TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1998 (3) TMI 631
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....cuted between the appellant's son. Balaguruswamy and his wife should be excluded from his (the 1st appellant) holding as being 'Stridhana land' of his wife. Within the meaning of the said expression in Section 3(42) of the Act, to the extent permissible under section 5(4) of the Act. The following are the facts: There was a partition deed between the first appellant and his son Balaguruswamy in the year 1959. Under the said document, each of them was allotted certain extent of the joint family property. on the basis that the wife of the first appellant was not allotted any property towards her right to maintenance against the joint family property, another partition deed dated 24.9.1970 was executed between the minor son. the said Balaguruswamy and his mother. i.e. wife of first appellant, Under this document towards the right to maintenance, the said Balaguruswamy allotted acres 36.74 in favour of his mother. At the time of execution of said partition deed dated 24.9.1970. the son Balaguruswamy, being a minor, was represented by his father, the first appellant, as guardian. The land ceiling authorities started proceedings under the Act for computing the admissible ceiling....
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....ed 24.9.1970 executed between the second appellant and her son Balaguruswamy was a valid document, - as it was executed between 25.2.1970 and 2.1.1970 during which period such partitions were permitted by the section 21A. It was argued that if the said partition deed was to be deemed to be valied under section 21A, then it must be held that because of the non-obstante clause in section 21A. The conditions laid down in section 3(42) for treating the land as stridhana land could not apply and therefore it was snot necessary that the eland covered by the partition deed should be 'held' by the female as on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act. Alternatively, it was argued for the appellants that the facts of the case fit into the definition of 'stridhana land' in section 3(42) inasmuch as t he allotment of land to the second appellant on 24.9.1970 by her son was in satisfaction of her right to maintenance under Hindu law, which was in existence even on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act. It must, therefore, be held that she was holding this land even from 15.2.1970 even though such right to maintenance crystalised in to the land on 24.9.1970. On the other ha....
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....hana land in addition to the extent so included: or (ii) less than 10 standard acres. She may hold in addition to t he extent so included an extent of stridhana land. Which together with the extent so included. Shall not exceed 10 standard acres. (b) where the extent of stridhana land held under clause (a) by any female member of a family consisting of more than five members........................ 21-A: Certain partitions and transfers to be valid -- Notwithstanding any thing contained in section 22 or in any other provision of this Act and in any; other law for the time being in force, where, after the date of commencement of this Act but before the notified date. (a) any person has effected by means of a registered instrument a partition of his holding or part thereof: or (b) ............................... (c) ............................... such partition or transfer shall be valid. ................................... the section. In Aswini Kumar Vs. Arabinda Bose [AIR 1952 SC 369] Patanjali Sastri. J observed: "The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously".....
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.... to persons governed by different personal laws - it is permissible to construe the 'definitions' in the light of personal laws. As shown below, unless the 'definitions' in land ceiling laws themselves refer to personal laws, it is not permissible to resort to the personal laws while interpreting 'definitions' in land ceiling laws. it may be that for purposes of computation of t he ceiling area, the land ceiling law may itself refer to t he personal laws or it may be necessary to refer to personal laws but that is different. Under this very Act, Venkataramaiah, J. (as he then was) in M. Ramakrishnan vs. State of Madras [1979 (4) SCC 209] stated that the definition of 'stridhana land' in section 3(42) ' is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu Law. The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by personal laws'. In that case, it was argued that certain land which had devolved on the declarant's wife on 20.4.62 upon death of one Sivagami Achi on the basis of the letter's should be treated as 'stridhana land' of the declarant's wife. Under Section 3(42) as it then stood, such land should have been held by the female as on 6.4.60, which was th....
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.... on 15.2.1970? Even assuming that the right to maintenance of a wife or mother as known to customary Hindu law could be used to construe the definition of 'stridhana land' in section 3(42), the question would be whether the second appellant could be deemed to be 'holding this extent of land on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act in view of the allotment of the land on 24.9.1970 under the partition deed in recognition of such a pre-existing right of maintenance. We have already referred to section 3(19) of the Act which defines the words ' to bold land'. Under that definition, a person is said to hold land if he owns land as owner or possesses or enjoys land as possessory mortgagee or as tenant or as intermediary or in one or more of those capacities. In the context of section 3(42) defining 'stridhana land'. a person can be said to hold the land if she owns as owner or possesses the same with elements of title. The word 'hold' or 'held' in the context of Land has come up for consideration in several cases before this Court. In State of U.P. vs. Sarjoo Devi [1977 (4) SCC 2], while dealing with the said word in section 3(14) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Lan....
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....most similar to the one before us arose under the Maharashtra Agricultural (Ceiling on Holdings) Act. 1961 (as amended in 1975) in Rambhau vs. State of Maharashtra [1995 Supp. (3) SCC 74]. In that case, the tenure holder had two unmarried daughters on the relevant date and he contended that, while calculating the ceiling area of the family, the land ceiling authorities should have taken into account the liability of the family for the maintenance and marriage expenses of these daughters and their share in the land should have been notionally worked out and so much of the area as would have been found sufficient for their maintenance should have been excluded while determining the ceiling area of the tenure holder. This Court rejected the said contention and in that connection reference was made to section 3(3) of the said Act which referred to the initial requirement of a person who is a member of a family to 'hold' a share in the family property which share could, for purpose of computation be notionally worked out, by applying the personal law. It was held that the minor unmarried daughters in a Hindu joint family had basically no right to a share and therefore the question of no....