TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1955 (11) TMI 51
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....f this case be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. Orby Howell Mootham, C.J. 3. The question which has been referred to this Bench is whether the time required for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree appealed from should be excluded in computing the period .of limitation for preferring an appeal fixed by the Rules of this Court under the Letters Patent. The relevant facts are that judgment in two connected second appeals was delivered by Brij Mohan Lall J. on 3-10-1950, the learned Judge granting leave to the present appellants to file a further appeal under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent ceased to have effect from the date upon which the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 came into force, but by virtue of Clause 9 of that Order and Article 225 of the Constitution rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the former High Court are applicable to the present Court, and, although not strictly accurate, it is convenient to refer to the Rules which we have to consider as made under the Letters Patent. On 11-10-1950, an application was made for a certified copy of the judgment and decree. The copy of the ....
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....xtent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply". It is not in dispute that the first schedule to the Limitation Act does not provide a period of limitation for an appeal under the Letters Patent, and (assuming that the Rules made by this Court are a special or local law, the first question is whether the provisions of Section 29(2) have any application when a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for an appeal for which BO period is prescribed in the first schedule . 7. The answer to this question depends upon the construction to be placed upon Section 29(2), a matter which is by no means free from difficulty. 8. This sub-section in my opinion falls Into two parts and makes provision for two different but connected matters. The first part provides that "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period off limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule....." The purpose of th....
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....s to me to indicate chat the provisions of the second part of the sub-section lay down a rule of general application in the case of all suits, appeals and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the special or local law. 10. I am further of opinion that the second part of the sub-section has not been made a separate sub-section but has been connected to the first part of the existing sub-section by the word "and" -- I venture to think that possibly the more appropriate word would have been "but" in order to make it clear that the provisions of the second part apply also to the suits, appeals and applications to which the first part refers, and so to remove the anomaly which would otherwise arise when applying Section 3 which is itself made subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Act. 11. The conclusion which I have reached on the interpretation of this sub-section is I think supported by the course of legislation culminating in the present Section 29(2). 12. Prior to its amendment in 1922 by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act of that year, Sub-section (1) (b) of Section 29 of the present Act provided that "Nothing in this Act....
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....putting a forced interpretation on their language". 'The Queen V. Nyn Singh' 2 NWP 117 (FB) (F). If the second part of the sub-section refers only to suits, appeals and applications to which the first part applies -- that is to those suits, appeals and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed which differs from that provided therefore in the first schedule -- the consequences will be highly inconvenient; for in that case the sub-section will make no provision for what is to occur when either the special or local law prescribes for a suit, appeal or application- a period which is the same as the period prescribed for such suit, appeal or application in the first schedule, or when the schedule omits -- as in the case before us -- to provide a period of limitation. Moreover a very anomalous position arises if the special or local law prescribes, as in the case of certain suits under the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, three periods of limitation one of which is the same as the period prescribed in the first schedule and the two others are different. Such, in my opinion, cannot have been the intention of the Legislature. 16. The meaning and effect of Section....
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....uld follow, for if an appeal is barred by limitation when the memorandum of appeal is preferred the right of appeal itself no longer exists, and the Court would in my opinion be bound to dismiss it on that ground. 18. In my opinion the first part of Section 29(2) only comes into operation when two different periods of limitation are prescribed by Schedule 1 and the special or local law respectively, but, for the reasons I have endeavoured to state, the provisions of the second part of the sub-section are of general application for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law for any suit, appeal or application. 19. I do not entertain any doubt that the rules made by the former High Court at Allahabad under its Letters Patent and continued in force by the virtue of Clause 7, U.P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, are special or local laws within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It has not been contended that they are not law; but they are a law of restricted local application as they concern only the jurisdiction of this Court the territorial extent of which is confined to the limits of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Whether they....
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....el for the appellant it is unnecessary for me to consider the second argument which he has advanced and on that argument I express no opinion. 24. In my judgment the appellant is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from, and I would answer the reference accordingly. Balram Upadhya, J. 25. The question referred to this Bench is as to whether in computing the period of limitation fixed by the rules of this Court for preferring a Letters Patent Appeal the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and the decree should be excluded. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice, and my brothers Raghubar Dayal, Agarwala and Bhargava, JJ. The arguments advanced by Mr. Kirty, learned counsel for the appellant, are that the rules framed by this Court under the Letters Patent are 'special' or 'Local' law within the meaning of Section 29(2), Limitation Act, 1908, and, therefore, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act would apply for the purpose of determining the period of limitation. The second argument advanced is that the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act are of genera....
