TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1973 (9) TMI 112
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....o claim benefit under Section 12(3)(a)." 2. Since a pure question of law, and not the entire petition, has been referred, it is unnecessary to consider the case on facts. However, with a view to understand the question that has been referred, we will briefly set out the facts giving rise to this petition. 3. Since prior to 1958, one Aher was a tenant of the open plot of land in dispute at the rent of Rs. 12/- per month. He put up a flour mill. On February 14, 1958, by a deed of assignment, he had assigned his tenancy rights together with the running business of the flour mill to the petitioners. The Petitioners fell in arrears for more than six months, and, therefore, by notice dated January 27, 1965, the landlord called upon them to vacate the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent for over six months. By a reply the petitioners challenged the quantum of rent as well as the period from which they were liable. Nothing, however, was paid by them towards the arrears of rent, and, therefore, the respondent-landlord filed the instant suit on August 25, 1965, for recovery of possession of the suit premises as also for arrears of rent. The petitioners filed their written-sta....
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....he recent division of Full bench of this Court in Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba, AIR1971Bom396 (FB). It was under these circumstances that Wagle, J. has referred this matter to a Division Bench. 5. There are other two Special Civil Applications viz. Nos. 89 of 1968 and 693 of 1969 which have been ordered to be placed for hearing with this Special Civil Application No. 2353 of 1968, as the question referred to by Wagle, J, is also involved in those two petitions. 6. With a view to facilitate the understanding of the rival points of view, it would be necessary to consider the scheme of the Rent Act of 1947 with a particular reference to the rights of the landlord to evict the tenant. The preamble shows that one of the objects in enacting the law is to control rents of premises and eviction of tenants. With the object of preventing the landlords from charging excessive rent, provisions have been made for fixation of stand are rent in relation to the premises. Section 5(10) defines "standard rent". According to this definition contained in Section 5(10)(a), the standard-rent that may have been fixed by the Court and the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restriction....
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....mitted increases, in respect of the same premises have been duly fixed by a competent Court on the merits of the case, without any fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or change in the amenities or in respect of any other factors which are relevant to the fixation of the standard rent, or change in such increases thereafter in the premises". would, therefore, appear that a new application for fixation of standard rent or permitted increases is not permissible except in certain special circumstances such as the fixation was made as a result of fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, or any structural alterations or change in amenities or change in such increase after the original fixation of standard rent and permitted increases by the Court. Section 11A is thus nothing but an extension of the principle of res judicata to fixation of the standard rent and permitted increases. Subject to the provisions of Section 11A. Section 11(1) enumerates the cases where the Court has the power to fix the amount of standard rent of any premises. Section 11(2) relates to the powers of the Court to fix the amount of permitted increases in....
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....ld not be instituted until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent and permitted increases has been served on the tenant. Section 12(3)(a) gives a right to the landlord to obtain possession from the tenant provided the conditions laid down in that subsection are satisfied. If all or anyone of the conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(a) do not exist, or are not satisfied, a further protection from eviction is given to the tenant by Section 12(3)(b), provided he pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due on the first day of the hearing of the suit, or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. The grounds other than the ground of non-payment of rent, which entitle the landlord to recover possession of the premises, are contained in Sections 13 and 13A, and if the landlord satisfies anyone of the grounds enumerated in the said sections, he gets a right to recover possession of the premises. 9. Section 14, 15 and 15A give protection to certain sub-tenants and licenses. We may observe that the original Section 14 and 15 dealt with the....
