TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (1) TMI 814
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....gam, Adv. Petitioner-in-person, AOR JUDGMENT ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant is aggrieved by initiation of a criminal proceeding against him and his detention in connection with the same by the respondent State through its CID. Allegations have been made against him for commission of offences under Sections 166, 167, 418, 420, 465, 468, 471, 409, 209 and 109 read with Sections 120B, 34 and 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 12 and 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said offences are alleged to have been committed between the years 2015 and 2019, during which period he was the Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Initially, a First Information Report dated 09.12.2021 was lodged with CID Police Station, Andhra Pradesh, Mangalagiri implicating twentysix persons as accused. On that basis, CR No. 29/2021 was registered. The appellant was not included in the array of accused persons in that F.I.R. The offences primarily relate to siphoning of public funds and I shall refer broadly to the allegations forming the basis of the F.I.R. in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. The li....
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.... the six clusters costing Rs.546,84,18,908/. Government contribution was limited to 10 percent of the cost amounting to Rs.55,00,00,000/, with SIEMENS and Design Tech providing grantinaid of 90% i.e., Rs.491,84,18,908/. It is the State's case that requirement of contribution of the two corporate entities was ignored and the final memorandum of agreement only entailed outflow of Rs.330/crores from the State to Design Tech. A signed copy of this memorandum, which does not carry any date, has been made Annexure R15 to the counteraffidavit of the State (Volume IV at page 206). 4. Submission on the part of the State is that in course of an investigation by the Additional Director General, GST Intelligence at Pune, while examining claims of availing CENVAT credit by Design Tech and one Skillar Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd. ("Skillar"), a financial scam was unearthed involving both SIEMENS and Design Tech. This was in relation to funds pertaining to the project of setting up skill development centres. The complaint of the taxing body was that SIEMENS and Design Tech had subcontracted substantial part of their work to Skillar despite there being no provision of any subcontract in the Agre....
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....ellant is that he had fast tracked the project and approved the cost estimation with criminal intent and by pursuing the government officials, he had ensured release of Rs.370/crores. The project was allotted to Design Tech and SIEMENS on nomination basis, without following any tender process. Misappropriation of government funds through corrupt and illegal methods has been alleged and abuse of official position has been attributed to the appellant. Summary of the allegations against the appellant is revealed from the Memorandum dated 08.09.2023, filed on behalf of the prosecution, for adding the appellant as an accused. These allegations, interalia, are to the following effect: ".... A37 by abusing his (A37) official position, fraudulently committed criminal breach of trust with a common intention, caused wrongful loss to the Government exchequer by allowing accused and others to divert APSSDC funds by using fake invoices as genuine one for purpose of cheating through the shell, defunct companies without providing materials/services to the APSSDCSiemens project." 6. On behalf of the appellant, the main argument, which was also made before the High Court, revolves ar....
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....h may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month." 8. The High Court, interalia, held that the said provision cannot be applied to any offence committed prior to 26.07.2018. It has also been highlighted before us on behalf of the State that offences under Section 13 (1) (c) & (d) were deleted from the said statute by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 26 of 2018. It was by the same Amendment Act, that Section 17A was incorporated in the said statute. On this basis, it is urged, that any protective measure, which is conceived in the Amendment Act could not extend to offences committed when such protective measure for obtaining prior approval was not a part of the statutory scheme. The High Court primarily decided the case on the premise that the aforesaid provision cannot be given retrospective effect. 9. The other limb of argument of the State, which was also sustained by the High Court is that a regular inquiry was already ordered on 05.06.2018 regarding the allegations of corruption against the officials of APSSDC. This was ordered by the Director General of AntiCorruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh. A redac....
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....pursuance of such request till the year 2021. The first suggestion of any active enquiry can be seen in a letter of 22.02.2021 originating from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, AntiCorruption Bureau of that State, which states that the bureau is investigating a regular enquiry pertaining to allegations of corruption, misappropriation of funds and procedural lapses in relation to collaboration of APSSDC/AP Government with Design Tech. It appears that there was a previous communication in this regard dated 09.02.2021. Even though reference is made to the letter of 05.06.2018 in this communication, there are no specific particulars of such enquiry or the date on which such enquiry was started. There are subsequent letters dated 22.02.2021, 30.03.2021, 23.06.2021 and 18.08.2021, all referring to the letter of 05.06.2018. But as it has been already observed earlier, there are no specific particulars regarding when and in what form the enquiry has started. There obviously was a time gap between the date of issue of the letter of 05.06.20218 and actual date on which the enquiry was commenced. The State has justified this delay in its counter affidavit. It has been stated that instead ....
