TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1987 (5) TMI 370
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....any as 73 writ petitions have been listed before us and, when we heard these matters, we found that the petitioners in all these cases have also raised several contentions other than the main one referred to above. The result is that, if we decide the above principal issue in favor of the petitioners, all the writ petitions can stand allowed but a decision by us against the petitioners on the main issue will necessitate the hearing of each one of petitioners on merits in regard to the other contentions that have been raised therein. With these preliminary observations, we proceed to deal with the contentions urged before us on the above issue first. 2. It is a well-known fact that, commencing from 1959, huge tracts of land in and around the city of Delhi have been acquired by the Government under the Act for facilitating the "planned development of Delhi". We are concerned here with two notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, one on 5.11.1980 and the other on 25.11.1980. Under the former, the Government notified its intention to acquire the entire land comprised in the villages of Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Neb Sarai, Hauz Khas and Khirki. By the....
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....hat this amendment provided for all situations. In respect of notifications under Section 4 issued after 29.1.1967, it prescribed a three year period for the making of declarations under Section 6. And, no notification under Section 4 prior to 29.1.1967, however old, became infructuous merely because considerable time had elapsed after its issue, so long as the declaration under Section 6 was made by 28.1.1969. 4. One more relevant aspect of the 1967 amendment may be touched upon here as some point was sought to be made of it. Prior to the above amendment, the position was that, where a notification under Section 4 was made in respect of certain lands, the declaration under Section 6 had also to be made in respect of all such lands together if it was desired to acquire all of them. It was not permissible for the Government to issue declaration under Section 6 piecemeal from time-to-time in respect of some of the lands covered by Section 4 notification. It was so held by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593. The 1967 amendment altered this position. It amended Section 6(1) to provide that "different declarations under Section 6 ma....
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....isition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), which came, into force on 24.9.1984. It amended Section 6 by substituting a new first proviso in the place of the old one and adding an Explanation in the following terms: "Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1)- (a) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of the three years from the dale of the publication of the notification; or (b) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: xxx xxx ....
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.... on its terms and its language. It can be made specifically retrospective. For instance, the amendments to Section 23A, Section 28 and Section 34 of the Act have been expressly made retrospective by a provision that it shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied to certain past situations. Such retrospective effect can also be necessarily implicit in the clear and unambiguous language of the statute in question. We have therefore to consider the language, scope and effect of the proviso read with the explanation. We cannot just stop at the proviso and say that, since the three years period had expired by 1983, no declaration under Section 6 subsequently is permissible. 8. To understand the scope of the new proviso and Explanation, it is necessary to envisage the various situations that could have existed. We may first start only with the proviso leaving the Explanation out of account. The object of the proviso was to curtail, w.e.f. 24.9.1984, the interval between Sections 4 and 6, to one year from three years. It could have simply read w.e.f. 24.9.1984 thus: "Provided that no decla....
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.... the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an act by becoming a hindrance in the interpretation of the same." We have, therefore, to construe the explanation with a view to see how far it clarifies certain ambiguities that may be there otherwise and how far it provides additional support to the dominant objects of the amendment Act so as to make it meaningful and purposeful. 10. Now we turn to the explanation. This provides for an extension of the period of one year or three years by excluding the period covered by stay orders. If the proviso had stood as indicated above and the explanation had been added, that would perhaps have had the effect of extending the period of limitation only in cases of notifications issued after 24.9.1984 and those issued before that date but in respect of which the period of three years had not expired by 24.9.1984. Where the notification had been issued prior to 25.9.1981, it could perhaps have been said that, ....
