TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1968 (4) TMI 89
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.... Government, and the Declaration Order under which they might be compelled to declare the paddy in their possession or control and to sell it to the Government, as unconstitutional. By consent of parties, this O. P. was heard by the learned Judge, along with 720 others that challenged the above-said Orders as also the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 -- hereinafter 'the Maximum Prices Orders' -- on "the question of the constitutional validity of the Orders" as a "preliminary point" and by a judgment common for ail the 721 O. Ps. the learned Judge has held: "The expression 'cultivator' has been denned as 'one who actually cultivates any land with paddy.' On the definition, it seems to signify one who actually puts his hand to the plough, and the plough to the soil. It seems also immaterial that the land he cultivates is one in which he has himself no proprietary or beneficial interest. If this be the meaning to be attributed to the term 'cultivator' the working ot the Levy Order would be reduced to an absurdity. It would mean that even a servant or labourer of an owner of land is to be rega....
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....e to be paid to a person required to sell an essential commodity in compliance with an Order made with reference to Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act. It is only one of the factors to be taken into account. ......... Turning to the provisions of the Levy Order, the controlled price is the sole determinant of the price to be paid. To that extent the Levy Order seems to have travelled beyond the provisions of the parent Act, viz., the Essential Commodities Act, in respect of the provision as to payment of price for the rice or paddy acquired. ...... In the result I hold that the definition of the term 'cultivator' in the Levy Order is vague and does not lay down even the broad principles for a satisfactory administration of the provisions of the Order and is productive of arbitrariness. As the definition is the very crux of the Order and is inextricably woven throughout the texture of the Order the entire Order is liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. I am further of the view that, in any event ...... the proviso to Clause 7 of the Order in so far as it places a ceiling on the market value of the price to be paid to the paddy acquired is violative of Ar....
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....ar, AIR 1960 All 692 (FB) where the question was whether an order of a Single Judge dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction in a suit can be appealed against before a Division Eenqh. The learned Judge said: "All kinds of decisions are, however, given in a suit or proceeding from the date of its institution to the date of its termination. It is obvious that it could not have been the intention to include all these decisions in the term 'judgment' and make them appelable irrespective of their nature or importance. If a decision amounts to a decree as denned in the C P. C., it would certainly amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent." But, Mootham. C. J., with whom Dayal, J., agreed, has observed in the abovesaid case, AIR 1960 All 692 (FB): "Now the order the nature of which we have to determine is an order which finally determines the right of a party to a specific temporary relief. It stems from a suit and its purpose is to make the judgment, if obtained, fully effective. It is neither an order which merely regulates procedure nor an order made on an application which is merely a step towards obtaining a final adju....
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....case for decision of other issues. The Privy Council held an appeal from that order of remand entertainable because the cardinal point in the case was about the will and that had been decided by the High Court leaving only certain subordinate enquiries to be made thereafter. 6. In Kasi v. Ramanathan Chettiar, 1947 Mad WN 723 the question was whether an appeal would lie against an order directing a fresh report by a commissioner on the accounts of a partnership, when that order contained an adjudication on the substantive rights of the parties with regard to several matters In controversy in the suit. Patanjali Sastri J., (as he was then), with concurrence of Tyagarajan, J., observed: "Even under the old Code which did not expressly provide for the passing of a 'preliminary decree' in any suit, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee stressed the expediency of passing such decrees so as to make it possible to prefer an immediate appeal to settle that part of a case on which the decision of the other parts depended. They observed in Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz, (1897) ILR 19 All 155 at p. 164 (PC): 'The learned Judges of the High Court have exam....
