2019 (5) TMI 1870

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....ikeyan, Ld. Advocate, appeared on behalf of the assessee and Ms. T. Usha Devi, Ld. AR, appeared on behalf of the Revenue. 3.1 Ld. Advocate submitted that there was a delay in filing the first appeal before the lower appellate authority and the said delay was within the condonable period of thirty days which, according to the Ld. Advocate, was on account of reasonable cause. 3.2 Ld. Advocate further submitted that on 31.10.2016, during Diwali celebrations, the wife of the Managing Director suffered burn injuries. With 80% burns, she was taken to the Indian Burns Research Society for treatment, but however, on 11.11.2016, she passed away due to 'Septicemic Shock due to burns'. He also submitted that even the Managing Director, the husba....

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....d. However, in view of the proviso thereto, the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to allow the appeal to be presented within a further period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the period of sixty days. Thus, the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to extend the period for filing an appeal for a further period of thirty days and no more. Therefore, once there is a delay of more than ninety days in filing the appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) has no power or authority to permit the appeal to be presented beyond such period. The controversy sought to be raised by the petitioner is no longer res integra, inasmuch as the same stands decided by the Supreme C....

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....ed beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the Legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period." (Emphasis in bold supplied by me) 7. On going through the impugned order, I find that the delay sought to be condoned is within the permissible thirty-day limit and not after the expiry of thirty days. The appellant has placed on record its....