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....egular enquiry was already initiated on 05.06.2018. The restriction in Section 17A of the 1988 Act is on conducting an enquiry by a police officer without the prior approval of the authority specified therein. A request to conduct an enquiry by itself cannot be the starting point of the enquiry under the said provision to bypass the restriction postulated therein. Moreover, in the facts of this case, actual search for information had commenced in the year 2021, as I have already indicated, and lack of action on this count has been attributed by the State to the appellant and the other accused persons themselves. We are not going into the truth of such allegations. But if such allegations are assumed to be correct, the same shall only support the appellant's case that no enquiry was initiated before incorporation of Section 17A in the statute book. Further, in the F.I.R. or the preliminary enquiry report dated 09.12.2021, there was no reference to the communication of 05.06.2018. I, accordingly, hold that before Section 17A of the 1988 Act had become operational, no enquiry, inquiry or investigation had commenced as against the appellant in relation to the subject crime. 14. Mr. ....
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.... without any previous sanction and the charges framed against the accused were quashed by the High Court on the ground that prior sanction under Section 197 of 1973 Code was not taken. In that context, it was held by a Coordinate Bench of this Court that looking at the nature of allegations in the complaint, at that stage it was impossible to conclude that the acts alleged to have been done by the accused were committed by her while in discharge of official duty. The High Court judgment was set aside and it was opined by the Coordinate Bench in the facts of that case, that a final view on that issue would be taken only after the evidence was recorded. 17. So far as the provision of Section 197 of the 1973 Code is concerned, the requirement for deciding the question on obtaining sanction is at the stage of taking cognizance. Thus, some element of application of mind is necessary while examining that issue. In the case of Matajog Dobey vsH. C. Bhari (AIR 1956 SC 44), there was use of force when a tax raiding party was resisted from conducting a search. This gave rise to two complaints, which were sent to two magistrates for judicial enquiry. Summonses were issued against the incom....
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....ed or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution. If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered, there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome the resistance. This accords with common sense and does not seem contrary to any principle of law. The true position is neatly stated thus in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn. at p. 312:" It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command." The scope of operation of Section 17A of the 1988 Act is, however, different from that of Section 197 of the Code. The requirement of taking sanction under Section 19 of the 1988 Act also is at the same stage. Unlike Section 197 of 1973 Code (which is near identically phrased as the same section i....
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.... out for quashing of the proceedings for the reason that the investigating agency intentionally waited till the retirement of the accused officer. The question as to whether a sanction is necessary to prosecute the accused officer, a retired public servant, is a question which can be examined during the course of the trial as held by this Court in K. Kalimuthu [K. Kalimuthu v. State, (2005) 4 SCC 512 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1291] . In fact, in a recent judgment in Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 545 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 146] , this Court has held that if an investigation was not conducted by a police officer of the requisite rank and status required under Section 17 of the Act, such lapse would be an irregularity, however unless such irregularity results in causing prejudice, conviction will not be vitiated or be bad in law. Therefore, the lack of sanction was rightly found not to be a ground for quashing of the proceedings." 18. I shall test later in this judgment as to whether the remand proceeding before the Special Judge was mere irregularity or fatal, but before that I have to answer the quest....
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....ment, the Coordinate Bench observed that: " 10. In State of Telangana v. Managipet alias Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy reported (2019) 19 SCC 87, this Court rejected the arguments that amended provisions of the PC Act would be applicable to an FIR, registered before the said amendment came into force and found that the High Court had rightly held that no grounds had made out for quashing the proceedings." In the present case, original FIR was registered on 09.12.2021 and the appellant was implicated in the aforesaid offences on 08.09.2023. There is no evidence of any substantive enquiry, inquiry, or investigation made against him prior to coming into operation of the Section 17A of the 1988 Act. Hence, the case at hand is distinguishable from the ratio laid down in the judgment of this Court of in the case of Tejmal Choudhary (supra). 21. The Amendment Act by which Section 17A of the 1988 Act was brought into the said statute also deleted the provisions of sub-clauses (c) and (d) of Section 13 (1) thereof. At the time the memorandum of adding the appellant as accused was issued, the said Amendment Act had become operational, but at the time of alleged commission of offen....
