TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2020 (7) TMI 643
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....T(A)"] erred on facts and in law in not holding that the order passed by the assessing officer under section 201(1)/ 201(1 A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act") was time barred and, therefore, without jurisdiction and void ab initio. 1.1 That the CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in holding that provisions of sub-section (3) of section 201 of the Act, as amended with effect from 01.10.2014, were applicable to assessment year under consideration, not appreciating that the time limit for passing order under sub-section (1) had already lapsed before insertion of the amended provision. 1.2 That the CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in not appreciating that the impugned order passed under section 201(1) and 201(1 A) of the Act was beyond limitation also for the reason that proceedings under the said sections were initiated after expiry of period of four years from the end of the relevant financial year. 2. That, without prejudice, the CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in upholding the order passed by the assessing officer under section 201(1) and section 201(1 A) of the Act, not appreciating that since the payees were not known in respect of the provision fo....
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..... On appeal before the ld CIT(A), assessee once again contested that the order is time barred. Assessee also objected that there is no liability to deduct tax at source on 'year end provisions' which was reversed on the first date of next month. The ld CIT(A) noted that new information was coming to the ld AO after the amendment to section 201(3) by the Finance Act No. 2 of 2014 w.e.f 01.10.2014, according to that amendment the time limit is extended upto 7 years and therefore, the order passed by the ld AO is not time barred. He further held that the ld AO has passed the impugned order for Assessment Year 2015-16 i.e. after 01.10.2014 therefore the order passed by the ld AO is within 7 years from the end of the Financial year to which the transaction pertained to. Therefore, the order is not time barred. On the issue of tax deduction at source, he rejected the contention of the assessee that the amount was credited in the books of account for various expenses at the year end but were reversed at the beginning of the next Financial Year and actual payment were made much later and at that point of time the tax is duly deducted and deposited by the assessee, hence there is no default....
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....emently supported the order of the lower authorities and submitted that the ld AO had time limit available of upto 7 years from the end of the Financial Year and therefore, this order is not barred by limitation. 7. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the orders of the lower authorities. The issue is small and clear that when the order u/s 201 (1) of the act can be passed for AY 2009-10. For that year, the TDS statement is required to be filed for the last quarter on 30/6/2009. It is the statements of the ld AR that assessee has filed such TDS return, therefore the time limit for passing an order u/s 201(3) would be two years from the end of the year in which such TDS statements are filed. In this case, such time limit expires on 31/3/2012. The ld AR has stated that assessee filed such return in FY 2009-10 , this is not denied by the revenue. According to us the identical issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Tata Teleservices Vs. Union of India (2016] 66 taxmann.com 157 (Gujarat)/[2016] 238 Taxman 331 (Gujarat)/[2016] 385 ITR 497 (Gujarat)/[2016] 284 CTR 337 (Gujarat) wherein it has been held that prior to section 201 was ....
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....s not been considered. That in response thereto the respondent No. 2 by a letter am 29/12/2014 held that the proceedings for F.Y. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 were valid and were within time relying upon the amended Section 201(3) of the Finance Act, 2014. 6.4 That the petitioner by reply dated 05/01/2015 reiterated its submissions in respect of the proceeding being time barred. 6.5 That the respondent No. 2 vide letter dated 12/01/2015 gave last opportunity to the petitioner to furnish the factual information as sought by the officer. Hence, the petitioner has preferred the Special Civil Application No. 1623 of 2015. 7. The challenge to the impugned notices /summonses which are issued under section 201 of the Act are mainly on the following grounds :- (i) Section 201 provides for consequences of failure to deduct tax. The said Section 201 was amended by Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 01/06/2002 wherein the proceedings were to be initiated within reasonable period of time. Subsequently Section 201(3) and Section 201(4) were introduced w.e.f. 01/04/2010 by Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 which provided period of limitation of two years from ....