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....irst case, Section 3, Limitation Act will apply 'per se'. In the second case, Section 29(2), Limitation Act lays down that the period prescribed under the special or local law would be read as if it were prescribed in the first schedule of the Limitation Act for purposes of applying Section 3 of the Act. In the third class of cases, where a special or local law prescribes a period which Schedule I, of the Indian Limitation Act has omitted entirely to prescribe, the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall be applicable by virtue of the second part of Section 29(2) as observed by my Lord the Chief Justice. I respectfully adopt the reasons given by him for the view that 'the provisions of the second part of the sub-section' laid down a rule to general application in the case of all suits, appeals and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the special or local law. 27. Chagla C. J. in AIR1953Bom35 considered Section 29(2), Limitation Act to be applicable even when a particular special law prescribes a period which is not provided for in the first schedule of the Limitation Act at all. At p. 36 he observed: ....
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....ion 4; Sections 9 to 18 and S, 22, Limitation Act shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by any such special or local law and the other provisions of the Act shall not apply. This further provision in Section 29(2) as to how the period of limitation prescribed by any -special or local law is to be determined, is independent of the earlier part of Section 29(2) which deals with the applicability of Section 3, Limitation Act only. The provision is consistent with the object of the Limitation Act to be a statute consolidating the law relating to limitation. As mentioned before, all possible remedies were thought of and provided for in the Articles, and this provision further provides that if any special or local law lays down some period of limitation which may or may not have been prescribed in the first schedule of the Act, the general rules which govern the determination of the period of limitation and are applicable to the periods prescribed in the first schedule have been made to govern those periods also which are so prescribed under the special or local law. 29. To my mind, it is not essential to decide in the present case as....
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.... of limitation prescribed therefore and the time from which such period begins to run, the sections embody the principles, which have been recognized as forming part of the law of limitation, and subject to which courts and authorities have to decide as to whether a suit, appeal or application is or is not within limitation. A perusal of the sections makes this clear. Section 4 lays down that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the court reopens. The provisions of this section are very general. When a period is prescribed for instituting a suit or preferring an appeal, the suitor concerned is required to file a suit or appeal within that period. If the Court itself is closed and the suitor concerned is unable to file the suit or appeal within the specified period he cannot justly be said to be at fault, and this section only provides that he will have an opportunity of filing the suit or appeal on the date that the Court reopens, after the expiry of the period during which he had to act. There can be no doubt th....
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....nd nowhere has it been stated in the sections contained in this part that the rules of computation should be applied only to the periods of limitation prescribed in the schedules. The sections say that in computing the period of limitation prescribed certain periods shall. be excluded or that a fresh period of limitation may be computed from a particular date and that all Instruments shall be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian Calendar for the purposes of the Act. These rules are general in nature and having regard to the fact that the Limitation Act is a Code dealing with the law of Limitation, it does not appear correct to hold that these general rules are intended to be made applicable only to the periods prescribed in the schedule and not to the periods prescribed under other enactments. A different view has, however, been taken by Chagla, C. J., in the 'Kanara Ban's case (A)' referred to above. At p. 37 he observes' "When a statute speaks of period of limitation prescribed it can only mean prescribed by that statute itself." Two reasons appear to have been stated as justifying this view. The first is, in the words of the learned Ch....
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....ry bar the provisions would have been applicable. I regret that in spite of anxious consideration due to a pronouncement coming from such an eminent Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the view taken by Chief Justice Chagla. 32. The difference is also attributed to convenience of expression and made with a view to avoid repetition. A perusal of the relevant sections does not, to my mind, justify such a view. The object for which the Act was framed, the scheme which is apparent from the provisions made in the various sections, and the arrangement, do not appear to support this construction. The Legislature wanted to codify the law of limitation and a glance at the schedules indicates the comprehensiveness of the attempt made. Yet the Legislature must have been alive and Sections 5 and 29 do indicate that it was so alive, that periods of limitation not provided for in the schedules may be prescribed by other enactments and that periods of limitation different from those prescribed in the schedules might be prescribed by certain other enactments. It hardly seems fair to assume that while attempting to codify the law of limitation the Legislature left the general principles to ....