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....ent when the enquiry commenced would also have to be answered by this Court. While dealing with the issue of necessity for obtaining prior approval, I have already held that the appellant could be implicated under Section 13 (1)(c) and (d), as at the time of alleged commission of the offences, these provisions were alive. Once certain offences are deleted from an enactment, they do not vanish totally unless the lawmakers say so. They move to the back pages and can be revived if they were committed before being enacted out of the legislation. But I cannot give a restrictive interpretation to the expression "under this Act" to give an isolated retrospective operation to the said phrase, detaching it from rest of the provisions of Section 17A of the Act and remove the protective shield in a situation where an enquiry has started after introduction of the said provision but relates to an offence committed prior to its introduction in 2018. The said phrase ought to be relatable to the date of starting of the enquiry, inquiry or investigation and not to the time or date of commission of offence. 23. Otherwise, if I apply an interpretation of the expression "under this Act" to mean the....
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....cluded within a period of two years : Provided that where the trial is not concluded within the said period, the special Judge shall record the reasons for not having done so: Provided further that the said period may be extended by such further period, for reasons to be recorded in writing but not exceeding six months at a time; so, however, that the said period together with such extended period shall not exceed ordinarily four years in aggregate." 24. Now if I accept the meaning Mr. Rohtagi wants us to give to the said expression as employed in Section 17A of the 1988 Act, the same expression i.e. "under this Act" as contained in Section 3 (1) (a) would also have to be read to mean as "the Act" prevailing at the point of time the appellant's case is brought to the Special Judge. This would result in shrinking the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try offences which have been repealed by the Amendment Act of 2018. I am unable to agree with Mr. Rohatgi on this point. It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that if a particular phrase is employed in different parts of an enactment, Courts ought to proceed with an understanding that the leg....
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.... this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month." (emphasis supplied) 117. In terms of Section 17A, no police officer is permitted to conduct any enquiry or inquiry or conduct investigation into any offence done by a public servant where the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his public functions without previous approval, inter alia, of the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. In respect of the public servant, who is involved in this case, it is clause (c), which is applicable. Unless, therefore, there is previous approval, there could be neither inquiry or enquiry or investigation. It is in this context apposite to notice that the complaint, which has been filed by the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018, moved before the first respondent CBI, is done after Section 17A was inserted. The complaint is dated 4-10-2018. Para 5 sets out the relief which is sought in the ....
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....ble Judges in the Bench. Mr. Rohatgi relied on a decision in the case of Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika vsState of Gurajat and Others [(2012) 3 SCC 400] on this point. The ratio of this decision would not apply in the context of the judgment delivered in the case of Yashwant Sinha (supra), as in the latter authority the majority view does not reflect any discord over the concurring view. In my opinion, however, position of law laid down in a concurring judgment ought to be treated as part of the main judgment and that opinion would form a binding authority. I should not distinguish between the main judgment and the concurring view and isolate the reasoning contained in the concurring opinion and hold the reasoning contained in the main opinion (of majority of the judges) only to have the status of a binding precedent. The concurring view is just as much part of the main opinion (of majority of the judges) and will be a binding precedent, composite with the majority view. The position of law would be different if the majority view had expressed, either directly or by implication, a contrary view. That is not the case so far as the judgment in the case of Yashwant Sinha (supra) is concerned....
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....as rejected on the ground that time for commission of the alleged offences related to a period prior to 26.07.2018. I have in the earlier part of this judgment discussed this question and held the point in favour of the appellant. 30. There are allegations of commission of offences against the appellant under different provisions of the 1860 Code. I have been taken through the memorandum for adding the appellant as accused and also the order of the remand Court. The IPC offences also relate to the same or similar set of transactions, for which the aforesaid provisions of the 1988 Act were applied. The substantive offences alleged against the appellant are Section 12 and Sections 13(1) (c) and (d) read with Section 13(2), which is the provisions prescribing punishment. I am not satisfied, at this stage, that the 1988 Act offences are so dominant in the set of allegations against the appellant that once I consider the allegations against the appellant de hors the alleged offences under 1988 Act, the allegations of commission of the IPC offences would automatically collapse. At this stage, in my opinion, the alleged commission of IPC offences are not mere ancillary to the 1988 Act ....
