TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (9) TMI 1480
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.... are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, is bad in law, and consequently that Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to this extent. 3. The facts of one of these appeals may be taken up as illustrative of the points for consideration in all these appeals. In Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7064 of 2019 @ SLP (C) No.9599 of 2019), a notification dated 24.12.2004 was issued under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), intending to acquire land belonging to the Respondents for the purpose of four-laning National Highway No.1-A on certain stretches of the JalandharPathankot section as well as the Pathankot-Jammu section falling within the State of Punjab. On 11th July, 2005, the said lands were declared to have vested in the State pursuant to Section 3D(2) of the said Act. On 5th October 2006, the competent authority under the Act passed an Award in which compensation was calculated at Rs. 4,219/- per marla or Rs. 6.75 lakhs per acre. As this Award was disputed by the Respondents, an Arbitrator was appointed under the ....
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....(4) RCR (Civil) 375, would, therefore, not apply. According to him, the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya vs Union of India 2005-06 Supp RLW 559, correctly distinguished this line of cases and equally correctly followed a line of judgments under various state town planning Acts, the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 and the Defence of India Act, 1971 to arrive at the conclusion that solatium and interest need not be paid in cases covered under the National Highways Act. He further argued that given the fact that market value on the date of publication of the Section 3A notification was to be given at the full market rate, there could be no fundamental right violated as solatium and interest that are granted are mere statutory rights which can be awarded if the statute so enjoins, and equally need not be awarded where a separate special statute expressly excludes them. He also contended, somewhat feebly, that since only strips of land adjoining the National Highways were required to be acquired, in many cases, the landowners would have properties which would not be subject to acquisition left with them, obviating any need t....
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....ry limited circumstances that such requisitioned property was to be acquired, which, therefore, obviated payment of any solatium. They, therefore, relied upon the line of authorities which struck down provisions of statutes which did not grant solatium where land was acquired without first being requisitioned. They also took us through the judgment of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court and pointed out that this basic distinction between the two sets of applicable precedents was not properly appreciated, leading the High Court to follow the wrong line of authority. On merits, they argued that in some cases in the Supreme Court itself, the then Solicitor General, Shri Ranjit Kumar, expressly stated that solatium will be paid to some of the persons who are covered by notifications under Section 3A of the National Highways Act. This apart, as was correctly observed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the impugned judgment, the National Highway Authority being "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, cannot file objections in certain cases and accept arbitration awards in others. In any case, no case has been made out under the limited....
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....dment in the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988. 5. With a view to achieve the above objectives and alsoas both Houses of Parliament were not in session and the President was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action, the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 was promulgated by the President on the 24th day of January, 1997. 6. The Bill seeks to replace the aforesaid Ordinance." 8. Pursuant to this, the amendments that were made to the National Highways Act, 1956 with which we are directly concerned, are set out hereinbelow: "3. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) "competent authority" means any person or authorityauthorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the competent authority for such area as may be specified in the notification; (b) "land" includes benefits to arise out of land andthings attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. 3A. Power to acquire land, etc. - (1) Where the Central Government is satisfied....
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....hat section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3A. (2) On the publication of the declaration under subsection (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has beenpublished under sub-section (1) of section 3A for its acquisition but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of publication of that notification, the said notification shall cease to have any effect: Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3A is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. (4) A declaration made by the Central Government undersub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any c....
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....ompetent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. (4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land andshall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authorityunder sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions ofthe Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (7) The competent authority or the arbitrator whiledetermining the amount under sub-section (1) or subsection (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration- (a) the mark....
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....y that Government, with the competent authority and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit. 3-I. Competent authority to have certain powers of civil court.- The competent authority shall have, for the purposes of this Act, all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of anyperson and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of anydocument; (c) reception of evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record from any court oroffice; (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses. 3J. Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply.- Nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to an acquisition under this Act." 9. Keeping in view the object of reducing delay and speedy implementation of highway projects, the amended National Highways Act does away with any "award" by way of an offer to the landowner. Post the notification under Section 3A, objections are to be heard by the competent author....
