TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (5) TMI 903
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... the respondent was given the concerned premises under a lease deed dated 1.4.1982 which expired on 31.3.1984. The rent for the premises was fixed at Rs. 75 per month. The lease deed provided in clause 2 (iii) that the lessee shall vacate the premises before the expiry of the lease as and when required by the Cantonment Board provided seven days' notice to this effect is given in writing. 3. The case of the appellants is that the premises were not being utilized fully and that the respondent had taken some other premises also. The appellants needed the premises. After the expiry of the lease on 31.3.1984, the Estate Officer of the Cantonment Board stopped accepting the rent. 4. The appellants served a notice of seven days as required under Section 4 of The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as `Public Premises Act') on 14.3.1984 and again on 27.3.1984. The respondent filed a Civil Suit No.10/1985 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge No.1 at Ajmer to challenge the notice. The respondent filed an application to deposit the rent in Civil Court but that was not entertained. The Civil Suit came to be dism....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... 7 days' notice of termination will not be a valid one. He further held that since such termination had not taken place, the respondent could not be held to be an unauthorized occupant. The Learned Judge also took the view that the order dated 31.7.1987 could not be read as an undertaking to vacate after the expiry of six months. Therefore, the Learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent and set aside the order passed under the Public Premises Act. The appellants herein preferred an Appeal numbered as 753 of 1993 to the Division Bench. The Division Bench also took the same view as the Learned Single Judge and dismissed the Appeal filed by the appellants herein. The Division Bench held that the premises may be taken to be public premises but the respondent cannot be taken to be an unauthorised occupant since his right to occupy was not terminated by a 15 days' notice. 7. Being aggrieved by this Judgment and order the present appeal has been filed. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the premises belonged to Union of India and were being managed by the appellant administratively under the Public Premises Act. Section....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....eal will have to be dismissed. He submitted that this was an issue with respect to having jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter and the submission can be raised at any stage of proceedings. 10. Mr. Venkataramani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out in his rejoinder that neither of these two submissions were advanced any time in the past. In any case, as far as the ownership of the premises by the respondent is concerned, no document has ever been produced in this behalf. With respect to the second submission he pointed out that the case of the appellant was that the premises belonged to Union of India and the appellants were entrusted with the management thereof. The Public Premises Act, therefore, applied to the concerned premises. 11. The submission of Mr. Venkataramani that the question of jurisdiction was not raised any time earlier is not fully correct in as much as, pointed out earlier, para 7 of the estate officer's order records the objection to the jurisdiction of the estate officer raised by the respondent though in a different manner. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the issue which he had raised now in this court disputi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....raised at the earliest opportunity so that appellant could have met the same earlier. It is undoubtedly true that objection to the maintainability of a proceeding must be raised at the earliest but an objection that the authority did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings over the subject- matter goes to the root of the proceeding. In a number of judgments, this Court has held that a defect, with respect to the lack of inherent jurisdiction is basic and fundamental and validity of such an order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or in collateral proceedings (for reference see a judgment of a bench of three judges of this Court in Balwant N. Viswamitra and others v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (dead) through Lrs. [reported in (2004) 8 SCC 706]. 14. However, such an eventuality does not arise in this case for the reason that the case of the appellant has been that the hospital premises of the respondent belong to the Union of India and are only under the management of the appellant, and therefore, are the "public premises", under Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act 1971. Thus, in the first paragraph containing the reasons of his order dated 26.6.1991, th....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....Administration Rules 1937 under which the properties under their management are classified into three categories `A", `B' & `C'. The present premises fall in category `C'. He has also shown us the receipt issued by the Defence Estate Officer to the appellant for the payment of rent of the land on which the hospital building is situated. We have also been shown the relevant notification issued by the Central Government authorizing the concerned Officer as the Estate Officer for the premises under the control of the Ministry of Defence. 17. This being the position, there is no substance in the objection raised by and on behalf of the respondent. The Estate Officer did have jurisdiction to take action against the respondent under the Public Premises Act. The period of authorization of the respondent to occupy the premises was over on 31.3.1984. Therefore, the respondent was in an unauthorized occupation thereafter under Section 2(g) of the Act. Notice as required, under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act was given. The respondent had no acceptable defence. The premises were no longer being used properly. That being so, the order of eviction was fully justified as also....