TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (5) TMI 1219
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....No. 2411 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4534 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2537 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4535 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2557 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4536 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2603 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4537 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2607 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4538 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2612 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4539 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2873 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4540 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3298 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4541 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3473 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4543 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3916 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4544 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3918 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4545 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4021 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4546 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4024 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4547 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4223 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4548 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4242 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4549 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4249 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4550 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4542 of 2012), Civil Appeal ....
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.... 4605-07 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 8853-8855 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4608 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9527 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4609 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9678 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4610 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9748 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4611 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9761 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4612 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10052 of 2012), Civil Appeal Nos. 4613-15 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10056-10058 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4616 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10315 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4617 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10597 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4618 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11303 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4619 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11304 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4620 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11879 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4621 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11993 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4622 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12299 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4623 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12461 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4624 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12844 of 2012), Civil Appeal Nos.....
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....f 2012, Civil Appeal No. 4677 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8631 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4678 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8635 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4679 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8887 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4680 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9168 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4681 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9297 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4682 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12784 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4683 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13017 of 2013), Civil Appeal Nos. 4690-4691 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 16722-16723 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4692 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17635 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4693 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18090 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4694 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18735 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4695 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18866 of 2013), Civil Appeal Nos. 4696-4697 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 19200-19201 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4698 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19922 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4699 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20329 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4700 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 232....
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....ing out of SLP (C) No. 6682 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4747 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7019 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4748 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7031 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4749 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7036 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4750 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10065 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4751-53 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10147-10149 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4754 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11737 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4755 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13401 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4756 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14786 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4757 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12443 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4758 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13034 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4759-60 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22298-22299 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4761-63 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22329-22331 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4764-65 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22384-22385 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4766-4768 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22716-22718 of 2014), Civil Appeal Nos. 4769-4770 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 36155-3....
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....on (C) No. 21 of 2015 in SLP (C) No. 27023 of 2012, Civil Appeal No. 4805 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 28167 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4806 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2057 of 2015), Civil Appeal Nos. 4810-18 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 17088-17096 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4837 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 35143 of 2013), Civil Appeal No. 4807 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17686 of 2014), Civil Appeal No. 4809 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15635 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4808 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 37126 of 2012), Civil Appeal No. 4809 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15636 of 2012), Civil Appeal Nos. 4810-18 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 17088-17096 of 2012), Civil Appeal Nos. 2197, 2195, 2198, 2199, 2225, 2226, 2704, 2705, 3022 of 2013, 4902 and 4928 of 2014 For Appearing Parties: L.N. Rao, P.N. Mishra, Nagendra Rai, Pramod Kumar Jain, Indu Malhotra, Rajeev Dhawan, Kailash Vasdev, Mahabir Singh, Pallav Shishodia, J.C. Gupta, Vijay Hansaria, S.C. Maheshwari, Nidhesh Gupta, S.R. Singh, Amarendra Saran, Ajay Kumar Misra, Rakesh Dwivedi, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Rakesh Kumar Khanna, Pramod Swarup, Sr. Advs., Reena....
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....an Deep Sharma, Abhishek Jain, R.K. Gupta, S.K. Gupta, M.K. Singh, B.P. Gupta, Shekhar Kumar, Rahul Verma, Susmita Lal, Adarsh Agarwal, Wajeeh Shah, Prabhat Kumar Rai, Himanshu Tyagi, Asha Gopalan Nair, Rajeev Sharma, Pankaj Dubey, Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Karmendra Pratap Singh, Robin Babu, Rishu Mishra, Vikas Mahajan, Vinod Sharma, Vishal Mahajan, Anuradha Mutatkar, A.N. Singh, Anisha Jain, V.P. Singh, Vipin Gupta, Prem Prakash, Anshul Narayan, Ankur Prakash, Priyanka Singh, Piyush Singh, Aditya Parolia, R.D. Upadhyay, Girdhar G. Upadhyay, Asha Upadhyay, Sanjay Sharma, Yogesh Tiwari, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Abhishek Garg, Dhananjay Garg, Deepak Mishra, Kumar Mihir, Vishal Gupta, Rakesh Kumar, Prabhat Kaushik, Manish Arora, Gaurav Jain, Arjun Bhandari, Bimlesh Kumar Singh, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, Dharam Singh, Nagesh Gajghate, Priya Sharma, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Manoj Kumar, Gopal Prasad, Surat Singh, Brajesh Kumar Singh, Sudhanshu Palo, Anil Kumar Tandale, Jitendra Singh, Gaurav Kumar Singh, Vikalp Mudgal, Ashok Kumar Sharma, D.N. Goburdhun, Prabal Bagchi, Lal Singh Thakur, Tabrez Ahmad, S. Mehdi Imam, Balraj Dewan, Zaki Khan, Sandeep Sethi, Shirin Zaidim,....