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....hat aspect is qualitatively different from the solatium which the legislature wanted to provide "in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition". 22. Compulsory nature of acquisition is to be distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In the latter, the landowner has the widest advantage in finding out a would-be buyer and in negotiating with him regarding the sale price. Even in such negotiations or haggling, normally no landowner would bargain for any amount in consideration of his disinclination to part with the land. The mere fact that he is negotiating for sale of the land would show that he is willing to part with the land. The owner is free to settle terms of transfer and choose the buyer as also to appoint the point of time when he would be receiving consideration and parting with his title and possession over the land. But in the compulsory acquisition the landowner is deprived of the right and opportunity to negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It depends on what the Collector or the court fixes as per the provisions of the Act. The solatium envisaged in subsection (2) "in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition" is thus n....
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....be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament." 12. The First Schedule to the said Act provides that solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors, depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area, constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired. The Fourth Schedule to this Act, to be read along with Section 105, expressly includes under Item 7, the National Highways Act, 1956. In Item 9, this Schedule also includes The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. By a notification dated 28th August, 2015 issued under Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions that t....
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.... in (1996) 4 SCC 49, this Court has referred the matter to five learned Judges on the vexed question as to whether Article 31-C survived at all in view of the declaration contained in Minerva Mills v. Union of India 1981 (1) SCR 206 to the effect that the amended Article 31-C was constitutionally invalid. As the aforesaid declaration would not revive the original Article 31-C, the Article became a dead letter. When the same case travelled to five learned Judges reported in (2001) 4 SCC 455, this Court was of the opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke (supra) require reconsideration in view of the fact that Sanjeev Coke (supra) adopted the reasoning of Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Karnataka vs Shri Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 and not the reasoning of the majority judgment of Untwalai, J. who stated that he must not be understood to agree with all that has been said by Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment. The Court, therefore, referred the matter to seven learned Judges. When the matter came up before the seven learned Judges, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 522, this Court held that the statement made in Sanjeev Coke (supra), followed by several other judgments, that ....
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....on measure far removed from the object of the 1997 Amendment Act to the National Highways Act. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that a challenge under Articles 14 and 31 were bound to fail in view of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C, yet the Amendment Act had still provided for 10% solatium as the legislature had correctly appreciated that solatium is a part of compensation given for the compulsory nature of acquisition of property. 15. Shri Divan then referred us to Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709, in which the Indian Electricity (Assam Amendment) Act, 1973 and the Tinsukhia and Dibrugarh Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1973 were challenged. These being nationalisation measures, this Court held that these enactments were entitled to the protection of Article 31-C. This nationalisation statute, again, is very far removed from the Amendment Act, 1997 to the National Highways Act. 16. It is well-settled that in order that a law avail of the protection of Article 31-C, it is not necessary that any declaration be made in that behalf. (See State of Maharashtra vs Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan (1986) 2 SCC ....
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....nd purpose of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. While Article 39(b) refers to "material resources of the community", the aims and objects of the Act refer to "the material resources of the Madras Race Club". It is difficult to understand what exactly are the material resources of the race-club which are sought to be distributed so as to subserve the common good within the meaning of the Directive Principles. Equally, the reference to Article 39(c) is wholly misplaced. While Article 39(c) relates to "the operation of the economic system ... to the common detriment", the aims and objectives of the Act refer to "the economic system of the Madras Race Club". What is meant by the economic system of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it is assumed that betting by the punters at the totalizator and with the bookmakers is part of the economic system of the Madras Race Club, it has no relevance to the objectives specified in Article 39(b) and (c). We are, therefore, of the view that reference to Article 39(b) and (c) in the aims and objects and in Section 2 of the Act is nothing but a mechanical reproduction of constitutional provisions in a totally inappropriate context. T....