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....by 24.9.1984. In other words, the argument is that only cases covered by notifications under Section 4 issued after 25.9.1981 can be affected by the amendments and have the benefit of the extended period contemplated in the explanation. This contention is clearly unacceptable. It runs counter to the entire scheme of the proviso (which specifically takes in all the period after 29.1.1967) and the explanation (which is specifically made applicable to both the clauses of the proviso). We are, therefore, of opinion that the period of exclusion mentioned in the explanation should be taken into account in the cases of all notifications issued after 29.1.1967 whether or not the period otherwise limited under the proviso for a follow-up declaration under Section 6 in respect thereof had expired or not. We, therefore, reject the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. 12. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the 1984 amendment has been worded in the above manner, not with a view to bring in all post-1967 notifications under its purview, but only because Parliament, in making the amendments, had to keep in view certain earlier amendments that had been made by certain ....
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....so. Such exclusion is permissible only in cases governed by Section 15, Limitation Act. But as the present situation is not covered by the said provision, the rule of exclusion was not available. This is clear from the decisions in Krishnappa v. Somiah vide paragraph 13 at page 232 and Venkateswara v. Narasimha . The proviso thus was in the nature of a mandatory provision; (2) That being so, Counsel argues, time starts running without any suspension from the date of the Section 4 notification (see Ramakrishna v. Sriniwasa and "the moment the three-year threshold" "from the date of the notification under Section 4" "was crossed, the power to issue a notification under Section 6 would be exhausted" vide Radhey Shyam v. State . Consequently, it is said, the land owners covered by the said notifications acquired a vested right that no declaration under Section 6 could be issued in respect of their lands on the expiry of the above period in 1983 and hence the explanation introduced in 1984 should not be so broadly interpreted as to take away that vested right. In support of this plea, Counsel referred to certain observations in Hossein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State Counsel contended,....
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....m Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn. page 73) and Mulla Code of Civil Procedure (14th Edn. Vol. 1 p. 785). We do not think we are called upon to go into this question. The respondent's case is based not on an equitable principle of general law but on the specific provision of the statute which has to be interpreted in the background, context and setting in which it was inserted. 15. The limb of the argument is, in our view, unacceptable. The observations in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case on by learned Counsel are actually to the effect that "......a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication". In our opinion, reading together the words used in the proviso and the explanation, the conclusion is inescapable that the exclusion envisaged in the explanation is available in respect of all notifications issued between 29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984. We have given elaborately our reasons for coming to this conclusion and, hence, we overrule this contention urged on beha....
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....e-limit specified in Section 6. It indicates, if at all, that one of the objects of the Bill was clearly to exclude period of delay in land acquisition proceedings consequent on stay orders from Courts. There were thus two objectives of the amending statute and no interpretation, therefore, of the amendment would be correct unless it keeps both these objects in view and facilitates of an achievement of both the objects insofar as the express words would permit. We have already pointed out that the proviso and explanation are expressed in the broadest terms possible and we see no justification for confining or restricting their scope in the manner suggested by Counsel for the petitioners. 17. Some argument was sought to be built on the language used in respect of certain other amendments introduced by the same Act of 1984. Attention was invited to the language of Section 30(2) of the said Act, which has been earlier referred to. Reference was made to the similarly worded explanation introduced in Section 11A. It was pointed out that a like Explanation occurs in Section 23(1A) of the Act which has to be read with Section 30(1) of the amending Act and it submitted that, if the resp....
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....ection 6 declarations has been put up by the very petitioners who had asked for and obtained stay of further proceedings in writ petitions challenging the Section 4 notification but those writ petitions, it seems, are not listed before us. The petitioners here urged that, whatever may be the position in the case of such petitioners, none of the present petitioners can be prejudicially affected by any stay order that may have been passed in suits or petitions to which they were not parties. 20. It may be useful here to refer to the stay orders which the respondents rely on to bring the Section 6 declarations within the scope of the explanation. In Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor (CW 426 of 1981), wherein the validity of the notification dated 25.11.1980 was challenged by certain residents of village Satbari, the following interim order was passed in CM 668/81 on 18.3.1981: "....Case for 27.4.1981. In the meanwhile, respondents 1 and 2 are restrained from issuing any declarations under Section 6...." The above interim order was made absolute on 4.5.1981, when the writ petition was admitted: "....Stay order passed on 18.3.81 made absolute till further order with liberty to the a....
