TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2014 (3) TMI 1072
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....records of the case had been transmitted to this Court. In the absence of the original records, the Chief Judicial Magistrate obviously could not proceed with the trial. It is time to look into and revisit the rules, practices and procedures being followed not only by this Court but also by other superior courts requiring the routine summoning of the original records of a trial for no apparent reason except that the rules, practices and procedures provide for their requisitioning. This routine brings the trial to a grinding halt and delays the delivery of justice to an aggrieved litigant. It is time to decide on the customary summoning of the original records of a trial, particularly at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. This appeal is an indicator that the disposal of some cases is delayed only because we follow some archaic rules, practices and procedures. If the original records had not been routinely summoned from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, we are confident that the trial could well have concluded many years ago, one way or another, and expeditious delivery of justice would not have been converted into a mirage. We are mentioning this only so that our policy p....
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....kata Colliery had contravened the provisions of Section 72 -B of the Act and were liable to be punished under the provisions of that section.[2] On 31st August 2000 the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and issued summons to the accused persons, including the appellant G.N. Verma. Proceedings in the High Court Upon receipt of the summons, G.N. Verma preferred a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of the proceedings and the summons issued to him. The petition filed by G.N. Verma being Criminal Misc. No. 8331 of 2000 R was taken up for hearing by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jharkhand who noted that the question before him was whether a person, other than an Agent, could be fastened with criminal liability for an offence under the Act on the ground that he is a deemed Agent. The learned Single Judge noted the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in R.J. Sinha v. The State[3] and observed that the definition of Agent in the Act had been amended since the decision rendered in Sinha and sub -section (5) had also been introduced in Section 18 of the Act. Accordingly, he was of ....
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....appointed, if any, to carry out the responsibility under sub -section (2): Provided that any of the persons aforesaid may not be proceeded against if it appears on inquiry and investigation, that he is not prima facie liable." The High Court was of the opinion that in view of the extended definition of Agent read with Section 18(5) of the Act, the Chief General Manager of a mine would be a deemed Agent responsible for the management, control, supervision or direction of a mine or a part thereof. On this basis it was held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate rightly took cognizance of the complaint against G.N. Verma and that there was, therefore, no merit in the petition filed by him for quashing the proceedings. It may be noticed that neither the definition of Agent nor Section 18(5) of the Act refer to a deemed Agent. This expression is to be found in Regulation 8 -A of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 dealing with the appointment of an Agent. Regulation 8 -A reads as follows: "8 -A. Appointment of Agent 1) The owner of a mine shall submit in writing to the Chief Inspector and the Regional Inspector, a statement showing name and designation of every person authorized....
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....conducted in accordance with the Act, the rules, regulations, orders made thereunder. It has been laid down, in the context of Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Anr.[4] that Section 141 is a penal provision creating a vicarious liability. It was held as follows: "It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to the accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in consonance with strict interpretation of penal statutes, especially, where such statutes create vicarious liability." It was then concluded: "The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no....