2017 (8) TMI 1749
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....sion No. 171 of 2017 has been filed by the firm and one of its partner, namely, Sri Pradeep Kumar Jain while the Revision No. 172 of 2017 has been filed by the heirs and legal representatives of the partner Sri Pradyumn Kumar Jain under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 3. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the deceased respondent-plaintiff nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were the owner and landlord of the disputed building situate at Station Road, Moradabad. In a portion of the disputed building, one Sri Sumer Chand (defendant No. 1) was the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 625/- in which, he was carrying on business under the name and style of "Pankaj Hotel". Subsequently, the aforesaid defendant No. 1 started taking rent receipts in the name of Pankaj Hotel. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant nos. 1 and 2, namely, Sri Sumer Chand and M/s. Pankaj Hotel through Sumer Chand defaulted in payment of rent and made material alterations in the disputed building causing substantial damages to the building and disfigured it without the permission of the plaintiffs-landlords. Consequently, the plaintiffs-landlords ....
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....d 4 and is making illegal profit thereof. Defendants 1 and 2 have also made structural alteration in the disputed premises inasmuch he has removed a wall, closed a passage and latrine and have constructed two big water tanks for washing of clothes as a result whereof southern wall has damaged due to seepage. They have also raised a wall and opened a door therein. On the open land, they have raised a tin-shed. A similar tin shed has also been raised on a open Chabootra. At various places old doors have been closed, floor has been damaged and location of latrines has been changed. Thus, ejectment of defendants was prayed on account of arrears of rent, subletting and structural alteration causing substantial damage and reducing utility and worth of disputed premises. 6. A combined written statement was filed on behalf of defendants 2, 3 and 4 wherein ownership and title of plaintiffs, of the disputed premises was admitted but it is said that defendant 1 has no concern with tenancy of disputed premises. Tenancy is with Pankaj Hotel and defendants 3 and 4. Allegations of subletting and substantial alteration are denied. In additional pleas, it was said that in the building, whi....
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....ctions of landlord, Sumer Chand Jain and Vipin Chandra were rejected by Rent Control and Eviction Officer (hereinafter referred to as "RCEO") on 03.03.1978 and he admitted M/s Pankaj Hotel as tenant. Defendants 3 and 4 are father and sons. Thereagainst Revision No. 63 of 1976 was filed which has also been dismissed and those proceedings will operate as res-judicata. Allegations of material alteration were denied. Defendants paid rent from July' 1977 to February' 1978, but no receipt was issued by plaintiff 1, hence, as per demand of landlord rent from 1.7.1977 to 30.6.1978 has been deposited in the Court vide Tender dated 19.07.1978 in Rent Case No. 160 of 1978 and there is no default in payment of rent. Subsequently, rent upto September' 1979 has been deposited under Section 30 (1) of Act, 1972 and rent from October' 1979 to February, 1980 has been deposited in S.C.C. Court. Sumer Chand Jain has no concern with the disputed premises pursuant to the decision dated 03.03.1978. 7. Admittedly, defendant 1, Sumer chand Jain, neither appeared in the Court below nor contested the suit. 8. Trial Court formulated 12 issues as under: (1) Whether th....
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....eep Sahgal who was running a Hotel, i.e., "Sahgal Hotel" therein. Subsequently, disputed premises was allotted by RCEO, Moradabad to defendant 1 on 07.05.1973. This fact was also admitted by defendants 2 to 4. However, defendants 3 and 4 sought to explain this fact that Sumer Chand Jain was running business of "Pankaj Hotel" in the partnership of defendants 3 and 4 and subsequently partnership was dissolved and reconstituted by separating Sumer Chand Jain, defendant 1, from the said business. In this regard, a dissolution-deed dated 08.05.1977 (Exhibit-A/115) was placed on record. It was mentioned therein that Sumer Chand Jain ran Hotel business in partnership for about four years. The business was left by Sumer Chand Jain in the name of defendants 2 to 4. All these facts were in the knowledge of plaintiff 1 and fortified by RCEO's order dated 03.03.1978. The Court below also relied on the application filed before RCEO alleging that disputed accommodation was owned by Bal Mukund, plaintiff 1 and allotted in the name of Sumer Chand Jain on 07.05.1973. Sri Sumer Chand Jain entered into a partnership on 26.06.1973 to run Hotel business in the name and style of "Pankaj Hotel" in th....