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.... language of the amended section says that it is w.e.f. 01/10/2014. In support of his above submissions, Mr.Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co., AIR 1965 SC 720 (Para 12 and 13) as well as in the case of J.P. Jani, ITO v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt [1969] 1 SCR 714 (Paras 4 and 5). 8.2 Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has further submitted that the time period for passing an order had lapsed under Section 201 for the relevant financial year and therefore a vested right had accrued in favour of the petitioner which can only be taken away by an express retrospective amendment. Hence the substantive right is conferred by a statute which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in law unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. It is trite law that every gimme is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Limitation provision therefore can be procedural in the context of one set of facts but substantive in the context of different set of fact....
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....r Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has further submitted that the judgment cited by respondent No. 2 i.e. (i) in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. S. G. Mehta, ITO [1968] 48 ITR 154 (SC) and (ii) in the case of Addl. Commissioner v. Jyoti Traders [1999] 2 SCC 77 would not apply in the present case as the interpretation of the amended Section by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Traders (supra) was in respect of the proviso which provided that the assessment and reassessment may be made after the expiration of the period aforesaid but not after expiration of eight years from the end of such year. To understand it more precisely the relevant provision of Section 21 dealt in the said judgment read as under: 'Section 21. Assessment of tax on the turnover not assessed during the year. (1) If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer, for any assessment year or part thereof has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or has been assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it is assessable under this Act, or any ....
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....etitioner and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Traders (supra), cited and relied upon by the respondent. 8.6 Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that without prejudice, even assuming without admitting that the there is a conflict between these two judgments, the judgment of K.M. Sharma case (supra) will prevail over Jyoti Traders case (supra) since it has been delivered by larger bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8.7 Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the judgment relied on by the respondent No. 2 in the case of CTO v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala [1996] 5 SCC 626, for the principles laid down there in would not apply to the present case as the facts in the said judgment are different from the facts of the present case. (a) In the said judgment, assessments were completed on 17/02/1969 and 26/03/1969. Under rule 80(5) of the Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1941 as it then stood, the assessment can be revised if the assessment has been made or the order has been passed more than four years previously. Accordingly the per....
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....ollows by necessary implication from, the language of the statute in question. The language used is not to be either stretched in favour of the revenue or narrowed in favour of the assessee. It is essential not to confound what is actually or virtually prohibited or enjoined by the statutory language with what is really beyond the enacting part. The words that have been used in the amended section must apply as they stand, however unreasonable or unjust the consequences, and however strongly it may suspect that it was not the real intention of the legislature. Therefore the language of the amended Section 201(3) by the Finance Act, 2014 is clear as it does not expressly provides or mentions to commence proceedings in respect of FY or extend the time limit from retrospective effect which had already expired. 8.8 Mr.Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that even decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.Ranga Rao & Sons v. State of Karnataka [2007] 9 SCC 691 and in the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. (supra) relied upon by Mr.Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Income Tax Department ....
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....3) of the Act, is untenable in law. It is submitted that section 201(3) as amended by Finance Act (No.2) of 2014 specifically provides for consequences of failure to deduct or pay the Income Tax and it further provides that no order shall be made under sub-section (1) deeming a person to be an assessee any default for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax from a person resident in India, at any time after the expiry of 7 years from the end of the Financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. It is submitted that, therefore, the Section itself provides for limitation period of 7 years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. It is submitted that in the instant case, period of 7 years has not elapsed from the end of financial year in which payment is made or credit is given. It is submitted that, therefore, the impugned notices / summonses cannot be said to be barred by period of limitation as provided under the Act. 10.3 Mr.M.R. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has further submitted that earlier provision had bifurcation as contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub- section (3) with re....
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....ger period of limitation where foreign assets are involved. 10.9 Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S.Gadgil (supra), by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, is concerned, it is vehemently submitted by Mr.Bhatt, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue that the said decision is distinguishable. It is submitted that in the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Sections 37 of 1922 Act. It is submitted that unamended Section 34(1)(iii) provided for a period of one year in respect of an agent. It is submitted that by the amended clause (iii), a negative covenant was placed putting an embargo on the assessing officer not to issue a notice after an expiry of two years. It is submitted that it is only by reason of this negative proviso that petition came to be allowed by the Court as can be seen from para 3 of the judgment. It is submitted that In the present case, there is no such negative proviso. It is submitted that in fact in the said decision also in para 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "there was no scop....
