TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2021 (10) TMI 1460
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....ereinafter, as "the Chadhas") and Sumit Gupta and Shilpa Gupta (Respondents 3 and 4, referred to, hereinafter, as "the Guptas") qua a loan availed by Appellant No. 2, M/s RBT Pvt. Ltd. ("RBT") from South Indian Bank ("the Bank"), against which a property located at C-11/4, Arjun Marg, DLF City, Phase-1 - 122002 ("the Gurgaon property"), belonging to Rajan Chadha and his wife, stood mortgaged. (For sake of convenience, Sanjay Arora would hereinafter be referred to as "the appellant") 4. The impugned order has been passed on a petition, filed by Respondents 1 and 2, before this Court, under Section 9(1)(ii) of the 1996 Act^2, treating it as an application under Section 17(1)(ii)^3. An objection has been raised, by the appellant, regarding the jurisdiction and authority of the learned Arbitral Tribunal to do so; however, I will deal with that objection somewhat later in this judgment. Suffice it to state, at this stage, that, of the various prayers contained in the Section 17 application of Respondents 1 and 2, the only prayer which was pressed, and which has been granted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal vide the impugned order, is for a direction to the appellant to continue to pa....
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.... this petition respondent No.2 acting for and on behalf of Respondent No.1 shall continue to pay the EMIs into the loan account of the company as per the terms and conditions of the loan account." 6. The very first argument advanced before me by Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned Counsel for the appellant, was that, irrespective of the merits of the case, no such urgency existed, as would justify issuance of the impugned direction at this stage. The assertion, to this effect, as contained in para 1(iv) of the present appeal, on which pointed reliance was placed by Mr. Mehta, reads as under: "The Respondent No.1 and 2 have pleaded fake urgency as there is no evidence of any impending threat of irreparable damage. The Application under Section 9 is based solely on the premise that interim direction for payment of Bank EMI is required as the loan account of RBT will be declared NPA if payments are not made urgently. It is submitted that in light of the spread of COVID -19, the Reserve Bank of India has vide circulars dated 27.03.2020 and 22.05.2020 already clarified that no accounts can be declared NPA till 31.08.2020. Further, no communication/notice has been issued by South India....
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....rarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, (1960) 3 SCR 713: AIR 1960 SC 1156:" "These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton, 1942 AC 130 '.....
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....o be initiated, to liquidate the loan. As such, it is submitted that there was no such pressing urgency as would justify grant of the impugned interim protective measures. 12. I am unable to agree. Once the possibility of the loan account of RBT being declared NPA, and SARFAESI proceedings, being initiated in that regard, loomed large, if the learned Arbitral Tribunal sought to grant interim protection in order to avoid such an exigency, I can hardly interfere with the exercise of such discretion, in exercise of my appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act. 13. It cannot be said that the learned Arbitral Tribunal ought to have waited for a 60-day notice under the SARFAESI Act to be issued in the first instance, before granting interim protection. One does not close the stable doors after the horses have bolted. In any event, once there was a real and live possibility of the bank account of RBT being declared an NPA, owing to non-infusion of EMIs into the account, that, even by itself, in my view, would have justified the passing of the interlocutory protective order by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. 14. The objection of Mr. Mehta, to the finding of urge....
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....of the MoU, the appellant, Rajan Chadha, Rajiv Chadha and Sumit Gupta, held 25%, 25.68%, 25.68% and 23.64%, respectively, in RBT. Respondent No. 4 Shilpa Gupta did not hold any shares in RBT. 23. According to the MoU, the parties would jointly manage the affairs of RBT till 31st October, 2019, and, with effect from 1st November, 2019, the appellant undertook to manage its affairs. All accounts stood reconciled till 31st October, 2019. This position is recognised by Clauses 3, 4 and 8 of the MoU, which read as under: "3. The parties agree that the Fourth Party is ready and willing to take over the entire shares of the First Party and therefore he has represented to the Second, Third, Fifth Party to transfer their respective shares in his favour or in favour of his nominees subject to the fulfillment of the obligations agreed upon between the parties in this MOU. The Parties have agreed that the cut-off date in order to assess the liabilities and assets shall be 31.10.2019. 4. The Fourth Party further agrees that he is solely handling the affairs of the First Party since 01.11.2019 and that he is ready and willing to continue to do the same as per his own perils ....