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....ted the result in the open Court by pronouncing that appeals were dismissed and the reasons shall follow. These are, thus, our reasons for dismissing the appeals. Leave is granted in all the special leave petitions. PROLOGUE: 2. The subject matter of most of these appeals are the Notifications dated 12-03-2008 issued by the State of U.P. Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act ("Act" for short) read with Section 17 of the Act as well as declaration issued Under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') vide Notification dated 30.06.2008. Land situate in various villages of Noida and Greater Noida in Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar was acquired. Some other Notifications under same provisions of the Act in respect of lands of these villages was also acquired by earlier Notifications. The purpose stated in the notifications was 'Planned Industrial Development'. Urgency provisions Under Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act were invoked thereby dispensing with the right of objection otherwise given to the land holders Under Section 5A of the Act. The total land which was acquired by these notification was 589.188 hec....
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....dle path in an endeavour to balance the equities of both sides. Thus, it enhanced the provisional compensation and also directed allotment of developed Abadi land to the extent 10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 sq. mtrs. However, in respect of three villages, when it found that no development work had been carried out at all by the Authorities during the intervening period, the High Court chose to quash the Notifications including consequential actions and directed restoration of the land to the respective land owners. 4. It may also be noticed at this stage that when there was flurry of writ petitions in the High Court challenging the invocation of Section 17 and the Division Bench of the High Court in Harkaran Singh (supra) had held invocation of urgency powers to be bad in law, some land owners whose land was acquired much earlier by invoking Clause (some of the Notifications of such land date back to 1979 or early 1980s as well) took adventurous step to file the writ petitions in the year 2011 challenging those Notifications. All these writ petitions, however, have been dismissed by the impugned judgment of the High Court on the ground that they are filed....
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.... the inquiry Under Section 5A can only be an exception where the urgency cannot brook the delay. The Respondents, without application of mind, dispensed with the inquiry. The acquisition proceedings were deprecated as void, unconstitutional, tainted with malafide, abuse of authority/power and non application of mind. It was pleaded that the procedure Under Section 5A is mandatory which embodies a just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being acquired or intended to be acquired should have occasion to persuade the authorities that his property be not touched for acquisition. It was also argued that land use of village Patwari was changed in the Master Plan 2021 after the issuance of notifications Under Sections 4 and 6, which is colourable exercise of powers and entire exercise is arbitrary, illegal and infringes rights of the Petitioners guaranteed Under Articles 14, 19 and 300A of the Constitution of India. These Petitioners also stated in the writ petition that though there was some delay in filing the writ petition if counted from the date of notification but the writ petition was filed only when it came to their knowledge that the land use of village Patwar....
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.... whom certain area was allotted for development of the housing colony was also impleaded as the Respondent. On its impleadment, this Respondent also filed its counter affidavit stating the circumstances under which it was allotted the land for development of residential units. It also contended that the substantial work had already been undertaken by the said Company. So much so, out of 6000 residential units which were proposed to be constructed, 4471 units had already been booked by the members of public and paid part considerations. It was pleaded that in this manner third party interest had also been created. It would be relevant to point out here that apart from M/s. Supertech Limited, there were at least 10 more such developers who had been allotted the various chunks of acquired land for similar housing projects etc. JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT 13. After noticing the aforesaid facts and the contentions and having regard to the plethora of writ petitions which were filed pertaining to different villages, the High Court deemed it appropriate to categorize these writ petitions in different groups, village wise. 65 village wise categories were, accordingly, carved out. Out ....