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.... Issue 5, thereafter, was decided against plaintiffs. 13. Issues 3 and 4 related to question of "material alternation" having effect of reducing or diminishing the value of disputed property. Here Court below observed that since it has already held that defendant 1 is not the tenant of disputed accommodation and has not appeared to contest the suit, since Pankaj Hotel is tenant through its Proprietor, defendant 3, therefore, allegations levelled against defendants 1 and 2 cannot result in making defendants 3 and 4 responsible for same. Defendant 1 was not contesting the matter and even if it is held that defendants made unauthorized construction, no relief can be granted against defendant 1 since he is no more tenant, in the circumstances, both these issues were also answered against plaintiffs. 14. Issue 6 that defendant 3 has made repair in the disputed premises without permission has also been answered against plaintiffs since it has not given any notice to defendants 3 and 4 terminating their tenancy. Consequently, suit has been dismissed. 15. Counsel for plaintiff-revisionist contended before this Court, while assailing the impugned judgment dated 22....
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....llegedly did something, has separated would not absolve other partners from liability they had as co-tenant with outgoing partner. Thus the mere fact that defendant 1 has not contested the matter or withdrawn from partnership would not exempt defendants 3 and 4 from any liability accrued when partnership was continuing, if the allegations of material alteration resulting in diminishing the value of property is/are found correct. The fact that partner to whom allotment was made by RCEO has ceased to be tenant and tenancy stood devolved upon remaining tenants would make no difference for the plaintiffs-landlords for the reason that responsibility is joint and several amongst the partners. Therefore, it was necessary for Trial Court to decide whether there was any material or structural alteration which has the effect of diminishing value of property and what was the period during which this structural alteration was made. If period was when defendants 1, 3 and 4 were enjoying tenancy in partnership, all the partners are bound to face the consequences as provided in law. Mere fact that one or more partner has separated or withdrawn subsequently would make no difference and absolve rem....
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....considering issues 3 and 4 which related to material alteration carried out in the demised premises as alleged in the plaint. In the order of remand, this Court had specifically observed that even if the principal tenant Sumer Chandra had withdrawn himself from tenancy but if the material alterations were made at the time when he was a partner with the other tenant, then his act would bind the other tenant and therefore what was crucial to be decided was whether the material alterations as alleged were made or not and if so made were they made at the time when the other partners who were defendants in the suit had been inducted in partnership or not. As the aforesaid questions required no further pleadings and the question had to be decided on the basis of material already on record, this Court finds no jurisdictional error in the order passed by the court below refusing the petitioners' request to file additional written statement because the heirs of deceased Paduman Kumar Jain had been substituted, particularly, when this Court while passing the order of remand had not granted any such liberty and the substitution was carried out under the orders of this Court in Civil Revis....
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....n the light of the observations made. However, the impugned judgment has been passed by the Court of Additional District Judge without recording any finding about the period of alteration or structural changes in the building. IV- The Court below has not taken into consideration the earlier commissioner report dated 17.2.1982 and merely relied upon the report dated 23.4.1983. Submissions on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs/landlord- 10. Sri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate submits as under; I- The remand was made to a specific court by the High Court with specific directions and pursuant thereto the Court below passed the impugned judgment and decree complying with the directions of this Court. Thus, the question of lack of jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment and decree, does not arise at all. The learned Additional District Judge rightly decided the case pursuant to the remand directions. The legal position in this regard is settled in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of M/s. Tek Chand & Co., Meerut and others Vs. VIIIth Additional Disrtict Judge, Meerut and others, 1992 (2) ARC 386 (para 4), Ramlal Yadav and another Vs. K....
