TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (8) TMI 1917
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....overy of damages. 1.1. This matter, arising out of the aforesaid suit for recovery of damages, carries a peculiar and chequered history of its own, with assortment of several undisputed actual facts, a few disputed facts, and varied rounds of litigations. In a brief outline of the subject matter, it may be noticed that the Plaintiff-Appellant had allegedly taken certain parcels of land Comprising field Nos. 805/1, 805/3, 805/4, 806, 807, 808 & 809 in Kalakkadu Village and field No. 495 in Malayadipudur Village (Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District), in all admeasuring 197.36 acres-Hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question' or 'the subject land'. on lease (initially for a period of 5 years in the years 1961-1972 and later, for a period of 25 years in the years 1977-1978) from its owner Sri Nanamamalai Jeer Mutt, Nanguneri Hereinafter referred to as 'the Mutt'. for plantation and co-related purposes. The case of the Plaintiff-Appellant has been that by virtue of a notification dated 06.03.1976, as issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the land in question was proposed to be included in a wild life sanctuary under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 19....
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.... and dismissed the suit. Hence, the Plaintiff-Appellant has preferred this appeal. The relevant background and factual matrix 2. The relevant background and factual aspects of the matter could be briefly summarised as follows: 2.1. The Appellant, a partnership firm, had taken the land in question, admeasuring 197.36 acres, on lease from its owner, the Mutt, for the purpose of cultivating commercial crops such as tea, coffee and cardamom over 80 acres of the total available land. The Appellant has alleged that the land in question was given on lease on 15.11.1971 but the registered lease deed in that regard was executed by the Mutt on 01.07.1972, for a period of 5 years i.e., from 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977. 2.2. By G.O. Ms. No. 183 dated 06.03.1976, issued Under Section 18(1) of the Act of 1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu stated its approval of the proposal of Chief Conservator of Forests to notify Kalakkadu Reserve Forest in Tirunelveli District as a sanctuary for the protection and development of wild life therein. This allegedly included the aforesaid 197.36 acres of land leased to the Appellant. 2.3. On 23.03.1975 and on 17.09.1976, the Appellan....
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....id, various proceedings and exchange of communications took place where on one hand, the Appellant and the Mutt made several attempts to get the subject land excluded from the proposed sanctuary and on the other hand, on 24.06.1984, the Appellant filed a written statement in the award inquiry along with the claim in Form No. 8 under the Rules of 1975, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 41,36,866/-. The authorities concerned also exchanged various interdepartmental communications for the purpose of assessment of the amount of compensation. All these proceedings and communications need not be elaborated herein but it may be noticed that on 01.08.1985, the Collector rejected an application filed by the Appellant for registration of Cardamom Estate in the land in question on the ground that the land was to be acquired for the purpose of setting up of the wild life sanctuary. Thereafter, on 23.03.1990, the Collector addressed a communication to the Special Commissioner and the Commissioner of Land Administration that the compensation together with solatium and interest for the land belonging to the Mutt was estimated at Rs. 72,98,661/-. On 03.12.1990, the said Special Commissioner....
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.... tea plantations; Rs. 96,00,000/- towards anticipated development of cardamom; and Anr. Rs. 96,400/- towards the cost of the building constructed. The Appellant also claimed 30% solatium and 12% p.a. interest from the date of notification until the date of award and 15% p.a. future interest on the total amount of compensation. 2.11. On 16.04.1992, the award proceedings were completed and a draft award was forwarded by the District Revenue Officer to the Special Commissioner. However, since the Respondent did not take further steps for making the award, another writ petition, being W.P. No. 6931 of 1993, was preferred, jointly by the Mutt and the Appellant, seeking directions for early making of the award. This writ petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.08.1993 with directions for making the award within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The learned Single Judge directed in the order dated 11.08.1993 thus: "Hence I direct the competent authority, viz., Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration to take into consideration the valuation proposals sent in Collector's Office reference ....
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....t is submitted that pursuant to this communication dated 12.11.1993, the Special Commissioner sent the letter dated 17.11.1993 to the Collector, Tirunelveli to exclude the land in question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 1972; and thus the Collector issued the questioned order dated 19.11.1993. 2.15. The said order dated 19.11.1993 was challenged jointly by the Mutt and the Appellant by way of a writ petition in the High Court, being W.P. No. 21721 of 1993. The present Appellant also filed a contempt petition (No. 340 of 1994) complaining of disobedience of the orders earlier passed by the High Court. On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the said order dated 19.11.1993; and also held the officers concerned guilty of contempt and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each of them. However, the order so passed by the learned Single Judge was questioned by the Respondent-State by way of an intra-court appeal, being WA No. 1041 of 1995, that was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 18.09.1997 but with several remarks and....