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....ssession of the land acquired was taken Under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law? (ix) Vesting: Whether after taking possession Under Section 17(A) of the Act the challenge to the notifications Under Section 4 read with 17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 cannot be entertained due to the reason that land which has already been vested in the State cannot be divested? (x) Section 11A; Whether acquisition under challenge has lapsed Under Section 11A of the Act due to non-declaration of the award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration made Under Section 6? (xi) Section 17(3A): Whether non payment of 80% of the compensation as required by Section 17(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act is fatal to the acquisition of proceedings? (xii) Waiver: Whether the Petitioners who have accepted compensation by agreement have waived their right to challenge the acquisition proceedings? (xiii) Acquiescence: Whether the Petitioners due to having accepted the compensation by agreement have acquiesced to the proceedings of land acquisition and they are estopped from challenging the ac....
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....ct, was illegal and unwarranted. As this issue is decided in favour of the land owners and against this finding appeals preferred by the State as well as the Authority have already been dismissed, it is not necessary to explain the raison d'etre behind these findings. We would be proceeding on the basis that invocation of Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) was wrong. Similarly, the findings of the High Court that exercise of power by the State was colourable and arbitrary need not be restated in detail, the same reason. 16. As far as the issue No. 4 pertaining the NCR planning Board Act is concerned, the High Court has held that land could not be acquired without the permission of the Board. Opinion of the High Court on this aspect was questioned by the State of U.P. as well as Authority in its appeals. However, it was found that as a matter of fact, insofar as these cases are concerned consent of the Board had been obtained. Having regard to this position, while dismissing the appeals of the State/Authority, we have left the said question of law open, namely, whether permission of the deemed under the Act of 1985 is a pre-condition before acquisition of the land. Therefore, th....
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....etitions which pertained to notifications issued prior to the year 2000 and the writ petitions were filed in the year 2011, these writ petitions deserved to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. 20. In nutshell, relief was categorised in three compartments. In the first instance, those writ petitions which were filed belatedly were dismissed. In the second category, three villages, namely, Devala (Group 40), village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village Asdullapur (Group 42) the acquisition was set aside. Land acquisition in respect of remaining 61 villages is concerned, the acquisition was allowed to remain but the additional compensation was increased to 64.7% with further entitlement for allotment of development abadi plot to the extent of 10% of the acquired land of those land owners subject to maximum of 2500 sq. mtrs. 21. We now reproduce the exact nature of direction given by the High Court, which reads as follows: In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows: 1. The Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating to village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522 of 2011 relating ....
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....relating to village Asdullapur is allowed. The notification dated 27.1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent proceedings are quashed. The Petitioners shall be entitled to restoration of their land. 3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are disposed of with following directions: (a) The Petitioners shall be entitled for payment of additional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village Patwari in addition to the compensation received by them under 1997 Rules/award which payment shall be ensured by the Authority at an early date. It may be open for Authority to take a decision as to what proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paid by allottees. Those Petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered above. The payment of additional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rights of land owners Under Section 18 of the Act, if any. (b) All the Petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of developed Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 ....
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.... of bunch of writ petitions before the Full Bench of the High Court were grouped in 65 groups, village-wise and facts of acquisition, possession, if any, payment of compensation, developments, the nature of utilisation of those lands, and/or creation of third party rights were taken note of. Out of these 65 villages, 41 villages fall in Greater NOIDA and 24 in NOIDA. The High Court discussed the issue of laches and delays under Issue No. 3, as mentioned above, after referring to various judgments of this Court and culling out the principles contained therein on that basis. The High Court accepted the plea of inordinate delay insofar as acquisition of land in respect of village Nithari, Village Chauyra Sadedpur, Village Khoda, Village Sultanpur are concerned. These writ petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay. In respect of other villages, the Court repelled the contention of delay raised by the department, accepting the explanation given by land owners of those villages that they did not oppose the acquisition earlier at the time of issuance of notification as the land was taken for industrial development. However, it is only when these land owners had come to know that inst....
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....he Act as well. (d) Though, Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act were invoked, 80% of the compensation, which is mandatory requirement, was not paid to the Appellants. (e) After acquiring the land purportedly for the purpose of industrial development, it was sold to private developers/real estate agencies for residential purposes, that too at a much higher rate. As per the Appellants, it would amply demonstrate that the Government acted more like a property dealer with intention to make money at the cost of the land owners/agriculturists. (II) It was further argued that even when status quo orders were passed in many writ petitions, the Government had violated those orders and in this manner, third party rights were created, thereby committing contempt of court. When the third party interest were created in the aforesaid manner, the High Court should not have influenced itself by the said consideration in denying the relief to the Appellants after holding that acquisition was illegal. (III) It was also argued that in a case like this, doctrine of severance should have been applied by excluding only t....
