TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (7) TMI 774
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....ue under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short "the Act") against the order dated 5.12.2008 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh, Bench 'B', Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in ITA No. 784/Chd./2006, relating to the assessment year 1995-96, claiming the following substantial questions of law:- "(i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the ld. ITAT has erred in law in allowing the appeal of the assessee by holding that four years was the reasonable period to issue show cause under section 201 by the Assessing Officer to assessee though no such limitation was provided in section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961? (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case ....
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....ho vide order dated 22.8.2006 dismissed the appeal. On further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal vide order dated 5.12.2008 allowed the appeal holding that the Assessing Officer was not empowered to issue a show-cause notice after a period of four years from the end of the financial year. Hence, the present appeal by the revenue. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. The Tribunal had adjudicated the issue against the revenue by holding that the order passed by the Assessing Officer under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act was bad being hit by delay and laches. 5. Learned counsel for the revenue submitted that there is no specific provision prescribing any limitation for passing the order under Sections 201(1) ....
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....hat where no period of limitation is prescribed in a statute the same is required to be implied under law in order to be just and reasonable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court repelled the said contention holding that where the legislature has not considered appropriate to prescribe limitation, it could not be read in such a provision. The legal position has been crystallized in the following terms:- "18. Now the Act does not contain any provision prescribing a period of limitation for assessment or recovery of damages. The monies payable into the Fund are for the ultimate benefit of the employees but there is no provision by which the employees can directly recover these amounts. The power of computation and recovery are both vested in the Regi....
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....Industrial Disputes Act, 1974, there is no period of limitation. In that context, it was stated that the Courts could not imply a period of limitation. It was observed: "It seems that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the Court to introduce any such limitation on the grounds of fairness or justice" The above decisions have been recently accepted in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilet 1995 (5) SCC 5(at pp.20-22) to which one of us (Majmudar, J.) was a party while dealing with the applicability of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to Courts or Tribunals. We may also point out in this connection that several High Courts have rightly taken the view that there is no period of limitation for ....
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....e been able to use these monies for his own purposes or for his business. In our opinion, it does not lie in the mouth of such a person to say that by reason of delay in the exercise of powers under section 14B, he has suffered loss. On the other hand, the defaulter has obviously had the benefit of the 'boon of delay' which "is so dear to debtors", as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nagendranath Dev v. Suresh Chandra Dev ILR 60 Cal. 1(PC). In that case, it was observed that equitable considerations were out of place in matters of limitation and the strict grammatical construction alone was the guide. Sir Dinshaw Mulla stated: "Nor in such a case as this is the judgment debtor prejudiced. Be may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which ....