TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2018 (8) TMI 1762
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....he judgment and order impugned on the ground that the entirety of the challenge to the arbitral award was not addressed by the Single Bench. According to the appellant, the very authority of the arbitrator had been challenged in course of the proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and such aspect of the matter was completely overlooked by the Single Bench. In addition, the award was challenged on many other heads, but the Single Bench confined the challenge to only four heads. As to the authority of the arbitrator to take up the reference, it is evident that an order was made on a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act by the Chief Justice or His designate. However, the original order by which the request under Section 11 of the ....
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....t have authority to represent the appellant. Once so much is not in doubt, it has to be seen whether advocate appearing for a party would have the general authority to urge some of the grounds taken and not urge some of the others. When advocate is appointed by a litigant, advocate has the implied authority on behalf of the client to urge several of the many grounds which may have been taken and not urge the other grounds. The very fact that advocate is engaged by a litigant, clothes advocate with adequate authority in such regard. The face before the Court is of advocate and not of the litigant and when advocate having due authority on behalf of a litigant limits the challenge to a few aspects and abandons the challenge in relation to the ....
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.... to reappraise the evidence to ascertain whether the award in respect of a particular head was justified. The arbitrator is regarded as a final arbiter on facts and unless the award under a particular head is barred by the agreement between the parties or is patently absurd to the meanest mind, the Court would scarcely interfere therewith. It is evident that the appropriate tests were applied by the Single Bench while assessing the award made under claim no.10 and the Court came to the correct conclusion that such aspect of the award could not be interfered with. Claim nos.12 and 13 pertain to the award of interest. It is not in dispute that clause 16 (2) of the general conditions governing railway contracts was applicable to this case a....
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....ica Construction judgment of 2017, though it is not clear from the Ambica Construction judgment of 2017 whether the matter involved in that case was governed by the 1940 Act or by the 1996 Act. In a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (2017) 9 SCC 611 (Chittaranjan Maity vs. Union of India), the decision in Ambica Construction (2017) was considered and the Supreme Court was of the opinion that there was a distinction between the authority available to an arbitrator under the 1940 Act and the authority of an arbitrator under the 1996 Act. It must first be noticed that both in Ambica Construction (2017) and in Chittaranjan Maity, the relevant clauses in the agreements were virtually the same as in the present case. Sect....
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....nch, it is the opinion of the three-Judge Bench which should prevail. The argument does not appeal. For a start, a judgment may be said to be per incuriam if it is passed in ignorance of any provision of statute or in ignorance of an authority which is binding on the forum but is not noticed. However, when a precedent is noticed and it is interpreted, even if the rule as enunciated in the precedent is read down, it is the rule as interpreted and read down in the later judgment that becomes binding on fora which are inferior to the forum which passes such judgment. In other words, if a Supreme Court Bench of equal or inferior strength fails to notice a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of similar or greater strength, it may be open to a....