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....ction 17 for 'planned development of the city' or 'the development of residential area' or for 'housing' must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz., rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to commissioning of dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently; rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects, etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise of such power. xxx 55. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the Government has completely failed to justify the dispensation of an enquiry Under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4). For this reason, the impugned notifications to the extent they state that Section 5A shall not apply suffer from legal infirmity. The question, then, arises whether at this distance of time, the acquisition proceedings must be declared invalid and illegal. 56. In t....
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....nts within two months from today, the State Government shall consider such representation in accordance with law and in conformity with the State policy for release of land Under Section 48(1) without any discrimination within three months from receipt of such representation. 27. In support of the arguments that the equities were to be balanced on the facts of the case which according to the Appellant were in their favour, following judgments were referred: (ii) H.M.T. Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 677 22. In the present case there has been contravention of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior approval of the State Government as required by the said section before steps for acquisition of the lands were taken. The report of Shri G.K.V. Rao points out as to how the Appellant Appellant-Society admitted large number of persons as members who cannot be held to be genuine members, the sole object being to transfer the lands acquired for "public purpose", to outsiders as part of commercial venture, undertaken by the office- bearer of the Appellant-Society. We are in agreement with the find....
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....nt to a tall claim made on behalf of M/s. S.R. Constructions in the agreement. He pointed out that the notifications Under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) have been issued beyond the time stipulated in the agreement and as such, it should be held that the State Government has exercised its statutory power for acquisition of the lands in normal course, only after taking all facts and circumstances into consideration. There is no dispute that in terms of agreement dated 1-2-1985 payments have been made by the Appellant Society to M/s. S.R. Constructions. This circumstance alone goes a long way to support the contention of the writ Petitioners that their lands have not been acquired in the normal course or for any public purpose. In spite of the repeated query, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant Society could not point out or produce any order of the State Government Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act granting prior approval and prescribing conditions and restrictions in respect of the use of the lands which were to be acquired for a public purpose. There is no restriction or bar on the part of the Appellant Society on carving out the size of the plots or the manner of allotment or....
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....en the Society and M/s. Devatha Builders was not for the acquisition of land but only for development of the acquired land. The Division Bench also noted that the agreement was entered into between the Society and the owners in 1985, whereas the Government gave approval for acquisition in 1985 and the agreement with the developer was of 1986. The Division Bench also noted that no stranger had been inducted as a member of the society. However, the acquisition which was under challenge in Writ Petition No. 28707 of 1995 was declared illegal because the House Building Cooperative Society concerned has not framed any housing scheme and obtained approval thereof from the State Government. The Division Bench also expressed the view that remedy Under Article 226 was discretionary and it was not inclined to nullify the acquisition made for the society because the Petitioners had approached the Court after long lapse of time and there was no explanation for the delay. xxx 132. Before concluding we consider it necessary to observe that in view of the law laid down in the 1st H.M.T. case (paragraphs 19, 21 and 22), which was followed in 2nd H.M.T. case and Vyalikaval House B....
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....writ petition was contested by the Appellant society as the Respondent and it was alleged that it was hopelessly barred by time being delayed by 14 years and it was also submitted that the writ Petitioners had participated in the inquiry Under Section 5A of the Act and have also received substantial amount from the Appellant society pursuant to the agreement executed in their favour. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of being hopelessly barred by time and the writ Petitioners participated in the proceedings therefore they have acquiesced in the matter. Aggrieved against this order passed by learned Single Judge, a writ appeal was filed by the Respondents which came to be allowed by the Division Bench for the reasons mentioned in another writ appeal decided by the same Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court on 17.1.2000. In that writ appeal the Division Bench held that the entire acquisition on behalf of the Appellant society was actuated with fraud as held in Narayana Reddy v. State of Karnataka ILR 1991 Kar. 2248. In that case it was held as follows: As seen from the findings of G.V.K. Rao Inquiry Report, in respect....