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....3.7.2015 in Civil Revision No. 930 of 1991 and judgment dated 2.2.2017 in Matters under Article 227 No. 10223 of 2016 have attained finality. IV- The changes made by the defendants-revisionists in the building in question, are structural changes in the building. Finding of facts in this regard, has been recorded by the Court below after due consideration to the evidences or record. It was admitted case of the defendants-revisionists that the material changes made in the building, were without permission of the plaintiff landlord. Detail finding of fact has been recorded by the Court below on the issue No. 3 and 4 which can not be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction unless the findings are perverse. The facts of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the defendant revisionist would show that there is no allegation of perversity in the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. 11. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record before him. Discussion and findings:- 12. The submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties as noted above give rise to the following quest....
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.... (b) in the proviso to sub-section (2) for the words "twenty five thousand rupees" the words "one lakh rupees" shall be substituted." 15. The statement of objects and reasons of the amendment (2016 Lucknow Law Times, part IV, page 2) is reproduced below; "Prefatory Note- Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Whereas the value of the subject matters brought to the courts has increased substantially, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Courts as well as those of Small Cause Courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh requires to be raised for institution of Civil Suits and appeals. It has, therefore become necessary to amend the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 to increase the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Courts and those of Small Cause Courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh for securing better administration of justice. The Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2015 is introduced accordingly." (emphasis supplied by me) 16. Perusal of the objects and reasons as aforequoted shows that the amendment in Section 15(2) of the Act was initiated on account of the fact that the value of the subject matter....
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....r, AIR 1989 SC 509 (para 6); State of H.P. Vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277 (para 77); State of Gujrat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat,JT 2005 (12) SC 580 (76). 19. The golden rule of interpretation is that words of a statute must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meaning when the language or phraseology used by the legislature is precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to and it is unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history, Statement of Objects and Reasons, framework of the statute, etc. Such an exercise need be carried out only when the words are unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. Reference in this regard may be had to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh Vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu 1979 2 SCC 34, Kehar Singh Vs. State (Delhi Admn.), 1988 3 SCC 609, District Mining Officer Vs. TISCO, 2001 7 SCC 358, Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2001 4 SCC 534, State of H.P. Vs. Pawan Kumar 2005 4 SCC 350 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Baburam, 2007 6 SCC 55 and Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and others Vs. Manhabala Jer....
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....4 All 1, Ramamirtham Vs. Ram Film Service (1951) ILR Mad. 93 (FB) and Venkateshwarlu Vs. Satyanarayana, AIR 1957 AP 49 (FB). Section 21 C.P.C.- Objection to the Pecuniary Jurisdiction: 22. Facts of the present case shows that a specific direction by remand was issued by this Court in Civil Revision No. 930 of 1991 decided on 3.7.2015 directing the court below to examine the Issue nos. 3 and 4 afresh in the light of observations made. The amendment in Section 15 of the Act was made by the U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015 which received the assent of the President of India on 19.11.2015 and it was published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary, Part 1, Section (Ka) dated 7.12.2015 but the revisionists-defendants have not raised any objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction of the court below. Their application for leave for filing additional written statement was rejected by the court below by the order dated 16.11.2016 against which, a petition being matters under Article 227 No. 10023 of 2016 was filed by the petitioner defendant which was dismissed by this Court by order dated 2.2.2017. For the first time in this revision, an objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction has been taken on ac....
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....ween law of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make the decree passed by that court to be one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best, it is voidable in the sense that it can be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. No objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court could be raised successfully in an appeal against the decree unless it had been raised at the earliest opportunity and failure of justice or prejudice was shown. This principle finds support from the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib Vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharamadas, (2007) 13 SCC 650 (para 33, 34, 40 and 41) as under; "33. What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in O.S. No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure ha....