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....transfer of the shares of the Chadhas and the Guptas in RBT to himself, subject to fulfilment of the obligations envisaged by the MoU. The present dispute relates to the fulfilment of these obligations, particularly in the context of clause 4 of the MoU, which reads as under: "4. The Fourth Party further agrees that he is solely handling the affairs of the First Party since 01.11.2019 and that he is ready and willing to continue to do the same as per his own perils and wishes. The Second, Third, Fifth and the Sixth Party have agreed to exit from the First Party on the terms and Conditions mentioned hereinbelow: - a) The Second and Third Party, hereinafter to(sic) referred to as the 'Exiting Parties', have agreed to exit and transfer their entire shareholding as mentioned in Clause 2 of the recitals of this MOU in favour of the Fourth Party or his nominees subject to the First Party/Fourth Party getting released the Collateral Security i.e. house bearing No. C11/4, Arjun Marg, DLF City, Phase-I, Gurgaon, Haryana-122002 from the South Indian Bank, i.e. where the Loan Accounts of the First Party are being maintained. b) That in order to fulfill its o....
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....irst Party." 28. Clause 5 of the MoU contemplated that, till the time of completion of obligation by the appellant, as envisaged by Clause 4, the appellant would be solely liable for handling day-to-day affairs of RBT, with effect from 1st November, 2019 and that, the Chadhas would have no role to play therein. It read thus: "5. The parties agree that in the meantime as to when the Fourth Party shall be arranging for completion of his obligation as mentioned in the Clause 4 hereinabove, the Fourth Party shall be solely liable for handling the day to day affairs of the First Party from 01.11.2019 the Second and Third Party shall not have any form of say in the affairs of the First Party." 29. Clause 7, as already noted hereinabove, required the appellant to, till successful completion of MoU, continue to pay all statutory dues and accounts overhead, including bank instalments and other day-to-day expenses of RBT from 1st November, 2019. The Chadhas and the Guptas were entirely absolved from responsibility in this regard after 1st November, 2019. 30. Clause 10 of the MoU noted the fact that the Chadhas had handed over, to Mr. Raman Arora, the signed documents of tra....
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....the following prayers: "In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be graciously be pleased to grant the following ex-parte ad interim measure:- a. Direct and/or restrain the respondents from disposing off/alienating, siphoning off or in any manner creating any third-party interest or charge in the assets of respondent No. 1; b. Restrain the respondents from using the premises of respondent No. 1 company for business operations of any other entity except for respondent No. 1; c. Direct the respondents to file before this Hon'ble Court all the books of accounts of the respondent No. 1 from 01.11.2019 till dated; d. Direct the respondent No. 2 to provide and execute all such documents as required for filing a claim for TUFF subsidy and to also provide for the Login credential of the GST filing account for filing of the GST refund to the tune of Rs. 90,00,000/- (Rupees Ninety Lakhs Only); e. Direct the respondents to forthwith pay the Loan Liability of respondent No. 1 and release the collateral security provided for by the petitioners for the loan facilities ava....
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....rator, the respondent No. 2 must be directed to pay the EMIs which are required to be paid monthly and the said liability must not be fastened upon the petitioners. That apart, it is his submission that the petitioners have come to know that the respondent No. 2 is taking away the raw material and the machinery installed at the premises of the respondent No. 1 company in Faridabad. That apart, he also states that the premises of the respondent No. 1 company is being used for third parties and not for respondent No. 1, which must be restrained. Mr. Mehta dispute the submissions. He on instructions also state that neither any material nor any machinery is being taken away. He qualifies the submission by stating that the pending reference to the Arbitrator, the petitioners shall not take away any raw material or machinery from the premises of the respondent No. 1 company. He also state that the premises is not being used for third parties and shall not be used so in future. 7. Having noted the submissions made by the counsels for the parties and their agreement for appointment of a new Arbitrator, this court deem it appropriate to appoint Justice Indermeet Kaur, a retired Jud....
