TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (7) TMI 1391
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....appeal having been filed three years and twenty days beyond limitation. 2. Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is reproduced hereunder:- "(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month." 2.1 The language of the provision is unambiguous that applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act is ousted and the power to condone delay by the appellate authority is only upto thirty days. 3. It is not disputed in the present case that delay is of three years and twenty days. The iss....
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....an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that sub section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired...the award shall be enforced and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of a court". This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after t....
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....cable because the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. " 3.2 The Supreme Court while dealing with similar provision in Singh Enterprises vs. CCE reported in (2008) 3 SCC 70 held as under: "The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short `the Limitation Act') can be availed for condonation of delay. The first....
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....35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry....