TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (9) TMI 1484
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..... 31 Hissa No. 2/10, admeasuring about 0.01.3 H.R. at Village Padavewadi, Taluka & District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5-1950 leaving behind Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heir and representative. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, widow became the owner of the said property. Her name was mutated in the revenue records. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was amended by Act 15 of 1957. Section 32 as amended provided that on 1-4-1957 (Tillers' Day), every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from the landlord free from all encumbrances the land held by him as a tenant. The predecessor of the Appellants were tenants prior to 1956-1957 i.e. prior to 1-4-1957. The proceedings for declaring the Appellants as purchaser Under Section 32-G were initiated during the lifetime of the landlady, Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant but the mutation Entry No. 1341 recorded that since landlady Indirabai Balwant Sawant is a widow, the proceedings as contemplated Under Section 32-G are suspended. On 12-5-1975, Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant executed last will and testament in favour of Anant Mahadev Sawant, Respondent 1. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant die....
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.... against the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ petitions were filed by the Appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed. 2. After setting out various provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), as amended, and after referring to various judgments of this Court dealing, in particular, with Section 32-F of the Act, the Division Bench then stated: 30. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments can be restated in the following words: 30.1. For a landlord suffering from a disability on the Tillers' Day i.e. 1-4-1957, the deemed purchase shall be suspended. 30.2. Landlord suffering from a disability has a right Under Section 31(3) of the Act to give notice of termination of tenancy and file an application for possession. 30.3. Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one year from the date on which he attains majority; a successor-in-title of a wido....
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....) added by Act 49 of 1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord who has attained majority has been made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other two categories which are a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability have not been expressly included in the amendment incorporated by Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as well as the express provisions of such amendment are for the purposes and object to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase. When for one category of landlord i.e. minor it is mandated that he will intimate the tenant after he attained the majority so that tenant may be enabled to exercise the right of purchase, we are of the view that the same object has to be read in two other categories of landlord that is the successor-in-title of a widow and a landlord whose mental or physical disability has been ceased. When the legislative object is to facilitate a tenant of a disabled landlord after cessation of disability to exercise right of purchase, the same benefit needs to....
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....ight meaningful and effective. The abovesaid right cannot be defeated on the ground that it was not exercised within the period prescribed when the tenant is unaware as to when the period has begun. 40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of the period prescribed. 41. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the right workable, effective and meaningful. Such right cannot be defeated unless it is proved that tenant, even after knowing that disability has ceased, does not exercise his right within the period prescribed. 42. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] has expressly rejected the submission that tenant had no intimation of the death of landlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti Ch....
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....was given only a limited right to ask for resumption of his land provided certain very stringent conditions were met, provided that such application was made on or before Tillers' Day i.e. 1st April, 1957. He argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely, widows, minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of the cultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section 32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutory right of purchase of the cultivating tenant. The 1969 Amendment made this clear, but was limited only to one of the three categories, namely, minors. According to him, therefore, to sub-serve the object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment, it is clear that whether a cultivating tenant is a tenant under a minor on the one hand, or a widow or a person with a disability on the other, should make no difference to the fact that once the landlord's disability ceases, the tenant must first know that such disability has ceased before he can meaningfully exercise the statutory right given to him within the period prescribed. According to him, all the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, which have h....
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....w, resulting in persons who are similarly situate being deprived of their statutory right for no fault of theirs, and contrary to the Object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment. 4. On the other hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through various provisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenant needs to be paid at least annually by 31st May every year, which would enable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died, as otherwise rent paid to a dead person cannot be credited to such person's account. He also made an emotional appeal to the Court that in all these cases, most landlords and tenants were villagers who would definitely come to know of a widow's death by word of mouth, given Indian village society. On law, he argued that the Division Bench judgments were correct. Section 32-F contains a non-obstante clause, which must be given full effect. Further, the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and can, therefore, pick up one class among three classes, where the need is felt most, for protection. He referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act of 1969 and argued that the legislature was....
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....(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 14 and 30 but subject to Sections 31-A to 31-D (both inclusive), a landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-AA) may, after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in Sub-section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following purposes: (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. (2) The notice required to be given Under Sub-section (1) shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which the landlord requires the land and shall be served on the tenant on or before the 31st day of December, 1956. A copy of such notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An application for possession Under Section 29 shall be made to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957. (3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be given and an application for possession Under Section 29 may be made,-- (i) by the minor within one year from the da....
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....ndlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy Under Section 31; or (ii) notice has been given Under Section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in Section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land: Provided that if an application made by the landlord Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as "the postponed date". Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 31 shall be deemed to h....
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....ll be entitled to restoration of the land under this Sub-section only if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area. Explanation-In this Sub-section, "successor-in-interest" means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. Section 32-F is the Section that falls for construction in the present case and is set out in toto hereinbelow: 32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor, etc.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,-- (a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land Under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31 and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlor....