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....e U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Amalgamation Order), the same Jurisdiction was continued in the amalgamated High Court designated as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by Clause 7 of the Order which laid down that the new High Court was to have all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before 26-7-1948, was exercisable in respect of any part of U. P. by either of the existing High Courts (which term included the erstwhile Allahabad High Court and the Chief Court in Avadh). Reference has to be made to the Letters Patent of the High Court in Allahabad in order to interpret the jurisdiction conferred by Clause 7 of the Amalgamation, Order and, in this case, the appeal to the Division Bench lies from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in the two connected second appeals as to result of the continuance of the power to entertain such appeals which: was granted by Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The rules of Court applicable to these special appeals were the rules in force in the years 1950-and 1951. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was delivered on 3-10-1950, and, at ....
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....n of the period of limitation are applicable in cases where the period of limitation is prescribed by a general law does not, in my opinion, fall to be considered in this case, as the rules of Court, which prescribe the period of limitation for a special appeal, cannot be held to be a general law. I do not, therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act and other sections of that Act which regulate the computation of the period of limitation are applicable to cases where the period of limitation to be computed has been prescribed by a general law which may be in 'pari materia' with the Limitation Act such as the Code of Civil Procedure. In -- 'Kandaswami Filial v. Kannappa Chetty AIR1952Mad186 , Rajamannar C. J., held: "It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in 'pari materia' and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other." He went on to add: "It followed that if there was a general provision in the Limitation Act, it would ....
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.... latter section. The Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court issued in 1866 laid down in Clause 10 the provision that "an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subordinate to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge of the said High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal." This right of appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge granted to the Allahabad High Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent was continued by Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order referred to above when the new High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was constituted by amalgamating the Allahabad High Court and the Chief Court in Avadh. The power of making rules to regulate the manner for the exercise of such jurisdiction granted by Section 13 of the Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. Cap. 104) was also continued by Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1919, which repealed the Act of 1861. In fact, Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 19....
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....ned Advocate is right that the Letters Patent of this Court is neither a special nor a local law and this is supported by the observations of Cunliffe J., in AIR 1930 Rang 228 (J)'". Meredith J., considered it unnecessary to decide whether a rule made by a High Court under the Letters Patent was a special or local law and expressed no opinion on that point. Mukharji J., the third Judge constituting the Bench, also did not express any definite opinion on the question whether the rules of Court have the force of a special or local law. In giving his decision, he was of the view that "Even if it is held that the High Court Rules have the force of special law although, strictly speaking, they cannot be classed as such, the provisions of Section 29 (2), Limitation Act, cannot be said to apply to an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court." With all respect, I have to differ from Manohar Lall J., inasmuch as I consider that the question whether the Letters Patent of a High Court are a special or local law does not arise at all where the point for decision is whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the determination of the ....
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.... of limitation prescribed were applicable to the determination of the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law. In the Limitation Act of 1908 before its amendment and in the Limitation Act 15 of 1877 the corresponding provision was as follows: "When, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed." In view of this language, it became necessary to interpret the scope of the words 'affect or alter' and views differed whether the rules of computation contained in other sections of the Limitation Act did or did not "affect or alter" the period of Limitation prescribed by the special or local law. As has been pointed out by my brother Dayal J., some of the Courts took the view that a special Act was not controlled by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act only when it was of a very special 'kind, complete in itself, and when it did not admit of the several provisions of the Indian Limitation Act being imported into it without incongruity and withou....
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....urther necessary to lay down in clear terms the rules for applying the other general provisions of the Limitation Act when computing the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law. It was for this reason that the second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 was worded as follows: "For the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law-- (a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply." This part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 appears to me to lay down a complete rule for determining the question of applicability of the general provisions of the Limitation Act for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed toy any special or local law. A view has been expressed that this second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 only comes into operation in those limited cases which are also covered by the first part of ,Sub-section (2) of Section 29,....
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....; in order to connect the first and the second parts. So far as I am aware, there is no rule of grammatical construction requiring an interpretation that if sentences, complete by themselves, are connected by the conjunction 'and', the second sentence must be interpreted as being limited to and referring to the first sentence. Of course, the language would have been much happier and would have admitted of no doubt if the two parts of Section 29 (2) had not been linked together by the use of the conjunction 'and' and the second part had been enacted as a separate sub-section. This unhappy drafting of the sub-section by linking the two parts with the conjunction 'and' will not, however, 'justify an interpretation which would take away all effect of the words used in the second part of this sub-section. If this second part is limited to the cases which are covered by the first part, it would not apply for the purpose of determining 'any' period of limitation prescribed for 'any' suit, appeal or application by 'any' special or local law but only for the purpose of determining those periods .of limitation prescribed for any suit,....
