TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (12) TMI 1146
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....ECIR was then recorded on 05.12.2012 by the Enforcement Directorate. In the investigation, it was found that 13 forged Vishesh Krishi and Gram Udyog Yojana licences (VKGUYL) were taken from M/s Reliance Industries Limited by the appellant M/s Sunkkalp Creations Private Limited. It was in conspiracy with Shri Piyush Viramgama of M/s Bansi Overseas & Krish Overseas, Rajkot with the ulterior motive to mis-use those VKUGY licenses. 4. It was revealed that 13 licenses were used to create forged licenses. It was in criminal conspiracy that Sh. Niyaz Ahmed, who procured DGFT stationery from one Chander, a suspended employee of Central Licensing Authority, DGFT, New Delhi. It was to prepare forged license and in the process of forging the licences, the words "Exchange Control copy" printed on the top right hand side of the licenses were erased and over-written with the words "Customs Purpose Only". The details contained in the original licenses were replicated on the forged licenses. The port of registration was changed in the forged license. It was made Mangalore Sea in place of JNPT, Mumbai. The signature of the DGFT officer/FTDOs were also forged apart from post rubber stamps affixed....
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....22 INSC 180]. 11. The elaborate Judgement on the issue was given by the Telangana High court in the case of Hygro Chemicals Pharmtek Pvt. Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors [MANU/TL/1003/2023] 12. In the light of the judgement aforesaid, case is not made out to cause interference in the impugned order or to declare the attachment to have lapsed. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent further contested the appeal even on the second ground. It was submitted that no material has been produced to show the property attached to be of joint ownership. If it is of joint ownership, the person holding the part of the property should have come forward to challenge the attachment order but there is no appeal in the hands of anyone else than the appellant. Thus, even the second ground is not made out. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no other ground has been raised by the appellant, thus the contest has been limited to the ground urged by the appellant. 15. We have considered the rival submission. The brief facts of the case has been narrated in the opening paras of the order which is not required to be reiterated because appeal has not been pressed to ....
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....02.2022 which was excluded by the Apex Court in computation of limitation vide In re: Limitation (supra) is applicable to orders confirming provisional attachment within 180 days? i) The Petitioner in W.P. No. 34238 of 2022 contends that the provisional attachment order i.e., PAO No. 04 of 2022 dated 03.02.2022 could not have been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 22.08.2022 as the same was passed after the lapse of 180 days. Further, the Petitioner contends that Adjudicating Authority cannot rely on In re: Limitation (supra) in calculating the period of 180 days in light of the Apex Court's decision in S. Kasi (supra). ii) In W.P. No. 34627 of 2022, the provisional attachment order therein i.e., PAO No. 01 of 2021 was passed on 01.02.2021. Pursuant to which an original complaint under Section 5(5) of the PMLA was filed on 19.02.2021 and show cause notice under Section 8(1) of the PMLA was issued by the Adjudicating Authority on 03.03.2021. A hearing under Section 8(2) of the PMLA was conducted on 05.07.2021 and 06.07.2021. However, no confirmation order was passed till date. The Petitioner contends that as 180 days have lapsed since the....
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....id order clarified that where any statute provides an outer limit of limitation period within which the proceedings are to be completed, the period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded in computing such period. The relevant paragraphs of In re: Limitation, 2022 (supra) are extracted below: 5.1. The order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0158/2021 : (2021) 5 SCC 452 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 40 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 615 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 50], 27-4-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0358/2021 : (2021) 17 SCC 2] and 23-9-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0946/2021 ], it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings. 5.2. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-10-2021, if any, shall becom....
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.... section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that- (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first p....
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....d by the High Court, then such period during which the stay operates shall be excluded in computing the 180-day period. Further, Section 5(3) of the PMLA states that a provisional attachment order passed under Section 5(1) of the PMLA shall cease to have effect after the expiry of 180 days from the date of provisional attachment. ix) A conjoint reading of Sections 5(1) & 5(3) of the PMLA indicates that the period of 180 days within which a confirmation order shall be passed is mandatory. This view is fortified in light of the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India MANU/SC/0924/2022 wherein the Apex Court dealing with constitutionality of various provisions of the PMLA held that the period of 180 days is in the form of a procedural safeguard. The relevant paragraph is extracted below: 287. Be that as it may, as aforesaid, sub-section (1) delineates sufficient safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officer before issuing provisional attachment order in respect of proceeds of crime. It is only upon recording satisfaction regarding the twin requirements referred to in sub-section (1), the authorised officer can proceed to issue order of provisio....