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....ith Sections 13(2) and 13(1) of the PC Act. Accused 9 and 10 died even before the chargesheet was sent to the Special Judge. The charge against the sole public servant under the PC Act could also not be framed since he died on 18-2-2005. The Special Judge also could not frame any charge against non-public servants. As already indicated, under subsection (3) of Section 4, the Special Judge could try non-PC offences only when "trying any case" relating to PC offences. In the instant case, no PC offence has been committed by any of the nonpublic servants so as to fall under Section 3(1) of the PC Act. Consequently, there was no occasion for the Special Judge to try any case relating to the offences under the PC Act against the appellant. The trying of any case under the PC Act against a public servant or a nonpublic servant, as already indicated, is a sine qua non for exercising powers under subsection (3) of Section 4 of the PC Act. In the instant case, since no PC offence has been committed by any of the nonpublic servants and no charges have been framed against the public servant, while he was alive, the Special Judge had no occasion to try any case against any of them under the PC....
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....accused persons have been implicated in offences under the 1988 Act. A similar line of reasoning was followed in the case of A. Sreenivasa Reddy vsRakesh Sharma and Another [2023 INSC 682]. I have earlier observed that the offences against the appellant relate to the same or similar set of transactions in relation to which the Special Judge is proceeding with the case initiated by the F.I.R. dated 09.12.2021 against the other accused persons. In this context, I shall refer to Section 223 of the 1973 Code, which stipulates : " 223. What persons may be charged jointly.-The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely:- (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; (b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence; (c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; (e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extor....
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....y offence other than an offence specified in Section 3 of the Act to which the provisions of Section 220 apply, there is no reason why the provisions of Section 223 of the Code should not apply to such a case. Section 223 in clear terms provides that persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction, or persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction may be charged and tried together. Applying the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Sections 220 and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must be held that the appellant and his co-accused may be tried by the Special Judge in the same trial. 15. This is because the co-accused of the appellant who have been also charged of offences specified in Section 3 of the Act must be tried by the Special Judge, who in view of the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 4 and Section 220 of the Code may also try them of the charge under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC. All the three accused, including the appellant, have been charged of the offence under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC. If the Special Judge has jurisdiction to t....
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....er of remand nonest. (iv) The appellant, however, could be proceeded against before the Special Judge for allegations of commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for which also he has been implicated. 35. The appeal stands partly allowed, in the above terms. 36. All connected applications stand disposed of. JUDGMENT BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The entire controversy in the instant Appeal centres around the interpretation of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "PC Act"), and its applicability to the facts of the present case. Having had the benefit of going through the draft opinion of my esteemed Brother Justice Aniruddha Bose, I deem it appropriate to pen down my views on the issues involved in the Appeal. FACTUAL MATRIX: 3. Bereft of unnecessary details, the bare minimum facts required to decide the present Appeal are that the appellant, who is sought to be added as the accused No. 37 vide the "Accused Adding Memo" dated 08.09.2023, in the FIR No. 29/2021 registered at the P.S. CID P.S., AP, Amarvathi, Mangalalagiri, on 09.12.2021, was the Chief Minister of Andhra Prade....
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.... A-38 through A-1, allowed other accused to divert APSSDC funds by using fake invoices as genuine one for purpose of cheating through the shell, defunct companies without providing materials/services to the APSSDC-Siemens project by the M/s DesignTech, by conspiring, colluding and intentionally co-operating in the commission offence with several acts of by the concerned Directors of companies and private persons. A-38 as a Minister holding a concerned department i.e SDE&I & APSSDC did not review the project and caused the wrongful loss to the Govt. and wrongful gain to himself and others. Therefore, a prima-facie case was established for the offences U/s 120(B), 418, 420, 465, 468, 471, 409, 201, 109 r/w 34 & 37 IPC & Section 12, 13(2) r/w 13(1) (c) and (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Sri Nara Chandra Babu Naidu (A- 37), formerly Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and against Sri K. Atchannaidu, the then Minister for Labour & Employment, Factories, Youth & Sports, Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, Govt. of A.P were added as accused no. 37 and A-38 respectively to this case." 6. The appellant was arrested on 09.09.2023 and was produced before the Sp....
