TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1960 (8) TMI 113
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.... as consideration. The defendant stated that the pro-note had been materially altered by changing the amount of Rs. 400/- to Rs. 4000/- and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for recovery of anything on the basis of the pro-note. The trial Court and the first appeal Court found that the pro-note was for a consideration of only Rs. 400/- and it was materially altered by raising the amount to Rs. 4000/-, The trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 400/- on the ground that the defendant had admitted the receipt of this amount. The lower appellate Court dismissed the whole claim holding that nothing could be recovered on the basis of the materially altered pro-note. The learned single Judge upheld the view taken by the lower appellate Court. The finding that the pro-note had been altered by raising the amount from Rs. 400/- to Rs. 4000/- is a finding of fact which was binding in second appeal and cannot be challenged in this Letters Patent Appeal. The short question, therefore, which arises for decision in this appeal is whether on account of the alteration, which has been made in the pro-note, the appellant could not recover the amount of Rs. 400/- which wa....
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.... that as there was no suggestion that the alterations were made by the minor or his adoptive modier, he could not be held responsible for the same and the suit was tenable in spite of the alterations. This view was upheld in the Letters Patent appeal. The principle underlying Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is based upon the Common Law rule which prevailed in England and was subsequently incorporated in Section 64 of the Bills of Exchange Act. The development of the rule has been-discussed in some detail in Pachkodi v. Krishnaji ILR (1946) Nag 796: (AIR 1947 Nag 145). The leading case on the point is the Pigot's case (1614) 77 ER 1177 in which it was held that when a deed is altered in a point material, by the plaintiff himself or by any stranger, without the privity of the obligee,, that deed thereby becomes void. This principle was later extended to negotiable instruments in Master v. Miller (1791) 1 Sm LC 780. The rule was very strictly interpreted against the person who produced the deed and was made applicable not only where the alteration was made by him but "also where it is made by any other whomsoever; for the person who has the custody of the ....
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....iff himself or by someone with his consent. In the absence of such pleadings, no relief should be granted to the defendant on the ground that the instrument has been materially altered. We find that the law on the point is just the contrary as would appear from the following passage occurring in Bhashyam's Negotiable Instruments Act (Tenth Edn., 1956) at p. 452: "Where the instrument appears to be altered, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff (i.e., the holder) to show that the alteration is not improperly made, and the presumption in the case of negotiable instruments is that the alteration was made subsequent to the issue of the instrument; while in the case of deeds, etc., the presumption is the other way. Where a bill appears to have been altered, or there are marks of erasure on it, the party seeking to enforce the instrument is bound to give evidence that it is not avoided thereby." The burden of pleading or proving how the alteration came in the instrument is thus on the plaintiff. In Pitamber Manik Jee v. Motee Chund 1 Moo Ind App 420 (PC), the following observations were made regarding the burden of proof in such cases: "If a plaintiff produces a bon....
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.... and how the alteration was made." We have no doubt that the burden of proving how the alterations were made in the document, lies on the plaintiff and in the absence of any proof, it should be presumed that they were made by him or by his next friend, who was in custody of the document. The view which we have taken does not go against the Madras decisions relied upon by the appellant. Although the single Judge had stated his conclusion somewhat widely, the Division Bench definitely concluded that the instrument would be saved from becoming void only if the material alteration was made by a stranger without the consent of the holder. In that case, the natural father, who was Sus-pected to have made the changes, was a stranger inasmuch as the pro-note was in favour of the adoptive father and the adoptive mother was acting as the legal guardian. In the instant case, the pro-note has all along been in the custody of the minor plaintiff's father, who also acted as the next friend of the minor when the suit was filed. Under these circumstances, according to the statement of law quoted from the Halsbury's Laws of England in paragraph 13 above, the presumption that the alter....