TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1922 (2) TMI 4
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....8. The resolutions involved a boycott of the Court by the Pleaders. 9. In his case there can be no doubt that he deliberately took part in he 'hartal' of the Pleaders. We have, however, been informed that R.K. Bose has ceased to practice as a Pleader and has not taken out a certificate this year. 10. Consequently, in cur judgment, it is not necessary for us at present to enquire further into the case of R.K. Bose, or to take any steps in connection with this reference. Reference No. 7 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 11. This is a reference by the learned District Judge of Noakhali forwarding a report made by the Officiating Subordinate Judge under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, with respect to two. Pleaders of that Court, Rajani Kanta Nag and Preo Nath Roy Chaudhuri. 12. The Subordinate Judge reported that the Pleaders committed grossly improper conduct in the discharge of their professional duty by not attending Court on the date in question and neglecting to do the necessary work on behalf of their client in the suit mentioned in the report on the 25th May 1921 though asked by their client, he further reported that they were guilty of misconduct wi....
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....endant No. 2 did not enter his case in my sherista, he himself took all the previous dates and looked after the case." 6. That in the matter of not attending Courts during hartal there was no combination or common object amongst the members of the Bar, that I did not, with a view to the furtherance of the alleged common object of the hartal or non-co-operation movement, absent myself from Court from 23rd May 1921 to 3rd June 1921. No such hartal or non-co-operation movement was started by me or the Local Bar; non-cooperation movement was started long before the period in question and it has no connection with my absence from Court." 9. That consequent upon the cooly affairs at Chandpur, public feeling in this town ran so very high that-the people, in one voice, resolved in sympathy for them, to suspend all works for a time and desired the Headers, the Mukhtears, merchants, ghariwallas and others to follow their decision under threat of social punishment and humiliation, and that it might be in obedience to this resolution that none of my clients asked me to appear in Court from 23rd May 1921 to 3rd June 1921. 10. That the resolution refe....
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....jection I was not further instructed to do any other work for him, that on 25th May 1921 the said defendant No. 2 did not pay me' any fees nor did he even ask my legal advice. 10. That defendant No. 2 did not even inform me that his suit was fixed for hearing on 25th May 1921, he himself making tadbir in his cases and having not entered this case in my sherista. 16. These two Pleaders and two others accepted a vakalatnama from the defendant No. 2 in a Suit No. 1083 of 1920, on the nth January 1921. The hearing of the suit was fixed for the 25th May 1921. Neither of the Pleaders attended the Court on that day, and the defendant No. 2 filed a petition asking for a month's adjournment on account of the hartal which had begun on the 23rd May 1921 and which continued until the 3rd June 1921, and in consequence of which the Pleaders did not attend the Courts. 17. The petition is as follows: To-day is the date of the abovementioned sirit. To-day I went to Pleader's basha with copy of issue to file list of witnesses: making hartal in the course of non-co-operation no Pleader looked into any papers. I pray for one month's adjournment in or....
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....arrangement has been proved by the Pleaders, upon which the onus of, proving it lay. 23. It was then said that no fees were paid for their attendance at Court on the 25th May 1921. No proof has been given that any fee was asked or that there was any arrangement that a fee should be paid before the Pleaders would attend Court. In the absence of such proof the mere fact that no fee was tendered or paid is, in my judgment, no justification for this refusal to attend to their clients' interests. 24 Further, having regard to the facts of the case and the statements in the written explanations of the two Pleaders, I have no doubt that even if a fee had been offered, they would not have accepted it or attended the Court. 25. It was then argued that there was no evidence of the common object alleged in the charge. 26. I agree that it has not been strictly proved that the Pleaders took part in what has come to be called the "non-co-operation" movement. 27. In my judgment, however, it has been proved that the Pleaders did join in the hartal, one object of which was to boycott the Courts. 28. The excuses put forward in the written explanations of the Pleaders, in my opin....
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....ed to the prejudice of his interest by Rai Plaintiff absenting yourself from the Court on that date you thereby committed grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty by neglecting your client's work and acting to the prejudice of his interest (Section 13(6)) and you have further been 'guilty of misconduct by joining the said movement started to boycott Courts and paralyse the work of the Courts and absenting yourself from the Court on those dates (23rd May, 1921 to 3rd June 1921) without any lawful excuse ((Section 13(f)) 32. The report of the Subordinate Judge was that the Pleader was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within the meaning of Clause (6) of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act and of misconduct within Clause (f) of the said section. 33. The learned District Judge concluded his reference as follows: The opposite party, as such Pleader, is liable to some punishment, however light, under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act; as he, in my opinion, has brought himself within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court and his misconduct which falls within Clause (f....