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....bjections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on overvaluation or under-valuation shall not be entertained by an appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary ....
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....to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on different footing where the court has no jurisdiction over the said matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take the case or matter . 28. The facts of the present case shows that the petitioner-defendant that after amendment of Section 15 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015 has not taken any objection on pecuniary jurisdiction before the Additional District Judge, Court No. 12, Moradabad. 29. In the present set of facts, it is undisputed that initially SCC Suit No. 09 of 1979 was dismissed by judgment dated 22.9.1991 which was challenged by the respondent-plaintiffs by filing a Civil Revision No. 930 of 1991 which was allowed by this Court by judgment dated 03.07.2015 and the matter was remanded to the court below to examine the Issue nos. 3 and 4 afresh in the light of the observations made. Pursuant to the said remand direction, the impugned judgment dated 4.5.2017 in SCC Suit No. 09 of 1979 has been passed. It is also important note that the prayer of the revisionist defendants to file an additional written statement in the SCC Suit No. 9 of 1979 was ....
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....ly to be tried up by the Judge Small Causes, Meerut. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel has referred to two decisions of this Court report in AIR 1975 Alld 425, M.P. Mishra V. Sangam Lal Agarwal and AIR 1978 Alld 129, Trilok Singh v. Smt. Jamuna Devi and another. I do not agree with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is not-worthy that while allowing the revision filed by the petitioner against the judgment and order of the Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit this Court had remanded the matter back to the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut with certain directions. This order was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioner against the judgment of this Court. The Supreme Court also directed the Additional District Judge to dispose of the matter remanded to him by the High Court preferably within six months. It cannot be disputed that the suit was filed in the Court of District Judge and transferred to the Court of the VIIIth Additional District Judge as the valuation was over Rs. 5000, and the said Court than had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The said Court was....
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....e Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give [such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed]. (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realized in manner provided by section [145] of the Code of Civil Procedure, [1908]." 33. In SCC Revision Defective No. 76 of 2017 (Sanjay Sharma @ Pintu Vs. Anil Dua @ Titu) decided on 13.7.2017, this Court considered the similar controversy after noticing the relevant facts and held as under; "6. The counsel for the revisionist submitted that pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge exercising power of Judge Small Cause Court was enhanced to Rs. one lakh and above, by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 07.12.2015, as such Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar had no jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 15 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, thereafter as valuation of the suit was below Rs. one lakh and decree dated 14.07.2016 passed by him in the suit is nullity and no....
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....l jurisdiction is concerned, Section 21 C.P.C., and Section 11 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 have laid down procedures for raising objection in this respect at the earliest opportunity to contest. Prior to insertion of Section 21 (2) C.P.C. w.e.f. 01.02.1977, a bench of four Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, read the provisions of Section 11 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 in Section 21 C.P.C. and held Section 99 C.P.C. therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 Suit Valuation Act was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil ....
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....ndment) Act, 2015 (U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015) with effect from 7.12.2015, the jurisdiction to try suits between lessor and lessee for rent and eviction under Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts as applicable to the State of U.P. up to the valuation of Rs. 1,00,000/-, irrespective of institution of the suit vests in the Small Cause Courts presided over by the Civil Judge (S.D.) and that the District Judge/Additional District Judge would have jurisdiction to decide such cases of higher valuation above Rs. 1,00,000/only and accordingly, the suit involving valuation of Rs. 41,400/- was held to be cognizable by the Small Causes Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) and not by the District Judge/Additional District Judge. This judgment has been held to be per-in-curium having no binding precedent in the case of Sanjay Sharma @ Pintu (Supra) decided on 13.7.2017. Under the circumstances, the case of Tejumal (Supra) is of no help to the revisionist-defendants. 35. In the case of Devendra Upadhyay Vs. Bhudev Prasad Sharma, 2017 (7) ADJ 319, this Court considered the effect of aforesaid U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015 and the question as to whether on account of alleged lack of pecuniary jurisdic....