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.... has received a notice from his landlord under sub-section (2) of Section 12, the Court shall forthwith specify the amount of rent or permitted increases which are to be deposited in Court by the tenant and make an order directing the tenant to deposit such amount in Court or at the option of the tenant make an order to pay to the landlord such amount thereof as the Court may specify, pending the final decision of the application. A copy of the order shall be served upon the landlord . Out of any amount deposited in Court the Court may make an order for payment of such reasonable such to the landlord towards payment of rent or increases due to him as it thinks fit. If the tenant fails to deposit such amount or, as the case may be to pay such amount thereof to the landlord his application shall be dismissed. (4) Where at any stage of a suit for recovery of rent, whether with or with out a claim for possession of the premises, the Court is satisfied that the tenant is withholding the rent on the ground that the rent is excessive and standard rent should be fixed, the Court shall and in any other case if it appears to the Court that it is just and proper to make such an order....
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.... the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. (4). Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation I. In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. Explanation II. - For the purposes of sub-section (2),....
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....of one month in order to take out the case from the provisions of Section 12(3)(a), it was incumbent on him to establish that the dispute about the standard rent raised by him in his written statement was a "bona fide" dispute and as in that case the dispute was not bona fide, the landlord was entitled to possession of the premises. This contention was not decided by the Division Bench on the Group that the question Bench on the ground that the questions raised by the landlord were questions of fact and were not considered by the Appellate Court. The Court, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a fresh decision after considering the issues raised on behalf of the landlord. If the Division Bench was of the opinion that a mere raising of a dispute, whether bona fide or otherwise, in a written statement by the tenant was sufficient to give protection to the landlord, and the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) were not applicable it was not necessary to remand the matter for fresh decision. It would, therefore, appear that the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that it was of the view that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) implies a "bona f....
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....ded before the Division Bench that there was a bona fide dispute regarding the amount of standard rent, and therefore, his case would fall under Section 12(3)(b). The Division Bench held on facts that the contention raised by the tenant was not bona fide. It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench that the aforesaid decisions of Tarkunde, J. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1822 of 1957 , D/- 12-11-1959 (Bom.) and that of Tambe, Acting C. J. and Abhyankar J. in (Spl. C.A. No. 459 of 1965 decided on 14/15-12-1965 (Bom.)) were relied on by the tenant in support of his contention that the dispute about the standard rent could be raised for the first time in the written statement and if the dispute is bona fide and genuine, the tenant was entitled to protection. However, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand, [1968]3SCR346 , the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the said two decisions of Tarkunde, J, and Tambe, Ag. C. J. and Abhyankar, , were no longer good law. The Division Bench was of the view that the tenant can claim protection from the tenant can claim protection from eviction only it before the expiry of one month af....
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....(a) of Section 12(3). 22. The last judgment in the series taking the view that the dispute, which entitled the tenant to take his case out of the clutches of Section 12(3)(a) must be a "bona fide" dispute is of Bal, J, in Special Civil Appln. No. 781 of 1968 Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba decided on 5.8.1968 (Bom), by which judgment, he referred the matter to a Division Bench, which in its turn, made a reference to the Full Bench for deciding the question "whether in a proceeding to which Section 12(3)(a) of the Act would otherwise apply, the tenant-defendant can prove that a dispute k about standard rent exists without following the procedure laid down in Explanation I to Section 12? and "whether he can also take a defence that Section 12(3)(a) does not apply and Section 12(3)(b) applies?' This reference was decided by the Full Bench in AIR1971Bom396 (FB)., It appears from the referring judgment of Bal, J. that he was unable to agree with the view expressed No. 512 of 1966 decided on 2.4.1968 = ILR (1970) Bom 1335 that the decisions of Tarkunde J., in C. R. A. No. 1822 of 1957 (Bom.) and of Tambe, Ag. C. J. and 1965 (Bom) were no longer good law. Bal, J. was of view that ....
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....the learned counsel for the landlord, places considerable reliance on the category of cases which have consistently taken the view that when the tenant chooses to raise a dispute about the standard rent or permitted increases for the first time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute about the standard rent or permitted increases for the first time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute must be bona fide to enable him to claim the protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, Mr. Diwan, the learned counsel for the tenant, however, contends that these decisions have no binding force as precedents, and this Division Bench is entitled to take a contrary view. Mr. Diwan's objections to the decided cases being considered as having binding cases are these. Firstly, according to him, these judgments are per incuriam as they were rendered ignoring the plain statutory provision of Section 12(3)(a) which only uses the word 'dispute' and not the words "bona fide dispute'. Secondly, these judgments are sub silentio in the sense that the particular point of law involved in the decision was not perceived by the court or present to its ....