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....em to seek exclusion of the period during which they had been prosecuting the matter in the High Court. These observations of the Division Bench of the High Court had been as under: "20. We do not propose to say that the Government is blemishless. On the otherhand, the Government had acted thoughtlessly both at the stage of the notification Under Section 18 and at the stage of withdrawal from the notification. The Government must suffer the consequences of their action, both issuing declaration Under Section 18 and in committing inordinate delay in passing the award and ultimately withdrawing from the notification. But the damages suffered by the Respondents on account of the Government's acts of commission and omission has to be proved in a Court of law. The Respondents have no doubt, a valid case against the Government for their acts of commission and omission. The question is what is the actual remedy of the Respondents. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), is no doubt applicable on the facts of the present case. But, we are only pointing out that the remedy of the Respondents is elsewhere. They have no right to insist....
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.... 197.36 acres of land, belonging to the Respondents and another extent of 148.55 acres from the limits of the proposed sanctuary. as perfectly in order and within the powers of the Government. Consequently, the prayer sought for in W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 cannot be granted and the writ petition will stand dismissed. The appeal is allowed in the above manner, leaving it open to the Respondents to agitate their rights in an appropriate forum. Contempt appeal No. 6 of 1995 is also allowed. There will be no order as to costs." 2.17. In order to complete the chronicle of background, it may also be noticed that the present Appellant alone preferred a petition for Special Leave to Appeal before this Court against the said judgment dated 18.09.1997, which was dismissed in limine on 23.02.1998. 2.18. Only after conclusion of the aforesaid litigation with dismissal of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal by this Court on 23.02.1998 that the Appellant took up the action in civil Court for recovery of damages. 2.19. Before dilating on the facts and events relating to the action for recovery of damages, it would be apt to summarise the material facts and features n....
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....93 and until 18.09.1997, the Appellant could not file the suit for damages. It was also submitted that in view of the rights specified, and the liberty given, by the Division Bench of High Court, the suit was maintainable and was not barred by limitation. 3.1. As regards the measure and quantum of damages, the Appellant referred to the alleged loss of earnings @ Rs. 2.31 lakhs per annum on the basis of valuation worked out in the award inquiry for the very same land. The Appellant also claimed interest at the rate of 18% per annum and yet further claimed the cost of re-plantation and rearing operations as also the loss of profit for a period of 3 years that was likely to be taken for the crops to yield the fruits. The Appellant claimed the total loss of earning for 22 years from 06.03.1976 and other components of loss as follows: Rs. "(a) Total on loss for 22 years (Rs. 2.31 lacs xx 22 years) 50.82 lakhs (b) Interest on loss of income for 22 years 70.13 lakhs (c) Cost of replantation and rearing operations for 3 years @Rs. 5000/- per acre for 75.52 acres (restricted to) 7.00 lakhs (d) Repairs to Factory/Office and Labour Sh....
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....etween the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Defendant-Respondent submitted that the land owner had not come forward with any claim since there was no loss caused to them; and the Plaintiff, if having any right under the law, was required to seek his remedy only with the lessor and not against the Defendant. 4.2. The Defendant-Respondent also submitted that even if the land in question was notified, the cause of action, in any case, accrued to the Plaintiff on 19.11.1993 and, therefore, the suit for damages was barred by limitation. The Defendant further submitted that the Division Bench, while allowing the writ appeal (by its judgment dated 18.09.1997), though had kept it open to the Plaintiff to rely on the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Limitation Act'. for excluding the period during which the matter was pending in the Court but, the Limitation Act was of no assistance to the Plaintiff inasmuch as what was being prosecuted earlier was a challenge to the proposal of acquisition and then for compensation for the alleged take-over of the land in question whereas, what was being prosecuted in the suit was the claim for damages for t....
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....vated with plantation crops but after the area was declared as wild life sanctuary, normal plantation was not allowed due to the land acquisition proposals. The learned Judge also referred to the letter dated 23.03.1990 (Ex. P-21) by the Collector, Tirunelveli to the Special Commissioner and to the proceedings dated 03.12.1990 (Ex. P-22) of the Special Commissioner which were carried out for the purpose of assessment of the amount of compensation. Ultimately, the learned Judge accepted the submissions of the Plaintiff that loss of earnings was calculated by the officers concerned at the rate of Rs. 2.31 lakhs per annum; and held the Plaintiff entitled to this amount for 22 years i.e., a sum of Rs. 50.82 lakhs. The learned Judge though rejected the other claims of the Plaintiff but allowed another sum of Rs. 1 lakh towards repairs of factory office. In this manner, the Plaintiff-Appellant was held entitled to the total sum of Rs. 51.82 lakhs towards damages. On issue No. 6, the learned Judge awarded another sum of Rs. 35.06 lakhs being interest @ 6% p.a. from 06.03.1976 to 18.09.1997 and also held the Plaintiff entitled to the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing until realisa....