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....t Act, 1887 for the trial of suits cognizable by such Courts, up to such value not exceeding five thousand rupees as it thinks fit, and may withdraw any jurisdiction so conferred: Provided that in relation to suits of the nature referred to in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the said Act, the reference in this sub-section to five thousand rupees shall be construed as reference to twenty five thousand rupees. (2) The High Court may by notification in the official Gazette, confer upon any District Judge or Additional District Judge the jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, for the trial of all suits (irrespective of their value), by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, or for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease or of compensation for the use and occupation thereof after such determination of lease, and may withdraw any jurisdiction so conferred. Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression 'building' has the same mean....
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.... mere amendment of Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act could not serve the legislative intention. Again, I do not seen any force in this contention. The purpose of Section 15(3) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts ' Act is different from the purpose underlying Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Section 15(3) enables the State Government to raise the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes. Normally the State Government can raise such limit to try suits whose value does not exceed Rs. 2,000 but in the case of suits between the lessor and the lessee of the aforesaid variety such enhancement can be up to the limit of Rs. 5,000. It should be clear that Section 15(3) has a reference to the regular Court of Small Causes established in a District. Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act enables the State Government (and after delegation the High Court) to confer upon any Civil Judge or Munsif or upon a District Judge or Additional District Judge the jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes. Whereas in Section 25(1) there are pecuniary limits in the case of Civil Judges and Munsifs, in Section 15(2) there are no ....
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.... said view of mine has been followed by a learned single Judge of this court while deciding Civil Revision No. 1432 of 1974 on 21-11-1975 (All). In (1977) 3 All LR 381 Hon'ble Chandra Shekhar J. (as his Lordship then was) independently reached the same conclusion without referring to my aforesaid reported judgment. Nothing has been submitted from the bar which would induce me to revise my opinion and in this view of the matter, I overrule the first contention of Sri Sidhewshwari Prasad and hold that despite the valuation of the suit in question exceeding Rs. 5,000/- it was triable by the Additional District Judge as a suit of the Small Cause nature in view of the conferment of jurisdiction on him to do so in terms of Section 25(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act." 41. In the case of Ram Lal Yadav vs. Kulwant Rai Puri, 1998 (1) ARC 7, this Court again considered in the matter of eviction suit regarding jurisdiction of District Judges and Additional District Judges, with reference to the aforesaid Notification and the provisions of Section 25(2) of the the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887....
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....ial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, Section 15--Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, Section 25-- Conferment of jurisdiction of Small Cause Court-- Section 15 of P.S.C.C. Act confers, such jurisdiction of Courts constituted and established by Small Cause Courts Act only-When other classes of Civil Courts are conferred with jurisdiction of Small Cause Court, that is dealt with by Section 25 of B.A.A.C.C. Act--State Government and High Court, has been given powers by Section 25 to confer jurisdiction of Small Cause Court on District Judges and Addl. District Judges--Thus, Notification issued on October 25, 1972 by High Court is valid and effective since the date it was issued. 13. I am bound by aforesaid authority and see no good reason to strike a discordant note and refer the matter to a larger Bench for decision afresh as prayed. So this contention is repelled." 43. In the case of Smt. Dilip Kaur and another vs. A.D.J., J.S.C.C./Special Judge (Dacoity Chhetra) Lalitpur and others, 2007 (67) ALR 283, this Court again considered the provisions of Section 25(2) of the the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, provisions of Section 15 of the Provincial Sma....
