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2022 (11) TMI 37

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....for the revision petitioner/the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. 3. I shall refer the parties in this Revision Petition as 'complainant' and 'accused' for convenience. 4. Shorn off unnecessary details, the case put up by the complainant before the trial court is as under: The complainant launched prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter will be referred as 'NI Act' for convenience) by the accused on the allegation that cheque for Rs.2,00,000/- each dated 24.07.2016 and 27.08.2016 issued by the accused to the complainant in discharge of the loan amount received by the accused from the complainant, when dishonoured. 5. The court below secured the presence of the accused for trial and went on trial. During trial, PW1 examined and Exts.P1 to P6 were marked on the side of the complainant. 6. After questioning the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, though opportunity was provided to the accused to adduce defence evidence, no defence evidence was adduced. 7. While assailing the concurrent verdicts of the trial court as well as the appellate court, th....

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....compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court." 10. In the case on hand, while asserting the said point, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner placed reliance on the award passed in this case before the Taluk Legal Services Committee, Kochi dated 08.04.2018. As per the said settlement, following are the terms incorporated: Both sides agree to settle the case on payment of Rs.4,20,000/- (Rupees Four lakh Twenty Thousand only) to the complainant by the accused as scheduled below. 1) Accused shall pay Rs.1,00,000/- (One lakh only) on or before 27.09.2018. 2) Balance Rs.50,000/- (Fifty Thousand only) shall be paid on or before 30.10.2018. 3) Balance Rs.2,70,000/- (Two lakh Seventy Thousand only) shall be paid on or before 30.12.2018. 4) On receipt of the said amount complainant will withdraw the cases. 5) In case of non-payment of the amount complainant will be at liberty to proceed with the complaint. 11. As per Clause 5 in the settlement, the parties agreed that, in case of non-payment of the amount, the complainant would be at liberty to proceed with the complaint. That means no fi....

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.... Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionalit....

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....onsidered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under: "Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. ................... 18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be oblite....

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.... appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..." 23. In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135) : "14. ...... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perve....