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....rence has also been made on behalf of the petitioners to certain order in CW 1203/82 (Budh Vihar Welfare Society v. Lt. Governor), though that was a writ petition which challenged the validity of a Section 4 notification dated 31.12.1981. In that case, the Court had granted an interim order on 23.4.82 "restraining the respondents from taking further proceedings in consequence of the impugned notification" and this was, apparently, later made absolute till disposal of the writ petition. The petitioners thereafter moved CM. 315/84 on 24.1.1984 alleging that "the respondents are misinterpreting the aforesaid stay order....and are saying that the aforesaid stay order is in respect of the entire village of Rithala" and praying, therefore, that as the petitioners had prayed for stay only in respect of their lands, the Court should be pleased "to clarify the order dated 23.4.1982 to the effect that the stay is only in respect of the petitioner's land, Khasra Nos. of which have been mentioned in the writ petition". The above position was contested by the Union of India which urged that the stay order had been granted qua notification under Section 4 and was not in respect of a particul....
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....ed it and got a stay order, the residents of other villages should not be prejudicially affected by conferring the benefit of the explanation to the Government even in respect of the lands in those other villages belonging to petitioners who had not moved any Court for any stay of proceedings. 24. It is no doubt true that generally speaking, an order made on an interim application in a suit or a writ petition is intended only to protect the interests of the parties to the suit or writ petition and will not ensure to the advantage, or operate to the prejudice, of any person not a party to the said proceedings. Counsel for respondent submits, however, that this rule is not of universal application. He submits that this would depend upon the nature of the proceedings and the terms of the stay order. He cites certain decisions in this context. In Sitaram v. Chunilalsa, AIR 1944 Nag 155 it was held, in the context of Section 15, Limitation Act, that "where the order staying the execution of the decree is not restricted as against a particular judgment-debtor or in respect of money recoverable under the decree, the stay is in respect of the whole decree and it prevents the decree-hold....
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....: "11. Agreeing with the Full Bench, we are inclined to the view that the word "execution" in Section 15(1) embraces all the appropriate means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all processes and proceedings in aid of, or supplemental to, execution. We find no rational basis for adopting a narrow and restricted construction on a beneficent provision like the one contained in Section 15(1). There is no reason why Section 15(1) should be given a restricted meaning as allowing the benefit to a decree-holder where there is a complete or absolute stay of execution and not a partial stay, i.e., a stay which makes the decree altogether inexecutable. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that in cases of partial stay, the benefit under Section 15(1) can be had only where an execution application is directed against the same judgment-debtor or the same property, as against whom an execution was previously stayed. Stay of any process of execution is therefore stay of execution within the meaning of the section. Where an injunction or order has prev....
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....r as the first of these aspects is concerned, while it is possible for the Government to issue notification under Section 4 in respect of each plot of land sought to be acquired, it is not feasible or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It is common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other capital cities, vast extents are being acquired for 'planned development' or public projects. The acquisition is generally part of an integrated scheme or plan and, though, technically speaking, there can be no objection to individual plots being processed under Sections 5A, 6, 9, 12, etc., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least up to the stage of the declaration under Section 6. To give an example, if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into operations unless the whole land can be eventually made available. If even one of the land owners anywhere along the line applies to Court and gets a stay of the operation of the notifi....
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....all promptness and expedition on the part of the Government notwithstanding. 29. It was sought to be urged that the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondent would result in equating an interim order with a final judgment and the final judgment in a land acquisition case to a judgment in rem and in this context reference was made to Section 41, Evidence Act and to a Passage in Woodroffe on Evidence (14th Edition, Vol. 2) at page 1225. We do not think this analogy is correct. If the final order can operate to the benefit of all the parties, there is no reason why the interim order cannot also affect them. Moreover, we are considering the nature and effect of an injunction passed by the Court against one of the parties thereto who has to act in the same capacity not only in the acquisition of the plot of land the owner of which has obtained a stay order but in all proceedings consequent on or in pursuance of same notification that is challenged in that petition. 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are chall....