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....onal validity of the impugned Orders) on which the (reliefs sought in the O. Ps. depend largely is a preliminary judgment within the meaning of the C. P. C. and is appeal-able as such under Section 5 (i) of the High Court Act. 8. As arguments on the merits of Writ Appeal No. 30 of 1968 proceeded. Mr. Velayudhan Nair, Mr. Suryanarayana Iyer and Mr. Easwara Iyer (who have already entered appearance in response to the general notice referred to above) stated that they have, on behalf of petitioners in five of the 721 O. Ps. disposed of by the judgment under appeal, filed Writ Appeals Nos. 76 to 80 challenging the validity of the Maximum Prices Orders and of the entirety of the Declaration Order as also the findings of the learned Judge against points urged by them against the Levy Order, and requested that those appeals may be heard along with the Writ Appeal No. 30 of 1968 in the present hearing itself. As the learned Advocate General took notice of those appeals and agreed to their being heard now, it was so ordered by us on March 8, 1968 and the hearing continued as on all these writ appeals together. I. The Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order. 9. The learned Ju....
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....to BOW seeds thereon, the common man would mention me to have cultivated the land, and not the servant or the labourer who did the manual work more or less as a machine and for my sake. When one does an act through the hand of another, one is in law and in fact doing it oneself really. The expression "actually" in the definition does not appear to cause any confusion. The dictionary meaning of the word "actually" is "really" "in actual fact"; and of the word "actual" is "real, 'existing in fact". If facts are assessed in proper perspective there can be little doubt that, when I engage a servant or a labourer to do a work for me, the work is mine, and mine only. Further, culti vation is not mere putting of the plough to the soil. As has been observed in Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, AIK 1957 SC 768 at p. 788 "cultivation of land in the strict sense of the term means tilling of the land, sowing the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land" like manuring and watering. If I purchase seed and manure and employ a labourer to strew or spread them on the land, will he be said to have planted and manured the land? Qui facit per alium fa-cit p....
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....e employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject-matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject-matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. ... Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in Section 2 (k) of the Act must be ... one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest." In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1956 SC 871 the Supreme Court held: "In the context in which it occurs in Section 418 (1) (of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act) the meaning which can reasonably be attached to the word 'abandoned' is 'let loose' in the sense of being 'left unattended' and certainly not 'ownerless'." The ratio of these decisions is reiterated by Gajendragadkar, C. J., in Sheikh Gulfan v. Sanat Kurnar Ganguli, AIR 1965 SC 1839 at p. 1845 in these words: "Often enough, in interpreting a statutory prov....
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....id" and explained it by pointing out that the cultivator of a land may be the owner, a co-owner, a tenant, a sub-tenant, an agent, or a servant, but there is no provision in the Levy Order to oblige the officer who makes a demand for the levy to make any enquiry as to the interest of the cultivator in the paddy raised by him. I see little force in this contention. Whatever might have been the position before September 4, 1967 -- which need not be canvassed here as the paddy raised then, whether procured by the Government or left with the cultivator, must have been disposed of long ago and therefore cannot now be made the subject of an effective writ or direction (cf. K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SG 592 Last Para) -- after the introduction of Clause 3C in the Levy Order there can be little chance for error in naming the cultivator for purposes of the levy. That clause obliges every cultivator, who IB liable for a levy, to inform in writing, 7 days before harvest, on penalty of a year's imprisonment, the Village Officer concerned the extent of land cultivated by him, the proposed date for harvest and the anticipated production. If any Officer turns down the inform....
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....ed to be vague. I do not find anv inequity, much less arbitrariness, in the definition of a cultivator or in the procedure laid down in the Levy Order for procuring the levy paddy from the cultivator. 13. The learned Judge has held that "Clause 7 of the Levy Order, in so far as it imposes a ceiling on the price to be paid, fails to specify the principles on which compensation for the paddy taken b to be assessed, and thereby violates Article 31 (2) of the Constitution." Clause 7 requires the Government or its officer or nominee puichasing paddy to pay its price "at the prevailing market rate but not exceeding the maximum price specified by the Government for the lime being under" the concerned Maximum Prices Order Mr. K. V Survanaravana Iyer cited State of Weal Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1854 SC 170, State of Madras v. D. Namasivava, AIR 1965 SC 190, Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1017. N. B. Jeejeebhov v. Assistant Collector, Thana, AIR lWi5 SC 1096, Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India. AIR 1967 SC 637 and Deputy Commissioner and Collector. Kamrup v. Durganath Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 394 to urge that the ....