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....lved, this Court is of the opinion that present petitions cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that the present petitions are against the Show Cause Notices. At this stage decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. [2003] 2 SCC 107 (para 7) as well as another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Filterco v. CST [1986] 24 Taxman 797, are required to be referred to and considered. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and as observed hereinabove, as the present petitions involve pure question of law, the objections raised by the revenue against entertainability and/or maintainability of the present petitions against the show cause notices are hereby overrules and the present petitions are considered on merits. 11.02 Short question posed for consideration of these petitions is as to, whether section 201(3) of the Income Tax Act as amended on 1/10/2014 by Finance Act of 2014 would be applicable retrospectively or prospectively and whether the said provision would be applicable with respect to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act for A.Y. 2008-09 ....
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.... 12.2 Subsequently, section 201 of the Act came to be amended. Sub-sections (3) and (4) came to be introduced w.e.f. 1/4/2010. Section 201 as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2009 w.e.f. 1/4/2010 reads as under : "201. (1) Where any person, including the principal officer of a company - (a) who is required to deduct any sum in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or (b) referred to in sub-section (IA) of section 192, being an employer, does not deduct, or does not pay, or after so deducting fails to pay, the whole or any part of the tax, as required by or under this Act, then, such person, shall, without prejudice to any other consequences which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax: Provided that no penalty shall be charged under section 121 from such person, unless the Assessing Officer is satisfied that such person, without good and sufficient reasons, has failed to deduct and pay such tax. (1A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), if any such person, principal officer or company as is referred to in that sub-section does not deduct the whole or any part of the tax ....
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....as under: "201(3). No order shall be made under sub-section (1) deeming a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax from a person resident in India, at any time after the expiry of - (i) two years from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed in a case where the statement referred to in section 200 has been filed: (ii) six years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or credit is given, in any other case: Provided that such order for a financial year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 2007 may be passed at any time on or before the 31st day March, 2011." 12.5 Subsequently, section 201(3) of the Act has been further amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014 w.e.f. 1/10/2014, which reads as under : "Consequences of failure to deduct or pay : 201(3). No order shall be made under sub-section (1) deeming a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax from a person resident in India, at any time after the expiry of seven years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made ....
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.... In order to bring certainty on this issue, it is proposed to provide for express time limits in the Act within which specified order u/s. 201 (1) will be passed. It is proposed that an order u/s 201(1) for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax as required under this Act, if the deductee is a resident taxpayer shall be passed within two years from the end of the financial year in which the statement of tax deduction at source is filed by the deductor. Where no such statement is filed, such order can be passed up till four years from the end of the financial year in which the payment is made or credit is given. To provide sufficient time for pending cases, it is proposed to provide that such proceedings for a financial year beginning from 1st April, 2007 and earlier years can be completed by the 31st March, 2011. However, no time-limits have been prescribed for order under subsection (1) of section 201 where- (a) the deductor has deducted but not deposited the tax deducted at source, as this would be a case of defalcation of government dues; (b) the employer has failed to pay the tax wholly or partly, under sub-section (1A) of section 192, as....
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.... Under Chapter XVII-B of the Act. a person is required to deduct tax on certain specified payments at the specified rates if the payment exceeds specified threshold. The person deducting tax ("the detductor") is required to 'file a quarterly statement of tax deduction at source (TDS) containing the prescribed details of deduction of tax made during the quarter by the prescribed due date. Currently, a deductor is allowed to file correction statement for rectification / updation of the information furnished in the original TDS statement as per the Centralized Processing of Statements of Tax Deducted at Source Scheme, 2013 notified vide Notification No.03/2013 dated 15th January, 2013. However, there does not exist any express provision in the Act for enabling a deductor to file correction statement. In order to bring clarity in the matter relating to filing of correction statement, it is proposed to amend section 200 of the Act to allow the deductor to file correction statements. Consequently. it is also proposed to amend provisions of section 200A of the Act for enabling processing of correction statement filed. The existing provisions of section 201(1....
