2002 (1) TMI 41
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....d the requirements of law have not been fulfilled. The contentions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner are as follows: The assessments for the assessment years were all completed under section 143(3) of the said Act and the petitioner disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for the said assessments. The said assessments have become final after the disposal of the said appeals by the final appellate authority under the said Act. He further contended that there is no omission or failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessments and therefore all the impugned notices under section 148 of the said Act are illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction. It is further contended that it is the case of the respondents that in the original orders of assessment for the said assessment years reliefs, inter alia, under section 32A as claimed, were allowed in full for the assessment years up to 1987-88 and under section 32AB for the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90. The petitioner's claim for relief under section 80HH and 80HHB was also allowed in the assessment order for the assessme....
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....he claims for deduction are concerned. He further contended that the respondents have relied upon a judgment reported in CIT v. N.C. Budharaja and Company [1993] 204 ITR 412 (SC), in their affidavits. The said judgment has no application, according to him, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court delivered the said judgment on September 7, 1993, after completion of the assessment of the petitioners for the said assessment years. He further relied upon the judgments reported in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC) and Indra Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1971] 80 ITR 559 (Cal), and contended that once all the primary facts are before the assessing authority, he requires no further assistance by way of disclosure. It is for the assessing authority to decide what inferences of facts can be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences have ultimately to be drawn and in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC). The Supreme Court held that the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction did not exist. He further contended that respondent No.1 has acted on a mere change of opinion in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N.C. Bud....
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....------ 1984-85 2-3-1987 27,76,398 25,74,379 x 2,22,019 1985-86 30-3-1988 49,69,502 45,82,268 x 3,87,234 1986-87 31-3-1989 21,82,596 21,82,596 x x 1987-88 30-3-1990 82,50,619 56,36,741 24,03,678 2,10,200 1988-89 27-3-1991 64,74,797 43,24,017 17,76,472 3,94,308 1989-90 30-3-1992 175,52,386 41,37,597 32,60,170 1,54,619 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- He further drew my attention to the judgment of the apex court in the case of N.C. Budharaja and Co. [1993] 204 ITR 41....
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....of the said assessment years is justified, legal, bona fide and within the scope of the relevant provisions of the said Act. He further contended that in view of the legal position settled by the Supreme Court, assumption of jurisdiction under section 147 of the said Act read with section 148 of the Act by the Assessing Officer was valid and legal inasmuch as the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction under section 147 of the Act has been satisfied. He also contended that the reasons for reopening of the said assessments in respect of the said assessment years are more or less similar, inasmuch as, it was found that income has escaped assessment on account of wrong claim made by the writ petitioner under sections 32AB, 80HH and 80HHB which would be evident from the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer before invoking jurisdiction under the said provision of section 147 read with section 148 of the said Act, which, inter alia, are as follows: "After the Supreme Court's decision in the case of CIT v. N.C. Budharaja and Co. [1993] 204 ITR 412, which has become law and the Supreme Court has also reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v.....
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....ce under section 148, the permissible limit of consideration is the existence of reasons and, as indicated above not sufficiency thereof." He further contended that as regards the contentions of the writ petitioner that on the same set of facts the Assessing Officer by the orders under section 154 of the Act both dated January 20, 1999, in respect of the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90 while withdrawing the reliefs granted under section 32A of the Act made an observation that no order under section 148 of the Act on the said relief under section 32A would be passed, it is submitted that the said order of rectification relates only to the relief as regards under section 32A of the Act and only in respect of the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90 and does not cover the issue as regards the relief under sections 32A, 80HH and 80HHB in respect of all the said assessment years. In that view of the matter, it is submitted that all the notices impugned in the said writ petition are valid proper and in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of N.C. Budharaja and Co. [1993] 204 ITR 412 and in the case of Builders Associations of India [1994] 209 ITR 877....
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