TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (8) TMI 95
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....he sale proceeds was to be donated to nine charitable institutions. Petitioners claim to have got the property valued by two valuers according to whom it was worth Rs.15.32 lakhs and Rs.15.60 lakhs respectively. The petitioners entered into an agreement of sale with Mrs. Sanbar N. Markar on 14.12.1989 for a total consideration of Rs.15.60 lakhs. They filed the statement in Form 37-I, together with the agreement of sale, before the 1^st respondent on 27.12.1989. Another set of Form 37-I was also submitted on 9.2.1990. The 1^st respondent, without giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard, passed orders on 16.2.1990 purchasing the property, on behalf of the Central Government, for Rs.15,31,640. 3. Questioning the said order dated 16.2.1990, the petitioners filed W.P.No.2978 of 1990 and this Court by its order dated 03.12.1997, while setting aside the impugned order dated 16.02.1990, observed that a fresh order shall be made keeping in view the ratio and the directions given in the judgment of the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78. The Petitioners were, therefore, issued notice dated 25.3.1998 enclosing t....
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.... On the question of relief the Supreme Court observed (page 560): "........This brings us to the question of relief. We find that the order for compulsory purchase under Section 269UD(1) of the Income Tax Act which was served on the petitioner in the night of December 15, 1986, has been made without any show-cause notice being served on the petitioner and without the petitioner or other affected parties having been given any opportunity to show cause against an order for compulsory purchase nor were the reasons for the said order set out in the order or communicated to the petitioner or other concerned parties with the order. In view of what we have stated earlier the order is clearly bad in law and it is set aside. The next question is as to the consequence to follow. In view of the fact that the object of the provisions of Chapter XX-C is a laudable object, namely, to counter evasion of tax in transactions of a sale of immovable property, we consider it necessary to limit the retrospective operation of our judgment in such a manner as not to defeat the acquisitions altogether. We find that if the original time-frame prescribed in Chapter XX-C is rigidly applied it wou....
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....e courts, do not also admit of application of the principles consistent with the statutory limit. After hearing the learned Solicitor General, we are satisfied that the problems and difficulties envisaged, in practical terms, are real and require to be provided for. 47. The first aspect arises out of the limited retrospectivity imported by the judgment. The judgment provides that: "In order to avoid that situation and, yet to ensure that no injustice is caused to the petitioner, we order, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the statement in Form 37-I submitted by the petitioner as set out earlier shall be treated as if it were submitted on the date of signing of this judgment." 48. Learned Solicitor General points out that in the cases where petitions are yet pending in this Court as well as in the various High Courts, the above direction becomes unworkable inasmuch as the interim orders subsisting in those petitions disable the authorities to carry out the directions contained in the judgment within the stipulated time-frame and that, therefore, the directions as given in the judgment become impossible of implementation. Learned Solicitor General suggests tha....
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....t in Form 37-I, under the proviso to Section 296UD(1) and had, therefore, prescribed the time limit of two months. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that as this period of two months was later enlarged to three months, by insertion of the second proviso with effect from 1.6.1993, the period of two months in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78 must be held to have been enlarged to three months with respect to all matters which were pending before Courts/Tribunals/other authorities on the date from which the amendment came into force. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that, since this Court had pronounced judgment, in W. P. No. 2978 of 1990 on 3.12.1997, much after the amendment came into force with effect from 01.06.1993, the period for completion of proceedings, as stipulated in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, must necessarily be read as three months. 9. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the clarificatory order in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78 cannot be read as creating two different classes of cases and that the latter class of cases mentioned in Para 50 must be held to have the same consequences as the former clas....
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....ed as if it were submitted on the date of signing of the judgment." 11. These directions were issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This power has been conferred only on the Supreme Court and its exercise is not dependent or conditioned by any statutory provision. (Mohd. Anis v. Union of India [1994] Supp (1) SCC 145; Chandrakant Patil v. State [1998] 3 SCC 38). The plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution inheres in the Supreme Court and exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. (Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [2005] 3 SCC 284). The phrase "complete justice" in Article 142 is a word of width couched with elasticity to meet myriad situations created by human ingenuity or cause or result of operation of statute law or law declared under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of the Constitution. (Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. [1997] 5 SCC 201). 12. The question which must be examined first is whether legal fiction, as applicable to Statutes, can also be extended to judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Among the synonyms for the words "....
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....umes that the law is necessarily a logical Code whereas, it must be acknowledged that, the law is not always logical. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. (Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647; Delhi Administration (NCT of Delhi) v. Manoharlal [2002] 7 SCC 222 ; Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) [2002] 257 ITR 123; and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2003] 2 SCC 111). 15. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills [2002] 3 SCC 496, the Supreme Court observed: "......Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is ....
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.... of a subsequent legislative amendment. The time limit specified in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, of two months cannot, by application of the principles governing statutory fiction, be construed as having been extended to three months. 18. This question can also be examined from another angle. As noted above, the time limit prescribed earlier under Section 269UD(1), for passing an order in respect of any immovable property, was two months from the end of the month in which the statement in Form 37-I was received by the authority. It is only by virtue of the second proviso that, in cases where the statement in Form 37-I was received by the appropriate authority on or after the 1st day of June, 1993, that the words "two months" stood substituted by "three months". Admittedly, in case on hand, the statement in Form 37-I was submitted as early as on 27.12.1989 and another set thereof was submitted on 09.02.1990 much prior to 01.06.1993. 19. It is not for courts to supply words to Section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act and read the words "received" in the second proviso thereto to include the words "deemed to be received". It is a cardina....
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....-6-1993, has, therefore, no application. The outer limit for passing the order, under Section 269UD(1), thus expired by 28.02.1998. Consequently both the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, and the final order dated 30.03.1998, are barred by limitation. 21. While this would suffice to quash both the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, and the impugned order dated 30.03.1998, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar would urge us to adjudicate on his other grounds of challenge also. Learned Counsel would submit that the show cause notice was issued on 25.3.1998 informing the petitioners that their case stood posted to 30.3.1998 and, though the petitioners had requested that further time be given to them to submit their reply to the show cause notice, they were denied the opportunity to do so. According to the Learned Counsel, it is evident from a mere reading of the show cause notice dated 25.3.1998, along with its annexures, that the 1st respondent had already pre-determined the issue. He would contend that, on the impugned order dated 30.3.1998 being set aside and since the original period of two months for completion of proceedings as laid down in C.B. Gautam [1993] 1 S....
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....ing to them, a final order could be passed. Having kept quiet for so long, for which no explanation is forthcoming, the respondents justify their having passed the impugned order less than 5 days thereafter, (thereby denying an opportunity to the petitioners to submit their objections), on the specious plea that the final order was required to be passed before 31.03.1998. The respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong in issuing the show-cause notice belatedly. They cannot be permitted to use that as an excuse for denying the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 24. Further, instead of furnishing reasons in the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, as to why they had chosen to proceed under Section 269UD(1), the respondents enclosed thereto a copy of their earlier order dated 16.02.1990 which, as noted hereinabove, was set aside by this Court in its order in W.P.No.2978 of 1998 dated 03.12.1997. While the submission of Sri S.R. Ashok does seem attractive, a detailed examination of the order dated 16.02.1990, as enclosed to the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, would reveal that the members of the appropriate authority had decided....