TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1957 (12) TMI 22
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.... the administration of the Railway, it gave option to the employees to continue in service on the terms set out in a document dated July 5, 1946. The appellant accepted those terms and continued in service on the conditions mentioned in that document. Acting in exercise of the powers conferred by ss. 241(2), 247 and 266(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor-General promulgated certain rules called the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Security Rules, and they came into force on May 14, 1949. It will be convenient at this stage to set out the Security Rules, in so far as they are material for the purpose of these appeals, as it is the validity of these rules that is the main point for determination by us. Rules 3, 4, 5 and 7 are as follows: 3. " A member of the Railway Service who, in the opinion of the competent authority is engaged in or is reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities, or is associated with others in subversive activities in such manner as to raise doubts about his reliability, may be compulsorily retired from service, or have his service terminated by the competent....
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....The matter was then referred to the Committee of Advisers, who held an enquiry on September 8,1950, and after hearing the appellant found that the charges against him mentioned in the notice were true. Acting on this report, the General Manager terminated the services of the appellant on April 3, 1951, giving him one month's salary instead of notice. Meantime, on February 3,1951, the appellant had filed the writ petition, out of which Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956 arises, in the High Court of Nagpur challenging the validity of the notice dated July 6, 1950, and the order of suspension following thereon. The order of dismissal dated April 3, 195 1, having been passed during the pendency of this Petition, the appellant had his petition amended by adding a prayer that that order also was bad. The grounds urged in support of the petition were that the Security Rules under which action was taken were in contravention of Arts. 14, 19 (1)(c) and 311 of the Constitution, and that, in consequence, the orders passed in exercise of the powers conferred thereby were void. The respondents resisted the application on the ground that the rules in question were valid, and that the orders pass....
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....e rules, but we declined to hear them on that point, as that was not raised in their petitions. The points for decision in these appeals are: (I) Whether the orders terminating the services of the appellants can be upheld under R. 148 of the Railway Establishment Code; (II)Whether the Security Rules are bad as infringing (a) Art. 14, (b) Art. 19(1)(c) and (c) Art. 311 of the Constitution; (III)Whether the impugned orders are not valid, even according to the Security Rules; and (IV) Whether those orders were not passed by the competent authorities. (1). On the first question, it appears clearly from the record that the authorities purported to take action only under the Security Rules. The notice dated July 6, 1950, was avowedly issued under R. 3 of those rules. It was in the scrupulous observance of the procedure prescribed therein that the explanations of the appellants in answer to the charges were taken, and the matters were referred to the Committee of Advisers for enquiry. And above all, the orders terminating the services of the appellants, in terms, recite that they were made under R. 3 of the rules, as for example, the notice dated April 3, 1951, given to the....
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.... were liable to be discharged in accordance therewith. But this reasoning ignores that under cl. (10) of the service agreement, the Security Rules stand on the same footing as the rules in the Railway Establishment Code and constitute equally with R. 148 the conditions of service on which the appellants held the employment, and there must be convincing reasons why orders passed statedly under R. 3 should be held not to have been passed under that rule. Before us, a different stand was taken by the respondents. They did not dispute that the action was really taken under R. 3 of the Security Rules, but they argued that the power to terminate the service under r. 3 was not something ;different from and independent of the power to discharge, conferred by R. 148, and that an order passed under R. 3 was, on its own terms, one made under R. 148(3). The basis for this contention is the provision in R. 3 that the service may be terminated in accordance with the service agreement, after giving due notice or pay in lieu of such notice. The appellants controvert this position. They contend that the power to terminate the service under the Security Rules is altogether different from the powe....
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.... passed under R. 3 of the Security Rules, without reference to R. 148. That renders it necessary to decide whether the Security Rules are unconstitutional, as contended by the appellants. The first ground that is urged against the validity of the Security Rules is that they are repugnant to Art. 14. It is said that these rules prescribe a special procedure where action is proposed to be taken against persons suspected of subversive activities, and that when the services of an employee are terminated under these rules, the consequence is to stamp him as unreliable and infamous, and there is thus discrimination, such as is hit by Art. 14. It is admitted that if the persons dealt with under these rules form a distinct class having an intelligible differentia which bears a reasonable relation to the purposes of the rules, then there would be no infringement of Art.14. But it is argued that the expression " subversive activities" which forms the basis of the classification is vague and undefined in that even lawful activities could be roped therein, and that such a classification cannot be said to be reasonable. Reference was made to the charges which were served on the appella....
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....nsists that it is, but his elaborate argument amounts to no more than this that the expression " subversive activities " may take in quite a variety of activities, and that its contents are therefore wide. It may be that the connotation of that expression is wide, but that is not to say that it is vague or indefinite. But whatever the position if the words "subversive activities " had stood by them selves, they are sufficiently qualified in the Security Rules to be definite. Those rules have, for their object, the safeguarding of national security as recited in the short title. That is again emphasised in R. 3, which provides that a member of the Railway service is not to be retired or his services terminated unless the authorities are satisfied " that his retention in public service is prejudicial to national security ". In our judgment, the words " subversive activities " in the context of national security are sufficiently precise in their import to sustain a valid classification. We are unable to agree with the opinion expressed in Ananthanarayanan v. Southern Railway (supra) at p. 223 that the language of R. 3 is indefinite, even when read with the words " national security". ....
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....Security Rules for the hearing of the charges does not satisfy the requirements of Art. 311, and that they are, in consequence, void. But Art. 311 has application only when there is an order of dismissal or removal, and the question is whether an order terminating the services of the employees under R. 3 can be said to be an order dismissing or removing them. Now, this Court has held in a series of decisions that it is not every termination of the services of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. 311, and that it is only when the order is by way of punishment that it is one of dismissal or removal under that Article. Vide Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India ([1953] S.C.R. 655), Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 26,), State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi (Civil Appeal No. 182 Of 1955.), and Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1957.). The question as to what would amount to punishment for purposes of Art. 311 was also fully considered in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra). It was therein held that if a person had a right to continue in office either under the service rules or under a ....