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....ant to note exclusion of certain period is different from extending the period. In the present case, the Apex Court exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 in computation of limitation. Therefore, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded while computing the period of 180 days under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. xiii) As stated above, the Petitioners relying on the decision in S. Kasi (supra) and other decisions of the High Courts in Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), Gobindo Das (supra) and Hiren Panchal (supra) contend that the decision in In re: Limitation(supra) is not applicable to PMLA proceedings. This Court cannot accept the said contention of the Petitioners. xiv) In S. Kasi (supra), the question before the Apex Court was whether the decision in In re: Limitation (supra) extended the time period `to complete investigation and file charge sheet and whether default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter 'CrPC') could be denied on the ground that investigation was not completed and charge sheet was not filed due to Covid-19. The....
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.... 10] never meant to curtail any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other statute which was enacted to protect the personal liberty of a person. The right of prosecution to file a charge- sheet even after a period of 60 days/90 days is not barred. The prosecution can very well file a charge-sheet after 60 days/90 days but without filing a charge-sheet they cannot detain an accused beyond a said period when the accused prays to the court to set him at liberty due to non-filing of the charge-sheet within the period prescribed. The right of prosecution to carry on investigation and submit a charge- sheet is not akin to right of liberty of a person enshrined under Article 21 and reflected in other statutes including Section 167 CrPC. 29. We, thus, are of the view that neither this Court in its order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020: (2020) 19 SCC 10] can be held to have eclipsed the time prescribed under Section 167(2)CrPC nor the restrictions which have been imposed during the Lockdown announced by the Government shall operate as any restriction on the rights of an accused as protected by Section 167(2) regarding....
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....re, In re: Limitation (supra) does not extend to PMLA proceedings in computation of 180 days within which provisional attachment of properties has to be confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Court therein also held no period of limitation is prescribed under Section 5(1) & 5(3) of the PMLA and after the lapse of 180 days, the Adjudicating Authority becomes functus officio. Further, had the legislature or the Government thought it fit, they would have expressly extended the period within which provisional attachment of properties could have been confirmed. However, the Court left the question regarding the applicability of In re: Limitation (supra) in computation of 180 days open. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 23. Therefore, a reading of sub-section (1) of Section 5 with Section 2(1)(d) of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the effect of the Provisional Attachment Order is deprivation of the right to property. 25. In the present case, the Act clearly deprives the person against whom the Provisional Attachment Order is passed of his right to deal in the property against which the attachment is ordered. Such deprivation can therefore, be for....
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....f a cheque. This itself shows that the orders of the Supreme Court are not a universal extension of time across the board, be it limitation or period prescribed for doing a particular thing, or as in the present case, the period of validity of an order. 32. The above distinction is also apparent to the Government of India as it promulgated The Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Ordinance, 2020 on 31.03.2020, extending the time limit for completion of any proceedings or passing of any order etc. specified in the Acts specified therein. However, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not one of the "specified Acts" under the Ordinance. Therefore, the respondents cannot take benefit of even this Ordinance. On the other hand, the Ordinance clearly shows that the reliance of the respondents on the orders of the Supreme Court is liable to be rejected. 35. The above judgment clearly highlights the reason and the limit of the order dated 23.03.2020 passed by the Supreme Court. It also highlights that the said order was never meant to curtail any provision of other statute which is enacted to protect the personal liberty of a person. In my ....
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....ent of bank accounts and postal accounts in question of the petitioner, dated 11th December, 2019, which has expired its validity on 9th June, 2021, has no force after expiry of 180 days from the date of passing of such order in view of not passing any formal order under Section 8 (3) of the said Act extending the validity of the same by the Respondent No. 2 and the action of Respondent No. 3 in not allowing the petitioner to operate its bank and postal accounts in question after the expiry of the period validity of 180 days from the date of the order passed under Section 5 (1) of the aforesaid Act, such action of the Respondent Enforcement authority, is arbitrary and illegal. 14. In view of the discussion made above this Writ Petition is allowed by declaring that the impugned order of provisional attachment of Bank accounts and postal accounts in question dated 11th December, 2019 passed under Section 5 (1) of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 after expiry of 180 days on 9th June, 2021 is ceased to have any effect or force as a consequence of failure on the part of the Respondent Enforcement authority/Adjudicating authority in passing further order under Sectio....