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....on was the foundation of the proceedings and that no objection was raised to the admission of the evidence. 41. In my judgment it is clear that in this case the Pleader declined to attend the Court on account of the hartal of the Pleaders. 42. In the course of the argument, the learned Vakil for the Pleader informed us that hartal meant "strike". 43. This conclusion is not based upon the statements in the petition only. There is other evidence in this case. 44. It appears that on the 22nd May 1921, a, meeting was held in the town and resolutions were passed, one of which was that Pleaders and Mukhiears should not attend the Courts. This meeting was held to show sympathy in respect of an incident which had occurred at Chandpur. The object of such a resolution could only be to: boycott the Courts and so interfere with the administration of justice. On the 23rd May 1921 the Pleaders in a body with the exception of the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, abstained from attending the Courts. This abstention lasted until the 3rd June 1921. There was an informal gathering of some, Pleaders in the Bar library called by the Pleader Annada Charan Roy, whose conduct is now u....
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....it cannot be said that the Pleader discharged himself with the consent of the client. 51. The Pleader was bound to give the client reasonable notice so as to afford the client an opportunity of obtaining other legal assistance. 52. In this case, the Pleader must have known that it was impossible for his client to obtain such assistance on the 2nd June 1921; all the Pleaders were observing the hartal except the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, and the client had no option except to bow to the inevitable and to present his petition himself. 53. It was then urged that although the Pleader absented himself from Court, and although his absence was in consequence of the hartal, there was no evidence of his joining the hartal. 54. I put aside the question of the "non-cooperation movement" as there is no evidence against the Pleader in this respect. I am satisfied, however, that there was a hartal; one of the objects of that hartal was to boycott the Courts; there is no evidence that the Pleader took part in promoting the hartal: but to my mind it is clear that he abstained from going to the Court on the 2nd June in consequence of the hartal; he took part in the discus....
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....ischarging his professional duty. In my judgment, therefore, the Pleader failed in his duty both to his client and to the Court and he was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within Clause (6) of Section 13 and of such misconduct as would bring his case within the meaning of Clause (f) of the said section. Reference No. 9 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 59. This is a reference by the learned District Judge of Noakhali under Section 1.4 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. 60. The learned Judge forwarded with his reference a report of the learned Munsif of the Third Court. 61. The charge was: Whereas you being enrolled as a Pleader and authorised to act as such in this Court, absented yourself from Court, contrary to the Mis. Case No. 419 wishes of your client and to the prejudice, of his interests, of 1920. on 28th and 50th May 1921 when the case noted in the margin, (Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.) in which you were engaged for the Petitioner was called on, Azam-ud-din-Peti you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of tioner v. Md. Ibrahim your professional duties within the meaning of Section 13 of ....
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....d an explanation to which I shall refer later. 68. The material facts which led up to these proceedings were as follows: 69. One Azam-ud-Din, an illiterate agriculturist, had made an application to the Court for setting aside a sale. On the evidence it is clear, in my judgment, that S.K. Nag acted as Pleader for Azam-ud-Din in connection with that application-. The 28th May 1921 was fixed for the hearing of that application. On the morning of that day Azam-ud-Din went to Noakhali and to the house of S.K. Nag and asked him to sign and move a petition in Court on his behalf. 70. The evidence of Azam-ud-Din is that The Pleader said he would not come to Court or sign my petition or a hajirah. His clerk said he would not write my petition. I am an illiterate man, I could not write a petition or a hajirah. They told me to come to Court. I came to Court but could not take any steps. I found no Pleader or Pleader's clerk in Court that day. I had engaged no other Pleader in my case except Surendra Babu. I had requested my Pleader to come to Court. I could not know the result that day. 71. It appears that Azam-ud-Din went to the Court and waited about until 3-3....
