TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2002 (4) TMI 53
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....82. This notification specifically required that if the goods in question was not used for the purpose for which importation was permitted then the importer was liable on demand to pay a sum equivalent to the duty leviable. Sometime in November, 1988, the ACC decided to abandon the work of expansion, hence, the licence obtained under the above said scheme for importation of duty-free steel became invalid. In spite of the same M/s. Virgo Steels imported certain quantities of steel duty-free knowing very well that the expansion project by the ACC had been abandoned. It is on record that M/s. Virgo Steels asked ACC to issue a signed export certificate in regard to actual quantities of steel supplied by it for the purpose of duty exemption, but the ACC pleaded their inability to provide such Deemed Export Certificate in view of the fact that it had abandoned its project. 2.In the above factual background and on the basis of certain information received by the Marine Preventive Wing of Mumbai, Customs investigations were conducted in regard to the import and illegal sale of steel by M/s. Virgo Steels. Based on the said investigation, Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai came to the conclu....
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....owed their appeal. The appeal of the ACC was also allowed holding that there was no intentional or otherwise abetment by ACC because they had already informed M/s. Virgo Steels of their decision to abandon their expansion project and had also refused to give M/s. Virgo Steels a certificate justifying the import made by them. 5.It is against this order of the Tribunal made in Appeal No. C-1994/92-B2 of M/s. Virgo Steels and Appeal No. C/151/94. Bom. filed by the ACC, the abovenoted four appeals have been preferred before this Court, out of which, Revenue has filed two appeals out of which C.A. No. 3711 of 2000 is against the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeals filed by M/s. Virgo Steels, in part, and C.A. No. 3712 of 2000 is against the order of the Tribunal, allowing the appeal of ACC in its entirety, while M/s. Virgo Steels being aggrieved by that part of the order which has gone against has preferred C.A. Nos. 48-49 of 2001. 6.Learned Solicitor General appearing for the Revenue, contended before us that the Tribunal has erred in coming to the conclusion that the principle of waiver did not apply to the requirement of notice under Section 28 of the Act. He submitted t....
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....mission was made by learned Counsel that the letter in question was obtained by coercion not even an affidavit was filed in support of that allegation. The Collector, by his order, had rejected the said contention holding that at no stage till the final submission of reply on 3-12-1992, M/s. Virgo Steels had made any grievance of coercion or any other undue influence in obtaining the letter of 30-3-1991. It is also necessary to note herein that this argument of coercion in obtaining the letter of 3-12-1992 seems not to have been pressed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in its impugned order in paras 8 and 9 has extracted the argument of learned Counsel for M/s. Virgo Steels where we find no reference whatsoever as to the non-voluntary nature of the letter of 30-3-1991. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of M/s. Virgo Steels that the letter of 30-3-1991 was not voluntarily submitted by them. This argument before us, in our opinion, is totally baseless and an afterthought. 8.We will next consider the requirement of Section 28 of the Act and the applicability of the principle of waiver to the said requirement of that Section. While so doing, ....
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....stoms duty under Section 12 of the Act, and the same does not emanate from Section 28 of the Act. In our opinion, Section 28 only provides for the procedural aspect for recovery of duty, hence, any irregularity committed by a proper Officer in following the procedure laid down in Section 28 would not denude that Officer of his jurisdiction to initiate action for recovery of escaped duty but it may make such proceedings initiated by that Officer voidable. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, the term "condition precedent" used in the case of Tin Plate Co. (supra) is referable to the procedural requirement of Section 28 and not to the jurisdictional aspect of the proper Officer to recover the escaped duty. In the said view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the law laid down by this Court in Tin Plate Co.'s case (supra) is that issuance of a notice under Section 28 is a mandatory requirement of that Section, with which we are in agreement. We also notice the very important fact that in that case the question of waiver did not arise and what was considered by this Court was the contention of the Revenue that a subsequent letter written by the Revenue after the expiry of ....
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.... the People Act, the person in whose benefit the privilege was enacted has a right to waive it because the very concept of privilege inheres a right to waiver. 12.In Krishan Lal v. State of J & K [1994 (4) SCC 422], this Court while considering the requirement of furnishing copy of inquiry proceedings under Section 17(5) of the J & K (Government Servants) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1962 held following the judgment in V. Chettiar's case (supra) and D.N. Gorai (supra) that though the requirement mentioned in Section 17(5) of the Act was mandatory, the same can be waived because the requirement of giving a copy of the proceedings of the inquiry mandated by Section 17(5) of the Act is one which is for the benefit of the individual concerned. 13.In Martin & Harris Ltd. v. 6th Additional Distt. Judge & Ors. [1998 (1) SCC 732], this Court while considering the provision of Section 21(1)(a) first proviso of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 negatived a contention advanced on behalf of the appellant therein that the said provision was for public benefit and could not be waived. It held that it is true that such benefit enacted under the s....