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.... Thana Electric Supply Co. (1989) 3 SCC 616, at para 43, this Court said: "43. The idea of nationalisation of a material resource of the community cannot be divorced from the idea of distribution of that resource in the community in a manner which advances common good. The cognate and sequential question would be whether the provisions of the Amending Act, 1976, had a reasonable and direct nexus with the objects of Article 39(b). It is true, the protection of Article 31-C is accorded only to those provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b). The High Court from the trend of its reasoning in the judgment, appears to take the view that while the provision for the takeover in the principal Act might amount to a power to acquire, however, the objects of the Amending Act of 1976, which merely sought to beat down the price could not be said to be part of that power and was, therefore, incapable of establishing any nexus with Article 39(b). There is, we say so with respect, a fallacy in this reasoning." The test of Article 31-C's protection being accorded only to those provisions which are basically and essen....
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.... Act to carry out the purposes of Article 39(b), the object of the Amendment Act is not served by removing solatium and interest from compensation to be awarded. It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest is not basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, 1997, even if it is to be considered as an acquisition Act pure and simple, for the object of the said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate delays in the acquisition process of acquiring land for National Highways. On application of this test as well, it is clear that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and, therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into by the Court. Article 14 - Discrimination 19. The sheet anchor of the case of the Respondents is the Constitution Bench judgment in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition (1965) 1 SCR 614 and Nagpur Improvement Trust vs Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500. It is, therefore,....
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.... housing purpose, the claimant gets only the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act or an amount equal to the average market value of the land during the five years immediately preceding such date, whichever is less. He will get a solatium of only 5 per centum of such value instead of 15 per centum under the principal Act. He will not get any compensation by reason of the suitability of the land for any use other than the use for which it was put on the date of publication of the notification." (at page 629 & 630) A challenge made to the said Amendment Act on the ground that it is hit by Article 14 succeeded, the Court holding: "Now what are the differences between persons owning lands in the Madras city or between the lands acquired which have a reasonable relation to the said object. It is suggested that the differences between people owning lands rested on the extent, quality and the suitability of the lands acquired for the said object. The differences based upon the said criteria have no relevance to the object of the Amending Act. To illustrate: the extent of the land depends upon th....
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....rust (supra), this Court referred to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, under which lands were to be acquired with reference to the Land Acquisition Act, as modified. We are concerned in this case with the modification that has to do with acquisition for the purposes of the Improvement Act, which did not provide for solatium of 15% that would have been obtained under the Land Acquisition Act. A Seven-Judge Bench of this Court examined the matter in some detail, and followed P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) together with another judgment, Balammal vs State of Madras (1969) 1 SCR 90. The Court held: "27. What can be reasonable classification for the purpose of determining compensation if the object of the legislation is to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes? 28. It would not be disputed that different principles of compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill, tall or short, or whether the owner has inherited the property or built it with his own efforts, or whether the owner is politician or an advocate. Why is this sort of classification not sustainable? Because the object being to compulso....
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....ss of acquiring lands for National Highways. This object has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove. It will be noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do with achieving this object, as it is nobody's case that land acquisition for the purpose of national highways slows down as a result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, a classification made between different sets of landowners whose lands happen to be acquired for the purpose of National Highways and landowners whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act, i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purpose of National Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of Article 14. 23. Even otherwise, in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), despite the fact that the object of the Amendment Act was to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low price, yet the Amendment Act was struck down when it provided for solatium at the rate of 5% instead of 15%, that was provided in the Land Acquisition Act, the Court holding that whether adjacent lands of the same quality and value are acquired for a housing ....
