TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (11) TMI 1259
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....sions of Societies Registration Act, 1860, bearing Registration No.2838 of 1973-74. The society was lastly renewed on 10.10.2010, vide certificate of registration dated 19.10.2010. An application was filed by respondent no.2 before the Registrar, stating that renewal of the society had been obtained by playing fraud, and therefore, it be cancelled. An affidavit was also filed stating facts in support of such application. The Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits rejected the application of respondent no.2, vide his order dated 12th March, 2012. This order of Assistant Registrar was challenged before this Court in a Writ Petition No.23181 of 2012, which came to be dismissed, in view of the availability of alternative remedy of filing an appeal, vide order dated 11th May, 2012, which reads as under:- "1. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute that in the present case the registration of society and its renewal was already over and in effect the petitioner wanted its cancellation, therefore, the application of petitioner was referable to Section 12-D of Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the order passed by Registrar under Section 12-D is appealable ....
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.... 2012 pending before the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi shall remain stayed." 4. Ultimately the writ petition got disposed of on 24.11.2015, vide following order:- "Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri Somesh Khare along with Ms.Komal Khare, learned counsel for respondent no. 2. Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 13.4.2015 and 21.9.2015 passed in Appeal No. 191 of 2012 (Pilgrim's Mission Inc. California vs. Assistant Registrar and others). Vide order dated 13.4.2015 the Divisional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi (in short the Commissioner) has admitted the appeal and fixed 11.5.2015 for hearing after issuing notice to the other side whereas vide order dated 21.9.2015 the Commissioner, on the application of the petitioner to decide the question of limitation first, has directed to consider the question of limitation at the time of deciding the appeal on merits. While assailing these orders Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that....
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.... It has observed that against the order dated 12th March, 2012, a writ petition had been filed before this Court, which had been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of filing appeal, on 11th May, 2012, and immediately thereafter, an appeal was preferred on 18th May, 2012. Accordingly, delay has been condoned by allowing the application under Section 5/14 of the Limitation Act with the observation that there was no intentional delay in filing of the appeal, and sufficient grounds for its condonation was disclosed. It is this order of Commissioner dated 13th June, 2016, which is put to challenge in the present writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Divisional Commissioner while exercising his powers under Section 12-D(2) of the Act does not act as a court, and consequently, the provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted. It is also contended that Societies Registration Act is a special law, which specifically provides for a period of 30 days limitation for filing of appeal, and does not confer jurisdiction upon the appellate authority to condone delay, and consequently, in absence of applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act ....
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.... 1964 SC 1099, as well as judgment of Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker reported in AIR 1995 SC 2272. 8. I have heard Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Learned Standing Counsel and Sri Somesh Khare for the respondents, and have perused the records as well as the judgments relied upon. 9. Before adverting to the submissions made, it would be appropriate to take note of relevant statutory provisions. Section 12-D has been inserted in the Act of 1860, by way of a State amendment in 1975, which reads as under:- "12D. Registrar's power to cancel registration in certain circumstance.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Registrar may, by order in writing, cancel the registration of any society on any of the following grounds:-- (a) that the registration of the society or of its name or change of name is contrary to the provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force; (b) that its activities or proposed activities have been or are or will be subversive of the objects of the society or opposed to public policy; [(c) that the regis....
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....i Ltd., Vs. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., (AIR 1982 SC 119). In that case a bench of two learned Judges was concerned with the question whether Divisional Commissioner acting under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 acted as a revenue court or whether he was a persona designata. It was held that the Divisional Commissioner had been constituted as appellate authority under the Act. That showed that the Divisional Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designata but as a revenue court. That being so it was obvious that Section 5 of the Act applied to appeals before Divisional Commissioner and he could condone the delay in filing appeals. It becomes obvious that this court in the aforesaid decision was dealing with revenue court constituted under U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act which was a special law. It was in terms held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to revisional proceedings before such Revenue Courts. It is of course true as pointed out by Mr. Nariman that in the said decision no other decision of this court was cited and Section 29(2) was not expressly referred to but the ratio of the deci....
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....e was examined by Apex Court in the context of an appeal filed under Section 128 of the Customs Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after noticing the statutory scheme as well as the judgments delivered previously on the issue have been pleased to hold that provisions of Limitation Act apply only to suits, appeals and applications filed in 'courts' and not to quasi-judicial bodies. The distinction between 'court' and 'quasi-judicial proceedings' have also been examined, with reference to the judgments delivered previously on the issue. After noticing the scheme of Limitation Act, 1963 in paras-11 onwards their Lordships observed as under in para-19 of the report:- "19. When it comes to applications, again Articles 124, 130 and 131 throw a great deal of light. Only review of judgments by a "court" is contemplated in the Third Division in the Schedule. Further, leave to appeal as a pauper again can be made either to the High Court or only to any other court vide Article 130. And by Article 131, a revision petition filed only before Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure are referred to. On a plain reading....