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.... present to its mind. Cases of this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam. We do not think that it would be right to say that there may not be other cases of decisions given per incuriam in which this court might properly consider itself entitled not to follow an earlier decision of its own. Such cases would obviously be of the rarest occurrence and must be dealt with in accordance with their special facts ..." "On a careful examination of the whole matter we have come to the clear conclusion that this court is bound to follow previous decisions of its own as well as those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this rule (two of them apparent only) are those already mentioned which for convenience we here summarise: (1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow. (2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion, stand with a decision of the House of Lords. (3) The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuri....
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....tio. A good illustration is Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd., (1936) 2 All ER 905. There, a discharged employee of a company, who had obtained damages against the company for wrongful dismissal, applied for a garnishee order on a bank account standing in the name of the liquidator of the company. The only point argued was on the question of the priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the Court of Appeal granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal, Lancaster Motor Co. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 - the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M. R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; never the less, since it was decided without argument, without referen....
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.... fact was not considered by the Appellate Court. However, the question of law as to whether the word 'dispute" should be interpreted is mean "a bona fide dispute" was not argued or decided. 34. With regard to the decision of Palekar and Nathwani, JJ. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1569 of 1964, decided on 17-4-1968 (Bom.), again it would appear that the question of law raised before us was not considered by the Bench, nor were any arguments advanced. Here too, the Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) must mean a "bona fide dispute" and not merely a 'dispute". 35. Mr. Kotwal submits that the observations and the view taken in the various decisions relied on by him has been consistently expressed over number of years, and even if technically, they cannot be considered as binding precedents on the Division Benches, they are entitled to weight. He says that it is not likely that this view would not be consistently taken without due consideration to the language of the section and the meaning to be given to the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a). Since we fee that Mr. Diwan is right in his submission that those judgments cannot ....
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....was, is binding; but, if it is not clear, it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi". It would be clear from the above quoted passage that it is the enunciation of the reason or principle or the process of reasoning on which a question before a Court has been decided can be said to be binding as a precedent. A mere logical decoction or corollary on the ratio of a decision cannot be binding as a precedent; for, generally, the exposition of law in the judgment must be qualified by the particular facts of the case. The ratio of the case must mean a decision on issue which is a live issue between the parties, and the law should result from being applied to live issues raised between actual parties and argued on both sides. We must not forget that very often general words and expressions are used invariably, but the same is always controlled by the facts of th....
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....t had not filed any application for fixation of standard rent before the filing of the suit by the landlord. By his written statement, however, he raised a dispute about the standard rent and also requested the court to fix the same. He applied for fixation of interim rent pending fixation of the standard rent, and the interim rent was accordingly fixed by the court. The trial court, in view of the contention taken up in the written statement, raised an issue about the standard rent. Ultimately, the trial court held that the standard rent of the premises was Rs. 26 p. m. In view of the deposit of the arrears of rent and costs of suit, the trial court dismissed the landlord's suit for possession. The landlord's allegation about waste and nuisance was rejected by the trial court. The appeal filed by the landlord relating to the recovery of possession was dismissed. This was again challenged by the landlord by a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. When the matter came up k for hearing before Bal, J., he found that there was a conflict of decisions of the Division Benches of this Court on the question as to whether a tenant was entitled to raise a dispute about....
