TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1971 (8) TMI 51
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....ances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in reopening the proceedings under section 147(b) ?" The assessment year is 1960-61. The accounting period is the 12 months ended with December 31, 1959. The assessee is a registered firm constituted under a partnership deed dated July 15, 1959 (annexure B). The assessee carried on business till the end of the accounting year, namely, December 31,1959. Previously there was a firm which was constituted under a deed dated January 1, 1957, a copy of which is annexure A. The partners of that firm were one Kelukutty, his three major and four minor sons. The firm carried on business from January 1, 1959, to July 8, 1959, when Kelukutt....
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....sistant Commissioner rejected the contention holding that there had been no dissolution of the old firm, but that the firm was only reconstituted under the deed dated July 15, 1959. He also held that no business was carried on from July 9, 1959, to July 14, 1959, but that would not amount to discontinuance of the old business. The assessee filed an appeal from the order to the Appellate, Tribunal and reiterated its contentions. The contentions were accepted. The Tribunal held that the old firm was dissolved and a new firm was constituted on July 15, 1959, and, therefore, the income of the two periods should not have been clubbed together. The Tribunal also held that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in reopening the assessments under....
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....the firm or division of its assets and liabilities, would not be sufficient to bring into being a totally different assessable unit. Since there was no dissolution of the partnership on the death of Kelukutty, but only a reconstitution of the firm, the assessment on the reconstituted firm must be for the entire period from January 1, 1959, to December 31, 1959. The second question is whether the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to reopen the assessments under section 147(b). Section 147(b) provides : " If ... notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income charge....
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....s in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. That information must, it is true, have come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer after the previous assessment, but even if the information be such that it could have been obtained during the previous assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law, but was not in fact obtained, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is not affected." So even if the information that there was no dissolution of the firm constituted by the deed dated January 1, 1957, by virtue of the clause therein that notwithstanding the d....
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....ther in the record is 'information' what is seen by the Income-tax Officer himself is not 'information' to him. In the latter case he just informs himself. It will be information in his possession within the meaning of section 34. In such cases of obvious mistakes apparent on the face of the record of assessment, that record itself can be a source of information, if that information leads to a discovery or belief that there has been an escape of assessment or under-assessment." A mistake apparent on the face of the record would itself constitute "information". Whether someone else gave the information to the officer or whether he informed himself is quite immaterial. In United Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the Kerala....