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....Ka). That on taking evidence the prayer for revival be granted and Miscellaneous Case No. 419 of 1920 be restored to its original number and justice done. 77. It is to be noted that the Pleader by signing the petition makes himself responsible for two material statements: first that, in consequence of the application to set aside the sale being dismissed, the petitioner (Azam-ud-Din) had sustained a heavy loss, and, secondly, that the cause of this heavy loss' was that hartal prevailed at the time and Pleaders and clerks did not attend Courts, and that as the petitioner could neither read nor write he could not take any step. I am not aware whether the matter was set right as neither side was able to inform the Court what had been the result of the petition. 78. In my judgment it is clear that on the 28th May 1921 S.K. Nag was the sole Pleader for Azam-ud-Din in connection with the application to set aside the sale; that was the day fixed for the hearing of the sale; Azam-ud-Din requested him to go to Court and file a petition. the Pleader refused. He was asked to sign a petition, the Pleader refused: the Pleader's clerk would not even write out the petition. 79. T....
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....ndoubtedly the hartal which was then going on, and the learned Vakil when asked by one of my learned brothers if the Pleader would have accepted a fee, if it had been offered to him, had to admit that "probably" he would not have, accepted it. I think instead using the word: "probably" he might have used the word "certainly." 85. It was then argued that the Pleader had discharged himself on the 28th May and that the client agreed to such discharge. It is difficult to treat such an argument seriously if the Pleader wished to discharge himself, he was bound to give his client reasonable notice: his refusal to act was on the morning of the 28th May: the case was fixed for that day: the Pleader knew his client could get no other advice on that day because of the hartal, and that he was an illiterate man, who could neither read nor write: it cannot possibly be held that the notice was reasonable. 86. It is then said the client agreed to the discharge. There is no evidence of such agreement by the client: on the contrary the evidence is all the other way and it is clear that Azam-ud-Din wanted the Pleader to go to Court: when the Pleader refused Azam-ud-Din had no alternative but t....
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....so far as to refuse to sign the client's petition, which he could have done in his own house, shows that he was acquiescing in, if not sympathising with, the hartal, one object of which was that the Pleaders should boycott the Courts and so bring the administration of justice to a standstill. 94. The Pleader had a duty not only towards his client but also towards the Court and, it was clearly his duty to co-operate with the Court in the orderly and pure administration of justice. 95. The Pleader has failed altogether in showing any justification for his refusal to act for his client, and to attend the Court and in my judgment, he was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within Clause (b) of Section 13 and of such misconduct as would bring his case within Clause (f) of the same section. References Nos. 4, 7, 8 & 9 of 1921. J.G. Wooddroffe, J. 96. These references have been heard separately but they have certain points in common to which I address myself. The Pleaders concerned are charged with furthering a hartal or strike by abstaining from Court in breach of their duty towards their clients and the Court. The hartal was pr....
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....t if they were, the promulgation of a public hartal directed, amongst others, against the Courts was a sufficient excuse for such non-attendance. 99. I think it is open to any practitioner for reasons personal to himself to refuse to practise in a particular Court or before a particular Judge. But he can only adopt this course either by refusing briefs in such Court, or before such Judge, or, if he has accepted a brief or vakalatnama, by first properly discharging himself on due notice to the client and in the latter case to the Court. But concerted action by a whole body of legal practitioners to boycott a Judge or Court in protest against an alleged wrong to one of its members or in respect of its conduct of the administration of justice generally is not permissible, because the Bar in any such case cannot constitute itself the authority to adjudge on such grievance and its duty is not to impede the administration' of justice, by, collective abstention from Court, but to make its representation through (if there be one) its Association to the High Court which has superintendence in such matters. In the present case, moreover, the abstention is alleged to have been due to c....
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....e threat of a boycott may be very great and might, in my opinion, exempt a legal practitioner from a charge of misconduct if he feared to brave it. To hold otherwise would be to make unwillingness to face a real danger or lack of courage grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duty, which is not, in my opinion, the law. In my opinion, it would not be possible to charge a legal practitioner with grossly improper conduct, whatever his liability to his client might be, if he omitted to carry out his duty to his clients by reason of his genuine fear of any real and substantial injury, physical or otherwise, to himself or family. Nor, in my opinion, would it make any difference if such fear were, in fact, unfounded if, in fact, it was sincerely entertained. And this for the reason that the Courts cannot punish a legal practitioner for grossly improper conduct because his apprehensions were beside the mark or he was devoid of courage. In such a case his client might have a remedy against him for neglect of a duty which his apprehensions did not excuse. But it would not be grounds for the Court's action by way of punishment for grossly improper conduct. It might, of ....