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....he embargo envisaged Under Section 20 is relating to inter vivos transfer of any right in or over the land comprised within the area. Therefore, the Plaintiff as an existing lessee for five years and the original owner were as such not debarred from exercising any right. However, it is apparent from the admitted facts that the subsequent lease for 25 years was executed in favour of the Plaintiff after issuance of notification Under Section 18. Since the Plaintiff claims right on the basis of subsequent lease for 25 years, which was admittedly executed by the original owner after notification Under Section 18, it is doubtful whether the Plaintiff had acquired any right at that time, at least against the State. At any rate, even assuming that the Plaintiff had any right as a lessee, there was no statutory embargo debarring the Plaintiff from exercising his rights. *** *** *** 24. In the present case, there is nothing on record to indicate that in respect of the area claimed, the Plaintiff and the original owner had ever been dispossessed and prevented from exercising any right, save and except the refusal to grant permission for felling the trees way back in 1976. I....
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....ns and the writ appeals, which had been filed, we do not find any allegation that at any point of time the original owner and the Plaintiff had been prevented from exercising their normal rights. We fail to understand as to why the Plaintiff should be paid compensation by way of damages unless there is any unlawful act on the part of the Defendant. Merely because the Plaintiff misunderstood the scope of declaration Under Section 18 of the Act or the fact that some enquiries were pending, is not a ground to award damages. 8.2. The Division Bench of the High Court also examined the purport and effect of the previous judgment dated 18.09.1997 and pointed out that the observations therein did not mean that the rights and liabilities of the parties had been decided and only quantification of the amount of damages was to be made. The Division Bench held, in the following, that the Plaintiff-Appellant, having failed to plead and prove the specific case of unlawful activity on the part of the State or its officials, was not entitled to recover any amount as damages: 28. It is no doubt true that in the Division Bench decision, while deciding the writ appeal in favour of the Gove....
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....ew of its findings on the relevant issues, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the State and dismissed the appeal filed by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant was dismissed. Hence, this appeal. Rival contentions: 9. Assailing the impugned judgment dated 26.02.2007, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant has painstakingly taken us through all the background aspects of the matter and the relevant provisions of the Act of 1972; and has strenuously contended that the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in law as also on facts in reversing the considered decision of the learned Single Judge and in dismissing the suit filed by the Appellant. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to the jurisprudential concepts of ownership and property; and has contended that the lease hold rights on the subject land and plantations thereon had been the valuable property of the Appellant; and deprivation of the usufruct of the subject land had been in direct violation of the Appellant's right to property for which, the Appellant is entitled to claim damages. The learned Counsel has particularly referred to the letter ....
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.... of the learned Single Judge deserves to be restored. In support of these contentions, the learned Counsel has relied upon several decisions, including that in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (Dead) by L.Rs. (1993) Supp (2) SCC 149, which need not be dilated upon, for the reasons occurring infra. 9.2. As regards the quantum of damages, the learned Senior Counsel has argued that when the Appellant has suffered huge loss for having been deprived of using the land in question and prevented from taking the usufruct, the quantum of damages had rightly been assessed on the basis of the loss of earnings assessed by the officers of the Respondent-State during the award inquiry; rather the assessment had been on the lower side, looking to the loss and deprivation suffered by the Appellant. 9.3. The learned Counsel has also referred to the contentions sought to be urged on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent with reference to Section 60 of the Act of 1972 and has contended that such a plea was neither taken in the written statement nor any issue was framed in that regard nor any such contention was urged before the Single Judge and hence, the Respondent cannot take such a plea at ....
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.... not entitled to make any claim for damages when the land in question was not acquired by the Government. The learned Counsel has contended that the land in question belonged to the Mutt, and if at all the same was leased to the Appellant, the only remedy available to the Appellant was against the Mutt and not the State as there was no privity of contract between the State and the Appellant. The learned Senior Counsel has also raised the contention that in terms of Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959', the alleged lease for a term of 25 years was null and void because such a lease could not have been made unless sanctioned by the authority concerned; and, in this regard, only a cursory statement was made by PW1 of having obtained permission but no documentary proof of the requisite sanction was adduced. 10.1. The learned Counsel has also contended that with the State and its officers having exercised their powers under the statute i.e., the Act of 1972 in a legal manner, the suit for damages was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the Act of 1972. T....