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....ard. If dealings with racketeers or other anti-social elements in black market are to rule the price of paddy procured for equitable distribution, the object of the Act and the Levy Order -- 'for securing availability at fair prices' -- is certain to be defeated. They cannot afford a standard for governmental action or judicial considerations. The contention that the Government is empowered by the Maximum Prices Orders to sell the foodgrains to the consumers at prices above the maxima fixed under them is not correct as the said Orders have only allowed the Government to fix separate maximum prices for the rice and paddy procured and sold by the Government "after taking into consideration expenses on account of transport, storage and other Incidental charges." I do not find anything unfair or illegal therein. The provision in the Levy Order for payment of price to the cultivator "at the prevailing market rate subject to the maximum price specified by the Government for the time being under" the concerned Maximum Prices Order does not therefore spell any negation of a just equivalent or a violation of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. It is conceded at the bar that ever ....
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.... cited the observation in AIR 1967 SC 637. "Under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution, no property shall be compulsorily acquired except under a law which provides for compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given." and urged that Section 3 (3B) of the Act, when it said "there shall be paid to that person such price for the foodgrains ...... as may be specified in that order" imperatively insists on the first of the alternatives, namely fixation of the amount ofcompensation itself in the Order, but the State Government has ignored those commands of the Act in the impugned Order professedly made under the Act itself. In other words, the contention is that, in not specifying the price as such in the Order the State Government has transgressed the limits of the delegation conceded to it and the Levy Order is for that reason invalid. Sub-section (3B) commands: "Where any person is required by an order made with reference to Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) to sell any grade or variety of foodgrains ...... to the ...... State Government or to an ....
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....ly described" in a schedule annexed to it. Likewise, in Carpenter v, Deen, (1889) 23 QBD 566, Fry, L. J. observed: "In considering the meaning of the words 'specifically described', we should look at the scope and object of the section. They are in my opinion plain. I think they are ...... to render the identification as easy as possible, and to render any dispute as to the intention of the parties as rare as possible, ...... That is to be done as far as possible; by which I mean, as far as is reasonably possible -- so far as a careful man of business trying to carry the object of the Act into execution could and would do without going into unreasonable particulars." The Bengal Foodgrains (Disposal and Acquisition) Order, 1947, directed that a notice or Directive issued to a cultivator "shall specify the price" of the paddy directed to be sold by him. The notice given to Ramachandra Pal was to sell paddy to K. M. Dey at a price not exceeding Rs. 7-8 per maund subject to deduction on account of poorness of quality and cost of transportation and other incidental charges incurred by the Government. Bose, J., cited Attorney General v. Marquis of Hertford, (1845) 153 EH....
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....the latter can only be envisaged as one below the controlled price and not exceeding it. As it is conceded that the cultivators have, since the date of promulgation of the instant Levy Order; been paid the maximum price fixed by the Government, they cannot have any legitimate grievance in this regard. The contention fails. 18. Thus, the grounds on which the learned Judge has struck down the Levy Order or its Clause 7 do not appear to me substantial. 19. Mr. K. Velayudhan Nair's attempt was to sustain the declaration of Invalidity of the Levy Order on certain grounds that have been repelled by the learned Judge. He contended that the promulgation of the Order is beyond the authority delegated to the State Government and therefore void, and explained it thus: The Levy Order has been mada on 1st July, 1966, in exercise of powers conferred by the Central Government on the State Government as per G. S. R. No. 906 dated 9th June, 1966; that G. S. R. had been superseded by G. S. R. No. 1111 dated 24th July, 1967; supersession implies a repeal of the superseded Order and therefore when G. S. R. No. 906 was superseded and thereby repealed without a provision to save existing order....