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....s a minor and has attained majority before the commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969) has not given intimation as required by this Sub-section but being in possession of the land on such commencement is desirous of exercising the right conferred upon him Under Sub-section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of two years from the commencement of that Act. (2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-E (both inclusive) and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase. 8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice to the tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to the erstwhile landlord is then determined. The relevant Sub-sections of this Section states as follows: 32G. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of land to be paid by tenants.- (1) As soon as may be after the tillers' day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon,- (a) all tenants who Under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the l....
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.... motu or on an application made on this behalf land in case other than those in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of Section 32-G or 32M, after holding a formal inquiry direct that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in Sub-section (2). (2) Such direction shall provide- (a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section 15, be surrendered to the former landlord; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surrendered in accordance with the provisions of Section 15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called "the priority list"): (i) a co-operative farming society the members of which are agricultural labourers, landless persons or small holders or a combination of such persons; (ii) agricultural labourers; (iii) landless persons; (iv) small holders; (v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists (other than small holders) who hold eit....
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....enant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, Section 32-M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making ....
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....thing more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal Under Section 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State. Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant. Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F. Therefore on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser and Mr. Lalit could not controvert this position. 7. If Janardh....
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....ajority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned Under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord Under Section 29 is finally rejected-a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed Under Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said Sub-section. Again, Under Sub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid Sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemed purchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, i....
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....e reason that Under Section 2(6) Explanation-I, these three categories of landlords are deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant. The entitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these three categories is contained in Section 31(3). In any of these three cases, the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share with permission Under Section 63, or to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to which an application for possession of land Under Section 29 may then be made. In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant's right to purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done within the period of one year, as aforestated, that the postponed right of the tenant springs into being. 16. Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this right within a period of one ye....
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....1969 Amendment and no intimation had been given, two years extra was given from the date of commencement of that Act in which such intimation may be given. This statutory object, reflected in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is carried out by the proviso to Sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969 Amendment Act into Section 32-F. 19. Simultaneously, the same Amendment Act inserted into Sub-section (1)(a), the following: and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31: The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would show that the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a special fact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to the tenant, so that he may then, with knowledge that the minor landlord has now turned major, meaningfully exercise ....
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.... death of the widow. As a result, this very land which was not required by the landlord's successors in interest for personal cultivation, goes back to the landlord Under Section 32-P in cases in which the landlord either has no land within the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the ceiling limit. This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform on its head. We have thus to see whether the language of Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdity aforementioned and the discrimination between persons who are similarly situate be obviated. The Golden Rule of Interpretation 22. In Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61, what is referred to as the Golden Rule of literal interpretation was stated as follows: ... I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrum....
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.... difficult to construe it so as to give effect to the before declared object. The conditional words "could or might exercise" would require the implication of an unexpressed condition; otherwise the sentence would result in a nullity. But the implication would be by no means a difficult one. By implying after the words "customs of England" the addition "over property subject to those laws and customs," the enactment would become sensible and harmonious. The difficulty is, and their Lordships quite agree that it is a great difficulty, that a condition which is apparently and at first sight the correlative condition of the conditional words "could or might exercise" is expressed by the last nine words of the section. And the question is whether that expression excludes all other implications. If such a construction left a substantial operative effect to the enactment, it might be necessary to answer that question in the affirmative; but, as it destroys the expressed objects altogether unless the word "resident" be construed to mean "domiciled," and in that case destroys the expressed objects so far as regards real property, their Lordships answer it in the negative. It is tr....
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....the said proviso to mean only persons who are not parties to the election petition. This was done, given the fact that the object of the proviso was to give notice to persons who had hitherto not been given notice of the election petition. Obviously, the parties to the election petition were persons who knew of the existence of such petition. 25. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras (1958) SCR 739, this Court found it necessary to supply words which were not found in Section 423(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This the Court did as follows: ...But this argument is wholly ineffective because in either view of the matter the court has to supply some words in answer to the question "find him guilty of what?" According to the Appellant, those additional words should be "of such offence as has been charged and of which he had been acquitted", and according to the other view, "of the offence disclosed". If, in construing the section, the court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latter construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice. 26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat....
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....as actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent. 28. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370, this Court construed Section 33-B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in order to avoid a manifestly absurd result as follows: ...According to the construction contended for by the Assessee and which found favour with the High Court the answer was in the affirmative because Sub-section (2)(b), on its literal construction, was absolute. In our view such literal construction would lead to a manifestly absurd result, because in a given case, like the present one, where the Appellate Authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax Officer's order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and (b) the Commissioner's order unsustainable as being in violation of principles of natural justice, how should the Appellate Authority exercise its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withhold its hands and refuse to interfere with Commissioner's order altogether, for, that would amount to perpetuating the Commissioner's e....