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.... read as the reliefs prayed for under Section 17 of the said Act. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 & 2 at the outset has an objection to the conversion of application from Section 9 to Section 17 of the said Act and its maintainability. He may take this objection in his reply which he has yet to file to this pending application. Reply be filed by the respondent No. 1 & 2 within 4 days i.e. on or before 21.6.2020 with a copy to the counsel for the petitioner. Rejoinder be filed within 4. days thereafter i.e. on or before 25.6.2020. List before the undersigned on 26.6.2020 at 4.30 p.m. at AB-84, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi. The court notes that apart from Respondent No. 1 & 2 there are 2 other respondents i.e. Respondent No. 3 & 4. Today at about 4 p.m. an email was received from respondent No. 3 informing the undersigned that due to the Covid situation he is unable to appear. It is noteworthy to note that the said respondents (No. 3 & 4) had not appeared before the Hon'ble High Court. Reliefs claimed in the pending application are even otherwise not directed against respondent No. 3 & 4. Be that as it may let respondent No. 3 & 4 be served t....
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....ourt has under Section 9 of the said Act. The powers under Section 9 and Section 17 are at par. The language in Section 17(1) (2) (e) clearly states"Arbitral Tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court for the purposes and in relation to, in proceedings before it". The issue of the enforceability of the Arbitral proceedings is contained in Section 17(2). It would also be relevant to note that Section 9(3) had also been amended and states "once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-Section(l) unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious." 27. Section 17 which is contained in Chapter IV of the said Act presupposes the pendency of "arbitral proceedings before the interim measures/reliefs as contained in the said section can be granted and these powers are within the domain of the Arbitrator". The undersigned is of the view that the arbitral proceedings were pending before the undersigned on 17.6.2020 when a statement had been made by the claimants that the application under Section 9 of the said Act be treated as an applic....
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....ion, empowering the arbitral tribunal to treat the Section 9 petition as a Section 17 application, the learned Arbitral Tribunal would not be acting strictly within its authority in doing so. Having said that, this point was not orally urged before me either during the course of argument; neither does it find place in the written submissions filed by the appellant. 42. That apart, if one reads the order dated 11th June, 2020, of this Court, in a holistic manner, it is difficult to treat the objection of the appellant, regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Arbitral Tribunal vis-a-vis its power to convert a Section 9 petition into a Section 17 application, as fatal to the impugned order. 43. Paras 2 to 4 of the order dated 11th June, 2020, set out the original dispute between the appellant and respondents. 44. Para 6 notes, at the outset, the submission, of learned Senior Counsel for the Chadhas, that he had no objection to the appointment of a new arbitrator "to adjudicate the dispute between the parties". Any power to adjudicate the dispute between the parties, needless to say, also includes the power to adjudicate on any prayer for interim relief, if raise....
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....s appeal, to any provision of the 1996 Act which prohibits the learned Arbitral Tribunal from doing so; nor has any such provision come to my notice. 50. The objection, of the appellant, to the learned Arbitral Tribunal having treated the Section 9 petition as an application under Section 17 is, therefore, rejected. Re. objection regarding maintainability of Section 17 application in absence of Statement of Claim 51. The second ground on which the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitral Tribunal was questioned, was the non-existence, on the date when the Section 17 application was preferred before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, of any statement of claim under Section 23, having been preferred by the Chadhas. The contention advanced before the learned Arbitral Tribunal - which was reiterated by Mr. Mehta before me - was that, in the absence of a statement of claim, no application under Section 17 of the 1996 Act was maintainable. The statement of claim, admittedly, came to be filed only after the impugned order was passed. This, according to Mr. Mehta, was fatal to the impugned order. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Mehta, in this regard, on the judgment of this Court in BPL L....
