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1959 (12) TMI 57
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....eceiving a monthly payment from Ram Ratan who had held a similar contract before him and that it would be to his interest to agree to pay the bribe. Shukla, however, refused to accede to this request and that led to may hostile acts on the part of the appellant. On January 3, 1953, the appellant again asked Shukla to pay him the monthly bribe as already suggested; Shukla then requested him to reduce the demand on the ground that the contract given to him was for a much lesser amount than that which had been given to his predecessor Ram Ratan; the appellant thereupon agreed to accept Rs. 375. Shukla had no money at the time and so he asked for time to make the necessary arrangement. The agreement then was that Shukla would pay the money to the appellant on January 8, 1953. Meanwhile Shukla approached the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Corruption Branch, and gave him information about the illegal demand made by the appellant. Shukla's statement was then recorded before a magistrate and it was decided to lay a trap. Accordingly, a party consisting of Shukla, the magistrate, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some other persons went to the Loco Yard. Shukla and Sada Shiv pro....
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....urt of Allahabad. The High Court saw no reason to interfere with the order under appeal because it held that, on the facts of the case, a statutory presumption under s. 4 had to be raised and that the said presumption had not been rebutted by the appellant. In other words the High Court did not consider the prosecution evidence apart from the presumption since it placed its decision on the presumption and the failure of the defence to rebut it. In the result the conviction of the appellant was confirmed, the sentence passed against him under s. 161 was maintained but the sentence under s. 5(2) of the Act was reduced to one year. The sentences thus passed were ordered to run concurrently. It is against this order that the present appeal by special leave has been preferred by the appellant. This appeal has been placed before a Constitution Bench because one of the points which the appellant raises for our decision is that s. 4(1) of the Act which requires a presumption to be raised against an accused person is unconstitutional and ultra vires as it violates the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. We would, therefore, first examine the merits of this point. ....
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....t is not very easy to establish the charge of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. Legislature felt that the evil of corruption amongst public servants posed a serious problem and had to be effectively rooted out in the interest of clean and efficient administration. That is why the Legislature decided to enact s. 4(1) with a view to require the raising of the statutory presumption as soon as the condition precedent prescribed by it in that behalf is satisfied. The object which the Legislature thus wanted to achieve is the eradication of corruption from amongst public servants, and between the said object and the intelligible differentia on which the classification is based there is a rational and direct relation. We have, therefore, not hesitation in holding that the challenge to the vires of s. 4(1) on the ground that it violates Art. 14 of the Constitution must fail. Incidentally, we may refer to the decision of this Court in A. S. Krishna v. The State of Madras [1957] S.C.R. 399F in which a similar challenge to the vires of a statutory presumption required to be raised under s. 4(2) of the Madras Prohibition Act, 10 of 1937, has been repelled. 6. That takes us to the questi....
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....n no doubt is supported by the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in The State v. Abhey Singh as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in the State v. Pandurang Laxman Parab (1958) 60 B.L.R. 811. 8. On the other hand Mr. Mathur, for the State, argues that the word "gratification" should be construed in its literal dictionary meaning and as such it means satisfaction of appetite or desire; that is to say the presumption can be raised whenever it is shown that the accused has received satisfaction either of his desire or appetite. No doubt it is conceded by now that in most of the cases it would be the payment of money which would cause gratification to the accused; but he contests the suggestion that the word "gratification" must be confined only to the payment of money coupled with the right that the money should have been paid by way of a bribe. This view has been accepted by the Bombay High Court in a subsequent decision in State v. Pundlik Bhikaji Ahire (1959) 61 B.L.R. 837 and by the Allahabad High Court in Promod Chander Shekhar v. Rex I.L.R. 1950 All. 382. 9. Paragraph 3 of s. 161 of the code provides that the word "gratification" is not restricted to pec....
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....knows to be inadequate. The plain meaning of this clause undoubtedly requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything more. If that is the true position in respect of the construction of this part of s. 4(1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word "gratification" in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but the incriminating character of the said payment. It is true that the Legislature might have used the word "money" or "consideration" as has been done by the relevant section of the English statute; but if the dictionary meaning of the word "gratification" fits in with the scheme of the section and leads to the same result as the meaning of the word "valuable thing" mentioned in the same clause, we see no justification for adding any clause to qualify the word "gratification"; the view for which the appellant contends in effect amounts to adding a qualifying clause to describe gratification. We would accordingly had that in the present appeal the High Court was justified in raising the presumption against the appellant because it is admitted by him tha....
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....reponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict" (p. 611). (Also vide : Regina v. Dunbar (1943) 1 Q.B. 1 . It is on the strength of these decisions that Mr. Anthony contends that in deciding whether the contrary has been proved or not under s. 4(1) the High Court should not have applied the same test as has to be applied in dealing with the prosecution case. The High Court should have inquired not whether the explanation given by the appellant is wholly satisfactory but whether it is a reasonably possible explanation or not. On behalf of the State it is urged by Mr. Mathur that in construing the effect of the clause "unless the contrary is proved" we must necessarily refer to the definition of the word "proved" prescribed by s. 3 of the Evidence Act. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matter before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act on the supposition that it exists. He has also relied on s. 4 which provides that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall record such fact as proved unle....