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.... his referring judgment, bal J. specifically observed that the dispute must be a "bona fide" dispute, because a dispute which is "not bona fide" is nt a dispute at all. We, however, find that the Full bench has not said anything to show that this view was wrong. It seems to be so because the Full Bench was to called upon to consider the question as to whether the dispute must be a "bona fide" dispute and not any dispute. The two questions, viz., whether the dispute could be raised for the first time in the written statement and whether such a dispute should necessarily be a "bona fide" dispute are different. The Full Bench was concerned only with the first one. If the Full Bench had in its mind the question of "bona fide", it would certainly have referred to that question and expressed their view one way or the other. The absence of any such consideration of the question by the Full Bench in the case shows that they did not apply their mind to this aspect. It is significant to note that none of the counsel appearing before the Full Bench seem to have thrashed out this point. Mr. Diwan, however, lays stress on the following observations of the Full Bench at page 385 of the Report 73....
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....d out whether a dispute raised under Explanation I to Section 12 is bona fide or not. Relying on the observation of the Full Bench to the effect that the word 'dispute' in both the sub-sections fixes the nature of the dispute referred to in sub-section (3) (a) and in Explanation I of S. 12, Mr. Diwan contends that the Full Bench by necessary implication has come to the conclusion that it is immaterial whether the 'dispute' under Section 12(3)(a) is bona fide or not. According to him, the ratio of the Full Bench expressed in the above referred to passages is that the nature of the dispute in Section 12(3)(a) cannot be different from the one contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11. If the bona fides or otherwise of the tenant in making an application under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11 are irrelevant, they would be equally irrelevant in the case of a dispute referred to in sub-section (3) (a). We are unable to accept these submissions of Mr. Diwan. It is true that the word 'dispute" in relation to standard rent and permitted increases occurs in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11 and sub-section (3) (a) and Explanation I to Section 12. I....
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....ired to be fulfilled for the applicability of Section 12(3)(a), the Full Bench goes on to observe- "Now if all the conditions are to be fulfilled there is no doubt that in the present case there was a dispute raised. The two Courts below actually fixed the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 26 per month when the contractual rent agreed upon was Rs. 28 per month. Such a case cannot fall under Section 12(3)(a)". These observations tend to indicate that even the Full Bench assumed for the purposes of the reference before them that the dispute raised by the tenant was "bona fide". Taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter, we are unable to accept Mr. Diwan's contention that the ratio decidendi of the Full bench decision binds us to the conclusion that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) means any dispute, whether "bona fide" or otherwise. It would not be proper to deduce such a ratio by taking into consideration a few observations out of a long and elaborate judgment of the Full Bench. The observations relied on by Mr. Diwan may at best from a basis for a logical argument in support of his contention that the word "dispute" must not be given a restricted ....
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....ain and grammatical meaning, and it is not the function of the Court to go on a voyage of discovery as in that case the Court would be usurping the legislative function of the Legislature. His next submission is that it is not permissible for a Court to read words in the Act not found there unless strong and compelling reasons are found within the four corners of the Act itself. he further submits that the only possible way of construing the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) is merely to find out whether "there is a dispute" or there is no dispute": and there is no justification whatsoever to add the word "bona fide" in the sub-section which is not there. He further submits that there is intrinsic evidence in the Act itself that whenever the Legislature intended to bring in the concept of bona fides, it has used the word in other section of the Act. According to him, "dispute" means that somebody alleges one way and the other party may allege in the other way. The question of the allegation being bona fide or not is irrelevant. He says that Section 12(3)(a) is a special case and provides for an exception, and as such, it must be strictly construed and its area should nt be unduly ....
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....words. But in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends of fair and reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of the words sometimes may not necessarily assess a proper construction of a statuary provision in which the words occur. often enough, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. The words should be construed in the light of their context rather than what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from their context ..... (See Sheikh Gulfan v. Sant Kumar, [1965]3SCR364 ). It is also well settled that the intention of the Legislature has clearly to be gathered from the actual words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal grammatical meaning. But when there is doubt about their meaning, the words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view ......... (See State of U. P. v. C. Tobit, 1958CriLJ809 - the Head note). Before adopting ....