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.... been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law. ...... The effect of an Act or Order which is superseded is not to obliterate it altogether. An Act or order is said to be superseded where a later enactment or order effects the same purposes as an earlier one by repetition of its terms or otherwise. ...... The order of 1943, for the breach of which the petitioner was prosecuted was never repealed, or in other words it was never obliterated altogether. On the other hand it continued to exist till Government decided to effect the same purpose as was contemplated by that order by another order. There is nothing in the law which would justify the contention that after the supersession of that order no proceedings in respect of its breach could be commenced. The provisions of Section 6, U. P. General Clauses Act, apply only to repealed Acts and not to Acts which are superseded by others There is, as shown above, an essential distinction between an Act or Order which is repealed and one which is superseded. The first contention must, therefore, be rejec....
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....ing authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. It is conceivable that any legislature ...... could have intended ...... that ...... the re-enacted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter? The answer must be in the negative." (Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838). "When the appeal Is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, ...... The line ot enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an Intention to destroy them," (State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84), There is no reason why the abovesald principles should not apply mutatis mm tandis to supersession of Statutory Orders as well -- particularly since it is said "subordinate legislation has, if va-lidly made, the full force and effect of a statute" (Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 36, para 732). It follows ....
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....each of the Houses of the Provincial Legislature at the session thereof next following" to held by the Supreme Court not to be mandatory: "It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature." Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Edn. Vol. 36, pages 486-7) also says: "Many statutes conferring legislative powers provide that instruments made In exercise thereof shall be laid before Parliament (or, in some cases, the House of Commons alone) after being made, but do not subject them to any further procedure. Before 1948, the effect of such a provision was in every case a matter of construction. It might be provided that an instrument was not to come into operation until the expiry of a specified period after laying; but no more was normally required than that it be laid, or laid forthwith or as soon as may be, or laid within a specified period, and in these latter cases the provision would, unless the contrary intention clearly appeared....
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....availability at fair prices". of foodgrains for all at a time of countrywide food shortage, the determination of quantity to be procured from or to be allowed to be retained by a producer must necessarily be left to the State Government who is the best appraiser of the pressure of the time, the urgency of the situation and the maintenance of public morale. Even a monopoly procurement may be justified if circumstances require such a course I am not persuaded to hold that the defects attributed by counsel to Section 3 of the Act are substantial. 24. Mr. Velayudhan Nair wanted the expression 'holding' to be interpreted, 33 the Supreme Court has done in K. K, Handique v. Member, Board of Agricultural Income-tax, Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1191 to "include a two-fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title" and therefore to construe the expression in Section 3(2) (f) of the Act a "person holding in stock", to refer only to a person who has both possession and title to the paddy at hand, and to impose that limitation into the definition of a cultivator in the Levy Order. The Supreme Court has not said categorically that the expression ....
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.... There is nothing in that sub-section to indicate that the stock means only a stock for sale. 26. Mr. Velayudhan Nair also contended that the Levy Order has gone beyond the parent Act, because Section 3 (2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act contemplates compulsory purchase only from a "person holding in stock" and that a person can be said to hold a stock only if he has a store of goods beyond his requirements; but the Levy Order compels sale of paddy by every person who has cultivated more than two acres of land without any enquiry as to his requirements. It is difficult to appreciate counsel's assumption that the Act, in contemplating measures "for maintaining or Increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices", contemplates purchase of food-grains only from persons who hold stock above all their requirements. A law designed to meet famine conditions cannot afford to be so liberal. Its provisions must be capable of drastic application to meet all situations. The expression "any person holding in stock any essential commodity" must, in the context, comprehend all persons having possession of any ....
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....0) 282 US 499 at p. 501 we have to remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints. A judicial review of governmental action should not involve excessive timidity that would encourage arbitrariness in administration nor temerity that would paralyse the administration. Counsel's reliance on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1468 and on K. T. Moopil Nayar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 which related to land revenue, is, in my opinion, out of place because of the wide difference in the nature of the subject-matters Involved and in the purpose of the laws concerned. The scheme of the Levy Order taken along with its complement, the Declaration Order in so far as the latter affects cultivators, is to procure with the least hardship to the producers a fair proportion of the paddy produced in the State as soon as the harvest is over, and thereafter, if conditions of the time so require, to empower the Government, Commissioner, District Collector or District Supply Officer to get a declaration of the stock held by the producer expected to have in possession or control excessive paddy, and procure ....