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....nitiated, during the arbitral process or even after the passing of the Award. If, therefore, before a Statement of Claim is filed, the situation that presents itself is such that interim protection has to be granted, to ensure the preservation of the arbitral process, the Court under Section 9, and the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17, is empowered to grant such protection. In view of this peculiar dispensation, unique to arbitration, I am of the opinion that the filing of Statement of Claim under Section 23 cannot be treated as a sine qua non for the maintainability of an application for interim protection under Section 17. 56. The decision in BPL Ltd. 2008 (1) Arb. LR 325 relates to a period prior to the amendment of Section 17 by Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. Section 17, prior to amendment (by way of substitution) read thus: "17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal. - (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order a party to take any interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the d....
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....of Section 17 at any point of time. The arbitral proceedings have commenced even before the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, as the notice invoking arbitration would necessarily be prior in point of time. From its very inception, therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to pass orders on any application filed, before it, under Section 17, by any of the parties. The requirement of filing of a statement of claim, prior to moving the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17, can no longer be regarded as a mandatory requirement, after the amendment of Section 17 with effect from 23rd October, 2015. 60. Even under the pre-amended Section 17, I may note that a Single Bench of this Court of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikramjit Sen (as he then was), in NTPC Ltd. v. BALCO Ltd. MANU/DE/1204/2004 opined that an application under Section 17 would lie even in the absence of a prior Statement of Claim. Para 6 of the report, in which it is so held reads thus: "6..... As has already been seen, the impugned Orders had been passed in April 2004, before the Claims had been filed before the learned Arbitrator. Predicated on this sequence of events the Award has been assailed on the ground of ....
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....ndication in the language of the two sections to the effect that an Arbitrator cannot also follow the same practice. All that is necessary is that the Arbitrator should have become broadly acquainted with the subject matter of the dispute. I cannot therefore accept the argument that the impugned Order is flawed on the ground that it preceded the filing of the Statement of Claim." (emphasis supplied) That the power and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, under Section 17, is co-equal with the power of the Court under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, stands recognised recently by the Supreme Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel v. Essar Bulk Terminal 2021 SCC OnLine SC 718 The decision in BPL 2008 (1) Arb. LR 325, which is also of a learned Single Judge of this Court does not take into account, the earlier decision in NTPC and cannot, therefore, be followed, even for this reason. 61. The objection, of the appellant, to the Arbitral Tribunal having condescended to entertain the Section 17 application of the Chadhas, even before a statement of claim was filed by it, is also, therefore, rejected. On merits 62. On the merits of prayer (e) in the Section 17 application o....
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....tement of the loan accounts. It is pointed out that there are 3 loan accounts of the company with the South Indian Bank i.e. a CC Limit; TL168; TL169. It is pointed out that the bank loan status as on 31.10.2019 was Rs. 9,72,96,977.97 but as on 14.2.2020 the respondents having infused money into this loan account has now reduced the loan liability to Rs. 6,11,76,074.37. In this context learned counsel for the claimant points out that even presuming that the loan liability of the company has been reduced these amounts are not the amounts which have been infused by the respondents into the loan account; these were amounts due to the company on other accounts which have been deposited into the loan account of the company. No money by Shri Sanjay Arora has been deposited into the account of the company. Admittedly balance confirmation has also not been received from the bankers. The obligation on the part of the claimants to infuse any money at this stage into the loan account of the company would thus not arise; it would arise only when the respondents have fulfilled their obligation. 34. Clause 5 stipulated that in the meanwhile till the 4th party is arranging for the funds,....
