TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1990 (9) TMI 13
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... by the respondent alleging violation of the provisions of section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961, punishable under section 276DD of the same Act. Since various deposits are involved, several prosecutions have been launched. The prosecution case is that, on several dates, the petitioners had received in cash various deposits as evidenced by cash book entries which amounted to contravention of the provisions of the Income-tax Act aforestated. In all these petitions filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code to call for the records and to quash the pending prosecutions as not maintainable and an abuse of the process of the court, Mr. V. Ramachandran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners, urged a single contention before me. While urging this contention, he submitted that, in the grounds raised in the petition, the constitutional validity of section 269SS of the Act had been questioned, but that ground has now become infructuous in view of the dismissal by this court of several writ petitions challenging the validity of that provision. The single ground urged is that, with effect from April 1, 1989, section 271D had been introduced in the In....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... penalty as such departmentally was provided therefor. These prosecutions were initiated even in 1985 when section 276DD was in the statute book. Acceptance of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner would result in a rather strange position. The petitioners will not be liable to pay penalty under section 271D of the Act, since it was introduced only on April 1, 1989, and prior to that date when that law was not in the statute book, they cannot be proceeded against. If a prosecution also cannot be launched under the then existing section 276DD of the Act, the resultant position would be that there can be neither a prosecution nor a penalty proceeding against these petitioners though violation of section 269S has been alleged and the respondent was prepared to substantiate his case by oral and documentary evidence. This certainly could not have been the intention of the Legislature. In the decision reported in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, AIR 1983 SC 150, the apex court was considering the offence committed by the accused therein under section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, on August 16, 1975, when the Act stood amended in its application to t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....note had been taken of the decision in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84, wherein, while considering sections 4, 7 and I 1 of the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act (12 of 1948) and the validity of the prosecution under the Act, the Supreme Court stated as hereunder (at page 88 of AIR 1955 SC) : " Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow, unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal, there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it Manifests an intention to destroy them (underlining is mine). The court cannot, therefore, subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enact....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist. On this interpretation, the complaint made for the offence under rule 132A(4) of the D.I.Rs., after April 1, 1965, when the rule was omitted, has to be held invalid. " The principle stated by the apex court is the same in several other cases cited before me, and they do not have to be referred to, for it only increases the volume, especially when there is no change in the principle. In R. V. M., T. V. D. and Co. v. CIT [1963] 50 ITR 23 (Mad), while considering the change of law - Repeal of Ordinance by later Act - and whether the Ordinance ceased to have effect oven with regard to the period before it was repealed, it was stated as hereunder (at page 28) : " It is not necessary to refer to the several provisions of the General Clauses Act which really nullify the above argument. It will be sufficient to refer to section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which clearly provides that where any Central Act repeals any enactment previously made, then unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed. The Ordinance effected a chang....