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....eing where a public servant is apprehended "red handed". (iii) Section 17A constitutes a complete legal bar to the very initiation of any enquiry, inquiry or investigation as was noted by this Court in Yashwant Sinha & Ors. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2020) 2 SCC 338. (iv) Section 17A relates to the procedure by which an enquiry, inquiry or investigation into an offence is to be conducted. It is a procedural provision, which does not impair any right of the investigating agencies. In this regard reliance is placed on Anant Gopal Sheorey vs. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 915 and on Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444. (v) No person has a "vested right in the remedies and the methods of procedure in trials for crime." A law that draws upon antecedent facts in its prospective operation is not retrospective - it is sometimes referred to as being retroactive. (vi) Section 17A is retroactive in the sense that it would apply in future in relation to all enquires, inquires or investigations being conducted, even though such enquiries, inquires or investigations may be in respect of offences which may have allegedl....
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....quential proceedings would fall. In the present case, once offences under the PC Act are effaced from existence, the custody of the appellant pursuant to the orders passed by the Special Court from time to time was without any sanction of law, as the Special Court in that case had no powers to remand persons accused of offences under the IPC alone. The jurisdictional fact for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Special Court is the existence of an offence under the PC Act, and once such jurisdictional fact ceases to exist, the orders of Special Court are required to be treated as without any sanction of law and non-est. In this regard, reliance is placed on State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Others (2011) 14 SCC 770. (xiv)A legal bar to a prosecution is a valid ground for quashing the proceedings as held by this Court in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 (Suppl.) SCC 335. 9. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mukul Rohtagi for the Respondent - State of Andhra Pradesh made following submissions: - (i) None of the facets contained in Section 17A would be applicable to the facts of the present case....
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.... but also under various offences of Indian Penal Code (IPC) like Sections 409, 166, 167, 418, 420, 465, 468, 471, 201 and 109 read with Section 120(B) of IPC. Committing criminal breach of trust/misappropriation of funds could never be construed to fall under the discharge of official duties. In any case the question whether an act is within one's official capacity or not can only be decided in the course of trial. (vii) As held in State of Rajasthan vs. Tejmal Choudhary, 2021 SCC Online SC 3477 Section 17A of PC Act is 'a Substantive Provision' and is therefore applicable only prospectively. Section 17A envisages a substantive right against non-prosecution of innocent acts in course of official duty; and not an obstacle/ hurdle in the investigation process of the prosecution, especially when the sanction is denied. Section 17A creates new rights, disabilities and obligations and therefore it ought not to be applied retrospectively as held in G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana (2019) 9 SCC 469. (viii) Under the 2018 amendment, other than introducing Section 17A, other sections like Section 13 (1)(c) and 13(1) (d) i.e. the offences for which the appellant is charged....
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.... other central agencies are also investigating the same scam alleged against the appellant. ANALYSIS : 10. At the outset, it may be noted that the PC Act 1988 sets the framework for prosecuting individuals involved in corrupt activities and provides measures to prevent corruption in various spheres of the society. By emphasizing accountability, transparency and strict legal consequences, the PC Act stands to combat corruption and to foster and uphold the culture of ethical conduct. The very objectives of the Act are to prevent corruption, to promote transparency and accountability in the public administration, to deter individuals from engaging in corrupt practices by imposing strict penalties, protects whistleblowers etc. It also provides for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, outlining the procedure for gathering evidence, conducting trials and ensuring a fair and expeditious legal process. By the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act, 2018), the PC Act 1988 was further amended, to fill in the gaps in the description and coverage of the offence of bribery so as to bring it in line with the current int....
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.... reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month." 12. Since the main issue involved in the present Appeal is in respect of the interpretation of the newly inserted provision Section 17A, let us regurgitate the basic principles of Statutory interpretation as propounded by this Court from time to time. It is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the courts must look to the object which the Statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary S. Gopal Reddy Vs. State of A.P.; 1996 (4) SCC 596. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect Indian Handicrafts Emporium & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.; 2003 (7) SCC 589. The text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in the Statue. If two views are possible, the view which most accords the object of the Act, and which makes the Act workable must necessarily be the controlling view. Even penal Statutes are governed not only by their literal language, but also by the object sought to be achieved by Parliament Asi....