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....sub-section will apply in all cases for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application under any special or local law and, as a consequence, whenever the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law has to be determined, the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply, except in so far as and to the extent to which they may be expressly excluded by such special or local law and the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply. The effect of the other interpretation, by which the scope of the second part is limited to cases covered by the first part, can be considered in two different aspects: One aspect arises on the view that, even apart from Section 29 (2), all the general provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to the determination of the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, when the period so prescribed is not different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule. The other aspect arises on the view that those general provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply at all, if the p....
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....y Act. Section 254 of the 0. P. Tenancy Act merely laid down that the suits and other proceedings specified in the Fourth Schedule had to be instituted within the time prescribed in that schedule for them respectively. The effect of the view that the second part of Section 29 (2) is only applicable where the first part of that sub-section also applies would be that, when determining the period of limitation for suits under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, in cases where the circumstances are such that the period of limitation would be only six years or three years, the provisions of Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply. In other cases where the period of limitation prescribed for the suit under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is 12 years and is, therefore, not different from the period prescribed for the corresponding suit under the Limitation Act, two different positions would arise. According to one view not only would Sections 4, 9, to 18 and 22 apply for the determination of the period of limitation in such cases but even other sections, such as Sections 6 and 19, would also apply. The anomaly, that arises, is th....
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.... of an application for execution of a decree. Under serial NOS. 5, 6 and 7 of Group F of the Fourth Schedule to the U. P. Tenancy Act, provision has been made prescribing the period of limitation for execution of money decrees. At serial Nos. 5 and 6, the period is the same as the period prescribed for execution of money decrees in the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, whereas, under serial No. 7, the period is different, being only one year from the date of the decree. If the second part of Section 29 (2) is held to be independent of the first part and applicable to the determination of all periods of limitation prescribed by a special or local law for any application, Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in all these three cases. On the other hand, if the second part is made dependent on the first part, then Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply to applications for execution of a money decree mentioned at serial No. 7 and, on the two different views mentioned above, in one case even Section 19 would apply and in the other case not even Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply in determining the period of limitation f....
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....riod 'shall be excluded', it cannot be held that the period, for the determination of which the exclusion is to take pale ,is being extended. It is only a mode of determining a period that is laid down; when determined, the period would still be the period prescribed which, in this case. would be 60 days. What Section 12(2), when applied to Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, thus brings about is not the extension of the period of 60 days but even after applying this provision, the period of limitation, that has to be computed, is the period of 60 days and no more with the difference that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment is not taken into account and is excluded. Exclusion of time in computing a period of limitation has been placed in a different class and distinguished from an extension of the period in the Indian Limitation Act itself. The provi sion for extension of time is made in S, 5, Limitation Act. Sections 19 and 20, Limitation Act, may also possibly be held to be examples of cases where the period of limitation prescribed is ex tended inasmuch as they lay down that fresh periods of limitation shall be computed under special circumstances. Secti....
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....omputing' used in Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 does not, in my opinion, bring about any conflict as the language of Section 29(2) is clear that, in determining the period of limitation prescribed, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to computation of the period of limitation contained in Sections 12 to 18 must apply. 42. It does not appear to be necessary for me to deal at any length with the effect of the provision in Rule 7 of the Rules of Court that the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or decree appealed from. The principle laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1928 PC 103 (I) makes it clear that Section 12(2), Limitation Act, will apply even when by a rule made by the High Court, a memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or decree. 43. For the reason's given by me above, I agree with answer to the reference proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. Raghubar Dayal, J. 44. The question to be decided is whether in a Letters Patent appeal the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment. and decree should be excluded in computing the period of limitation fixed by ....
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....f four Judges in 2 All 192 (A) that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment appealed from could pot be deducted in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The judgment just expressed the opinion and did not state the reasons possibly for the simple reason that the very language of the rule itself, as interpreted by me above, indicated that the period laid down in the rule was the final period and that, therefore, in computing that period there could not be any deduction of any period for any reason. Of course, the Judge had the discretion to grant further time for good cause shown. 48. It is now contended that this case is no longer good law in view of the case reported in AIR 1928 PC 103 (I) and of the present Section 29, Limitation Act of 1908. At the time when this appeal was filed and decided by the Court the Limitation Act of 1877 was in force. Paragraph 2 of Section 12 of that Act is: "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, and an application for review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pr....
