TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2014 (11) TMI 1296
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....hat gift-deed dated 12th August, 1982 executed by one Ramaiah was void and for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from alienating the suit schedule property or interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same by the plaintiff. By its judgment and order dated 25th March, 1991, the Trial Court decreed the suit holding the gift-deed in question to be null and void, hence not binding on the plaintiff-appellant. Defendants No. 2 and 3 in the said suit were also directed to demolish the building constructed in the schedule property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed against him the respondent filed RFA No. 223 of 1991 befor....
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.... with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit in question was barred by Rule 3A of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. By its order dated 11th February, 2011, the City Civil Court, Bangalore, allowed the application filed by the respondent and rejected the plaint filed by the plaintiff-appellant. The Court took the view that in the light of the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC inserted w.e.f. 1.2.1997, a party aggrieved of a decree on compromise had to approach the Court that passed the decree to establish that no compromise had taken place between the parties which could provide a basis for the Court to act upon the same. In doing so the Court placed reliance upon th....
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.... did not exist or take place. The High Court appears to have taken the view that even if the compromise was fraudulent since the appellant had filed a suit for declaration he ought to pursue the same to its logical conclusion. The High Court further held that even if the plaint in the suit filed by the appellant had been rejected in terms of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC, the appellant ought to seek redress against any such order of rejection. The High Court has on that basis declined to consider the prayer made by the appellant for setting aside the compromise decree. 8. The precise question that falls for determination in the above backdrop is whether the High Court was right in directing the appellant to seek redress in the suit having ....
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....suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within meaning of the said rule if the same is void or voidable under Indian Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the Court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and t....
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.... the plaintiff to take recourse to the remedy by way of separate suit. The High Court in the process remained oblivious of the provisions of Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A of the CPC as also orders passed by the City Civil Court rejecting the plaint in which the Trial Court had not only placed reliance upon Order XXIII Rule 3A but also the decision of the Court in Pushpa Devi's case (supra) holding that a separate suit was not maintainable and that the only remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach the Court which had passed the compromise decree. The following passage from the decision of Pushpa Devi (supra) case is, in this regard, apposite: "17. ..Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to a....