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....on of an offence under the Act (Para 4.2 of the said SOPs). The meaning of the words 'inquiry' and 'investigation' for the purposes of Section 17A could be imported from the definitions contained in Section 2(g) & Section 2(h) respectively of Cr.PC, the same being made applicable subject to certain modifications in view of Section 22 of the PC Act. 15. As stated earlier, the provisions pertaining to the offences under the PC Act particularly the offences under Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13, have been substantially amended, and the new offence under Section 7(A), has been inserted by the Amendment Act 16/2018. Such substitution in place of existing provisions and such insertion of new provisions in the PC Act, have created new set of rights and liabilities under the Act. Section 17A having been newly inserted simultaneously with such amendments in the provisions pertaining to the offences, in my opinion, Section 17A could be made applicable only to the said amended/ newly inserted offences under the PC Act. Section 17A having been introduced as a part of larger legislative scheme, and the other offences under the PC Act having been redefined or newly inserted by way of Amendment Act....
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....ncept of retrospective and retroactive statute was stated by this Court in Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh [Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 191] , thus: (SCC pp. 211-13, paras 35-37) "35. Mr Sachar relies on Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari [Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, (1952) 1 SCC 713 : AIR 1952 SC 231] , Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540] , Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim [Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim, (1976) 2 SCC 917] , Govind Das v. CIT [Govind Das v. CIT, (1976) 1 SCC 906 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 133] , Henshall v. Porter [Henshall v. Porter, (1923) 2 KB 193] , United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum [United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, 1940 SCC OnLine FC 11 : AIR 1941 FC 16] , in support of his submission that the Amendment Act was not made retrospective by the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication as the Act itself expressly provided that it shall be deemed to have come into force on 23-1-1973; and therefore there would be no justification to giving it retrospective operation. The vested right to contest which was created on the alienation havin....
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..... 18. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4 SCC 602, it was held by this Court that a statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation unless otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary implication. The ratio of the said judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur was also followed in G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana (2019) 19 SCC 469. 19. In State of Telangana vs. Managipet @ Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy (2019) 19 SCC 87, this Court rejected the arguments that the amended provisions of the PC Act would be applicable to an FIR registered before the said amendment came into force. 20. In a very recent decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Tejmal Choudhary (2021) SCC OnLine SC 3477, this Court set-aside the interim order passed by the High Court which had quashed the proceedings only on the ground that the approval was not obtained under Section 17A of the PC Act, by observing inter alia that the legislative intent in the enactment of a statute is to be gathered from the express words used in the statute, unless the plain words literally const....
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....ated or could become infructuous on account of the subsequent amendment in the Act. The well-known and well accepted rule of interpretation of statute is that the courts should take into consideration the other provisions of the Act also while interpreting a particular provision, and should avoid such interpretation as would lead to an anomalous situation or to frustration of the object of the Act. 23. As held in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh and Another (2012) 3 SCC 64, in case of two possible constructions of a provision in the PC Act, it would be the duty of the court to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it. In Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (2014) 8 SCC 682, the Constitution Bench had observed while dealing with Section 19 of the P.C. Act that the protection against malicious prosecution which is extended in public interest, cannot become a shield to protect corrupt officials. 24. The judgment in case of Yashwant Sinha and Others vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), relied upon by Mr. Salve also would not be of any help to the appellant. Mr. Salve has relied up....
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....sion of Section 13, the right of the investigating agency which had accrued to investigate the crime which took place prior to the amended provision of Section 13, continues in view of Clauses 'c' and 'e' of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. According to him, unless a different intention appears in the Amendment Act 2018, the right of the investigating agency to investigate the offences under Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1) (d) could not be said to have been affected by the Amendment Act 2018. I find substance in the said submission of Mr. Rohtagi, in view of the observations made by this Court in M.C. Gupta vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Dehradun (2012) 8 SCC 669, which clinches the issue. "14. Viewed from this angle, clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the GC Act become relevant for the present case. Sub-clause (c) says that if any Central Act repeals any enactment, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. In this case, the right which had accrued to the investigating agency to investigate the crime which took place prior to the coming into force of the new Act and which ....