TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (5) TMI 711
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....he applicants under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') seeking interim reliefs on account of indirect/direct alleged breach of certain clauses of the Joint Venture Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 'JVA') dated 30.05.1986 and Licence and Technical Assistance Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 'LTAA') dated 17.02.2014. Case of the applicants on facts 6. Applicant no. 1 is son of Mr. J.P. Minda (hereinafter referred to as 'Minda'). A JVA was executed and signed on 30.05.1986 between Minda, for and on behalf of M/s. Jay Industries, and respondent no. 1 to establish a JV, i.e. applicant no. 2. By means of a memorandum of family settlement dated 14.02.1988, Minda and Sons acquired all interests in M/s. Jay Industries, a partnership firm, in respect of the JVA and the JV. Transfer of interest was intimated to respondent no. 1 and was acknowledged and assented to by it. 7. Thereafter, Minda acquired the entire interest of M/s. Jay Industries in respect of the JV, through a family settlement executed on 21.02.2013 and finally, the said interest was transferred to applicant no. 1 thro....
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....eof." 10. In the year 1989, JV went public in order to increase the capital and offer liquidity to both the JV partners, but this had no effect on the terms and conditions of JVA, as regards the control/management and majority shareholding of applicant no. 1. At present applicant no. 1 and respondent no. 1 are promoters of JV and the shareholding pattern is as under: Shareholders in JV Shareholding % Number of Equity Shares Applicant No. 1/Controlling Shareholder 30.30% 1,171,106 Respondent No. 1 (M/s U-Shi Ltd.) 26% 10,04,645 Public/ Body Corporates/ NRI/ Others 43.70% 16,88,749 11. Applicant no. 1 has been the "controlling shareholder" of the JV, holding and controlling the single largest group of shareholders and promoters, i.e. 30.30% and has been the Managing Director since 15.04.1988 and a promoter. Respondent no. 1 has not had a nominee director in the Board of JV since 2012. 12. Pursuant to Clause 6.2 of JVA, JV and respondent no. 1 further executed agreements for technical assistance, which primarily expanded the scope of their technical collaboration and this led to the transfer of technical know-how from respondent no. 1 to JV....
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....ting the relief sought by the applicants as an emergency measure. The reliefs sought in the EA were as under: "82. Claimants seek the following interim reliefs against respondents (including persons claiming through or under the respondents): (a) to restrain respondents from pursuing any actions or steps with respect, and in relation, to the open offer to purchase shares, in excess of its existing 26% voting share capital in claimant no. 2, as per the India's Takeover Code; (b) in the alternative, to restrain respondents from exercising their rights as shareholders, in respect of shares purchased via open offer which are in excess of its existing 26% voting share capital in claimant no. 2, until the conclusion of the present dispute; (c) in the alternative, to grant an interim mandatory injunction to transfer the shares acquired via open offer, which are in excess of its existing 26% voting share capital in claimant no. 2, to claimant no. 1 at the prevailing market rate (in Aug. 2019) when it ought to have made the pre-emptive offer to claimant no. 1 to comply with JVA and LTAA, and until such time restrain respondents from exercising their r....
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....relation to the open offer to purchase shares in excess of its existing 26% shares in the JV. A similar prohibitory interim injunction was granted by the Supreme Court in Vinay Prakash Singh vs. Sameer Gehlaut and others, Contm. Pet. (C) No. 2120/2018 in SLP (C) No. 20417/2017. If the respondents are allowed to publicly announce the open offer, it would lead to a chain of events and transactions, involving the public-at-large, which would be irreversible, resulting in grave consequences and setbacks to the applicants as well as to the investors and the securities market. It would be impossible to ascertain the measure of loss and hence, damages would not be the appropriate compensation. 21. In the alternative, it is submitted that a prohibitory interim injunction be granted restraining the respondents from alienating their shares and exercising any rights in respect of the shares purchased via open offer, in excess of 26% held by them, till the arbitral tribunal decides the matter finally. Reliance is placed on a decision of this court in Ravi Mittal vs. Kumkum Mittal in Execution Petition No. 137/2010, dated 28.10.2014 to argue that such interim injunctions are common. 22. I....
