TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (8) TMI 158
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....nishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short "N.I. Act"), and he was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- to the complainant under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. 2. However, subsequently, the accused preferred an appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II) Kollam, vide judgment dated 03.04.2007 in Criminal Appeal No.173/2004, set aside the judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and acquitted the accused. Challenging the said judgment of acquittal rendered in the above-said case, the complainant approached this Court with the present appeal. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties in this appeal are hereinafter ....
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.... Exts. P1 to P6. After consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record, and hearing both sides, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act, and accordingly, convicted him. Assailing the said judgment, the accused approached the Sessions Court, Kollam, in appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kollam, vide judgment dated 03.04.2007 in Criminal Appeal No.173/2004, allowed the appeal and found the accused not guilty of the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, and he was acquitted. Assailing the said finding and the order of acquittal, the complainant has preferred this appeal. 5. I heard Sri.Manjusha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri.Rahul Sunil, le....
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....ce in the present appeal, it is pertinent to note that the legal yardsticks applicable to an appeal against acquittal are different from those applicable to an appeal against conviction. Ordinarily, an appellate court would not interfere with a judgment of acquittal unless it is demonstrated that the trial court's view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust, and that the only possible conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record was that the accused was guilty of the offence alleged. If two views are possible on the basis of the evidence, and the trial court has taken one such view leading to acquittal, the appellate court would generally refrain from substituting its own view merely because it might have arrived at a diffe....
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.... 9. Upon perusal of Ext.P1 cheque, it is evident that the cheque in question is a cash cheque. It is not a cheque drawn in the name of the complainant. Now the question is whether the complainant who is in possession of a cash cheque qualifies as a holder of a negotiable instrument as defined under Section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The definition of "holder" as provided under Section 8 of the N.I. Act is as follows: "8. "Holder": The holder of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto. Where the note, bill or cheque is lost or destroyed, its holder is the person so entitled at....
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.....I. Act in his favour. 12. When the presumption under Section 139 is not available in favour of the complainant, it becomes his bounden duty to adduce independent and credible evidence to establish that, the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. However, in the case at hand, apart from the feeble evidence of PW1 there is nothing to show that there was a subsisting liability towards the complainant from the accused, and it was towards the discharge of the said liability, Ext.P1 cheque was issued. At this juncture, it is significant to note that although the complainant asserted that Ext.P1 cheque was issued towards the price of the rubber sheets purchased by the accused, no documentary evidence whatsoe....