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....r examination it was discovered by their Lordships that the case was not a decision on the Limitation Act, but upon what is known as a Letters Patent Appeal, that is an appeal under the clause in the charter constituting the Court; a rule fixed the period for appeal and there was no provision like that in the Limitation Act for excluding the period of time required for getting copies of the judgment and decree". 51. These observations of their Lordships make it clear that the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act, could not have been relevant to the point which was for decision in the Allahabad case and which point had to be decided on the provisions of the rule framed by the Court for the presentation of Letters Patent appeal, an ap peal under the clause in the charter constitu ting the Court. If it had been otherwise, I would have expected that the Allahabad case would not have been completely ignored from the discussion: and if it had laid down wrong law even though without considering the question of the applicability of the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act, their Lordships would have pointed it out. It seems that the submission of Mr. Kenworthy Brown, which....
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.... not apply and that, therefore, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act apply to the rule of the Court prescribing limitation for the presentation of a Letters Patent appeal. The contention is based on the fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 12 does not expressly state how the period .of limitation to be computed was prescribed the expression used being simply: "in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal.... .the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree... .shall be excluded". 55. In support of his contention reliance is placed on the Full Bench decision reported in --'Duragpal Singh v. Panchamsingh1 AIR1939All403 and the decisions of other High Courts which had subsequently agreed with that view. These other cases are 'Ramgopal BhiAada, Firm v. Sidram Aunayya (P); 'Sitaram v. Chunnilalsa Bhagchandsa AIR1952Mad186 ; and 'Amarendra Lal Khan v. Manindranath Roy AIR1955Cal269 . These cases held that the provisions of Section 48 C.P.C. were controlled by those of Section 15, Limitation Act. I do not agree with the views expressed in these cases regarding the applicability of the general ....
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.... and 20 use the expression "before the expiration of the period prescribed". The other sections i.e., Sections 6 to 11 in Part II and Sections 17, 18 and 21 to 25 in Part III do not use any such expression which would make it necessary to inquire which period prescribed is referred to in the sections where such an expression is used. 58. Ordinarily the expression "period of limitation prescribed" in the Indian Limitation Act should refer to the period of limitation prescribed by that Act. Chagla, C. J., observed in AIR1953Bom35 . "In the first place, this argument runs counter to the ordinary canon. of construction which one must apply in construing a statute. When a statute speaks of a period of limitation prescribed, it can only mean prescribed by that statute itself". It should be unnecessary, therefore, to repeat the expression "by the second Schedule hereto annexed" after the word "prescribed" in every such section where the expression "period of limitation prescribed" has been used. The fact that the omission of such an expression in the section subsequent to Section 4 was not with a view to make the provisions of those sections applicable to the computation of....
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....umn of the first schedule" is "from the time so prescribed". Reference to the third column had to be given in the first sub-section as there had been nothing in the earlier sections, referring to the contents of the third column of the first schedule. The expression "prescribed therefore in the third column of the first, schedule" was not repeated in Sub-sections (2) and (3), but a more convenient expression "so prescribed" was used after the expression "from the time". This indicates that the framers of the Act did not like to repeat unnecessary expressions. The use of the word "so" in Sub-sections (2) and (3) before the word "prescribed" was necessary because otherwise from the expression "from the time prescribed", it would not have been clear as to which prescribed time was contemplated. The omission of the word "so" before the word "prescribed" in the expression "in computing the period of limitation prescribed" in Sections 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Act and in other expressions using the mere word "prescribed" cannot, therefore, point to the inference that the period of limitation prescribed was meant to be the period: of limitation prescribed by any law and not only ....
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....ght to such property shall be extinguished". Such a language appears to have been used because the period contemplated in the section would not only be equivalent to the period of limitation prescribed for instituting a suit for possession of property but would' be equal to such period plus the period extended by the application of the various rules for computing the period of limitation or for the non-commencement of the period of limitation till the happening of a certain contingency. Its provisions, therefore, imply that the Act did contemplate that the period of exclusion provided under the various provisions for the computation of the period of limitation prescribed did really amount to enlarging the period of limitation prescribed for the institution of a suit. 72. Lastly comes Section 29, which, after the amendment of 1922, is; "29. Savings. -- (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if su....