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....granted by the tribunal and thus once the applicants elected to approach the emergency arbitrator, they cannot file the instant petition. 27. It is further contended that under Article 77(7) of the Rules, mandate of the emergency arbitrator terminates only on account of three reasons mentioned therein, which have not occurred in the present case. Moreover, despite passing the order on 02.04.2020, the arbitrator's mandate continues and the arbitrator has, in paragraph 15.2.1 of the order, specifically stated so. Thus, for all purposes, an arbitral tribunal, validly constituted, is in place and the jurisdiction of this court under Section 9 of the Act cannot be invoked. 28. It is next contended that even assuming that the emergency arbitrator is not an "arbitral tribunal" within the meaning of Section 9(3) of the Act, applicants have already elected their remedy and lost and have not even shown or pleaded any change in circumstances, since the passing of the emergency award. The applicants cannot be permitted to have second bite at the cherry and resort to the present remedy. It is further contended that the doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are availab....
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....ounsel submits that even otherwise the petition is not maintainable as the applicants have no locus standi to file the same. Applicant no. 1 is not a signatory/party to the JVA or JV and there is no arbitration agreement between him and the respondents. Applicant no. 1 is wrongly asserting rights in the agreements in praesenti on the basis of the purported settlement deed dated 12.05.2019, whereas Clause 9 of the deed provides that shares of applicant no. 2 would pass on to applicant no. 1 only after the death of the settler, Minda. However, Minda is still alive and thus no interest/rights have passed on to applicant no. 1, as yet. Applicant no. 1 claims to represent the entire 3030% shareholding in JV belonging to the Minda Promoter Group, but the publicly available records of applicant no. 2 show that he is not even a shareholder of applicant no. 2 presently and does not form a part of the Minda Promoter Group. Insofar as applicant no. 2 is concerned, it is not a party to the JV as it was incorporated on 14.08.1986 and was, therefore, not even in existence when the JVA was executed on 30.05.1986 and the EA order takes note of these submissions, in detail. 34. Learned senior co....
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....le in the present case the JVA does not contemplate prior approval of the party, in the event of change in the shareholding pattern of the other party. 38. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the doctrine of election would not apply in the present case as the relief sought is an interim relief of protection while the doctrine would apply in cases where alternative rights are available concerning the merits or are substantive rights. The judgment relied upon in the case of National Insurance is distinguished by arguing that the said case pertained to a right of appeal under two different statutes and concerned the substantive rights. 39. Insofar as the locus of the applicants is concerned, it is submitted, relying on P.K. Mohan Ram vs. B.N. Ananthachary, (2010) 4 SCC 161, that entire interest under the JVA has vested in applicant no. 1 and he is entitled to the usufructs. Settlement deed clearly shows that Minda has made no provision reserving the right to revoke the settlement deed and thus a right is created in praesenti under Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 40. It is next argued that present petition is not by way of an appeal ....
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....mutual consultation. 9.5. In case of failure to reach a settlement, such disputes, controversies or differences shall be submitted to the arbitration under the Commercial Rules of the India Commercial Arbitration Association to be held in India if initiated by YUSHIN, or under the Rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association to be held in Japan if initiated by JAY." 47. Perusal of the arbitration clause shows that the parties were ad idem that in' case respondent no. 1 initiated the arbitration, then the arbitration would be held in India and under the Commercial Rules of India Commercial Arbitration Association. However, arbitration would be held in Japan and under the Rules of Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (hereinafter referred to as 'JCAA'), in case it was initiated by M/s. Jay Industries. In the present case, it is undisputed that it is an international commercial arbitration and that the emergency arbitration and regular arbitration were invoked by the Indian entity. Hence, the seat of arbitration is Japan and the rules applicable are those of the JCAA. 48. The controversy whether Part I of the Act would be applicable to internati....