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....rescribed period of limitation in instituting a proceeding. 18. Section 5(3) is a clear embargo on the order of attachment continuing to have effect after the expiry of 180 days. Section 5(1) designates the authority and the steps to be taken for proceeding against any person who is in possession of any proceeds of crime. The section is hence concerned with the procedure to be undertaken for provisional attachment of a property subject to the fulfillment of the other conditions in Section 5. A prescribed procedure after the same has been initiated cannot be equated to institution of a suit or filing of a petition/application which is a starting point of litigation for a person who seeks relief under a statute. The 180 days window in Section 5 contemplates an endpoint whereas the Supreme Court in the Suo Motu writ petition sought to protect the starting-point, which was at the risk of being defeated by reason of the pandemic. 19. In other words, what was being protected by the orders of the Supreme Court was the right to remedy, not the right to take away a remedy under a given statute. The respondents before this Court seek to do the latter. The only step taken by....
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....specified time frame. If the Authority does fail to take requisite steps, the right to relief arises immediately after exhaustion of the 180 days window and once such right is (supra). xviii) According to this Court, the decision in S. Kasi (supra) cannot be relied upon by the Petitioners to contend that In re: Limitation (supra) is not applicable in computing 180 days under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. In S. Kasi (supra), In re: Limitation (supra) was held to be inapplicable to proceedings involving personal liberty of a person where the investigating officer failed to file charge sheet within the prescribed time. The decision in S. Kasi (supra) cannot be extended to PMLA proceedings dealing with confirmation of provisional attachment order within 180 days. xix) It is true that provisional attachment of property has an effect of potentially depriving a person of his property. However, right to personal liberty and right to property stand on a different footing and cannot be equated. This is evident from the fact that the urgency in concluding proceedings dealing with a person in jail is much higher than a person whose property is provisionally attached. Further, und....
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....r case so as to invoke the option available under sub-section (4) of Section 8. 305. Indisputably, statutory Rules have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 73 of the 2002 Act regarding the manner of taking possession of attached or frozen properties confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority in 2013, and also regarding restoration of confiscated property in 2019. Suffice it to observe that direction under Section 8(4) for taking possession of the property in question before a formal order of confiscation is passed merely on the basis of confirmation of provisional attachment order, should be an exception and not a rule. That issue will have to be considered on case-to- case basis. Upon such harmonious construction of the relevant provisions, it is not possible to countenance challenge to the validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the 2002 Act. xxi) Therefore, provisions prescribing timelines and which deal with police investigation upon which a person's liberty is dependent has to be strictly construed. On the other hand, where timeline is prescribed for attachment of properties and due to unforeseen circumstances like C....
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..... Kasi case [S. Kasi v. State, MANU/SC/0491/2020 : (2021) 12 SCC 1] , this Court also noticed that a coordinate Bench of the same High Court had already held [Settu v. State, MANU/TN/3790/2020] that the said order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] did not cover the offences for which Section 167 CrPC was applicable but, in the order [S. Kasi v. State, MANU/TN/7730/2020] impugned, the other learned Single Judge of the same High Court took a view contrary to the earlier decision of the coordinate Bench; and that was found to be entirely impermissible. In any case, the said decision, concerning the matter of personal liberty referable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and then, relating to the proceedings to be undertaken by an investigating officer, cannot be applied to the present case relating to the matter of filing written statement by the defendant in a civil suit. xxiii) Further, a Division Bench of Madras High Court in S. Prasanna v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India MANU/TN/8962/2022 held that the decision in S. Kasi (supra) is not ....
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....nd filing the original complaint within 30 days under Section 5 of the PMLA, prejudice cannot be caused to it by not excluding the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. One litigant's interests cannot be protected at the cost of another. This Court would further like to stress that the provisionally attached properties can still be enjoyed under Section 5(4) of the PMLA. xxvi) The reasoning in Hiren Panchal (supra) that what was protected under In re: Limitation (supra) was institution of proceedings and not proceedings which were already initiated cannot be accepted in light of the decision in Prakash Corporates (supra) which held that In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be narrowly applied. xxvii) Lastly, the decisions in S. Kasi (supra),Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), Gobindo Das (supra) and Hiren Panchal (supra) cannot be applied for the simple reason that In re: Limitation (supra) was further clarified in In re: Limitation 2022 (supra) wherein the Court at Para 5.4 (extracted supra) held that where time period is prescribed for termination of proceedings, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded. In the present case, Section 5(3) of the PMLA states....