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....h in AIR1939All403 was whether the general provisions of Section 15, Limitation Act, applied to, periods of limitation prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance was placed by the learned Judges on the observations in the Privy Council case reported in 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N). The question which arose for decision in that case was whether Sections 11 and 12,. Limitation Act (Act 14 of 1859) applied to Section 246, Civil P. C. (Act 8 of 1859) which provided that the order which might be passed by the Court under that section would not be subject to appeal; but the party against whom the order be given was at liberty to bring a suit to establish his right at any time within one year from the date of the order. 78. Sections 11 and 12, Limitation Act (14 of 1859) were : "11. If, at the time when the right to bring an action first accrues, the person to "whom the right accrues is under a legal disability, the action may be brought by such person or his representative within the same time after the disability shall have ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time when the cause of action accrued, unless such time shall exceed the period of three years, in ....
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....ng to the 5th sub-section of the 1st section, and the 3rd and 11th sections of Act 14 of 1859, their Lordships have no doubt that the intention of the Legislature was that the period of limitation resulting from the 246th section of Act 8 should in the case of a minor be modified by the operation of the llth section of Act 14; and that this construction has obtained in the Courts of India appears from the case cited from the 3rd Weekly Reporter. (C. B. p. 8)". 81. The reason why Section 11 of the Act was held to apply to Section 246, Civil P. C. of 1859 was that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 246 of Act 8 of 1859 was not shorter than the period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 5, Limitation Act of 1859, for suits to alter or set aside summary decisions and orders of any of the civil Courts and therefore such period of limitation was not to be preferred to the period of limitation laid down in the Indian Limitation Act in view of the provisions of Section 1 which was : "No suit shall be maintained in any Court of Judicature within any part of the British territories in India in which this Act shall be in force, unless the same ....
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.... or by the First Schedule." Adverting to the sharp divergence of Judicial opinion on the point, he observed at page 404: "I do not consider it necessary to discuss In detail the decisions to which reference Was made; firstly because the controversy, so far as this Court is concerned, is in my judgment, concluded by the Full Bench decision in -- 'Dropadi v. Hira Lal' 34 All 496 (U); and secondly because the Legislature by its amendment of Section 29, Limitation Act of 1908 in 1922 placed the matter beyond doubt." I shall deal with the case of 'Dropadi v. Hira Lal (U)' later. The amendment to Section 29 in 1923 does not, to my mind, indicate that the decision in 'Dropadi v. Hjra Lal (U)' correctly interpreted the intention of the Legislature. Nor did it clearly indicate that Section 15, Limitation Act, applied to periods of. limitation prescribed by all laws. It is true that certain general provisions of the Limitation Act had been made applicable in certain circumstances for determining the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local law, but their application can be excluded by an express provision in the special laws. In fact, ....
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....word "prescribed" is used in different connections in the Act and at some of those places it would not mean "prescribed by the first schedule". In fact, I may mention that this expression "in computing the period of limitation prescribed" has direct reference to the period of limitation mentioned in Section 3 of the Act while the other expressions where the word "prescribed" is used need not have direct reference to that, period. There are sections in the Act where the expression "period of limitation" is used and the word "pre-scribed" is not used at all. Such provisions may be of general application. 84. Iqbal Ahmad, J., then referred to the provisions of Sections 6 and 29. I have already mentioned the necessity of mentioning the provisions of the third column of the first schedule and of the use of the word "so" in Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 6. Iqbal Ahmad J. observed at page 410: "The enactment of Section 29 of the present Act In its present form was rendered necessary not because the word 'prescribed'- in Part III of the Act did not mean prescribed by any law for the time being in force but because certain Courts had held that the application of....
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....when the cause of action accrued. The expression "cause of action" is used in Sections 5 to 10, which deal with the computation of period of limitation. It follows that for applying the provisions of Section 11 the Court will have to go to the other provisions of the same Limitation Act, and I may again repeat that under the Limitation Act of 1859 limitation for suits was governed by the provisions of that Act and not by those of any other Act except in the case coming under Section 3, Limitation Act of 1859. 86. Bajpai, J. did consider the question to be not free from difficulty and based his decision on the cases reported in 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N) and 34 All 496 (U) and on there being no limiting words used with reference to the word "prescribed" in the general provisions of the Limitation Act for the computation of limitation. I have indicated my views on these questions. 87. The decision in Am 1943 Bom. 164 (P): is largely influenced by the case reported in AIR1939All403 . 88. The decision In (Q) mainly rested on the provisions of Section 15, Limitation Act, being perfectly general, it being considered that where any restrictions were intended to the applicability of ....
