maintainability of the present batch of criminal revision petitions are not barred owing the judgment in Bapuji Murugesan. He submits that these petitions have been filed along with the invocation of Section 528 of the BNSS, thereby adopting the recourse that the petitioner in Bapuji Murugesan failed to - effectively disarming any objections against their maintainability. 30. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Analysis 31. The proposition of law relevant to adjudicating the present batch of revision petitions pertains solely to the powers of an appellate court in its issuance of directions under Section 148 of the NI Act. However, it is proper to address preliminary object....
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....view on this proposition, with the decision in Bapuji Murugesan being one such oft-cited example. Bapuji held that revision petitions against orders passed under Section 148 of the Act are not maintainable owing to their interlocutory nature, and that their correct route of challenge lies in the invocation of Section 482 of the CrPC. 36. However, this Court is of a different opinion. While the learned Madras High Court in Bapuji Murugesan conducted a commendable exercise of laying down the definition of interlocutory, intermediate, and final orders - and then sought to categorise an order under Section 148 of the Act under one of these heads, this Court chooses to traverse a different route to ascertain the maintainability of the present batch of revision petitions. 37. At the outset, it is imperative to consider the Hon'ble Supreme Court's observation contained in paragraph 6 of Jamboo Bhandari. Here, a deposit under Section 148 of the Act has been considered to be waivable where it would "amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant". This exception shines a light upon the very nature of an order passed under Section 148. 38. Considering that directions ....
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....p further, reference is made to paragraph 12 of the decision in Jamboo Bhandari. Here, the Hon'ble Supreme Court restored the revision petitions that were originally filed before the concerned High Court in challenge against an order for deposit under Section 148. Paragraph 12 stands reproduced for ready reference: "12. In these circumstances, we set aside the impugned orders, of the High Court and restore the revision petitions filed by the appellants before the High Court. We direct the parties to appear before the roster Bench of the High Court on 9-10-2023 in the morning to enable the High Court to fix a date for hearing of the revision petitions. As the contesting parties are before the Court, it will not be necessary for the High Court to issue a notice of the date fixed for hearing. The High Court, after hearing the parties, will consider whether 20% of the amount is already deposited or not. If the Court comes to the conclusion that 20% of the amount is not deposited, the Court will re-examine the revision petitions in the light of what we have observed in this judgment. Till the disposal of the restored revision petitions, the interim order passed by this Court or....
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....nce imposed without adherence to the mandatory procedural requirements of the N.T. Act prior to/at the time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the proceedings vitiated, or the trial court might have rejected admissible evidence from being led and/or relied on inadmissible evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trial court might have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipso dixit, without any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally misappreciating the evidence on record, or the trial court might have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it fails to meet the proportionality test : all that, which would evince an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to be labelled as perverse. These instances, which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive, may not arise too frequently but its possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It would amount to a travesty of justice if exercise of discretion, which is per....
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.... (emphasis supplied) 45. The degree of scrutiny for the purpose of the application of the third exception (as laid down in Muskan) to the ordering of a deposit under Section 148 is unequivocally stated to be of a prima facie nature, evident from the Hon'ble Supreme Court's usage of the phrase "on a plain reading of the order". This view is buttressed by the view adopted by a coordinate bench of this Court in Bandhu Baba Khad Bhandar, where the consideration of an argument as to the ledger account in question reflecting no outstanding dues was held to be an exercise involving a degree of scrutiny that exceeds the threshold laid down in Muskan. 46. On that note, those of Mr. Mathur's submissions which were challenges to the learned Trial Court's orders of conviction and sentencing, rather than challenges to the impugned order of the learned ASJ whereby a deposit under Section 148 was directed, cannot be considered at this stage. Any observations on this front would amount to usurping the learned ASJ of its power to hear and decide the pending appeal. 47. This Court acknowledges the learned ASJ's exercise of carrying out a plain reading of the learned Trial Court's judgmen....