TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1962 (7) TMI 53
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....ring the course of the execution proceedings and consequently the proceedings before the arbitrator were void. Misconduct on the part of the arbitrator was also alleged. The executing Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the reference to arbitration is void on any ground and is not binding on the judgment-debtor? (2) Whether the arbitrator is guilty of any misconduct? If so to what effect? Both these issues were decided by the executing Court against the judgment-debtor. From this order the judgment-debtor preferred execution first appeal to this Court. The matter came up before a learned Single Judge who, in the absence of clear authority of this Court on the question arising under the first issue, thought that the matter should be authoritatively decided by a Bench. The matter has thus been referred to this Bench. ( 2. ) Shri Babu Ram Aggarwal, learned counsel for the judgment-debtorappellant has drawn our attention to the following provisions of the Arbitration Act. "21. Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may at any time before judgment ....
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....s. This legal signification of the word "suit" is very broad, and the term has also a much narrower meaning when it is examined in the procedural sense. "suit" is no doubt a judicial proceeding, but every such proceeding cannot be termed a suit. As observed by Lord Russel of Killowen in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. , 60 Ind App 13: (AIR 1933 PC 63 ). "the word "suit" ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. " That case related to the meaning of the word "suit" as used in Section 2 of the limitation Act, which provision distinguishes a suit from an appeal or application. The term "suit" is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure and the above observations of the Privy Council furnish a working principle. There are, however, a large number of authorities drawing a distinction between a "suit" on the one hand and "applications", "appeals" and "executions" on the other. It is also true that for certain matters, appeals are treated as continuation of a "suit". The safe guide in all such matters is the context in which the term "suit" has been employe....
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.... are clear and admit of no ambiguity, the words are to be construed in their natural and ordinary sense for finding the intention of the legislature. From the precise language used, unless it leads to absurd consequences, the legislative intent is to be determined. Where the words have acquired a technical meaning, they have to be construed in their technical sense and their ordinary meaning are not to be given to them. The rule of construction, as remarked by Parke, J. , in R. v. Banbury, (1s34) 1 A and E 136 (142), is "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. " It is a safe guide to adhere to the litera legis than to try and discover the sententia legis. A Court of law is not justified in supplying casus omissus. As pointed out by Lord brougham sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore P. C. 1: 13 ER 582 (585), "the construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the act We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add, and mend, and by construction make up defici....
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....) Both these decisions were considered by a later Full Bench of Allahabad High court in Moradhwaj v. Budhar Dass, (S) AIR 1955 All 353 (FB), and the correctness of the proposition laid in the above two decisions was not accepted. The following observations of the Full Bench are in point: "the Arbitration Act incorporates the provisions of Schedule II of the civil Procedure Code and is in 'pari materia' with that Code. The limitation Act and the Civil Procedure Code apply to arbitrations under the Arbitration Act (vide Sections 37 and 41 respectively) words used in acts 'pari materia' are to be interpreted in one and the same sense, unless the contrary appears. * * * * in Chapters II and III the word 'suit' means the original proceeding in the Court of first instance. There is, therefore, no reason to think that the word 'suit' in Section 21 and in the definition of the word "court' in section 2 (c) as applicable to that section has been used in any other sense. The word 'suit', therefore, does not include appeals or execution proceedings and the word 'court' in Section 2 (c) refers to a Court of original jurisdiction". It wa....