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....an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be "drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity". We can do no better than repeat the famous words of Judge Learned Hand when he laid: ... it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. We must not adopt a strictly literal interpretation of Section 52 Sub-section (2) but we must construe its language having regard to the object and purpose which the legislature had in view in enacting that provision and in the context of the setting in which it occurs. We cannot ignore the context and the collocation of the provisions in which Section 52 Sub-section (2) appears, because, ....
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....e which has neither arisen to him nor is received by him, merely because he has carried out the contractual obligation undertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational reason why the legislature should have thought it fit to impose liability to tax on an Assessee who is bound by law to carry out his contractual obligation to sell the property at the agreed price and honestly carries out such contractual obligation. It would indeed be strange if obedience to the law should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither arisen to the Assessee nor has been received by him. If we may take another illustration, let us consider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after some time which may be a couple of years or more, he shall re-sell the property to A for the same price. Could it be contended in such a case that when B transfers the property to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of re-sale, if, in the meanwhile, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent? Many other s....
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....utory provision must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. 46. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the Legislature so as to achieve the intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the Legislature from the language used. It is necessary to remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human intention. It is well to remember the warning administered by Judge Learned Hand that one should not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish and sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 47. We have noted the object of Section 16(3) of the Act which has to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this case for the present purpose. If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act wh....
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....t, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. We need not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eve "some" violence to language is permissible. (See K.P. Varghese v. ITO [ (1981) 4 SCC 173, 180-82 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 293, 300-302 : (1981) 131 ITR 597, 604-606] and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1964) 54 ITR 692 (HL)].) xxx xxx xxx 19. ... The presumption canvassed to be raised that the true effect of the words "if the offence had not been committed" was to presume a situation in which the undertaking given by the Assessee had been carried out even though in fact the same had not been carried out. That would be an absurd result. In our opinion the use of the expression "if" simpliciter, was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability fell Under Sub-section (2) of....
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....acted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. 32. This judgment was followed in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 as follows: 19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25] where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299 : AIR....
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....ty. The following passage from Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) may usefully be quoted: 1. Modification of the language to meet the intention.--Where the language of the statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the Rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and the intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doi....
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....f the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by eschewing a literal interpretation thereof, and reading into the Section the words "and that reference is entertained and answered". The Court stated: 9. ...It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier Under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference Under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector Under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference Under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another applica....
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....tution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: (see Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar) [ (1962) Supp 2 SCR 769]. 38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1959) SCR 279, this Court summarised the case law Under Article 14 in the form of six propositions. We are concerned here with proposition (d), which reads as follows: ... The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish-- xxx xxx xxx (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; Based on this proposition, Shri Bhasme has argued that the legislature in the present case has recognised a certain degree of harm, namely, to tenants of minor landlords and may, therefore, confine itself to such cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. 39. Proposition (d) has been later clarified in the seminal judgment of this Court, In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979)1 SCC 380. A Constitution Bench....
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....c exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. xxx xxx xxx (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. xxx xxx xxx (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense abovementioned. To proposition (d) in Ram Krishna Dalmia&....
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....) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 : 1960 Cri.L.J. 1504] AIR p. 1134 para 26: SCR at p. 34 further went on to state that whereas equality before law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the law has positive content. The early judgments of this Court referred to the "discrimination" aspect of Article 14, and evolved a Rule by which subjects could be classified. If the classification was "intelligible" having regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass muster Under Article 14's anti-discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222], SCR at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50) 50. ... Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of its glorious content. He referred to the doctrine of classification as a "subsidiary rule" evolved by courts to give practical content to the said Article. 63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer to the "rule of law" or "positive" aspect ....
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....ent in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, and then held: 88. What is the remedy open to the citizen and the corresponding obligation of the judiciary to deal with such a situation, where the inequalities are created either by the legislation or executive action? Traditionally, this Court and the High Courts have been declaring any law, which created inequalities to be unconstitutional, but in Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] this Court realised that such a course of action would not meet with the obligations emanating from a combined reading of the directive principles and Article 14. Therefore, this Court emphatically laid down in Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] that it is possible to give an appropriate inductive relief by eliminating the factors, which creates the artificial classification leading to a discriminatory application of law. 44. Respectfully following the law laid down in these judgments, and in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, we eliminate the words "..of the fact that he has attained majority.." so that the in....
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.... Sections 32-F and 31 is quite clear and the period of one year will have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case grant relief on the basis of equity. Since this judgment does not square with object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment to the 1948 Act or to the declaration of law in this judgment, it does not state the law correctly and is, therefore, overruled. 47. The next judgment that was cited before us is Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC 200. After setting out the relevant provisions of the Act, this Court held that on the facts of that case since Section 31(3) had ceased to apply, Section 32-F(1) did not apply at all, as a result of which there was no need for the tenant to issue any notice of intimation to the landlord. The other judgments that were cited were distinguished in paragraph 27 stating that they were all judgments in which Section 32-F(1A) would apply. The facts of this case again are far removed from the facts of the present case and the judgment has, therefore, no application to the law laid down in t....