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....ve it further weight by rendering it an unnecessary obeisance. We find that, notwithstanding that it is reasonable to expect some difference of opinion as to the reality of the menace, a difference which might be due both to judgment and degree of courage, practically all the Pleaders abstained from attendance at Court. In one of the references (No. 9) the Pleader charged declined even to sign a petition in his own house, showing that it was not in that particular instance a case of apprehension of danger in going out and attending Courts. And in other cases it seems to me that the refusal to attend was due to sympathy with the objects of the hartal and not to fear of the consequences of disobeying it. And what were these consequences in fact? One person was molested by having his bicycle taken from him in attending Court, the Government Pleader, who with the Public Prosecutor attended Court, was fined Rs. 25 by the "public" (whether it was paid or not does not appear) and has some night-soil thrown into his. compound, another man was fined by the "public" Rs. 5 and the like. Large number of people carried on, and amongst these the Municipal mehiars made more decent and mannerly di....
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....or deciding it, for that is not here necessary. 106. Quasi-criminal proceedings are not (as the word shows) criminal proceedings in the sense that all rules of procedure applicable in criminal trials are necessarily in force in a quasi-criminal proceeding. This question is not of much moment here for reasons next stated. Thus I think that in such a proceeding as this it is open to the Pleader charged to say nothing, to give no explanation, to adduce no evidence, to refuse to be examined on oath or otherwise and to say to the Court proceeding against him "prove your case." This is a course legally open to him, though, seeing that the Pleader is an offer of Court, I cannot say it is a proper course and certainly not a wise one, if the Pleader has any defence. I cannot conceive that a legal practitioner who has a real defence on the merits will not disclose every fact and take every step to prove it. When there is no defence or the defence is doubtful, it may be that a legal practitioner may adopt the course taken by a guilty accused in a criminal trial. Anyhow the prosecuting party must prove its case. If, however, (as here) the Pleaders charged do offer an explanation, the Court ....
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.... prima facie case and that when as here (except in Reference No. 9 where it was unnecessary) it is shown that a Pleader has accepted a vakalatnama in a general and common form, this is sufficient to start the case against him, and if it be desired to show that there was any special contract accompanying the acceptance of the vakalatnama, the burden of proving this, as a matter specially within his knowledge, is on the Pleader. If again it is alleged that the Pleader who has accepted a vakalatnama has discharged himself, he must show that he has properly done so with sufficient notice to his client and with intimation to the Court. 108. If again a Pleader stipulates for payment of fees before he does any work he is not bound to do such work without such payment. If, however, he accepts a vakalatnama without such stipulation, that is, gives credit to his client, he must proceed to represent him, even though unpaid his fees, until either his client discharges him or he properly discharges himself. 109. Applying these genera principles to the present case, I am of opinion that the obligation to attend Court as charged is prima facie established, that no special contract affecting....
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.... question whether these cases r fall under Clause (b) or Clause (f) of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, I am r disposed to think they fall under both clauses, that is under Clause (b) in so far as they involve neglect of duty towards the client 1 in accepting a vakalatnama and without excuse not fulfilling the duties involved in such acceptances; and under Clause (f) in so far as the practitioners conduct was directed against the Court by abstention from attendance on account of the hartal. In the present case the two are closely connected, because one and the same act constitutes the neglect and furtherance of the hartal. It is plain on the view of the facts here taken that one or other section applies. The matter is of no practical importance in any event, particularly having regard to the order which we are about to pass in these cases. References Nos. 4, 7, 8 & 9 of 192. Asutosh Mookerjee, J. 114. These are four references made by the District Judge of Noakhali under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act in respect of six Pleaders. Reference No. 4 relates to Babu Rajani Kanta Bose and Babu Burga Prosanna Chakraburtty, Reference No. 7 to Babu Rajani Kanta ....