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....n by the judicial authority must be notified without delay to the Secretariat. The Secretariat shall inform the arbitral tribunal thereof. 34. Thus, Article 23 of the ICC Rules permits parties to apply to a competent judicial authority for interim and conservatory measures-Therefore, in such cases an application can be made under Section 9 of the said Act. 35. Lastly, it must be stated that the said Act does not appear to be a well-drafted legislation. Therefore, the High Courts of Orissa, Bombay, Madras, Delhi and Calcutta cannot be faulted for interpreting it in the manner indicated above. However, in our view, a proper and conjoint reading of all the provisions indicates that Part I is to apply also to international commercial arbitrations which take place out of India, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude it or any of its provisions. Such an interpretation does not lead to any conflict between any of the provisions of the said Act. On this interpretation there are no lacunae in the said Act. This interpretation also does not leave a party remediless. Thus, such an interpretation has to be preferred to the one adopted by the High Courts ....
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....arbitration with a seat outside India. 196. We conclude that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is applicable only to all the arbitrations which take place within the territory of India. 197. The judgment in Bhatia International was rendered by this court on 13.03.2002. Since then, the aforesaid judgment has been followed by all the High Courts as well as by this court on numerous occasions. In fact, the judgment in Venture Global Engg. has been rendered on 10.01.2008 in terms of the ratio of the decision in Bhatia International. Thus, in order to do complete justice, we hereby order, that the law now declared by this court shall apply prospectively, to all the arbitration agreements executed hereafter." 50. Pursuant to the 246th Report of the Law Commission, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 was promulgated, which was published in the Gazette of India on 23rd October, 2015 and came into effect immediately. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Amendment Act') brought about various amendments in the Act, one of them being enactment of Section 2(ii) whereby Section 2(2) was ame....
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.... the parties to exclude the applicability of Part I of the Act. There is another important facet of this case. Article 77(5) of the JCAA Rules makes it clear that the emergency measures are deemed to be interim measures granted by the arbitral tribunal, when it is constituted. In fact, the provision further stipulates that the parties shall be bound by, and carry out, the emergency measures ordered by the emergency arbitrator and that the emergency measures shall remain in effect till suspended, modified or terminated under Article 782. Article 77 is extracted hereunder: "Article 77--Mandate of emergency arbitrator 1. The emergency arbitrator may order, modify, suspend or terminate emergency measures in accordance with Articles 71 through 74. 2. The emergency arbitrator shall make a procedural schedule for emergency measures immediately after his or her appointment. 3. The emergency arbitrator, if he or she considers a hearing necessary in order to make a determination on the emergency measures, may hold such hearing for one day only. 4. The emergency arbitrator shall make reasonable efforts to decide on the emergency measures within two....
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....nt relief to the applicants. Respondents, in my view, are right in their contention that having invoked the mechanism of the emergency arbitrator and invited a detailed and reasoned order, it is not open for the applicants to take a second bite at the cherry. There has been no change of circumstance after the said order as none has been pleaded or even argued. Having excluded the applicability of Part I of the Act and agreeing to be governed by different rules and procedures binding on the parties and having invoked the same, jurisdiction of this court under Section 9 of the Act cannot be invoked and the petition is not maintainable. 56. Even on the anvil of doctrine of election, applicants have to fail. Applicants had consciously chosen to tread on a path and cannot turn around only because they were unsuccessful. It also needs a mention that the pleadings in the petition are really in the nature of an appeal pointing out flaws and infirmities in the order of the emergency arbitrator. Respondents are right that this court in a petition under Section 9 of the Act cannot sit as a court of appeal to examine the order of the emergency arbitrator. 57. During the hearing, court wa....
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....f arbitration--The language of the arbitration shall be in English. 15.5. Survival--The provisions contained in this Clause 15 shall survive the termination of this agreement." 59. Clause 15.2 postulated that any dispute, controversy, claim or disagreement of any kind whatsoever, between the parties, would be resolved by arbitration in Singapore, in accordance with Arbitration Rules of Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC Rules). Examining this clause, the court held as under (paras 95 and 96, page 467 of Arb. LR): "100. The SIAC Rules are clearly in conformity with the UNCITRAL Model Law and permit the parties to approach the court for interim relief. As pointed out earlier, UNQTRAL Model Law expressly provides for courts to grant interim orders in aid to proceedings held outside the State. And, the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act also enables a party to have recourse to Section 9 of the Act notwithstanding that the seat of arbitration is outside India. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that since the parties had agreed that the arbitration be conducted as per SIAC Rules, they had impliedly agreed that it would not be incompatible for them to ....