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....n certain cases or furnishing of incorrect information in TDS/ TCS statements. The existing provisions of section 271H of the Act do not specify the authority which would be competent to levy the penalty under the said section. Therefore, provisions of section 271H are proposed to be amended to provide that the penalty under section 271H of the Act shall be levied by the Assessing officer." 12.14 At this stage, it is required to be noted that earlier section 201(3) of the Act as amended by Finance Act, 2012 amended on 28/5/2012 was specifically made applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 1/14/2012, whereby limitation period was substituted from four years to six years for passing orders where TDS Statement had not been filed. However, section 201(3) of the Act as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014, as mentioned in the memorandum of the Finance Bill No.2 of 2014 is stated to have effect from 1st October, 2014. Thus, wherever the Parliament / Legislature wanted to make provisions applicable retrospectively, it has been so provided. 12.15 At this stage, it is required to be noted that while making amendment in section 201(3) of the Act by Finance Act No.2 of 201....
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....re the amending Act became effective, it was barred. Therefore the view that even when the right to assess or reassess has lapsed on account of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the earlier statute, the Income-tax Officer can exercise his powers to assess or re-assess under the amending statute which gives an extended period of limitation was not accepted in Calcutta Discount Company's case, 1953-23 ITR 471 : (AIR 1953 Cal 721). 13. As we have already pointed out the right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the assessee as an agent of a non-resident party under the Income-tax Act before it was amended, ended on March 31, 1956. It is true that under the amending Act by S.18 of the Finance Act, 1956, authority was conferred upon the Income-tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under S. 43 within two years from the end of the year of assessment. But authority of the Income-tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1956 having already come to an end, the amending provision will not assist him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notice it is within the peri....
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....Tax Officer to re-open the assessment for the year 1947-48 was barred under the old Act before the new Act came into force. In our opinion it is not permissible to construe Section 297 (2) (d) (ii) of the Act as reviving the right of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment which was already barred under the old Act. The reason is that such a construction of Section 297 (2) (d) (ii) would be tantamount to giving of retrospective operation to that Section which is not warranted either by the express language of the Section or by necessary implication. The principle is based on the well-known rule of interpretation that unless the terms of the statute expressly so provide or unless there is a necessary implication, retrospective operation should not be given to the statute so as to affect, alter or destroy any right already acquired or to revive any remedy already lost by efflux of time. On behalf of the appellants reference was made to the opening phrase "Where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940" occurring in S. 297 (2) (d) (ii) of the new Act, but these general words cannot take in their sweep all assessment years subsequen....
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....amended provision became barred on 31st March 1956 and the amended provision did not operate against him so as to authorize the Income Tax Officer to commence proceedings for re-opening the assessment of the assessee in a case where before the amended provision came into force, the proceedings had become barred under the unamended provision. At page 240 of the Report (ITR) = (at p. 177 of AIR), Shah, J. speaking or the Court observed as follows:- "As we have already pointed out, the right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the assessee as an agent of a non-resident party under the Income Tax Act before it was amended, ended on March 31, 1956. It is true that under the amending Act by Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, authority was conferred upon the Income Tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under Section 43 within two years from the end of the year of assessment. But authority of the Income Tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1956, having already come to an end the amending provision will not assist him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notice it is within the per....
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....ot be condoned under the proviso. Then, will the application be barred under sub-section (3) of Section 110A? Our answer is in the negative and for two reasons: (1) Time for the purpose of filing the application under Section 110A did not start running before the constitution of the Tribunal. Time had started running for the filing of the suit but before it had expired the forum was changed. And for the purpose of the changed forum, time could not be deemed to have started running before a remedy of going to the new forum is made available. (2) Even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of the commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation." 13.4 In the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. (supra), while discussing the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragr....