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....ion at a rate which is not less than market value is in order that a farmer, who is cultivating the land personally, gets other land of equivalent value, which he can then cultivate personally. As such farmer is at the centre of agrarian reform legislation, such legislation would be turned on its head if lands were to be acquired without adequately compensating him instead of from absentee landlords whose lands are then to be given to the landless and to such persons if they personally cultivate lands less than the ceiling area under State Agricultural Ceiling Acts. We think that any reference to the second proviso of Article 31-A is wholly irrelevant to the question before us and cannot under any circumstance be used in order to distinguish a judgment which otherwise applies on all fours. 27. However, it was argued that a line of judgments have distinguished P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) and that this line of judgments should be followed in preference to the aforesaid two judgments. 28. In Union of India vs Hari Krishnan Khosla 1993 Supp (2) SCC 149, this Court upheld the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 and ....
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.... purpose. In our considered view, these vital distinctions will have to be kept in mind while dealing with the question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. We may, at once, state, when examined in this light, the reasonings of the High Court to make out a case of discrimination, seem to be incorrect. xxx xxx xxx 58. We are of the firm view that cases of acquisition of land stand on a different footing than those where such property is subject to a prior requisition before acquisition. 59. Therefore, the cases relating to acquisition like Vajravelu Mudaliar case [(1965) 1 SCR 614 : AIR 1965 SC 1017], Balammal case [(1969) 1 SCR 90 : AIR 1968 SC 1425], Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500] and Peter case [(1980) 3 SCC 554] are not helpful in deciding the point in issue here. Goverdhan v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 3058 of 1983, allowed by this Court on January 31, 1983) no doubt was a case of acquisition under the Defence of India Act, 1962 but it contains no discussion. It has already been noticed that the award of solatium is not a must in every case as laid down in Prakash Amichand Shah case [(1986) 1 SCC 581]" 29. Similarly, in....
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....g regard to the said factor, which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Parliament while making the provisions for payment of compensation must have also taken into consideration the fact that the owner of the property would have received compensation for remaining out of possession during the period when the property was under acquisition. 29. The learned Attorney-General appears to be correct in his submission that the provision for grant of solatium was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by Parliament having regard to the fact that the amount of compensation awarded to the owner of the land is to be determined on the basis of the value thereof as on the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. It has been noticed that the process takes a long time. Taking into consideration the deficiencies in the Act, the Land Acquisition Act was further amended in the year 1984. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, solatium is paid in addition to the amount of market value of the land. 30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the classification sought to be made for determination of t....
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.... would determine and certain consequential rights in favour of the owners would arise therefrom. If in the scheme, reconstituted or final plots are allotted to them they become owners of such final plots subject to the rights settled by the Town Planning Officer in the final scheme. In some cases the original plot of an owner might completely be allotted to the local authority for a public purpose. Such private owner may be paid compensation or a reconstituted plot in some other place. It may be a smaller or a bigger plot. It may be that in some cases it may not be possible to allot a final plot at all. Sections 67 to 71 of the Act provide for certain financial adjustments regarding payment of money to the local authority or to the owners of the original plots. The development and planning carried out under the Act is primarily for the benefit of public. The local authority is under an obligation to function according to the Act. The local authority has to bear a part of the expenses of development. It is in one sense a package deal. The proceedings relating to the scheme are not like acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor are the provisions of the Land A....
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....nt, school building or police station? The amount of compensation payable has no bearing on this distinction, although it is conceivable that classification for purposes of compensation may exist and in such cases the statute may be good. We are unable to discern any valid discrimen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act warranting a classification in the matter of denial of solatium. 21. We uphold the Act in other respects but not when it deals invidiously between two owners based on an irrelevant criterion viz. the acquisition being for an improvement scheme. We are not to be understood to mean that the rate of compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all cases. We need not investigate this question further as it does not arise here although we are clear in our minds that under given circumstances differentiation even in the scale of compensation may comfortably comport with Article 14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed. Indeed, the State, realising the force of this facet of discrimination, offered, expiratory fashion, both before the High Court and before us, to pay 15%, solatium to obliterate the hostile distinction. ....
