TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (1) TMI 863
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....spondents herein filed a Civil Suit before the Senior Sub Judge, Ropar for the relief of (i) declaration to the effect that the orders of their termination/retrenchment from service were illegal and (ii) that they were entitled to reinstatement in service with back-wages. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs-respondents were skilled workers and were working on the Anandpur Sahib Hydel Project (hereinafter called \023the Project\024) in various capacities such as T. Mate, Mixer Operator, Beldar, etc. for more than 5 years and, therefore, as per the Standing Orders and Rules they were regular employees of the defendants. It was alleged that the defendants did not maintain any seniority-list of the workers and various categories of services on the said Project and they arbitrarily removed the plaintiffs-respondents from service on the dates mentioned in Annexure A to the plaint by obtaining their signatures on papers under coercion and force and also forced them to accept payments. It was further alleged that while removing the plaintiffs-respondent, the defendants-appellants did not observe the seniority, meaning thereby while the juniors were retained in service, the seniors were retr....
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....iple of last come first go in making the retrenchments. The Trial Court also relied on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Piara Singh & Ors. V. State of Haryana[1989 PLR 396] and one another judgment, the copy of which was filed Vide Exhibit D-13 wherein the High Court had given directions that the workers so retrenched should be accommodated somewhere-else in some other projects and such appointments in the new projects would be treated as new appointments for the purpose of seniority and that the relief given to such workers would be without prejudice to the retrenchment and any other compensation that such workers would be entitled to under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Relying on these observations, the impugned orders of termination were held illegal. As regards issue regarding tenability of the suit, all that was said by the Trial Court was that the Government Pleader could not point out any defect in the form of the suit except that the plaintiffs had not challenged any specified orders regarding the termination of their services. (That is the only discussion in respect of the tenability). Though it was held that there was no evidence....
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.... 1801) and Piara Singh v. State of Haryana (1989 PLR (1) 396), the Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 7. The matter was taken before the High Court by way of a Second Appeal on various grounds. To begin with the High Court granted stay of the operation of the orders passed by the courts below. However, by the subsequent order, the stay application was dismissed and the said order granted on 20.12.1991 was vacated. This came to be challenged by way of a Special Leave Petition before this Court. In the Special Leave Petition a contention was raised by way of Ground (8) that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the relief of reinstatement in the present case was available only under the Industrial Disputes Act. This Court, however, did not interfere at that stage and directed the High Court to dispose of the Second Appeal as expeditiously as possible. The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal necessitating the present appeal before us. CONTENTIONS 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that since the issues squarely fell within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 an....
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.... If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.\024 10. The second decision came in Jitendra Nath Biswas\022s case (supra), wherein this Court specifically held, interpreting Section 9 of the CPC that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction where its jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. The Court held: \023It could not be disputed that a contract of employment for personal service could not be specifically enforced and it is also clear that except the industrial law, under the law of contract and the civil law, an employee whose services are terminated could not seek the relief of reinstatement with back wages. At best he could seek the relief of damages for breach of contract. The manner in which the relief has been framed by the appellant plaintiff in this case, although he seeks a declaration and injuncti....
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....thereof could only be tried under the machinery and the procedure provided by the Industrial Disputes Act and the civil court\022s jurisdiction was impliedly barred to that extent. The Court while referring to the seven principles culled out by this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [(1968) 3 SCR 662: AIR 1969 SC 78] further explained the decision in Premier Automobile (supra) to hold that not only the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act were barred but the disputes arising out of the sister enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act also stood outside the jurisdiction of the civil court since they did not provide a special forum of their own for enforcement of the rights and liabilities created by them. The Court, therefore, held: \023Thus a dispute involving the enforcement of the rights and liabilities created by the certified standing orders has necessarily got to be adjudicated only in the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act within the meaning of Sections 2(k) and 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the....
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....enchment compensation as also the compensation for notice and that they had duly accepted the order. In the civil suit it was prayed that a decree be passed for declaration to the effect that the orders of termination/retrenchment of their service were null and void and that they should be reinstated with back-wages. A mandatory injunction to that effect was sought for. It was urged before the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not maintained a proper seniority list and that had resulted in the breach of the principle of last come first go and, therefore, their termination was bad in law. In short, the original plaintiffsrespondents had averred the breach of Section 25-G of the Industrial Dispute Act, in that, they had alleged that the employer had shown discriminatory attitude and the plaintiffs-respondents were picked and chosen for being terminated and thus were victimized. On the other hand defence raised was that there were certain cut-off dates fixed for the retention of the employees and all the plaintiffs-respondent had actually joined the service after that cut-off date and, therefore, they were terminated in terms of Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the Certi....
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....urisdiction aspect as is being presently highlighted before us. Same is the story about the First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court. However, it is not as if this issue was not raised altogether. Atleast a notice of this issue was given to the respondents in SLP (C) 11086 of 1992 which was filed on behalf of the appellants to challenge the dismissal of the said application by the High Court. It is very specifically raised therein in Ground No.8, which is reproduced as under: \023Because the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The relief of reinstatement in the present case was available only under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was expressly barred. [(1991) 1 RSJ 770]. The declaration claimed by the plaintiffs in his suit could be granted by the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act and consequential relief was also exclusively outside the jurisdiction of the civil court. The plaintiff respondents are basing their case mainly on the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents could only be adjudicated by the Labour Court. The proposition of law is ....
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.... in para 32 that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. The Court further observed that\024 \023It is well settled and needs no authority that \021where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing\022. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.\024 The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan [(1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340] and quoted therefrom: \023It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction\005strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by co....