TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2003 (9) TMI 771
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....ellant, in March 2001 after expiry of the period as noticed above, a further agreement was executed permitting the appellant to use the property for commercial purposes for a period of five years, such a claim is being disputed and it is not only unnecessary but we are not also entering into any exercise to deal with the correctness or otherwise of such claim having regard to the limited issue that is before us in these proceedings. The respondent filed an application under Section 24 read with Section 42 of the Act before the Competent Authority (Rent Act) Konkan Division, Mumbai, for eviction of the appellant and also for compensation on the ground that the leave/ licence has expired by efflux of time. The property is said to be a residential property and fully furnished and the further grievance of the respondent appears to be that the property has been an unauthorisedly used for commercial purposes as well. The said petition for eviction seems to have been filed before the Competent Authority on 9.5.2001. Summons to the respondent therein, the appellant herein, was said to have been served on 19.5.2001 and the appellant entered appearance on 29.5.2001 before the said Authority.....
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....ity inasmuch as the Competent Authority had the power of condonation. It is the stand of the appellant that the Competent Authority, being one which has all trappings of a Court, is a `Court' in the eye of law and consequently possess inherent power to condone the delay as is available to any other Court under the Civil Procedure Code, all the more so when Sections 42 and 43 of the Act is indicative of the applicability of the provisions of the CPC. It was also contended that the appearance within 30 days would be sufficient compliance and it is not necessary that the application itself seeking for leave to defend also should be filed within that period. It was further urged that Section 5 or the principles contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the case on hand to enable the Competent Authority to countenance the claim for condonation in an appropriate case and no exception could be taken to the said order passed in this case by the Competent Authority. On behalf of the appellant, certain decisions have been brought to our notice, a reference to which will be made at the appropriate stage while considering the submissions of the counsel on either sid....
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....ered to be 'court' for purposes of attracting Contempt of Courts Act, keeping in view the nature of powers discharged by him. In Sakuru vs. Tanaji [1985(3) SCC 590] while considering the question as to whether the collector who was the appellate authority under Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, was court and Limitation Act, 1963 applied to appeals before him for invoking powers under Section 5 this court, on the provisions as it stood prior to certain subsequent amendments specifically made for the purpose did not approve the claim for condonation invoking powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In Birla Cement Works vs. G.M. Western Railways & Another [1995(2) SCC 493] Railway Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 78B of the Railways Act, 1890, was held to be not a civil court and Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 had no application, the Tribunal being only a creature of the statute. In France B. Martins vs. Mafaida Maria Teresa Rodrigues (AIR 1999 SC 3243) it was held that the complaint filed under the Act was not either a suit or appeal or an application within the meaning of the Limitation....
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.... as the legislature itself calls it to be, for disposal of applications. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 mandates the issue of summons in the form specified in Schedule III, which form indicates, apart from informing the person concerned about the filing of an application seeking for his eviction, the need to appear and contest the application for eviction on the ground mentioned therein and that in default whereof the applicant will be entitled, at any time after the expiry of the period stipulated therefor, to obtain an order for his eviction from the said premises and further as to how the said application should be filed as well. Section 44 states that the order of competent Authority is not appealable and only revision could be sought before the Government or the Authority designated for the purpose. Section 49 deems the competent Authority under the chapter to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC, while all proceedings before such Authority are deemed to be judicial proceedings for the purposes of Section 193 and 228 IPC under Section 50, and Section 51 deems the competent Authority to be civil court for the purposes of Section 345 and 346 of the Code....
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....d and specific purposes, cannot make it a court for all or any other purpose and at any rate for the purpose of either making the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 attracted to proceedings before such Competent Authority or clothe such authority with any power to be exercised under the Limitation Act. It is by now well settled by innumerable judgments of various courts including this Court, that when a statute enacts that anything shall be deemed to be some other thing the only meaning possible is that whereas that the said thing is not in reality that something, the legislative enactment requires it to be treated as if it is so. Similarly, though full effect must be given to the legal fiction, it should not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction has been created and all the more, when the deeming clause itself confines, as in the present case, the creation of fiction for only a limited purpose as indicated therein. Consequently, under the very scheme of provisions enacted in Chapter VIII of the Act and the avowed legislative purpose obviously made known patently by those very provisions, the competent Authority can by no means be said to be 'court' for a....