TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2007 (3) TMI 826
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.... The respondent, when she was serving as the Deputy Secretary in the Department of Finance, Government of West Bengal, used to meet the appellant between November 1983 and June 1984. They cultivated close friendship which later developed into courtship. 2. The respondent's first husband, Debashish Gupta filed a belated appeal against the decree of divorce obtained by her from the District Court of Patna. Therefore, during the pendency of the appeal, she literally persuaded the appellant to agree to the marriage immediately so that the appeal of Debashish Gupta may become infructuous. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 13.12.1984. According to the appellant, soon after the marriage, the respondent asked the appellant not to interfere with her career. She had also unilaterally declared her decision not to give birth to a child for two years and the appellant should not be inquisitive about her child and he should try to keep himself aloof from her as far as possible. According to the appellant, there was imposition of rationing in emotions in the arena of love, affection, future planning and normal human relations though he tried hard to reconcile himself to th....
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....ere staying in Minto Park was allotted to the respondent as per the standard convention. The appellant and the respondent again began living together in Calcutta from September 1988. The appellant again tried to establish his home with the respondent after forgetting the entire past. 6. According to the appellant, the respondent never treated the house to be her family home. The respondent and her mother taught respondent's daughter that the appellant was not her father. The child, because of instigation of the respondent and her mother, gradually began to avoid the appellant. The respondent in no uncertain terms used to tell the appellant that he was not her father and that he should not talk to the child or love her. The appellant obviously used to feel very offended. 7. The appellant also learnt that the respondent used to tell her mother that she was contemplating divorce to the appellant. The respondent's daughter had also disclosed to the appellant that her mother had decided to divorce him. According to the appellant, though they lived under the same roof for some time but the respondent virtually began to live separately from April, 1989 at her parent's ho....
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....e that Prabir Malik may not develop any affection towards the respondent's daughter. 10. According to the version of the respondent, the appellant used to work under the instructions and guidance of his relations, who were not very happy with the respondent and they were interfering with their family affairs. The respondent stated that the appellant has filed the suit for divorce at the behest of his brothers and sisters. The respondent has not denied this fact that from 27th August, 1990 they have been continuously living separately and thereafter there has been no interaction whatsoever between them. 11. The appellant, in support of his case, has examined himself as witness No. 1. He has also examined Debabrata Ghosh as witness No. 2, N. K. Raghupatty as witness No. 3, Prabir Malik as witness No. 4 and Sikhabilas Barman as witness No. 5. Debabrata Ghosh, witness No. 2 is the younger brother of the appellant. He has stated that he did not attend the marriage ceremony of the appellant and the respondent. He seldom visited his brother and sister-in-law at their Minto Park flat and he did not take any financial assistance from his brother to maintain his family. He mentione....
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....stated that he had known the appellant and his wife and that they did not have cordial relations. He further stated that the appellant told him that the respondent cooks for herself and leaves for office and that she does not cook for the appellant and he had to take meals outside and sometimes cooked food for himself. He also stated that the respondent had driven the appellant out of the said flat. 13. The respondent has examined herself. According to her statement, she indicated that she and the appellant were staying together as normal husband and wife. She denied that she ill-treated Prabir Malik. She further stated that the brothers and sisters of the appellant used to stay at Minto Park flat whenever they used to visit Calcutta. She stated that they were interfering in the private affairs, which was the cause of annoyance of the respondent. She denied the incident which took place after 24.8. 1990. However, she stated that the appellant had left the apartment on 27.8.1990. In the cross-examination, she stated that the appellant appeared to be a fine gentleman. She admitted that the relations between the appellant and the respondent were not so cordial. She denied that she ....
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....o humiliated and had driven out the loyal servant-cum-cook of the appellant, Prabir Malik. 16. The learned Additional District Judge came to the finding that the appellant has succeeded in proving the case of mental cruelty against the respondent, therefore, the decree was granted by the order dated 19.12.1996 and the marriage between the parties was dissolved. The respondent, aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, filed an appeal before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 20.5.2003 reversed the judgment of the Additional District Judge on the ground that the appellant has not been able to prove the allegation of mental cruelty. The findings of the High Court, in brief, are recapitulated as under: I. The High Court arrived at the finding that it was certainly within the right of the respondent-wife having such a high status in life to decide when she would like to have a child after marriage. II. The High Court also held that the appellant has failed to disclose in the pleadings when the respondent took the final decision of not having a child. III. The High Court held that the appe....
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....nd not for the husband would be a clear instance of causing annoyance which may lead to mental cruelty. 18. The High Court has seriously erred in not appreciating the evidence on record in a proper perspective. The respondent's refusal to cohabit has been proved beyond doubt. The High Court's finding that the husband and wife might be sleeping in separate rooms did not lead to a conclusion that they did not cohabit and to justify this by saying that the respondent was highly educated and holding a high post was entirely unsustainable. Once the respondent accepted to become the wife of the appellant, she had to respect the marital bond and discharge obligations of marital life. The finding of the High Court that if the ailment of the husband was not very serious and he was not even confined to bed for his illness and even assuming the wife under such circumstances did not meet the husband, such behavior can hardly amount to cruelty, cannot be sustained. During illness, particularly in a nuclear family, the husband normally looks after and supports his wife and similarly, he would expect the same from her. The respondent's total indifference and neglect of the appellan....