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.... 36. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the EMIs qua the loan account (which are 2 EMIs of Rs. 9.72 lacs in a month) have to be discharged by the company in order that the loan account of the company does not become an NPA which otherwise would then target proceedings under the SARFESI Act. Learned counsel for the claimant points out that the company was not abiding by this regime and the last installment of Rs. 9.72 lacs had been paid by the claimants into the loan account of the company (admittedly paid) in order that the loan account of the company does not become NPA although this was not an obligation caste upon him. The obligation to discharge the EMIs into the loan account of the company was upon Shri Sanjay Arora. The claimant had done this only on an apprehension that the property might become the target of SARFESI proceedings. 37. Learned counsel for the claimant further submits that he is only pressing prayer (e) of his application. The undersigned notes this submission. The undersigned also notes the statement/concession granted before Hon'ble High Court by the respondent on 11.6.2020 which would continue till the disposal of the arbitral....
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....use 4(b)(iv) of the MoU entitled the Chadhas to, consequent on exercise by the appellant of his option under Clause 4(b)(iii), take over the entire balance outstanding loan. As such, the responsibility to infuse monies into the said loan account was on the respondents, once the option under Clause 4(b)(iii) had been exercised by the appellant. (iii) The learned Arbitral Tribunal had erred in holding that the appellant had failed to infuse, into the loan account of RBT, the amounts which were required to be paid by him. Mr. Mehta drew my attention to para 33 of the impugned order, which notes the fact that the appellant had, before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, produced the bank loan status of RBT as on 14th February, 2020 vis-à-vis the status which stood on 31st October, 2019, which showed that the loan liability of RBT had been reduced from Rs. 9,72,96,977.97 to Rs. 6,11,76,074.37. This, it was submitted, was because of the infusion of monies, by Sanjay Arora, the appellant, into the loan account. (iv) Subsequently, during arguments, however, responding to the findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal that there was no evidence to show that these monies h....
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...., has not informed the Claimants or called upon the Claimants to deposit any amount in the Term Loan Account. It is further a matter of record that the Respondent No. 2, in order to exercise the said option had to submit with the Claimants a balance confirmation from the bankers after infusion of the amount by him, which admittedly the Respondent failed to do." (v) In view of the fact that the loan account statement of RBT clearly reflected reduction of its loan liability, the learned Arbitral Tribunal was in error in holding that there was no formal confirmation from the bank in that regard. Reliance has also been placed, by Mr. Mehta, in this context, on Clause 4(b)(iv) of the MoU to contend that the respondents could have approached and dealt with the bank directly. He has also referred to a communication dated 23rd February, 2019, from Rajan Chadha to the Bank and to a response dated 2nd March, 2020, from the Bank to Rajan Chadha, regarding the outstanding loan amounts. (vi) In these circumstances, the onus to show willingness to infuse the amounts, into the loan account of RBT, proportionate to their respective shareholdings, was on the Guptas and the Chadhas....
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.... 3. The parties agree that the Fourth Party is ready and willing to take over the entire shares of the First Party and therefore he has represented to the Second, Third, Fifth Party to transfer their respective shares in his favour or in favour of his nominees subject to the fulfillment of the obligations agreed upon between the parties in this MOD. The Parties have agreed that the cut-off date in order to assess the liabilities and assets shall be 31.10.2019." Time was, therefore, according to Mr. Rao, of the essence of the MoU. Mr. Rao also contends that, by virtue of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause 4(b), the entire liability of RBT, after 1st November, 2019, was of the appellant. He has laid particular emphasis on the words "by him" contained in Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MoU, to contend that the infusion of monies into the loan account of RBT had, in the first instance, to be by the appellant in his personal capacity. No exception can, therefore, according to Mr. Rao, be taken to the finding, of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, that there was no material to indicate that the appellant had infused any money into the loan account of RBT. Mr. Rao has also referred, in thi....
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.... was the appellant. This position, he reiterates, also stands recognized in para 34(v) of the statement of claim which later came to be filed by the Chadhas. 69. Mr. Mehta also faults the learned Arbitrator in distinguishing between amounts personally infused into the loan account of RBT by the appellant and those which may have augmented the loan account owing to liquidation of debts by third parties. He submits that the balance confirmation even if received back from the Bank, would not show the source of funds. As such, by making receipt of the balance confirmation from the Bank a condition for infusion of amounts into the loan account by the Guptas and the Chadhas, Mr. Mehta submits that the MoU eviscerated the distinction between monies infused into the loan account of the bank personally by the appellant and monies which may have come from third parties. 70. Mr. Mehta also contends that the impugned order amounts to a mandatory injunction at an interlocutory stage, which the learned Arbitral Tribunal was not competent to grant and which, even otherwise, was not justified in the facts before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. He also submits that the impugned order amounts t....