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....ent-State. In other words, the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly allowed the appeal filed by the State and has rightly dismissed the baseless suit filed by the Appellant. Hence, this appeal sans merit and deserves to be dismissed. 12. Before dilating on the questions relating to limitation and sustainability of the Appellant's claim for damages, we may observe that the contentions belatedly put forth on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent, as regards validity of the alleged second lease in favour of the Appellant on the anvil of the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959 (as urged before this Court); and as regards immunity from any action as per Section 60 of the Act of 1972 (as urged before the Division Bench of High Court) cannot be said to be wholly without substance. We would hasten to observe that the case of the Appellant is not being rejected on these grounds for the reason that such contentions were not urged at the trial stage but, in the given set of facts and circumstances, we feel rather impelled to make prima facie observations in regards to these aspects. 12.1. As per the case of the Appellant, the second lease deed dated 20.03.1978 in relation to the land in que....
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....ggestions were invited and considered. For want of necessary evidence on the validity of second lease deed, prima facie it appears seriously questionable if the Plaintiff-Appellant had at all acquired any right in the land in question by virtue of the said lease deed, much less a right to claim damages from the State. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we are leaving the aspect relating to the effect of Section 34 of Tamil Nadu Act of 1959 at that only, essentially because we are satisfied that the said lease deed was even otherwise impermissible and in any case, even on the basis of this questionable second lease, the Plaintiff-Appellant has no right to claim damages. 12.2. Secondly, by virtue of Section 60 of the Act of 1972, The relevant parts of Section 60 of the Act of 1972 read as under: 60. Protection of action taken in good faith.-(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any officer or other employee of the Central Government or the State Government for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act. (2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Governmen....
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....tifications dated 06.03.1976 and 28.08.1978, the provisions in Sections 18 to 24, 27 and 28 of the Act of 1972, under the sub-heading "Sanctuaries", with which we are largely concerned in this appeal, had been as under: 18. Declaration of sanctuary.-(1) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area to be a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment. The provisions contained in Section 18(1) came to be amended by Act No. 44 of 1991 with effect from 02.10.1991. The amended provisions of Section 18(1) read as follows: "18. Declaration of sanctuary.-(1) The State Government may, by notification, declare its intention to constitute any area other than an area comprised within any reserve forest or the territorial waters as a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment." 19. Collector....
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....civil court for the trial of suits. 24. Acquisition of rights.- (1) In the case of a claim to a right in or over any land referred to in Section 19, the Collector shall pass an order admitting or rejecting the same in whole or in part. (2) If such claim is admitted in whole or in part, the Collector may either- (a) exclude such land from the limits of the proposed sanctuary, or (b) proceed to acquire such land or rights, except where by an agreement between the owner of such land or holder of rights and the Government, the owner or holder of such rights has agreed to surrender his rights to the Government, in or over such land, and on payment of such compensation, as is proved in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894). By the said amendment Act No. 44 of 1991, Sub-clause (c) was added to Section 24 as follows: "(c) allow, in consultation with the Chief Wild Life Warden, the continuation of any right of any person in or over any land within the limits of the sanctuary." *** *** *** 27. Restriction on entry in sanctuary.- (1) No person other than,- (a) a public servant on duty, (b) a person ....
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....esiding in the sanctuary. (2) A permit to enter or reside in a sanctuary shall be issued subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. 15.1. It could at once be noticed that a few changes were brought about by the amending enactment i.e., Act No. 44 of 1991, having the effect of slightly altering the process of declaration of sanctuary. Prior to the said amendment, the notification Under Section 18(1) of the Act of 1972 was of the declaration of an area to be a sanctuary whereas, after the amendment, such notification Under Section 18(1) would be of declaration by the State Government of its intention to constitute an area as a sanctuary. However, the remaining part of the scheme of the provisions regarding the powers of the Collector to determine the rights; the bar over accrual of rights after issuance of notification Under Section 18; issuance of proclamation by the Collector; inquiry by the Collector; and the Collector's powers for the purpose of inquiry remained essentially the same. It may, however, be pointed out that in view of modification in the scheme of the process of declaration of a sanctuary, whereby, after the a....