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....s e.g. District Judges and Additional District Judges. The constitution and jurisdiction of other classes of civil courts is dealt with by the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Section 25 of the latter Act specifically deals with conferment of jurisdiction of a Judge Small Causes on the existing civil courts. Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act hence could not bear the conferment of jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes on the other civil courts. Further Section 15(2) itself operates subject to any other enactment for the time being in force. That will include Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act hence could not and did not bar conferment of jurisdiction of a Judge Small Causes on other classes of civil courts including District Judges and Additional District Judges." 45. In the case of Smt. Madhu Gupta vs. Satish Chand and others, 2010 (80) ALR 180 (Paras 12 to 19), this Court again considered in a tenancy matter, the provisions of Section 25(2) of the the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and provisions of Section 15(2) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 w....
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....ve discussion, the Question No. 1 is answered against the Revisionists-defendants and it is held that the judgment dated 04.05.2017 in S.C.C. Case No. 09 of 1979 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 12, Moradabad, does not suffer from lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The impugned judgment and the decree have been validly passed. Question No. 2:- 47. In para-19 of the judgment dated 03.07.2015 in Civil Revision No. 930 of 1991 {Smt. Vidyawati (since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) vs. Sumer Chand}, this Court observed that the disputed premises was allotted to the defendant Sumer Chand, who inducted the defendants No. 3 & 4, namely Sri Pradyumna Kumar Jain and Pradeep Kumar Jain to run partnership hotel business in the disputed premises in the name and style of 'Pankaj Hotel'. In para-19 of the aforesaid judgment, this Court observed as under:- "I finds substance in the submissions. As already said, defendant 1 was allotted disputed premises by RCEO and tenancy commenced in his name. He inducted defendants 3 and 4 to run a partnership Hotel business in the disputed premises. Since knowledge of landlord to this partnership business has bee....
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....Emphasis supplied by me) 48. In remand proceedings, the Court below noted the facts in detail in the judgment. It considered the notice dated 24.06.1978 being Paper No. 104-C given by the plaintiffs to the defendants which contains description of structural alterations made by the defendants which diminished the value of the property. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Sri Rakesh Chand, P.W.-1 was examined, who, in his evidence, gave details of structural alterations and damages made by the defendants in the disputed building. He also proved notice being Paper No. 104-C, postal receipt and acknowledgements being Paper nos. 106-C, 108-C, 110-C and 112-C. On behalf of the defendants, Sri Pradyumna Kumar Jain D.W.-1 was examined who stated that certain repairs in the disputed property were made with the consent of the deceased plaintiff No. 1 Bal Mukund. He referred to Paper No. 42-C and stated that this is receipt which bears signature of Bal Mukund. In his cross-examination, P.W.-1, in substance, stated that the defendant Pradyumna Kumar Jain has not spent any amount towards repairs with the consent of Lala Bal Mukund and the receipt being Paper No. 42-C is a forged paper which does no....
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....ith in the present Revisions filed by the revisionists defendants under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887. The impugned judgment is valid and does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. Thus, the question No. 2 is also answered against the defendants revisionist/ defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs respondents. CONCLUSTIONS:- 49. The discussions made above is briefly summarized as under:- (i) The golden rule of interpretation is that words of a statute must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meaning when the language or phraseology used by the legislature is precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to and it is unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history, Statement of Objects and Reasons, framework of the statute, etc. Such an exercise need to be carried out only when the words are unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. (ii) The amendment made in Section 15 of the Act made by the U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015 as aforequoted, do not specify as whether the cases pending before the court by way of remand by order of a higher court with speci....
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....emonstrate that on account of the proceeding in a court having no pecuniary jurisdiction there had been a consequent failure of justice. (vi) Section 15 C.P.C. enacts a rule of procedure with an object to avoid overcrowding in the Court of higher grade. It does not oust the jurisdiction of Court of higher grade. The competency of the Court of higher grade to try a suit, below the valuation of his pecuniary jurisdiction has not been affected either by Section 15 C.P.C. or by any other provision. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. (vii) In the case of Sanjay Sharma @ Pintu (supra) this Court held that there is nothing in Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act....
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