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....Section 48, Civil P. C. was controlled by Section 15, Limitation Act. 90. There does not appear to be any additional consideration mentioned in AIR1955Cal269 for adopting the same view that Section 48, Civil P. C. was controlled by Section 15, Limitation Act. 91. The case reported in (G) raised a question whether the appellant filing a Letters Patent appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge in the exercise of his original civil jurisdiction could take advantage of Section 12, Limitation Act. It was answered in favour of the appellant in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1928 PC 103 (I).1 The case reported in 2 All 192 (A) was distinguished. It was also held in this case that the Letters Patent of the Court did not amount to special or local law. 92. I have already discussed the Privy Council case reported in AIR 1928 PC 103 (I), and expressed the view that it does not lead to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 12 Limitation Act are of general application. 93. I now discuss the Full Bench case in 34 All 496 (U). The question before the Bench was whether the appellant was entitled under Section 12, Limitation Act to deduct the t....
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....dian Limitation Act were not to apply to the periods of limitation prescribed by that Act. But even such a reason would not be compatible with the uncontrolled language of the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. Those general provisions are not subject to the provisions of special laws. I am, therefore, of opinion that such a distinction of the special law being a complete Code or an incomplete Code cannot justify the application or otherwise of the general provisions of the Ind. Limitation Act to the periods of limitation prescribed by special or local laws. 94. The learned Judges further observed at p. 503; "The question is one of considerable difficulty, and it must be admitted that at first sight It is straining the words to hold that the application of the general provisions of the Limitation Act to periods of limitation prescribed by other Acts does not 'affect or alter' those periods. In one sense it certainly does. But the construction accepted by Strachey C. J., Banerji and Muthusami Ayyar JJ. seems to us to be correct". It appears from the further observations in continuation of those quoted above that the learned Judges considered t....
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....h expressly provides that certain portions of the Act are not applicable to suits under two special Acts named, the Indian Divorce Act and Madras Regulation VI of 1831. That, we think, greatly strengthens the inference that in regard to suits under other special Or local Acts the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, subject, of course, to the Qualifications already pointed out". It is not disputed that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, could have applied where possible to the proceedings under special Or local Acts. But it is a different question whether any particular provision of the Indian Limitation Act whose application by its language would ordinarily be limited to the periods of limitation prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act could be considered in connection with the periods of limitation prescribed by special or local Acts. The view expressed by Muttusami Ayyar J., in 18 Mad 99 (FB) (V) was not acceptable to the majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench. He referred to the Privy Council cases reported in 'Mohummud Buhadoor Khan v. Collector of Bareilly,' 1 Ind App 167 (PC) (W) and 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N) and observed a....
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....extended by Legislature due to certain circumstances, necessary provisions about it are provided in the Act creating the limitations, and thus supports the view that the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 7 of the High Court Rules, 1951, could not be enlarged with reference to the provisions of the general Limitation Act as no such beneficial previsions exist in the rule itself which lays down the period of limitation. 98. I have already referred to the case reported in 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N), and do not find anything to support the inference that a special Act is not controlled by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act only when it is of a very special kind, complete in itself, and when it does not admit of the several provisions of the Indian Limitation Act being imported into it without incongruity and without defeating the intention of the Legislature. 99. I do not agree with the other reasoning and have already referred to the inference against it from the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N), the reasoning being that while Section 6, Limitation Act of 1871 prohibited the application of the provisions of that A....
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....ot to be presented after 60 days and that it can be so presented only if the Judge in his discretion on good cause shown grants further time for its presentation. When this special provision enacts a special procedure the general provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be applied in interpreting this provision. 102. I now consider the effect of Sub-section (2) of Section 29, Limitation Act of 1908. This sub-section is: 29(2) "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law -- (a) the provisions contained In Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply". The first part of Sub-section (2) relating to the applicability of the ....
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....ermine the period of limitation means to find out the outer limit by which such suit, appeal or application could be filed, and it is for finding this out that the provisions of Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22, Limitation Act could be applied unless their application was expressly excluded by the special or local law. The other provisions of the Indian Limitation Act do not apply for determining such period of limitation. 104. "To determine" means according to Chambers Twentieth .Century Dictionary "to put bounds to, to put limits, to put an end to" and the word "to compute" merely means "to calculate". Chagla C. J., also observes at p. 36 in the 'Canara Bank, Ltd., case (H)': "In our opinion, the expression "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" does not mean 'computing the period of limitation". In our opinion, every provision in the Limitation Act is Intended for the purpose of determining the period of limitation". 105. It is contended for the appellant that the latter part of Sub-section (2) would be applicable for determining the period of limitation by any special or local law in all cases and its application is not restrict....
