TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (11) TMI 1335
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.... NAVNEET KUMAR For the Petitioner : Mr. Rahul Kumar , Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar , Sr. SC , CGST Mr. Anurag Vijay , Jr. SC , CGST For the Respondent No.9 : Mr. Nitin Kumr Pasari , Advocate Mrs. Sidhi Jalan , Advocate Mr. Gaurav Kaushalesh , Advocate ORDER Per , Sujit Narayan Prasad , J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the order dated 24.08.2022 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi (hereinafter referred as to the learned Tribunal) has been assailed by which the Original Application being O.A No.051/00438/2020 filed by the writ petitioner has been rejected by the learned Tribunal on the ground of delay and laches as also barred by limitation. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is required to be enumerated which reads as under: That petitioner is a general candidate who joined the CGST and Central Excise, Ahmedabad Zone on 29.06.2009 on the post of Stenographer Grade-III. It is pleaded that the petitioner along with other candidates of Grade-II which was later designated as Grade-II joined at Ranchi Zo....
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....his first representation after which he rendered two more representations dated 28.10.2019 and dated 03.12.2019 again seeking the same prayer for restoring his seniority and reviewing the DPC's that were conducted after the erroneous fixation of seniority amongst the Inter-Commissionerate transfer candidates had been done right from the very beginning. Even after representing so many times he received no reply from the respondent authorities. He had submitted a fourth representation dated 08.01.2020 reiterating his grievance. In reply to the representation, the respondents stated that no statutory provision has ever been made obligatory with regard to following any mechanism for accepting application of Inter-Commissionerate transfer for determining seniority in future. It was further informed that a clarification was being sought from the Board with regard to the corrected seniority list which was forwarded vide letter dated 03.06.2019. Thus, it is apparent from this response that even the respondent authorities have no idea as to what principle is being followed in order to ascertain the seniority amongst the Inter-Commissionerate transfer candidates. It is pleaded that....
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....s have appeared and taken the ground of delay and laches as also the limitation. Such ground has been taken on the basis of the fact that the seniority list was prepared on 20.06.2013, as such, approaching the Court of Law after lapse of six years has been laid to be barred by the principle of delay and laches as also the limitation. 7. Original Application being O.A No.051/000438/2020 has been dismissed by the Central Administrative Tribunal vide order dated 24.08.2022 on the ground that "O.A suffers from acquiescence and laches on the part of the petitioner and is barred by limitations. Hence, O.A deserves to be dismissed accordingly." 8. Being aggrieved, the writ petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. Argument by the learned counsel for the petitioner: 9. Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner while assailing the impugned order has submitted that the learned Tribunal has passed the order by rejecting the Original Application on the ground of delay and laches as also on the ground of limitation. But the said ground cannot be said to be proper because the delay and laches at all or even the principle of....
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....eniority list, i.e., on 20.06.2013, therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any error. 14. Mrs. Sidhi Jalan, the learned counsel, who put her appearance on behalf of the respondent no.9, on being noticed, has also defended the impugned order. She has adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-CGST while defending the impugned order. Analysis 15. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and gone across the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order. 16. This Court before entering into the legality and propriety of impugned order, would like to refer herein that this Court vide order dated 05.03.2024 has issued notice to the private respondent nos. 5 to 9. In pursuant thereto, the respondent no.9 has appeared, the notices upon the respondents nos.5 to 9 have been shown to be validly served. 17. It appears from the order dated 08.07.2024 that the service upon the respondent nos.5 to 9 is complete through their Controlling Authority and, hence, this Court has taken up the matter for final hearing and, accordingly, the learned counsel for the parties have advanced their arguments. 18. On the basis of th....
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....behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after Respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when Respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot ....
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....Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. 23. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 by referring to the judgment rendered in the case of Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 has observed which reads as under: "17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 524] and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India [(1995) 5 SCC 628 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1273 : (1995) 31 ATC 186]." 24. Such law has been laid down in view of the principle that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is no period of limitation having been prescribed to approach the High Court. The question which requires consideration herein is the power of the learned Tribunal which has been created by way of an amendment incorporated in the Constitution by insertion of a new Art....
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.... (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." 27. Therefore, it is evident that the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 wherein the Tribunal is to apply the principle of limitation for the purpose of acceptance of the original application subject to the power to condone the delay, meaning thereby, the whatever power has been conferred to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same is little bit different, even though the Tribunal is having the Constitutional status to the effect that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is non- applicability of principle of limitation and, as such, by virtue of the judicial pronouncement the principle of delay and laches has been held to be applicable on the principle that inordinate delay cannot be allowed to approach the Court of equity after lapse of a reasonable delay, subject to sufficient cause. 28. While on the other hand, the Tribunal is to proceed on the premise of the applicability of principle of limi....
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....h v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an e....
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.... court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." 30. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Co....
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....ms (P) Patna/ Jamshedpur. Madam/Sir, Sub: Forwarding of Revised Provisional Seniority List of Stenographer Grade - and Stenographer Grade-ll as on 01.01.2019 (Corrected up-to 15.05.19)- reg. In continuation to this office letter of even C.No. 3814-22 dated 19.03.2019, please find enclosed herewith Revised Provisional Seniority List of Stenographer Grade -I and Stenographer Grade-II, working in this Zone as on 01.01.2019 (Corrected up-to 15.05.2019) for circulation and needful at your end. The Revised Provisional Seniority List of Stenographer Grade-I and Stenographer Grade-Il as on 01.01.2019 (Corrected upto 15.05.2019) has been prepared in the following manner: a. The relative seniority among the officers appointed through ICT has been determined in accordance with their respective order of selection for such transfer as per para 3.1 of DOPT 0.M: No: 22011/7/86-Estt(D) dated 03.07.86. b. Further, the seniority of ICT officers has been fixed by placing them below all officers appointed regularly to the grade on the date of absorption as per Para 3.5 of DoPT O.M. No. 03.07.86. In this connection, it is requested to pleas....
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....seniority list which is provisional in nature. 39. As such, the cause of action is said to be accrued from the day when the decision, if will be taken by the authority concerned, on the basis of the objection so raised by the authority and not on the basis of the seniority list published on earlier occasion. 40. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the objection has been dealt with by the authority on 13.01.2020 and immediately within a period of one year the Tribunal has been approached by the petitioner and, as such, it is not even a case to satisfy the learned Tribunal for the purpose of condoning the delay, since, the Tribunal has been approached within a period of one year from the date when the objection of the writ petitioner has been rejected , i.e., on 13.01.2020. 41. This Court is conscious with the power which is to be exercised by the High Court as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein and while dealing with the said power, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 while conferring the power to the learned Tribunal of the Court of first instanc....
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....or apparent on the face of the order means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be exercised. The scope of judicial review conferred to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in sowing interference with the award passed by the adjudicator/Tribunal as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no. 7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a quest....
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....ued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari." 45. In Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, (1....
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....at paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under: "30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137]. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not b....