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....itness also stated that immediately thereafter the appellant had left the flat and admittedly since 27.8.1990, both the appellant and the respondent are living separately. This was a serious incident and the trial court was justified in placing reliance on this evidence and to come to a definite conclusion that this instance coupled with many other instances led to grave mental cruelty to the appellant. The trial Court rightly decreed the suit of the appellant. The High Court was not justified in reversing the judgment of the trial Court. 21. The High Court also failed to take into consideration the most important aspect of the case that admittedly the appellant and the respondent have been living separately for more than sixteen and half years (since 27.8.1990). The entire substratum of the marriage has already disappeared. During this long period, the parties did not spend a single minute together. The appellant had undergone bye-pass surgery even then the respondent did not bother to enquire about his health even on telephone. Now the parties have no feelings and emotions towards each other. 22. The respondent appeared in person. Even before this Court, we had indicated to....
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.... mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important element where it exits. In 24 American Jurisprudence 2d, the term "mental cruelty" has been defined as under: Mental Cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse. In the instant case, our main endeavour would be to define broad parameters of the concept of 'mental cruelty....
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....wn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. 27. In Rajani v. Subramonian AIR1990Ker1 the Court aptly observed that the concept of cruelty depends upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions, their culture and human values to which they attach importance, judged by standard of modern civilization in the background of the cultural heritage and traditions of our society. 28. Again, this Court had an occasion to examine in great detail the concept of menta....
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....cusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made. 29. This Court aptly observed in Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi reported in [2001]3SCR20 , para 14 at pp.258-259, as under: Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well-knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case. 30. In Savitri Pande....
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....d then pose the question whether such behavior is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other. In this case the Court also stated that so many years have elapsed since the spouses parted, company. In these circumstances it can be reasonably inferred that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably. 33. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur reported in AIR2005SC534 , the Court observed as under: The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social va....
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....onduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complai....
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....ourt observed that the respondent wife was living separately from the year 1981 and the marriage has broken down irretrievably with no possibility of the parties living together again. The Court further observed that it will not be possible for the parties to live together and therefore there was no purpose in compelling both the parties to live together. Therefore the best course was to dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce so that the parties who were litigating since 1981 and had lost valuable part of life could live peacefully in remaining part of their life. The Court further observed that her desire to live with her husband at that stage and at that distance of time was not genuine. 37. This Court observed that under such circumstances, the High Court was not justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of the appellant who sought divorce from the Court. "Mental cruelty" is a problem of human behavior. This human problem unfortunately exists all over the world. Existence of similar problem and its adjudication by different courts of other countries would be of great relevance, therefore, we deem it appropriate to examine similar cases decided....
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....f that word which amounted to saevitia, entitling the party aggrieved to a divorce; that there might be many wilful and unjustifiable acts inflicting pain and misery in respect of which that relief could not be obtained. 41. Lord Merriman, in Waters v. Waters (1956) 1 All. E.R. 432 observed that intention to injure was not necessary ingredient of cruelty. 42. Sherman, J. in Hadden v. Hadden, The Times, December 5, 1919, (also reported in Modern Law Review Vol.12, 1949 at p.332) very aptly mentioned that he had no intention of being cruel but his intentional acts amounted to cruelty. In this case, it was observed as under: 'It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty, but when reprehensible conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is cruelty if a reasonable person, after taking due account of the temperament and all the other particular circumstances would consider that the conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called upon to endure it.' 43. Lord Simon in Watt (or Thomas) v. Thomas (1947) 1 All E.R. 582 observed as under: ... th....
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....s. 48. In Bravery v. Bravery (1954) 1 WLR 1169, by majority, the Court held as under: 'If a husband submitted himself to an operation for sterilization without a medical reason and without his wife's knowledge or consent it could constitute cruelty to his wife. But where such an operation was performed to the wife's knowledge, though without her consent and she continued to live with him for thirteen years, it was held that the operation did not amount to cruelty.' 49. Lord Tucker in Jamieson v. Jamieson (1952) I All E.R. 875 aptly observed that "Judges have always carefully refrained from attempting a comprehensive definition of cruelty for the purposes of matrimonial suits, and experience has shown the wisdom of this course". 50. In Le Brocq v. he Brockq [1964] 3 All E.R. 464, the court held as under: I think...that 'cruel' is not used in any esoteric or 'divorce court' sense of that word, but that the conduct complained of must be something which an ordinary man or a jury...would describe as 'cruel' if the story were fully told. 51. In Ward v. Ward (1958) 2 All E.R. 217, a refusal to bear children followed by ....