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....ction (2) of Section 29 of the Act applies only to those cases which are covered by the first part of that sub-section, that is to cases where the special or local law provides a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed by the first schedule of the Limitation Act and not to all cases for which limitation was prescribed by the special or local law. 108. I am, therefore, of opinion that the benefit of Section 12, Sub-section (2), Limitation Act cannot be given to an appellant presenting an appeal under the Letters Patent. Chandra Bhan Agarwal, J. 109. The above appeal was filed beyond 60 days from the date of the delivery of judgment. It would, however, be within time if the time required in obtaining the copies of the judgment were excluded as provided for in Section 12(2), Limitation Act. At the time when the appeal was filed the relevant rule was Rule 7, Chap. Ill of the Rules of the Court which were then in force. This rule provided: "In all appeals under the Letters Patent, a duly stamped memorandum of appeal shall be presented to the Registrar within 60 days and not more from the date of the judgment, unless....
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.... groups: (a) some provisions specifically, referred to the period prescribed by the 1st schedule of the Limitation Act. These were Sections 3 and 6 only (apart from Section 29 itself). Section 11 referred to rules of limitation contained in the Act and Section 28 referred to the "period hereby limited". (b) Some sections used the word "prescribed" alone without mentioning the first schedule of the Limitation Act. These were sections 4, 5, 12, 13, 14,15, 16, 19 and 20. (c) Some sections did not refer to any period at all. 117. .Sections in which reference was made to the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act either by using the expression "prescribed in the first schedule" or "prescribed in the third column of the first schedule" or "prescribed hereby" or "contained in the Act" obviously applied 'proprio vigore' only to those periods of limitation which were prescribed by the Act and not to the periods prescribed by special or local laws unless they were made applicable by such laws. 118. But there was a difference of opinion as to the applicability of those general provisions of the Limitation Act in which reference was not directly made to the periods....
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.... or local law -- (a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply". There are two parts of Sub-section (2). The first part deals with the applicability of Section 3, Limitation Act and the second part deals with the applicability of the other provisions of the Limitation Act. The first part makes the provisions of Section 3, Limitation Act applicable to the period prescribed by a special or local law if that period be "different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule". The Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for all kinds of suits (Article 120) and applications (Article 181) but for appeals it prescribes a period of limitation for particular kinds of appeals only. Hence the question becomes material whether the first part of Section 29(2) applies to a special or local law which prescribes a period of limitation for an appeal when no such period is prescribed in the first schedule. The question is whether in such a cas....
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....ry does not, with respect, appeal to me. Section 12(2) would apply to the period of limitation prescribed for instituting a special appeal unless the provisions are 'expressly excluded by such law. 122. I am, however, of opinion that the provisions of the Limitation Act are expressly excluded by Rule 7 of Chap III of the Rules of the Court which were in force in the year 1951 when the present special appeal was filed. 123. The rule as worded shows that the memorandum of appeal shall be presented within 60 days, unless a Judge in his discretion, on. good cause shown, shall grant further time for its presentation. The extension of the period of limitation under the rule can be made only on one ground, namely, on good cause shown, and thus there is an express exclusion of any other mode of extension of period. The general rules prescribed in the Limitation Act for determining and com putting the period of limitation prescribed for a suit, application or appeal to extend the period of limitation for various reasons -- under Section 5 for an appeal or application for good cause shown; under Section 6 for suits and applications on the ground of legal disability; under Sectio....
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.... for the same was shown. 125. In 'Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande' AIR 1942 All 429 (PB) (Z2), the majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench held that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to a special law which is a self-contained Code by itself in the matter of limitation. I think that the principle of this decision applies to the provisions of Rule 7 of Chap. III. 126. It was urged that the provisions of Section 12 (2), Limitation Act do not enlarge the period of limitation fixed for filing appeals but only lay down a method of computation or calculation of the period of limitation. This argument assumes that a method of computation cannot enlarge the period of limitation. But the assumption is obviously untrue. How are the provisions of Section 12 (2) given effect to, if not by adding to the period of 60 days (in the case of Letters Patent appeal, for example) the number of days spent in obtaining a certified copy of the judgment or decree? If this is not addition to the period of 60 days, what else 'is it? 127. It may be urged that in the view I am taking, even the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 (1), Limitation Act will not be applicabl....