2022 (9) TMI 718
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....600/- 26-12-2013 18-01-2021 19-01 2021 2552 days (B) I.T.A. No. 702/PUN/2021 - Q3/26Q Appeal No. FY and Form & quarter Demand raised u/s 200A/234E Date of order u/s 200A Date of receipt of intimation as per form, 35 Date of filing of appeal Delay in filing appeal (No. of days) NFAC/2012-13/10012328 2012-13 24Q Q3 27,200/-- 26-12-2013 18-01-2021 19-01 2021 2552 days (C) I.T.A. No. 703/PUIN/2021 - Q4/26Q Appeal No. FY and Form & quarter Demand raised u/s 200A/234E Date of order u/s 200A Date of receipt of intimation as per form, 35 Date of filing of appeal Delay in filing appeal (No. of days) NFAC/2012-13/10012313 2012-13 24Q Q4 8,400/- 26-12-2013 18-01-2021 19-01 2021 2552 days 3. The ld. A.R. for the assessee submitted that the Department could not have levied late fees prior to 01-06-2015 as now, as per the mandate through specific judicial pronouncements, whereas, as can be seen from the aforestated tables in all the three cases it was with respect to Financial Year and quarters 2012-13 only. Therefore, it was prior to 01-06-2015 and such levy of late fee is not permitted with....
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....an result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 11. Similar....
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.... the material on record. The only issue in the present appeal relates to the levy of late fees u/s 234E of the Act. The CPC (TDS) had levied penalty u/s 234E of the Act for belated submission of tax deducted at source statement during the financial year 2012-13. It is only w.e.f. 01.06.2015 an amendment was made u/s 200A of the Act providing that fee u/s 234E could be computed at the time of processing of the return of income and intimation could be issued specifying the same payable by the dedutor as fee u/s 234E of the Act. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi vs. Union of India, 73 taxmann.com 252 held that the provisions of section 234E of the Act are substantive in nature and the mechanism for computing the late fee was provided by the Parliament only w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Therefore, late fees u/s 234E of the Act can be levied only prospectively w.e.f. 01.06.2015. The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi (supra) are extracted hereunder :- "19. Hence, it can be said that, the mechanism provided for enforceability of Section 200(3) or 206C (3) for filing of the statement by making it penal unde....
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....egulatory mechanism or provision for regulating the mode and the manner of recovery and its enforceability as retroactive. If at the time when the fee was provided under Section 234E, the Parliament also provided for its utility for giving privilege under Section 271H(3) that too by expressly put bar for penalty under Section 272A by insertion of proviso to Section 272A(2), it can be said that a particular set up for imposition and the payment of fee under Section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under Section 200A payable under Section 234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-Revenue that insertion of clause (c) to (f) under Section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective. 22. It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well-established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution m....
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.... demand notices under Section 200A is held to be without authority of law so far as it relates to computation and demand of fee under Section 234E, we find that the question of further scrutiny for testing the constitutional validity of Section 234E would be rendered as an academic exercise because there would not be any cause on the part of the petitioners to continue to maintain the challenge to constitutional validity under Section 234E of the Act. At this stage, we may also record that the learned counsels appearing for the appellant had also declared that if the impugned notices under Section 200A are set aside, so far as it relates to computation and intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E, the appellant-petitioners would not press the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. But, they submitted that the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E may be kept open to be considered by the Division Bench and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge may not conclude the constitutional validity of Section 234E of the Act. 26. Under these circumstances, we find that no further discussion would be required for examining the cons....
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