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....nreasonable discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. The merit of equal protection of the laws does not lie in giving the same treatment to every member of the society, for all are not of the same condition; but in giving to those in want according to their needs and taking from those in plenty according to their stocks, I am in respectful agreement with the observations of Shearer. J., in Mohammad Anzar Hussain v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Pat 220 at p. 226: "It cannot fairly, or indeed at all, be eaid that the object of the Ministry be making this Order was to benefit one sub-class of producers at the expense of any other sub-class. There is, clearly, nothing objectionable in the levy being a progressive one. that is in any comparatively large producer being required to; deliver to the State a proportionately greater quantity of his grain than a smaller producer." The contention fails, 30. Mr. Paikaday contended that Clause 13 of the Levy Order which empowers the Government to exempt any class of persons from levy is an unbridled power capable of enormous mischiel and therefore arbitrary. In Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR ....
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....e likely to be made an instrument of unhealthy patronage bv certain officers. The Court cannot presume that the administration of a particular law would be done "with an evil eye and unequal hand." The jurisdiction to decide is conferred on a responsible officer, and the subjection of his decision to the supervision (under Clause 11) of the Government and the Commissioner and Director of Civil Supplies is a sufficient safeguard against abuses by individual officers. On the principle of the decision in Bagla's case, AIR 1954 SC 465, the contention has only to be overruled. 33. The result is that none of the grounds of attack on the validity of the Levy Order appears substantial. The Order is declared constitutional and valid. II. The Kerala Paddy and Rice (Declaration & Requisitioning of Stocks) Order. 34. Mr. Krishna Iyer challenged Cl. 4 of the Declaration Order as arbitrary in that it allows officers even of the status bf a Panchayat Executive Officer to order a stock-holder to sell a specified quantity of paddy to a nominee of the Government without any enquiry as to the volume of the stock in his possession and his requirements for the maintenance of himself and hi....
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.... the stock-holder, the State Government has, in the impugned Order, made a concession to him to retain a part of it and has for that purpose classified the stock-holders according to their relation with the stock and their co-operation with the Government in the ad ministration of the Order. If the stock is of paddy produced in the stock-holder's lands and he has co-operated with the Government by filing his declaration aa required by the Order, he is allowed concession for the full period between two consecutive cultivations on his land -- the rate of such allowance being greater if he is the producer himself, and lesser if he is only a receiver of rent in paddy. If the stock is not of paddy of the stock-holder's land or if the stockholder has suppressed his stock, the con-cession allowed to him is only for a period of one month at the rate allowed to rent-receivers. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. But that does not exclude a reasonable classification of persons, objects or transactions, for attaining certain objectives. If a classification is based on some real and substantial distinction, bearing a just ....
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....less than what is allowed by the Order. Except the vague allegations at the hearing, no data have been placed before this Court to find any arbitrariness in this matter. No data are given by, counsel to show that 1.5 quintals of paddy per aere would not suffice for the seed and other requirements like food to agricultural labourers at work which have to be met with the grain. Nor am I convinced that there is large difference in labour conditions between one part of the State and another. I do not therefore find any prejudice to the producers caused by the fixation of an allowance of 1,5 quintals per acre of cultivated area. 38. Counsel contended that the fixa-tion of compensation for the rice and paddy requisitioned under the Order all the controlled price, which is denned in the Order itself as the maximum price' fixed under the Maximum Prices Orders, is a negation of the stock-holder's right to get a "just equivalent" for the grains taken from him. It is one thing to say that the Maximum Prices Orders need periodical revision, and another thing to say that payment of the maximum price fixed by law is not a just equivalent for a thing procured by the Government. In t....