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....ed in respect of each plot of land discreetly. It is no doubt true that declarations, awards, etc., may be made in respect of various plots comprised in the notification under Section 4. This, however, does not detract from the considerations we have discussed earlier. On the other hand, the language of Section 4 lends some support to our conclusion. For, under the statute, it is possible for the Government while issuing a Section 4 notification not to specify any particular lands in the locality but to simply say that lands in a particular locality are likely to be needed for a public purpose and it is open to interested persons under Section 5A to object to the acquisition of any land in the locality. Where such an objection is put forward by an interested person or some other writ petitioner on general grounds, any stay order passed on such objection cannot be limited in operation to the owner of, or person interested in, any particular land only. It will affect the interests of all persons in all the lands proposed to be acquired. 33. The terms of some of the stay orders, set out earlier are also couched in wide language. One of them stays the issue of any declaration under ....
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....d in detail no such situation exists in the present case. On the other hand, as pointed out by us earlier, it is the interpretation advocated by the respondents which furthers the intention of the amendment and avoids hardship and injustice to the States' interests flowing from stay orders over the language, scope or effect of which they have no control and the type of restructuring of the words of the statute that the petitioners contend for cannot be justified on any principle of statutory interpretation. 35. Learned Counsel next contended, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Taxes v. Assam Jute Supply Co. Ltd. , that, even assuming that the respondents could claim the benefit of the explanation or of the general principle that no Court order should be allowed to prejudice the rights of a party, the respondents cannot take advantage of the mere fact that a stay order had been passed in some cases; they should be able to go further and say that, as a result of the stay order, it had become impossible for them to issue a declaration under Section 6. That cannot be said unless the respondents had tried every remedy in their power to have the stay....
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....s by Counsel for petitioners by reason of their conduct in the following respect: (a) Being fully aware of the position that any stay order in a litigation ) was confined to the parties therein, the respondents could and should have proceeded under Sections 5A, 6, 9, 12, etc. of statute in respect of lands of parties who had not obtained stay orders; they failed to do so. (b) If they thought somehow that the stay order stood in the way of their further proceedings even in other cases, they should have moved the Court for clarification or for varying it so as to restrict the stay order only to the party who obtained it. They did not do this, in spite of the fact that this Court in some cases referred to earlier) gave them liberty to seek a variation of the orders, if so advised. (c) When some of the petitioners moved the Court for clarification that the stay order was of restricted scope, the respondents contested the position and their stand was rejected (in CM 315/84). Despite this, they took no steps to proceed further in respect of lands not covered by stay orders. (d) When the petitioners moved for contempt against the respondents for issuing a declaration under Sec....
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.... be dealt with. Some of these are, it seems, covered by Munni Lal's case (AIR 1984 NOC 230) (Delhi) (CW 426/81) and may have to be dealt with on that basis. Some petitioners have contended that there is no Master Plan applicable to Delhi at present and that the proposed acquisitions do not fit in with the Second Draft Master Plan issued on 6.4.1985. It is, therefore, contended that the declarations are bad as it cannot be said that the lands are now required for the planned development of Delhi. Yet others contend, relying on the decision in Collector v. Rajaram , that the power of acquisition is being exercised mala fide and in a colourable manner and hence liable to be quashed. We are of opinion that it will not be convenient or possible for the Full Bench to consider and pronounce the numerous contentions that may be raised in each one of the 73 petitions now. We have no option but to direct that all these writ petitions be listed before the Division Bench for hearing on the other contentions. We express no opinion on the other contentions which the petitioners will be at liberty to urge before the Bench hearing the matters finally to the extent they have been raised or are ....