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....tas, in the event of the appellant electing to follow option (c) [in Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MoU] supra. The Chadhas and the Guptas could take over the entire balance outstanding loan as on the date of offer by the appellant to their personal names or in the names of their associate companies. In that event, the Chadhas and Guptas were required to share, with RBT and the appellant, the No Dues Certificate from the Bank. 73. The options at (a) and (b) were never exercised by the appellant. They are, therefore, of no relevance to the present case. The dispute relates entirely to option (c) - and, in its wake, option (d). 74. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has correctly held that, before any liability, to make any payment, or to take over the balance outstanding loan, devolved on the Chadhas or the Guptas [under option (c)], the appellant was required, in the first instance, to discharge his obligation under the said option. This required the appellant himself to deposit, in the loan account of RBT, the share required to be contributed by him, and to produce documentary proof of such deposit having been made "by him", in the said loan account. 75. The submission of the appella....
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....ty, as required by Clause 4(b)(iii). 79. The contention, advanced in the written submissions filed by the appellant and reproduced in para 64 supra, to the effect that "no distinction could be created between the funds infused by the appellant in RBT after 01.11.2019 and the profits/income/assets of RBT" would amount to re-writing of Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MoU and would, in fact, provide for yet another alternate mode of liquidating the loan liability of RBT. In this context, I find substance in the reliance, by Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, on the words "by him", as contained in Clause 4(b)(iii), referring to the source of infusion of funds into the loan account of RBT, resulting in reduction of its loan liability. These words definitively belie the contention advanced by the appellant, in their written submissions, that no distinction could be created between the funds infused by the appellant in the loan account and the profits/income/assets of RBT. 80. Nor am I able to accept the contention that the mere use of the words "First Party/Fourth Party" in Clause 4(a) of the MoU would operate to entitle the appellant to treat receivables infused into the loan account of RBT from other s....
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.... be the "equivalent amount", for the purposes of the Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MOU. The contention of Mr. Mehta that the appellant must be treated as having complied with the requirement of infusion of an "equivalent amount" into the loan account of RBT, as contained in Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MoU, does not, therefore, commend itself to acceptance. 83. The second requirement, in order to entitle the appellant to the benefit of the third option under Clause 4(b)(iii) of the MoU, was the receipt of confirmation from the banker of the reduced reduction of loan liability of RBT. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has held that no such confirmation was received. To this, Mr. Mehta's response is that, as the statement of the loan account of RBT was issued by the bank, no further confirmation was required. There may be some substance in this contention, especially as the MOU did not specify any particular format in which the bank was to certify the reduced loan liability. Nonetheless, as the statement of loan account of RBT did not evince reduction of the loan liability consequent upon infusion of any amount by the appellant in excess of Rs. 90,50,000/-, the finding of the learned Arbitra....
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...., by the Chadhas and Guptas, from the affairs of RBT were not, prima facie, satisfied in the present case. The sequitur would be that after 1st November, 2019, all liabilities of RBT including payment of loan taken from the banks were to be met by the appellant. I am unable, therefore, to fault the learned Arbitral Tribunal in directing the appellant to continue to pay the EMIs, during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings. Concluding observations 87. This Court has noted that, as a matter of routine, appeals are preferred against interlocutory orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, even if they do not result in irreparable prejudice to the appellant and are always capable of being modified when the final arbitral award is passed. Unlike the course of action, which it follows while dealing with petition under Section 9, the Court, when seized with an appeal against an interlocutory order of the learned Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, is constrained to return findings on merits, on the issues in controversy, as the Court is effectively sitting in judicial review over the findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal. These findings have the potentiality of effec....