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..... There is ample power conceded by our Constitution to the Courts to correct the vagaries of any erring individual officer, I see no force in the contention. 40. As the Kerala. Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966, is not shown to have offended any provision in the Constitution, the attack on its constitutional validity has to fail. The Order is declared valid. III. The Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965. 41. Mr. Krishna Iyer Impugned the Maximum Prices Orders as arbitrary le-gislations as the prices therein have beer) fixed in 1965 without a provision for revision from time to time and pointed out that the Orders made under conditions prevailing in 1965 have not been revised BO far, even though the cost of production has gone up on account of increase in labour charges and enhancement in price of manure. It is true that the price of paddy must be such as to leave a rea-eonable margin of profit to the producers above their cost of production. But no data have been placed before us to show that under the present conditions in the State the maximum prices fixed by the Maximum Prices Orde....
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....ductive of arbitrariness and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the last portion of Clause 7 of the Levy Order in so far as it places a ceiling on the market value of the price to be paid for the paddy acquired offends Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The learned Judge took the view that since the definition of the term "cultivator" is so intimately connected with all the other provisions the Levy Order is liable to be struck down. The learned Judge also held that Clause 4 of the Ke-rala Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order. 1966, (hereinafter referred to as the Requisitioning Order) to the extent it directs sale to the Government at the "controlled price" offends Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. But the challenge of the Ke-rala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, was overruled by him. The Levy Order, the Requisitioning Order and the Maximum Prices Orders have been issued by the Kerala Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (Central Act X of 1955) read with certain Orders issued by the Government of India. The Essential Commodi....
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....hereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1). and order made thereunder may provide-- (a) .................................. (b) .................................... (c) for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or Bold; (d) .................................... (e) .................................... (f) for requiring any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or a State Gov ernment or to an officer or agent of such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the orden (g) ................................. (h) .................................... (i) .................................... (i) .................................... Neither before the learned Judge nor before us the Constitutional validity of either the Act as a whole or Sections 3 and 5 thereof separately was challenged The attack was confined only to the Levy Order, the Requisitioning Order and the Maximum Prices Orders on the around....
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....the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subiect or context." An interpretation clause cannot therefore be used to interpret any of the Sections in the Act if there is anything in the Section itself which will be repugnant to the definition contained in the interpretation clause. Clause 2 of the Levy Order starts by saying: "In this order, unless the context otherwise requires". Clause 3 of the Levy Order directs that every cultivator shall sell to the Government paddy derived from lands cultivated by him in accordance with such scale as may be specified by the Government from time to time by notification in the Gazette; Clause 3-C directs that every cultivator holding more than two acres of land shall furnish information to the Village Officer of the Village in which the paddy lands are situated, in writing, regarding the harvest and shall harvest the crop only after obtaining the written permission of the Village Officer; Clause 4 provides for the issue of notice to the cultivator by the Officers mentioned therein sp....
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.... clause 3C provides for a cultivator holding more than two acres of land to furnish the Information regarding the harvest. It Is therefore Impossible to conceive that the term "cultivator" used In these provisions relates even to a tiller having no sort of control over the paddy to be sold to the Government. Though the term "holding" in clause 3C of the Levy Order may not be sufficient to indicate the necessity of any proprietary interest in the land it is a pointer to show that the sale is contemplated by a person in whom the right to sell is vested. This view is confirmed by the provision of Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act which provides for requiring any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock. It is not possible to conceive that the legislature has empowered the delegate to make laws for the acquisition of the paddy from those people who have absolutely no right to them to the detriment of the people having right over the same. The subordinate legislation evidenced by the Levy Order and the Requisition Order has normally to be interpreted only in consonance with the power delegated and these orders therefore cannot be expe....