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.... be trivial and not hurtful but when considered cumulatively they might well come within the description of cruelty. (see: Jamieson v. Jamieson [1952] I All E.R. 875; Waters v. Waters [1956] I All E.R. 432. "The general rule in all questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relations must be considered.' (per Lord Normand in King v. King [1952] 2 All E.R. 584). 54. In Warr v. Warr [1975] I All ER 85), the Court observed that "Section 1(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 provides that irretrievable breakdown may be proved by satisfying the court that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition." AMERICAN CASES: 55. In Jem v. Jem (1937) 34 Haw. 312, the Supreme Court of Hawaii aptly mentioned that cruel treatment not amounting to physical cruelty is mental cruelty. 56. While dealing with the matter of extreme cruelty, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in the case of Hybertson v. Hybertson (1998) 582 N.W. 2d 402 held as under: Any definition of extreme cruelty in a marital setting must necessarily differ according to the personalities of the parti....
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....of legal cruelty a pure question of fact to be resolved upon all the circumstances of the case. CANADIAN CASES: 60. In a number of cases, the Canadian Courts had occasions to examine the concept of 'cruelty'. In Chouinard v. Chouinard 10 D.L.R. 263], the Supreme Court of New Brunswick held as under: Cruelty which constitutes a ground for divorce under the Divorce Act, whether it be mental or physical in nature, is a question of fact. Determination of such a fact must depend on the evidence in the individual case being considered by the court. No uniform standard can be laid down for guidance; behavior which may constitute cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another. There must be to a large extent a subjective as well as an objective aspect involved; one person may be able to tolerate conduct on the part of his or her spouse which would be intolerable to another. Separation is usually preceded by marital dispute and unpleasantness. The court should not grant a decree of divorce on evidence of merely distasteful or irritating conduct on the part of the offending spouse. The word 'cruelty' denotes excessive suffering, severity of pain, mercilessne....
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....39;danger to life, limb, or health, bodily or mentally, or a reasonable apprehension of it' or any of the variations of that definition to be found in the Russell case. In choosing the words 'physical or mental cruelty of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses' Parliament gave its own fresh complete statutory definition of the conduct which is a ground for divorce under Section 3(d) of the Act. AUSTRALIAN CASES: 64. In Dunkley v. Dunkley (1938) SASR 325, the Court examined the term "legal cruelty" in the following words: 'Legal cruelty', means conduct of such a character as to have caused injury or danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental), or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger. Personal violence, actual or threatened, may alone be sufficient; on the other hand, mere vulgar abuse or false accusations of adultery are ordinarily not enough; but, if the evidence shows that conduct of this nature had been persisted in until the health of the party subjected to it breaks down, or is likely to break down, under the strain, a finding of cruelty is justified. 65. In La Rovere ....
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.... The Legislature must, I think, be taken to have intended that separation for three years is to be accepted by this Court, as prima facie a good ground for divorce. When the matrimonial relation has for that period ceased to exist de facto, it should, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, cease to exist de jure also. In general, it is not in the interests of the parties or in the interest of the public that a man and woman should remain bound together as husband and wife in law when for a lengthy period they have ceased to be such in fact. In the case of such a separation the essential purposes of marriage have been frustrated, and its further continuance is in general not merely useless but mischievous. 68. In the said Report, it is mentioned that restricting the ground of divorce to a particular offence or matrimonial disability, causes injustice in those cases where the situation is such that although none of the parties is at fault, or the fault is of such a nature that the parties to the marriage do not want to divulge it, yet such a situation has arisen in which the marriage cannot survive. The marriage has all the external appearances of marriage, but ....
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....iction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. 75. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. 76. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied for ever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist. 77. Some jurists have also expressed their apprehension for introduction of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of the decree of divorce. In their opinion, such an amendment in the Act would put human ingenuity at a premium and throw wide open the doors to litigation, and will create more problems then are sought to be solved. 78. The other majority view, which is shared by most jurists, according to the Law Commission Report, is that h....
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....(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behavior of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of t....
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....n important circumstance that the parties are admittedly living separately for more than sixteen and half years (since 27.8.1990) the irresistible conclusion would be that matrimonial bond has been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. 76. The High Court in the impugned judgment seriously erred in reversing the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court in the impugned judgment ought to have considered the most important and vital circumstance of the case in proper perspective that the parties have been living separately since 27th August, 1990 and thereafter, the parties did not have any interaction with each other. When the appellant was seriously ill and the surgical intervention of bye-pass surgery had to be restored to, even on that occasion, neither the respondent nor her father or any member of her family bothered to enquire about the health of the appellant even on telephone. This instance is clearly illustrative of the fact that now the parties have no emotions, sentiments or feelings for each other at least since 27.8.1990. This is a clear case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In our considered view....