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....accepted a vakalatnama, is he bound to appear to conduct the case in its various, stages; secondly, if he is so bound, does' the liability continue till he has discharged himself by recourse to the appropriate procedure; and, thirdly, does failure to appear to conduct the case before he has so discharged himself, render the Pleader liable to disciplinary action by the Court? As regards the first question, it is essential to point out that a Pleader must be duly appointed before he can appear, act and plead in a case. Reference may be made to Rule 1 and Rule 4(1) and 4(2) of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the patty in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a Pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf. Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. The appointment of a Pleader to make or do any appearance, application or act for any p....
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....pon directed the Vakil to return the amount paid to him, and ruled that the acceptance of a vakalatnama by a Vakil of the High Court should in all cases be unconditional. But it is plain, that notwithstanding this expression of opinion, vakalatnamas have been accepted by Vakils in this Court, subject to conditions implied by well-known usage, as is clear from the decision in Ram Koer v. Puna Koer 3 Shome. 75. I am bound to add, however, that the true import of the observations made by Mr. Justice Phear was not, it seems to me, correctly appreciated by Sir Richard Garth, C.J. The view indicated by Phear, J., that if once a legal practitioner accepts a brief, he is bound to plead the cause of his client, whether he is paid his fee or not, is not in conflict with the opinion maintained by Garth, C.J., that a legal practitioner may, both as a matter of right and of professional propriety, insist upon the payment of his fee before he reads his brief or pleads his client's cause. As Garth, C.J., himself points out, if a legal practitioner takes a brief without a fee and without informing his client that the fee must be paid before he attends to the case, he cannot with propriety rece....
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....and correlated aspects of the matter, such as that raised in Moheshpur Coal Co. v. Jotindra Nath Gupta 18 Ind. Cas. 315 : 40 C. 386 : 17 C.W.N. 278. 117. As regards the second question, it is clear that when a Pleader has accepted a vakalatnama with or without implied conditions his liability continues, till he has discharged himself by recourse to the appropriate procedure. It is a mistake to suppose, however, that this is a matter solely between the Pleader and his client. The statutory provisions on the subject leave no room for doubt that "the appointment of a Pleader, when filed in Court, with his acceptance, continues in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the Pleader, as the case may be, to this rule, there are two exceptions, namely, first the death of the client or the Pleader, and, secondly, the termination of the proceedings in the suit so far as regards that client. An instance of the application of this rule is furnished by the decision of Harington, J., in Atul Chandra Ghose v. Lakshman Chunder Sen 2 Ind. Cas. 830 : 36 C. 609 : 13 C.W.N. 1172. See also Prabhu Lal v. Kumar Krishna Dutt 33 Ind. Cas. 73 : 23 C.L.J. 3....
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....ation of Pleader and client has been described by some as that of principal and agent and by others as that of master and servant, in a limited and dignified sense, Maruga Chetty v. Rajasami 14 Ind. Cas. 823 : 22 M.L.J. 284 : (1912) M.W.N. 333 : 11 M.W.N. 280. It may be a matter for controversy how for these analogies hold good; but, in any event, the relation involves the highest personal trust and confidence, so much so that it cannot be delegated without consent. The Pleader by his obligation is bound to discharge his duties to his client with the strictest fidelity and is answerable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court for dereliction of duty. A Pleader, however, is more than a mere agent or servant of his client. He is also an officer of the Court, and as such he owes the duty of good faith and honourable dealing to the Courts before which he practises his profession. His high vocation is to inform the Court as to the law and facts of the case and to aid it to do justice by arriving at correct conclusions The practice of the law is not a business Open to all who wish to engage in it; it is a personal right or privilege limited to selected persons of good character wit....
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....al proceeding. It was ruled in the cases of Hardwick, In re (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 148 : 53 L.J.D.Q. 64 : 49 L.T. 584 : 32 W.R. 191 and Eede, In re; Davy, Ex parte (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 228 : 59 L.J. Q.B. 376 : 38 W.R. 683 that as the Court in making an order striking a Solicitor off the rolls for misconduct does so in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its own officers and not in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, an appeal lies from such order to the Court of Appeal. The same principle was recognised by Lord Mansfield in Brounsall, Ex parte (1778) 2 Cowper. 829 : 98 E.R. 1385 when he over ruled an objection to disciplinary proceedings against an Attorney who had been convicted of felony, on the ground that the only misconduct imputed to him was the very offence which had formed the basis of his conviction. The same view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Randall v. Bringham (1868) 7 Wallace. 523 : 19 Law. Ed. 285 and Wall, Ex parte (1882) 17 Otto. 265. The true position appears to be that these proceedings are neither civil suits nor criminal prosecutions: Janak Kishore, In the matter of 37 Ind. Cas. 484 : 1 P.L.J. 576 : (1917) Pat. 60 : 18 Cr. ....
