2019 (2) TMI 1159

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....ment and penalty imposed for the years 2005-06 to 2008-09. Both the appellants are Societies registered under the Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. Both of them own separate auditoriums, one in Muvattupuzha and the other in Ernakulam. They rent it out for functions both public and private. However, they do not rent out any rooms for accommodation, as is done in a hotel. They would not come under the term "luxury" for reason of there being no rooms for rent, is the compelling contention. 2. The impugned judgment noticed the contention of the appellants that section 4 and section 2(f) would only apply in cases of auditoriums, where there is accommodation provided for residence ; for con....

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....then it should fall outside the scope of assessment as permissible under the Act, argues the learned senior counsel. 4. The learned senior counsel would also place reliance on [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty) and [1960] 40 ITR 142 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.). Relying on Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC), the learned senior counsel would argue that the charging section, as also the computation provision, forms an integral code and if computation is not possible, there could be no assessment made. The fiscal statute has to be strictly construed and there can be no taxation effected or an assessee be absolved from the lia....

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....n five rooms, charging rent in excess of the specified amount, for such rent to be assessed. However, even in a hotel where there are less than five rooms, if there is a hall rented out for public or private functions, the same would fall within the definition of "luxury" as defined in the statute. The definition clause, in fact, without any ambiguity, as has been noticed in the impugned judgment, put the "luxury", which is sought to be taxed under the Act in a very definite and precise perspective. The charging section also speaks of "accommodation for residence or use", wherein the use is for conducting functions whether public or private. The computation provision speaks of the charges for accommodation, amenities and services and the wo....