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....ngle Judge, who decided the writ petition after remand by the Division Bench. 25. Although the Framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power conferred upon the High Court to issue to any person or authority including any Government, directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari is not hedged with any condition or constraint, in the last 61 years the superior courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint including the one that the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to the Petitioner if he is found guilty of laches. The principle underlying this rule is that the one who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of constitutional, legal or other right is not entitled to relief Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Another reason for the High Court's refusal to entertain belated claim is that during the intervening period rig....
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....t to distinguish the judgments cited by the Appellants' counsel. He submitted that the High Court has wrongly fixed the cut-off date as 06.07.2011. He also submitted that the High Court was in error in rejecting the arguments of acquiescence as acceptance of compensation clearly meant that these land owners had acquiesced into the action of the authorities in acquiring the land. His submission was that case should have been examined keeping in view the aforesaid factors and the plea taken by the writ Petitioners that they felt aggrieved only when they came to know land was allotted/sold to private builders, was totally irrelevant and could not have been the ground to entertain the writ petitions on merits. 32. It was also argued by Mr. Rao that the High Court could not have enhanced the compensation by 64.7% in writ petition filed Under Article 226 as it was not a public law remedy. His plea in this behalf was that Land Acquisition Act provided for complete machinery for determination of the compensation and reference by the land owners Under Section 18 of the Act had already been sought and present way to matters are pending before the Reference Court to determine the marke....
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....xercise in law on the part of the Government to invoke the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby dispensing with the enquiry Under Section 5A of the Act which amounted to taking away the valuable right of the land owners. That is a finding on merit. However, it is subject to the caveat that the writ petitions filed by the Appellants herein could be considered on merits and were not to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Such a contention was indeed taken by the Respondents/ authorities before the High Court. However, the same has been repelled. Primary reason given by the High Court in this behalf is that the delay was explained satisfactorily inasmuch as the land acquired for the purposes of industrial development was, at a later period of time, allotted to private builders for development of residential units and when this was done it came to the knowledge of the Appellants. Aggrieved by this step taken by the Noida authorities, the Appellants filed the writ petitions. Thus, in nutshell, allotment of the land by the Noida authorities at a subsequent point of time has weighed with the High Court. In other words, it is clear that the Appellants did....
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....which concerns the same Act viz. U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. In that case, for Yamuna Express Project, the land was acquired setting it to be 'public purpose'. The land was utilised for construction of Yamuna Expressway and along therewith development of the part of the land was undertaken for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes as well. It was accepted that construction of Yamuna Expressway was work of public importance. However, the utilisation of land for development of other purposes, namely, commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential etc. was challenged, as not amounting to acquisition for 'public purpose'. There was another feature namely for the development of the land in the aforesaid manner Public Private Partnership (PPP) was formed and private parties were asked to undertake the development on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) basis. Such PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise of power in which private parties were involved. The challenge was repelled by this Court holding that acquisition of land along Yamuna Express for development of the same for commercial....
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....ive, the argument of the Appellants that giving away of the land by allotment to the private developers for construction of residential units gave them the fresh cause of action, gets dented to a great extent. No doubt, following Royal Orchid Hotels Limited case and other similar cases, the High Court has not dismissed the writ petitions filed by the Appellants on the ground of delay and laches accepting the plea of the Appellants that they felt aggrieved on coming to know that the land was sought to be given to the private persons for development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the High Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits. Since such a discretion is exercised, we would not like to interfere with that discretion, more so, when a very fair stand is taken by Mr. Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Noida authority, as mentioned above. However, the aforesaid position in law is stated to highlight that it was equally possible to dismiss these writ petitions as the same were filed belatedly after passing of the award and when in most of the cases, possession was taken and compensation paid. When we examine the matter from the aforesaid angle, we reach an....
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....ourt in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority 2010 (7) SCC 129, where this Court has gone to the extent of directing the authorities to allot 15 per cent of the developed plots. In our view and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, since the relief that is given to the Respondents/agriculturists is purely discretionary relief by the Court in order to sustain the notification issued by the authorities, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High Court, at the instance of the Petitioners/Appellants/ authorities, namely, NOIDA and Greater NOIDA. 10. This order shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case. 40. Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one hand, invocation of urgency provisions Under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right to file objection Under Section 5A of the Act, is found to be illegal. On the other hand, we have a situation where because of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the land owners, developments have taken in these villages and in most of the cases, third party rights have been created. Faced with this situa....