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....put by the Court, the Court and the Jury, if any, may draw such inference from such refusal as it thinks just; see Section 114, 111(b) of the Indian Evidence Act; Emperor v. Dwijendra Chandra 31 Ind. Cas. 164 : 19 C.W.N. 1043 : 16 Cr. L.J. 734. On the other hand, if the Pleader does submit a written statement in answer to the charge, the Court is bound to take it into consideration and may draw such inference as legitimately arises from its contents. To take an example, if the Pleader in his written statement seeks to justify his conduct on certain allegations of fact, it may well be inferred that the conduct was not justifiable on other hypothetical or imaginable grounds. A singular illustration of such a contingency was furnished in the course of argument in one of the cases now before us. It was urged with considerable insistence that the failure of the Pleader to appear in Court on the appointed day did not render him liable to disciplinary action, inasmuch as it had not been affirmatively, established that he had been offered his fee for the day by the client. But in answer to a question put by the Court, the reply was given that even if the fee had been tendered, it would not....
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.... and took an active part in the proceedings. He then absented himself from Court and did not appear in the case in which he had been engaged. He has not shown cause, and we have been informed that he has retired from the practice of his profession. It is, consequently, not necessary to discuss this matter further. As regards Babu Durga Prosanna Chakrabarty, the evidence indicates that his services were engaged by the client for only one occasion, consequently his failure to appear on another occasion does not support the charge of professional misconduct. 122. In Reference No. 7, we are concerned with the cases of two Pleaders, Babu Rajani Kanta Nag and Babu Priyanath Rai Chaudhri. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that these Pleaders had accepted a vakalatnama and yet did not appear in Court when their case was taken up. There can be no doubt that they acted in this manner, because they were in sympathy with the hartal resolution, and it is idle for them to urge that they had no intention to boycott the Court or paralyse the administration of justice. I feel no doubt that they could have attended the Court, as the Government Pleader and the Public Prosecutor had done, and ....
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....ppear on the date to which the case was adjourned without, his knowledge. In view of the statement contained in this petition, which was signed by the Pleader himself, it is difficult to, understand how the charge, of unprofessional conduct could be seriously met. It has been urged, however, that as no vakalatnama was filed along with the application, for reversal of sale, the Pleader was not liable to attend on the appointed date. There is no foundation whatever for this contention, for it is well-settled that no fresh vakalatnama is necessary to entitle the Pleader to appear in proceedings subsequent to the decree, Shah Mukhun v. Sreekishen Singh 8 W.R. 92 Sutto Churn v. Suroop Chunder Doss 12 W.R. 465 Gopal Jayachand v. Hargovind Khushal 5 B.H.C.R. (A.C.J.) 83 Sadashiv Ganpatrao v. Vithaldas Nanchand 20 B. 198 : 10 Ind. Dec. 691. The Pleader did not, in fact, present the application for reversal of the sale, and, subsequently the petition for restoration of that application, on the strength of his appointment as Pleader in the suit; and no weight can be attached to the fact that a fresh vakalatnama was not filed. There is also no force in the contention that he was not paid his ....
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.... justice. It is thus a matter of the deepest concern that they passively acquiesced in, if not actively sympathised with, the movement to paralyse the Courts, and, what is most deplorable, they did not hesitate to cast baseless aspersions on the judicial officers who instituted these disciplinary proceedings solely with a view to vindicate the authority and maintain the dignity of the Courts. References Nos. 4, 7, 8 & 9 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 126. After due consideration we have decided to take no further action in respect of the References No. 4 of 1921, No. 7 of 1921, No. 8 of 1921 and No. 9 of 1921. Some of the reasons which have actuated us in coming to this conclusion, are: (1) that these are the first cases of the kind which have been brought before this Court; (2) that the Pleaders concerned, with the exception of one, who has ceased to practise, have resumed work and attended the Courts; (3) that there was undoubtedly a strong feeling in Noakhali on the occasion in question; (4) the Pleaders may have acted in haste and without due consideration of the serious nature and effect of their conduct. ....