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....d pointed out in certain situation the Court would rule against a retrospective operation. 32. Limitation provisions therefore can be procedural in the context of one set of facts but substantive in the context of different set of facts because rights can accrue to both the parties. In such a situation, test is to see whether the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case, would impair existing rights and obligations. An accrued right to plead a time bar, which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period, is nevertheless a right, even though it arises under an Act which is procedural and a right which is not to be taken away pleading retrospective operation unless a contrary intention is discernible from the statute. Therefore, unless the language clearly manifests in express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective. 33. A statute, merely procedural is to be construed as retrospective and a statute while procedural in nature affects vested rights adversely is to be construed as prospective. The manner of filing an appeal, under subsection (2) o....
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....hich is retrospective in relation to one aspect of a case (e.g. because it applies to a pre-statute cause of action) may at the same time be prospective in relation to another aspect of the same case (e.g. because it applies only to the post-statute commencement of proceedings to enforce that cause of action); and an Act which is procedural in one sense may in particular circumstances do far more than regulate the course of proceedings, because it may, on one interpretation revive or destroy the cause of action itself. Whether a statute is to be construed in a retrospective sense, and if so to what extent, depends, on the intention of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute, having regard to the normal canons of construction and to the relevant provisions of any interpretation statute. From authorities cited, it is my considered judgment that whether the prospective or retrospective Rule of construction should apply depends on the nature of the new statute or amending statute. If it is purely a procedural statute and does not deal with substantive rights then the retrospective Rule of construction should apply. But where the statute deals with s....
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....wo classes of case can be considered. existing statute of limitation may be altered by enlarging or abridging the time within which proceedings may be instituted. If the time is enlarged whilst a person is still within time under the existing law to institute a cause of action the statute might well be classed as procedural. Similarly if the time is abridged whilst such person is still left with time within which to institute a cause of action, the abridgment might again be classed as procedural. But if the time is enlarged when a person is out of time to institute a cause of action so as to enable the action to be brought within the new time or is abridged so as to deprive him of time within which to institute it whilst he still has time to so, very different considerations could arise. A cause of action which can be enforced is a very different thing to a cause of action the remedy for which is barred by lapse of time. Statutes which enable a person to enforce a cause of action which was then barred or provide a bar to an existing cause of action by abridging the time for its institution could hardly be described as merely procedural. They would affect substanti....
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....Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.14 and 21 has observed and held as under : "14. Fiscal statute more particularly on a provision such as the present one regulating period of limitation must receive strict construction. Law of limitation is intended to give certainty and finality to legal proceedings and to avoid exposure to risk of litigation to litigant for indefinite period on future unforeseen events. Proceedings, which have attained finality under existing law due to bar of limitation cannot be held to be open for revival unless the amended provision is clearly given retrospective operation so as to allow upsetting of proceedings, which had already been concluded and attained finality. The amendment to sub-section (1) of Section 150 is not expressed to be retrospective and, therefore, has to be held as only prospective. The amendment made to subsection (1) of Section 150 which intends to lift embargo of period of limitation under Section 149 to enable Authorities to reopen assessments not only on the basis of Orders passed in proceedings under the IT Act but also on Order of a Court in any proceedings under any law has to be appli....
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....re are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only - 'nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non praeteritis' - a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at page 438.) It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole. (ibid., page 440). 14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is 'to explain' an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well-settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is gen....
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....bvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision." 16. There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by reenacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under the reenacted law. Sometimes the Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon Courts. The Legislature may follow anyone method or all of them. 17. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is therefore only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent." 13.8 Identical question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Sha....
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....law to be applied is that which is in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. Even a procedural provision cannot in the absence of clear contrary intendment expressed therein be given greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned so as to enable the Authorities to affect finality of tax assessments or to open up liabilities, which have become barred by lapse of time. Our conclusion, therefore, is that sub-section (1) of Section 150, as amended with effect from 1-4-1989, does not enable the Authorities to reopen assessments, which have become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1-4-1989 and this position is applicable equally to reassessments proposed on the basis of Orders passed under the Act or under any other law." 14. Now, so far as reliance placed upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (supra) as well as another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Traders (supra), by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue is concerned, on facts and considering the provisions which came to be considered....