TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1977 (10) TMI 19
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....957, as it applied to assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72, refers to wealth-tax assessment year ? " The aforesaid questions have arisen in relation to the assessments to wealth-tax made against the assessee for the assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72, for which the valuation dates are 31st March, 1970, and 31st March, 1971, respectively. In making those assessments, the Wealth-tax Officer acting under section 4(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act added to the net wealth returned by the assessee a sum of Rs. 1,27,610 being the value of agricultural lands gifted by the assessee to his wife and children prior to April 1, 1963, but after the commencement of the Gift-tax Act, 1958. The assessee complained against the said addition by filing an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. That appeal was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who held that sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of section 4(1)(a) were not attracted to the case since the gift in question was of agricultural lands which did not constitute " assets " within the definition of that expression contained in section 2(e) of the Act as it stood on the date of the said transaction. In this view, the Appellate Assi....
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....rred the aforementioned two questions to this court. The answers to both the questions referred will depend upon the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Act. That section is in the following terms : " 4. Net wealth to include certain assets.--(1) In computing the net wealth of an individual, there shall be included, as belonging to that individual-- (a) the value of assets which on the valuation date are held-- (i) by the spouse of such individual to whom such assets have been transferred by the individual, directly or indirectly, otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart, or (ii) by a minor child, not being a married daughter of such individual, to whom such assets have been transferred by the individual, directly or indirectly, otherwise than for adequate consideration, or (iii) by a person or association of persons to whom such assets have been transferred by the individual directly or indirectly otherwise than for adequate consideration for the immediate or deferred benefit of the individual, his or her spouse or minor child (not being a married daughter) or both, or (iv) b....
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....see. If the properties held by the spouse or minor child are " assets " under section 2(1)(e) of the Act on the valuation date and if they are found to have been transferred by the assessee to the spouse or minor child, directly or indirectly, otherwise than for adequate consideration, the requirements of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) are satisfied. It is not necessary that the properties concerned should have been " assets " as defined in the Act on the date of the transfers effected by the assessee. We would, therefore, answer question No. (i) in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The point raised in question No. (ii) is whether the expression " assessment year " occurring in the proviso to section 4(1)(a) refers to wealth-tax assessment year or gift-tax assessment year. The proviso was inserted in sub-section (1) of the Act by section 4(a)(ii)(B) of the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 (46 of 1964). The said amendment was to have effect only from April 1, 1965. The words " but before the 1st day of April, 1972 " were later introduced in the proviso by Finance (No. 2) Act of 1971 with effect from 1st April, 1972. It admits of no doubt that ....
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.... whole clearly indicates that the intention of Parliament was to grant the benefit of the exemption only prospectively in respect of transactions of transfers of assets by way of gift, etc., effected after the commencement of the assessment year 1964-65. The existence of the comma in the place aforementioned in the proviso must be attributed to an accidental mistake on the part of either the draftsman or the printer. While marks of punctuation contained in a statute will not generally be wholly ignored by the court in interpreting a statutory provision, it may not always be safe to rely on punctuation as a deciding factor in a question of construction. Greater importance will be attached by the court to the language employed by the legislature and if it is found that the words used in the section, when read as a whole, clearly furnish a clue to the legislative intent underlying the section and they admit of an interpretation consistent with the said legislative intent, any punctuation mark which is inconsistent with such construction will be disregarded and the punctuation will not be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text. As observed by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gop....