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....ing the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan (supra), CST Vs. Madan Lal Das & Sons [1976(4) SCC 464], and CST Vs. Parson Tools and Plants [1975(4) SCC 22], their Lordships observed as under in paras-28 to 33 of the report:- "28. Two other judgments of this Court need to be dealt with at this stage. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Section 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act , 1965. This was done by applying the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Despite referring to various earlier judgments of this Court which held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to Tribunals, this Court in this case held to the contrary. In distinguishing the Parson Tools' case, which is a 3-Judge Bench binding on the Court that decided Mukri Gopalan's case, the Court held:- "18. ... If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before him. But so far as this Court is concerned it did....
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.... would apply to tribunals. 29. Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan's case being out of step with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, it does not square also with the subsequent judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal secy., Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After discussing the various provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Limitation Act, this Court held: "23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for....
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....e to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award." 30. While discussing Parson Tools, this Court held: "25......In appeal, this Court held that (1) if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith, on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, and (2) the appellate authority and the revisional authority were not "courts" but were merely administrative tribunals and, therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act did not, in terms, apply to the proceedings before such tribunals. 26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in CST [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743] it is evident that essentially what weighed with the Court in holding that Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not applicable, was that the appellate authority and the revisional authority were not "courts". The stark features of the revisional powers ....
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....ot act as a court but only as a Revenue Tribunal and therefore the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceedings before such Tribunal, and consequently, neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged by the Commissioner of Sales Tax before this Court, contending that the Limitation Act did not apply to tribunals, and Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act was excluded in principle or by analogy. This Court upheld the view that the Limitation Act did not apply to tribunals, and that as the revisional authority under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was a tribunal and not a court, the Limitation Act was inapplicable. This Court further held that the period of pendency of proceedings before the wrong forum could not be excluded while computing the period of limitation by applying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. This Court, however, held that by applying the principle underlying Section 14(2), the period of pendency before the wrong forum may be considered as a "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay, but then having regard to Section 10(3-B), the extension on that ground could not extend beyond six months....
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....d by such special or local law." A bare reading of this Section would show that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule. This would necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the schedule. We have already held that such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the schedule are only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the schedule is to be filed in a court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted. This is made even clearer by a reading of Section 29(3). Section 29(3) states:- "29. Savings.-- (1)-(2) * * * (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law." When it comes to the law ....
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.... follows: "Before considering the meaning of the word "held" in Section 9, it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the lawmakers who are the representatives of the people enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable. The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on Statutory Constructions the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the law- makers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent." After noticing various judgments on the issue, their Lordships have been pleased to hold that principle of Sec....
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.... party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section,-- (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction." 17. In the facts of the present case, immediately after the order ha....
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....nt, which is conveniently reproduced:- "52. As has been already noticed, Sarathy's case i.e. (2000) 5 SCC 355 has also held that the court referred to in Section 14 would include a quasi-judicial tribunal. There appears to be no reason for limiting the reach of the expression "prosecuting with due diligence" to institution of a proceeding alone and not to the date on which the cause of action for such proceeding might arise in the case of appellate or revisional proceedings from original proceedings which prove to be abortive. Explanation (a) to Section 14 was only meant to clarify that the day on which a proceeding is instituted and the day on which it ends are also to be counted for the purposes of Section 14. This does not lead to the conclusion that the period from the cause of action to the institution of such proceeding should be left out. In fact, as has been noticed above, the explanation expands the scope of Section 14 by liberalizing it. Thus, under explanation (b) a person resisting an appeal is also deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. But for explanation (b), on a literal reading of Section 14, if a person has won in the first round of litigation and an ....
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....Commission by virtue of provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. However, this judgment does help the respondents to an extent by holding that principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be applicable even in matters filed before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the Commission. But the moot question remains to be answered - whether the bar of limitation is required to be respected by the Commission on the ground that there is no provision in the Electricity Act conferring additional rights upon a party moving the Commission for relief so as to claim even such reliefs which stand barred by limitation before the Civil Court or even for arbitral proceedings. The other ancillary issue required to be answered is - whether by virtue of provisions of the Electricity Act 2003 the Limitation Act has been made applicable to an action before the Commission by express provision or even by necessary intendment? * * * 32. In the light of above there can be no difficulty in appreciating that M/s. LANCO rightly appreciated the hurdle of limitation in its way when such an objection was taken by the appellant and it rightly chose to seek exclusion of the period it ....