TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (6) TMI 1638
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....ppeals are that the assessee, formed by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) for welfare of its employees, filed its Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for both years declaring NIL income after claiming exemption/deduction under section 11 and also under section 10 of the Act. As per the appellant, it is a case of a provident fund trust duly approved under Rule 3(i) of part 'A' of the Fourth Schedule of the Act. As per ITRs, the assessee has claimed exemption under section 11 of the Act [in Column No. 1 of part A and GEN of the ITR] as well as under section 10(21), 10(22B), 10(23A), 10(23B), 10(23C)(iv), 10(23C)(v), 10(23C)(vi), 10(23C)(via)] of the Act [in Column 12 of part B of TI (Total Income)]. These ITRs were processed under section 143(1) of the Act wherein the AO (CPC) disallowed the claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act on the reasoning that the assessee was not eligible for said exemption under specified sub-sections of section 10 of the Act duly mentioned in ITRs. Later, the assessee filed applications under section 154 of the Act for rectification of the processing under section 143(1) of the Act for allowing exemption under section 10(25)(ii) ....
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....ferred above, suffice to say by giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Assessee. The Assessee shall also be at liberty to place the relevant documents and raise the appropriate issues/claims before the Ld. Commissioner in accordance with law." [Emphasis is supplied by us.] 4.2 In pursuance of the above-mentioned order of the Tribunal, the Ld. CIT(A), vide orders dated 07.05.2024 in remanded proceedings, again dismissed appeals on reasoning that there was neither a prima facie mistake apparent from the record as there was no claim of exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Act in ITRs nor the assessee was a registered Trust or Institution under section 12A of the Act. 5. At the outset, the Ld. Authorized Representative (AR) prayed for condonation of delay of 68 days in filing both appeals. The applications for condonation of the delay annexed with the appeal memos stated the reason for delay as the appellant assessee was firstly advised to file rectification applications against impugned orders before the Ld. CIT(A). However, the advice for filing of appeals came later. Per contra, the Ld. Senior Departmental Representative (DR) submitted that the condo....
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....ent appeals by 68 days. There is also no dispute that under section 253(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit an appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it is satisfied that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the appellant for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time. We are of the considered view that there was no malafide or deliberate delay in filing both appeals in hand and in the interest of substantial justice, the delay in filing these appeals deserve condonation to be decided on merit. We do not see any prejudice which will be caused to the Revenue in deciding these appeals on merit. In case of HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, Circle12, New Delhi (ITA No. 211/2020 & CM Appeals 32045-32047/2020 dated 22nd December, 2020), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had held that in absence of anything male fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, the Court should normally condone the delay as the intent is always to promote substantial justice following the Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others (1987) 2 SCC 107 and N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy 1998 (7) SCC....
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....rescribed time and therefore, these appeals are hereby admitted for adjudication on merits. 10. We have perused various columns of ITR-7 of the relevant year and have found that the assessee has made overall claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act in ITRs of both years in Column 13 of Part B - TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. However, the break-up of the same in both ITRs was wrongly shown in Column 14 instead of Column 16 of Part B - TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. It is also an undisputed fact that the Revenue has allowed similar claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act in all preceding and subsequent years as the assessee was recognized as a PF Trust in accordance with the Rule 3 of part A of the Fourth Schedule of the Act since 30.08.1984. A simple prima-facie mistake in filing a particular column of ITR should not go against the intent of the Act. The assessee filed petitions, under section 119(2) of the Act, before the Ld. PCIT to allow the assessee to revise ITRs. However, the same vide orders dated 23.07.2024 [DIN: ITBA/COM/F/17/2024-25/1066910706(1) and ITBA/COM/F/17/20....
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....eme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (2006) 284 ITR 323 would not debar the CIT(A) to consider the fresh claim, if any, so as to arrive at the correct taxable income. 12. Circular no. 14 - XZ (35) dated 11/04/1955 issued by the CBDT laid down that the Officers and Department must not take advantage of ignorance of an assessee as to his rights. It is one of their duties to assist a taxpayer which in the long run benefit the Department that would inspire confidence in the minds of public. Here, the Revenue has raised demand only due to a wrong data entry in Column 14 instead of Column 16 of Part B - TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7, which is contrary to the intent of the CBDT Circular no. 14 - XZ (35) dated 11/04/1955. 13. In the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (2006) 284 ITR 323, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of the Tribunal under section 254 of the Act is to entertain for the first time a point of law provided the fact on the basis of which the issue of law can be raised before the Tribunal. The decision does not in any way relate to the power of the AO to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by fili....
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....ings. This is so, because the very object of the appeal is not to decide a point raised as a dispute, but any point which goes into the adjustment of the taxpayer's liability. In that sense, a view prevails, even in England, that the authorities sitting in appeal in a tax case, cannot be regarded as deciding a lis, but they are only engaged in an administrative act of adjusting the taxpayer's liability. Under our fiscal jurisprudence, we may regard the appellate authorities as exercising quasi-judicial functions in the same sense as a taxing officer does. But, even so, the proceedings before them lack the basis elements of adversary proceeding. It, therefore, follows that the discussion and the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal and other authorities under the tax code cannot be pursued by drawing a parallel to civil litigation with particular reference to appeals from decrees, and the like. The insistence on one party to the appeal being entitled to the fruits of finality, as it is called, and the appellate authority being confined to the subject-matter of the appeal are all ideas which might have relevance if the discussion centers on purely civil litigat....
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....isapprehension that an appeal under the Income Tax Act, 1918, is the same in substance as an appeal where two private persons are engaged in litigation. It is, of courts, totally different." 29. In IRC v.Sneath [1932] 17 TC 149, Greer L. J. gave a similar description of the true position of a tax appeal in the following words (P. 164): "I think, the estimating authorities, even when an appeal is made to them, are not acting as judges deciding litigation between the subject and the Crown. They are merely in the position of valuers whose proceedings are regulated by statute to enable them to make an estimate of the income of the taxpayer for the particulate year in question." 30. Romer L. J., in the same case, held as under (p. 168): "The appeal is merely another step taken by the Commissioners, at the instance of the taxpayers, in the course of the discharge by them of their administrative duty of collecting the sur-tax." 31. Rex. v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax [1935] 20 TC 381, went to the Court of Appeal and there Lord Wright M.R. reiterated the position in the following passage in his judgment (p. 387): "I may note her....
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....f assessment is not strictly an arbitral tribunal deciding a contested issue between two litigants ranged on opposite sides. In a tax appeal, the appellate authority is very much committed to the assessment, either by pursuing further investigation or causing further investigation to be done. It can do sos on its own initiative, without being prodded by any of the parties. It can enhance the assessment, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the taxpayer's appeal, even though the appeal itself has been mooted only with a view to a reduction in the assessment. These are special and exceptional attributes of the jurisdiction of a tax appellate authority. These attributes underline the truth that the appellate authority is no different, functionally and substantially, from the assessing authority itself." 33. It seems to us, therefore, that both on principle and on precedent, there is no reason why the Appellate Tribunal must be precluded from handling a point which appertains to the assessee's assessment merely because nobody else had handled it before or because to had not occurred either to the assessee or to the Department to raise and urge that point at ....