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....the case at hand. The operation and effect of Section 20 of the Act of 1972 16. It is beyond the pale of doubt that in the scheme of the Act of 1972, issuance of a notification Under Section 18 thereof has the peculiar and striking effect, of arresting the accrual of any right in the land comprised within the limits of the area specified in such notification except by way of testamentary or intestate succession (vide Section 20 ibid.). Even if the Appellant was given the land in question on lease for a period of 5 years from 01.07.1972, that period came to an end on 30.06.1977. On this date of completion of the term of the lease, indisputably, the notification Under Section 18(1), which was issued on 06.03.1976, was in operation and it had been the specific assertion of the Appellant that the subject land was included in the said notification. Even when the Defendant-Respondent made an uncertain attempt to suggest that the subject land was not included in the said notification Under Section 18(1) of the Act, it had been the specific assertion of the Appellant that it was so included and the entire matter, including the claim of the Appellant, has proceeded on the basis that i....
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....er the right of the Appellant (if any) in the subject land was infringed in the manner as to give the Appellant a cause to maintain an action for damages. Noteworthy it is that the claim for damages in the present suit is based on the assertion that the Respondent-State through its officers caused prejudice and injury by preventing the Appellant from entering the subject land and enjoying the usufruct thereof and then, by denying compensation for acquisition by lately excluding the subject land from the sanctuary. Such assertion of the Appellant has also taken its strength from some of the observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court in its aforesaid judgment dated 18.09.1997, whereby the claim of the Mutt and the Appellant against the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 was rejected. In our view, there is no merit in the claim of the Appellant. 17.1. The Division Bench of the High Court has noticed in the impugned judgment dated 26.02.2007, and rightly so, that even as per the admission of the PW-1, the Appellant had not been dispossessed. So far as the restriction on entry is concerned, as per Section 27 of the Act of 1972, a person having any right over the immovabl....
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....denied. The question, however, is about the effect of this letter. In our view, even if the said letter, being essentially of interdepartmental correspondence, is taken on its face value, nothing much turns upon it because, as rightly observed by the High Court, there is nothing on record to indicate that the original owner and the Appellant were prevented from going inside the subject land and from collecting the usufructs; and it cannot be said that the Appellant was prevented in any unlawful manner by the State in exercising its lawful right (if at all the Appellant had any such right). 20. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly answered both the material questions i.e., as to whether the Appellant had any right in the subject land; and if there was any such right, as to whether the same had been infringed, against the Appellant in a proper manner and in accordance with law. No case for granting any decree for damages is made out. Limitation 21. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the question of limitation naturally arises for consideration. If the actions of the officers of the Re....
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.... any reason; and stated the conclusion that the suit was filed within time. The Division Bench, on the other hand, pointed out its prima facie doubts on the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act but did not decide the question of limitation, as the claim was being negatived on merits. Having regard to the subject matter, it appears appropriate to deal with this issue and to point out as to why Section 14 would not apply. 21.4. Section 14 is one such provision in the Limitation Act that provides for exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting one civil proceeding bona fide in a Court not having jurisdiction, while computing limitation in any suit where the matter in issue is same as that of the earlier proceeding. The heading of this provision and Sub-section (1) thereof may be extracted as under: 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates t....
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.... of all the creditors; but in the latter, the money due is sought to be realized for the benefit of the decree-holder alone, by processes like attachment of property and arrest of person. It may be that ultimately in the insolvency proceedings the decree-holder may be able to realize his debt wholly or in part, but this is a mere consequence or result. Not only is the relief of a different nature in the two proceedings but the procedure is also widely divergent. 21.4.4. We may also refer to a Division Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kashinath Shankarappa v. The New Akot Cotton Ginning and Pressing Co. Ltd. AIR 1951 Nagpur 255 wherein, on the question as to whether in an action for recovery of debt in the civil Court, the time spent in the winding up proceeding could be excluded, the High Court answered in the negative thus: 28. The grounds on which a company can be wound up are set out in Section 162, Companies Act. There are number of them. Even if it be assumed that the application was Under Section 162(v), namely, that the company was unable to pay its debts Section 163(1) shows that the expression "unable to pay its debts" embraces three distinct concepts. Ther....
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.... This is apart from the other requirements that the previous proceeding had been civil proceeding, which were being prosecuted by the Plaintiff with due diligence and in a Court which, from the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, was unable to entertain the same though the Plaintiff had been prosecuting in that Court in good faith. 21.5. In the present case, except the fact that the earlier writ petition in challenge to the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 was civil proceeding and the Plaintiff might have been prosecuting with due diligence, none of the other requirements of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are satisfied. The basic requirement, that the matter in issue in the earlier and the later proceeding ought to be the same; and both the proceedings, earlier and later, ought to relate to the same cause of action and for the same relief, is totally missing. Rather, the matter in issue in the earlier proceeding could well be contradistinguished from the matter in issue in the present suit. In the said earlier proceeding, the Plaintiff-Appellant joined the Mutt to assert that the Respondent-State was not entitled to exclude the land in question from sanctuary....