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.... purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language.........(See [1960]3SCR578 . Similarly in construing an enactment and determining its true scope, it is permissible to have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature such as the history of the Act, the reason which led to its being passed the mischief which had to be cured as well as the cure as also the other provision of the statute.........(See S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, [1963]49ITR1(SC) . 45. Having regard to the rules of construction referred to above, the intention of the Legislature assumes paramount importance. For this purpose, the statute has to be construed as a whole. We have already noted above the broad features of the scheme of the Rent Act. The preamble of the Act indicates that the intention is to control rents and evictions. The object appears to be not to put a complete ban on evictions of tenants, but only to control eviction. By enacting the various provisions of the Rent Act, the Legislature has in effect modified the general law as contained in....
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.... effect, the compliance of the requirements of the provisions of Explanation I by the tenant creates a statutory presumption, or as is often called, a conclusive evidence of the tenant's readiness and willingness to pay. Thus, Explanation I gives a further protection to the tenant. It would appears from the provisions of sub-section (1) that the Legislature intended to give protection to a bona fide tenant who actually wanted to pay or was ready and willing to pay. These provisions of sub-section (2) and Explanation I have been enacted with a view to give a further chance to honest tenants to make payment by clearing off the arrears or resorting to the machinery provided by Explanation I. Failure of the tenant to pay in spite of the notice by the landlord under sub-section (2) results in the curtailment of the protection given to him, subject, however to his taking advantage of the machinery provided. If he avails of the Explanation I, he continues to be protected as by legal fiction, he is deemed to be ready and willing to pay. Section 12(3)(a) deals with cases to which Section 12(1) does not apply and a vested right is created in a landlord on fulfillment of the four conditio....
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....ing provision of Explanation I. It would appear that sub-section (3) (b) is couched in negative language in contrast to the wording of Section 3(a) which makes if mandatory upon the Court to pass decree for eviction if the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. We may now assume that the landlord has been able to establish the three conditions laid down in sub-section (3) (a), viz., (i) the rent is payable monthly; (ii) the rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months; and (iii) the tenant neglects to make the payment until expiration of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), The bone of contention between the parties relates to the fourth condition, viz., that there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases. In view of the judgment of the Full Bench in AIR1971Bom396 FB), there can be no dispute that the tenant is entitled to raise a contention about the standard rent and permitted in creases for the first item in his written statement. 46. The crucial point for consideration is whether the dispute contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) should necessarily be a "bona fide" dispute. Can it be said to be the intention o....
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....3)(a) would in most of the cases render the effect of the provisions of S. 12(3)(a) nugatory, Even though the tenant may now full well that what is charged by the landlord is nothing but the standard rent and permitted increases, still what was required of him to defect the vested right of the landlord is only to raise a plea about the standard rent in his written statement. It would be unreasonable to hold that such was the intention contemplated by the Legislature. The scheme of Section 12 would show that the protection is extended to honest tenants. We find that there are other indications as well to support the view that we are inclined to take. 48. Section 11-A precludes a Court from entertaining a plea of standard rent or permitted increases being excessive if the same are already fixed on merits by the Court except on proof of fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or change in circumstances. Now, it is difficult to hold that even if a tenant is barred from raising a plea about standard rent or permitted in creases in the written statement and take the case out of the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) . If a literal meaning ....
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....rd rent and permitted increases by enacting sub-section (2)and Explanation I. The tenant is given one month's period after he receives a notice from the landlord during which he can pay off the asrrears. By inserting Explanation I, a fictional case of readiness and willingness in favour of the tenant has been introduced giving protection to him where he has a dispute about standard rent and permitted increases. The very fact that the tenant resorts to the machinery provided by Explanation I read with Section II within the prescribed period would prima facie show that he was ready and willing to pay rent but had a genuine reason for withholding payment . The Legislature has deliberately created a case of conclusive evidence of readiness and willingness to pay to give protection to the tenant. There can be no dispute that the protection is further extended to honest tenant who had a genuine dispute about standard rent and permitted increases, about standard rent and permitted increases, but who for some reason could not take the advantage of the machinery provided by Explanation I, and such a tenant six allowed to raise the dispute for the first time in his written statement unde....
