TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (7) TMI 1
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....ever, with consent of learned counsel on both sides, main writ petition itself is taken up, heard out and is being disposed of. 3. Short facts shorn of elaboration, details and particulars or in other words, short facts imperative for appreciating this order are as follows: a) The writ petitioner is a dealer, who has been registered under the 'Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006' ['TNVAT Act' for the sake of brevity]. However, the writ petitioner had not filed monthly returns pursuant to the obligation cast on the writ petitioner. As the writ petitioner was not filing monthly returns under Section 21 of the TNVAT Act, there was no deemed assessment under Section 22(2) of TNVAT Act. Under such circumstances, the ....
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.... day i.e., 08.04.2019 bearing 'Rc.A/158/2019' ['Impugned order' for the sake of brevity]. Vide the impugned order, the Appellate Authority, who is sole respondent in instant writ petition, before this Court rejected the writ petitioner's statutory appeal on two grounds. One ground is that the writ petitioner has filed the appeal only with a photo copy of the original order under appeal i.e., original order that is being assailed in Appeal and had not enclosed the original assessment order. The second ground is more important and that ground is that the delay in filing the appeal that was sought to be condoned is beyond the scope of the respondent. f) Assailing the aforesaid order i.e., impugned order, i....
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.... Gopinath v. CESTAT, Chennai reported in 2013 (32) STR 172 (Mad.), Albert v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai reported in 2015 (37) STR 187 (Mad.) and Saradha Travels v. Commissioner of Service Tax reported in 2015 (3) STR 433 (Mad.), held that the above decisions make it abundently clear that the appellate authority, has no powers to condone the delay, beyond the extendable period. 5. Following the above decisions that the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay, beyond the extendable period, this Court is inclined to set aside the order of the Writ Court, condoning the delay, by setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 6. Hence, the Writ Appeal is allowed. No costs. Consequently,....
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....as power to admit an appeal, presented after the expiry of the period of 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown subject to the rider that it is within a further period of 30 days. In other words, in very simple terms, the time period prescribed for the appeal is 30 days and the Appellate Authority is vested with power to condone delay, but with rider that the delay should not be more than 30 days. In simpler terms, the maximum time limit available for an assessee to prefer an appeal under Section 51 of TNVAT Act is 30 + 30 = 60days as there is a cap qua delay condonation period. 10. Having extracted the relevant provision, this Court now adverts to two judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, which were pressed into service by learned Reve....
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....osition clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.' (Underlining made by me to supply emphasis and to highlight) 11. The other case law referred to by learned Revenue counsel is Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited and another, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791. 12. To be noted, Hongo India Private Limited ....
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....led that in cases of this nature, the period of limitation is absolute i.e., unextendable by a Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Most relevant part of the conclusion is contained in Paragraph 36 and the same reads as follows: '36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35-H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.' 17. To be noted, in Section 3....