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....tion to any area means a period of four months beginning from the last day of the fortnight during which harvesting operations normally commence." 49. Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act enables the Central Government or its delegate to require any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or a State Government or to an Officer or agent of such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order. When any person is required to sell any essential commodity in compliance with an order made with reference to Section 3 (2) ff) of the Act, Section 3 (3) of the Act provides that there shall be paid to him the price therefor as stated therein. Section 3 (3) of the Act is a general provision which will apply when a person holding any stock of essential commodity is required to sell by an order under Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act to any of the persons referred to therein. Section 3 (3A) of the Act enables the Central Government or its delegate in the circumstances mentioned in the provision to regulate the price at which the foodstuff shall be sold in a....
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....e appeals before us, the direction issued is to sell the paddy to the State Government. I am therefore of the view that to the cases before us Section 3 (3B) will alone apply and not Section 3 (3) of the Act. The purpose of Section 3 (3B) of the Act is to enable the Central Government or the State Government to fix the prices for procurement of substantial stocks of foodgrains, edible oilseeds and edible oils at prices specially fixed for release at reasonable prices particularly in areas hit by scarcity. The attempt of the Advocate-General to distinguish Sections 3 (3) and 3 (b) on the grounds that the former deals with general orders and the latter deals with individual orders cannot also stand. 51. The fixation of price in the latter part of Clause 7 of the Levy Order is for the paddv which the rent receiver or cultivator is required to sell to the Government or agent or the person as the case may be. The orders requiring the respondents to sell the paddy to the State Government therefore amount to acqui sition or requisition of paddy in which case the latter part of Clause 7 of the Levy Order will have to be tested in the light of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The prin....
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....lute and unbridled discretion, in the Central Government or its delegate in the matter of controlling prices. 1 do not think that I can countenance this contention. In the nature' of things it is impossible for any legislature to afford the guide lines in regard to the fixation of prices at which essential commodities which are varying in nature may be bought or sold in the different localities in the Union. The fixation of prices will have to depend on conditions which vary from State to State and the factors which have to be taken into account in fixing the prices will also be varying depending upon the nature of the commodity and the availability of the same and the legislature cannot be expected to take note of such details. An effective answer to the contention of the respondents is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Bhanomal Gulsarimal Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 475, where their Lordships had to consider the question whether Clause 11B of the Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order, 1941, issued by the Central Government under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, violates Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Const....
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....ts. In overruling the contention their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "...... the preamble and the body of the sections sufficiently formulate the legislative policy and the ambit and character of the Act is such that the details of that policy can only be worked out by delegating them to a subordinate authority within the framework of that policy." The above principles apply equally to Maximum Prices Orders of 1965 as the Maximum Prices for rice and paddy have been fixed after taking into account several factors which the legislature cannot be expected to exhaustively lay down, The plea therefore that the Maximum Prices Orders are vitiated by uncontrolled and excessive delegated legislative power cannot be accepted. 53. The contention that Maximum Prices Orders of 1965 violate the guarantee under Articles 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution cannot stand. The object of fixing the price under Section 3 (2) (c) of Act is to maintain the supplies of essential commodities at a fair price to the general public. It is obvious that the Maximum Prices Orders of 1965 have been made to ensure the availability of rice and paddy to the public at reasonable prices a....
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....lf of the respondents was that the maximum prices fixed in 1965 are quite inadequate even for covering the cost of production, in view of the increase in the wages to be paid for the labourers, the cost of fertilisers etc. If the cultivators are compelled to give paddy either through the Levy Order or the Requisition Order, without getting adequate compensation It will be in violation of the terms of Section 3 (3B). Even if the contention of the learned Advocate-General that Section 3 (3) will apply, the position is the same. It was also pointed out on behalf of the respondents when the Government has specified the compensation payable for the paddy requisitioned during the latter part of the year 1967 on the basis of the maximum price fixed in 1965 the burden is upon the State to prove that even today the said price represents a fair price or a just equivalent from the point of view of the cultivator and In support of that contention reliance was made on the following observations in AIR 1965 SC 190. "Assuming that in appropriate cases, fixation of a date anterior to the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) for ascertainment of market value of the land to be acqu....