2019 (6) TMI 952

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

....ibunal." 3] After the order-in-original dated 10th March 2016 was made by Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs Division-II, under the provisions of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (formerly, Central Excise Act, 1944), the petitioner instituted appeal before the Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, (Appeals-III). However, this appeal was instituted beyond period of 90 days, i.e., beyond the period of maximum extendable period by the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority by order dated 25th May 2017 dismissed the same as time barred. This dismissal was upheld by the Tribunal by its order dated 21st November 2017. 4] Insofar as the orders dated 25th May 2017 and 21st November 2017 are ....

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

....ion No.1 is answered in negative by observing that the limitation provided under Section 35 of the Act cannot be condoned in filing the appeal beyond the period of 30 days as provided by the proviso nor the appeal can be filed beyond the period of 90 days. (2) The second question is answered in negative to the extent that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. (3) On the third question, the answer is in affirmative, but with the clarification that A) The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be preferred for challenging the order passed by the original adjudicating authority in following circumstances that ....

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

.... the event he chose to invoke such appellate remedy. On the scope of judicial review in such matters, the Full Bench has in fact followed the ruling of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra). 9] Mr. Prabhakar submits that from out of three agencies which had discharged the job work for the petitioner, two agencies had already paid the requisite tax and tax in respect of the third agency was borne by the petitioner. He therefore, submits that the demand upon the petitioner to pay duty upon the finished product amounts to double taxation and consequently, such taxation was totally unjust and in excess of jurisdiction. He submits that such a ground warrants interference with the order-in-or....