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....t covered by Section 12(3)(a) that Section 12(3)(b), which is in pari materia with the original Section 12(3), would be attracted .it may incidentally be noted that Section 12(3)(a) as amended by Act 61 of 1953 provided that "the Court may pass a decree for eviction" in the circumstances mentioned in the section. The word "may" has been substituted by the word "shall" by Maharastra Act 14 of 1963; but this change has not made any change in the legal position. Even when the word "may" found place in Section 12(3)(a), it was construed to mean "shall". It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to confer a vested right in the landlord a dn also made it mandatory on the Court to pass a decree for eviction. On fulfilment of the four conditions. On fulfilment of the four conditions load down in Section 12(3)(a), the Court is bound to pass a decree, and no option is left to the Court. It may further be noted that even with regard the tender in Court of the standard rent and permitted increase,s the original provisions of Section 12(3) were liberal, for the tender could be made at the hearing of the suit. This was interpreted to mean that the tent could deposit the amount ....
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....ver, this presumption would be very slight. One must have regard to the intention of the Legislature which can be gathered from the scheme of the relevant provision, and its setting in the scheme of the Act. We have already indicated that not only that there is internal evidence of the intention of the Legislature to give a restricted meaning to the word "dispute" but giving an enlarged or plain or grammatical meaning to the word "dispute" would lead to absurd results, and it is also likely to render the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) incorporated by amendments by the Legislature infructuous and nugatory. 53. Mr. Diwan, however, submits that there was no reason why the Legislature should not have made its intention clear by using the word "bona fide" in Section 12(3)(a). In this connection, he has drawn our attention to the provisions of sub-clauses (g),(h) and (hh) of sub-s. (1) of Section 13 of the Act, where the legislature has used the word "bona fide". The said provisions of Section 13 relate to the requirements of the landlord for certain purposes. In that context, the Legislature has used the word "bona fide" in Section 13. Section 30 deals with the powers of the Court to....
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....nsider the question as to whether the dispute raised by the tenant is bona fide or not. Under the provisions of Explanation I to Section 12 as well as Section 11(1)(e) and 11(2) a dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases is initiated by making an application. In fact, Explanation I specifically refers to the making of an application by the tenant under Section 11(3). As stated earlier, the very fact that the tenant has made an application for fixation of standard rent within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) and continues to pay or tender the amount specified in the order made by the court is a conclusive evidence of his readiness and willingness to pay. If a tenant takes the advantage of Explanation I, it is irrelevant for the Court to consider whether the dispute raised by the tenant is bona fide or not, and, therefore, the Legislature cannot have intended that the word "dispute" in Explanation I should be given a restricted meaning. It would, therefore, appear that the word "dispute" in Explanation I should be given a restricted meaning. it would, therefore, appear that the word 'dispute" in Section 11(1)(e), 11(2) and Ex....
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....andlord by showing that the so-called dispute raised k by the regnant is not genuine or bona fide. Of course, the burden of proving that the dispute raised by the tenant is not bona fide would be on the landlord. 56. The other contention is that Section 12(3)(a) is an exception to the general rule laid down in Section 12(1) and the rule of interpretation requires that such, a provision must be strictly construed; and if two reasonable and possible construction are available then the one which does not expand the ambit of the sub-section should be selected. Once we come to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to use the word "dispute" as a "bona fide" dispute, this argument too can have no force. To us, it appears that the only reasonable and proper construction of the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) would to be construe the sand as a "bona fide dispute". and not "any" dispute. 57. It is further urged on behalf of the tenant that the expression "bona fide" is vague and uncertain and incapable of application by a Court of law in a rational manner to the facts of a given case, as the word has neither been defined in the Act nro are there any guidelines in the Act nor ....