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....under the Town Planning Act. Section 34(2) provides for compensation exactly like Section 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and in the light of what we have just decided Section 25(2) will also apply and "in addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition". 34. One more judgment needs to be referred to, namely, Girnar Traders (3) vs State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, which was relied upon by Shri Divan to argue that, like Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, the amendment to the National Highways Act is a complete self-contained code and must, therefore, be followed on its own terms. This judgment dealt with whether Section 11-A introduced by the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act could be said to apply to acquisitions made under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. The answer to this question was that Section 11-A could not be so applied as the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act referred to the Land Acquisition Act as legislation by way of incorporation and not legislation by ....
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....G(2) makes it clear that rights of user and rights in the nature of easement being valuable property rights, compensation must be payable therefor. It is obvious that there is no double payment to the owner on this score as the owner and/or any other person has to prove that a right in the nature of an easement has also been taken away. Obviously, the right of user being subsumed in acquisition of ownership, the owner cannot get a double benefit on this score. The right of user is, therefore, referable only to persons other than the owner, who may have tenancy rights, and other rights of license on land which is acquired under the National Highways Act. 37. Insofar as easementary rights under the Land Acquisition Act are concerned, three Sections are relevant and need to be quoted: "3. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,- xxx xxx (b) the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land; ....
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....sition Act actuals are payable, whereas under the National Highways Act, a fixed amount of 10% of the amount determined by the competent authority is payable. It is, therefore, wholly incorrect to state that extra amounts are payable to the owner under the National Highways Act, which are not so payable under the Land Acquisition Act. Also, both Acts contemplate payment of compensation to persons whose easementary rights have been affected by the acquisition. In any event, this contention cannot possibly answer non-payment of solatium and interest under the National Highways Act, which has been dealt with in extenso in this judgment. 38. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect from 1st January, 2015, an Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 2014 was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said amendment Ordinance states as follows: "10. In the principal Act, in section 105,- (i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be subs....
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....s for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee; As whereas, as per the provisions of article 123 of the Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the land owners at the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act as extended to the land owners under the said Ordinance; And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the land owners under the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land acquisition under t....
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.... of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, the case of Chajju Ram (supra), has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court is not correct. 39. We were also referred to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported as Lalita vs Union of India AIR 2003 Karnataka 165, as well as a judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani vs Union of India, both of which distinguished the Requisition Act cases and relied upon Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) in order to reach the same conclusion as the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Both these judgments are also correct. 40. One more argument was raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, which is that nothing survives in these mattes in view of orders passed by this Court in Union of India v. T. Chakrapani - the Division Bench judgment of the ....
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....v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 and had granted the benefit of interest on solatium only in respect of pending proceedings. We are of the view that a similar course should be adopted in the present case also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron & Steel Forgins v. Union of India i.e. 28.03.2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 01.01.2014), which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the Act of 2013." 41. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or inte....
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.... ground has been raised and argued sometimes at the Section 34 stage, sometimes at the Section 37 stage, and sometimes at both stages. The burden to prove that the land in question is within 50m of the National Highway, and that it does not have commercial potentiality, is on the NHAI but, on facts, has never been discharged. This being the case in all these appeals, they stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken or argued in the Section 34 petition. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 2: That the arbitrator conducted the spot visit five years after the Section 3A notification was issued, based on which compensation was determined. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No.15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;....
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....) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019;SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No.15485/2019; In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15471/2019 In this matter, this ground has been taken up in the Section 34 petition, however, the High Court has rightly dismissed this appeal in terms of the Punjab & Haryana High Court order dated 15.02.17, in FAO No. 6522 of 2016, titled 'Mangal Dass vs. Govt. of India', wherein compensation of Rs. 7,00,000 per marla, which was calculated based on the collector rate of 2011, was held to be not justified, and was reduced to Rs. 4,50,000 per marla. Therefore, this appeal also stands dismissed. Ground 5: That compensation on account of loss of structure was awarded. SLP (C....
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....34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 37 appeals. Therefore, these appeals also stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No.21692/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken up in any of the Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 8: That compensation was awarded based on post- notification sale deed SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No.21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019;SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No.9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21....